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Disarmament DocumentationUS Congressional Testimony, February 2002John Gordon, Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, February 14Statement by John A. Gordon, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review, February 14. The central question that I want to address today is: what are the implications of the NPR for nuclear weapons programs? More broadly, what does NNSA need to do to implement the findings and recommendations of the NPR? ... First, the NPR reaffirms that nuclear weapons, for the foreseeable future, will remain a key element of US national security strategy. As a result, NNSA must continue to assure the safety and reliability of the US nuclear stockpile. Our stockpile stewardship program is designed to do just that, and to do so in the absence of nuclear testing. Second, the NPR reaffirms the stockpile refurbishment plan agreed previously between DoD and NNSA, which calls for three warhead refurbishment programs - the W80, the W76 and the B61 - to begin later this decade. As a result, NNSA must press ahead with its efforts to reverse the deterioration of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, restore lost production capabilities, and modernise others in order to be ready to begin those refurbishments on schedule. ... Third, several NNSA initiatives have been endorsed by the NPR, including efforts to:
Role of the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise in Achieving Defense Policy Goals ... Now that the Cold War is over, how can the nuclear weapons enterprise act both to reassure allies, and to dissuade or deter future adversaries? An enterprise focused on sustainment and sized to meet the needs of a smaller nuclear deterrent can provide capabilities to respond to future strategic challenges. A future competitor seeking to gain some nuclear advantage would be forced to conclude that its buildup could not occur more quickly than the US could respond. Alternatively, an ability to innovate and produce small builds of special purpose weapons, characteristic of a smaller but still vital nuclear infrastructure, would act to convince an adversary that it could not expect to negate US nuclear weapons capabilities. The development and subsequent modification of the B61-7 bomb - converting a few of them into B61-11 earth penetrator weapons - is a case in point. Thus, it is not only in-being forces, but the demonstrable capabilities of the defense scientific, technical and manufacturing infrastructure, of which a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure is a key part, including it's ability to sustain and adapt, that provides the United States with the means to respond to new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner. This has served top reassure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries from strategic competition with the US, and underpin credible deterrence in a changing security environment. Supporting the NPR: Capabilities for a Responsive Nuclear Weapons Enterprise ... To date we have been able to certify stockpile safety and reliability without underground nuclear testing, but the capability to do so in the future as the stockpile continues to age remains uncertain. No advanced warhead concept development is underway. Past under-investment in the enterprise - in particular, the production complex - has increased risks and will limit future options. Currently, we cannot build and certify plutonium 'pits' and certain secondary components, much less complete warheads (although we are working hard to re-establish these capabilities). Many facilities are in poor condition - some are unusable - and we have a rapidly aging workforce. ... The nuclear weapons enterprise that we seek must: (10 continue to assure stockpile safety, reliability, and performance, and (2) respond rapidly and decisively to stockpile 'surprise' or to changes in the international security environment. ... Assure Stockpile Safety, Reliability and Performance ... To strengthen weapons assessment and certification, we are seeking fundamental improvement in our understanding of the physics of nuclear explosions, including the effects of aging or remanufacture on weapon system performance. This requires development of new simulation capabilities that use large, high-speed computers and new experimental facilities in areas such as hydrodynamics testing, materials science, and high-energy density physics. ... Respond Rapidly and Decisively to Stockpile 'Surprise' or to Changes in the International Security Environment ... Here we refer to the ability of the enterprise to anticipate innovations by an adversary and to counter them before our deterrent is degraded, and its resilience to unanticipated events or emerging threats - all the while continuing to carry out the day-to-day activities in support of the enduring stockpile. Unanticipated events could include the catastrophic failure of a deployed warhead type. Emerging threats could call for new warhead development, or support to DoD in uploading the responsive force. In any case, there are a number of capabilities and activities that will help us to hedge in an uncertain future including our ability to:
... Specific goals are being established for the following four activities; our progress towards meeting them will be an important measure of the success of our program. Fix stockpile problems: The ability to assess a stockpile problem, once one has been identified, and then design, develop, implement and certify a fix will of course depend on the nature and scope of the problem. For a relatively minor problem, we seek to be able to assess the problem and establish an implementation plan...for the 'fix' within one year, and then to conduct development and production engineering activities leading to initial production...within approximately three years. New warhead design, development and initial production: New or emerging WMD threats from rogue states make it difficult to predict future deterrence requirements. If the US is to have a flexible deterrent, it must be able to adapt its nuclear forces to changing strategic conditions. Adaptation and modernization of forces, including implementation of new technologies, will enable us to continue to achieve deterrence objectives more efficiently even as we move to significantly lower force levels. Our goal is to maintain sufficient R&D and production capability to be able to design, develop, and begin production on the order of five years from a decision to enter full-scale development of a new warhead. To achieve this goal, we must work with DoD to determine and prioritise potential weapons needs over the long term. In certain cases, it may be appropriate to design, develop and produce a small build of prototype weapons both to exercise key capabilities and to serve as a "hedge", to be produced in quantity when deemed necessary. Quantity production of new warheads: While there are no plans to increase the size of the stockpile, we must have flexibility to respond to various scenarios. Our goal is to maintain sufficient production capacity to be able to produce new warheads in sufficient quantities to meet defense requirements without disrupting ongoing refurbishments. In this connection, refurbishment demands starting later in this decade, and continuing until about 2014, are expected to dominate production capacity. If necessary, we would work with DoD to adjust production priorities. Support to DoD in uploading the responsive force: We must assure that NNSA's tasks, such as warhead transportation, tritium support, etc., are not 'long poles in the tent' for upholding the responsive force. That is, they must be carried out on a time scale consonant with DoD's ability to upload these weapons. Sufficient numbers of responsive warheads must be maintained in the active stockpile to ensure that ready warheads are available to meet upload timelines. ... National Commitment and a Multi-Year Plan What do we need to do in order to achieve the capabilities of a modern and flexible nuclear weapons design and production enterprise? ... Modernize Nuclear Weapons Production Capabilities The production complex, which has seen site closures and considerable downsizing since the end of the Cold War, consists of the following 'one of a kind' facilities: the Y-12 Plant (uranium and other components), Pantex Plant (warhead assembly, disassembly, disposal, high explosive components), Kansas City Plant (non-nuclear components), and Savannah River Plant (tritium extraction and handling). In addition, production activities for specific components occur at two national labs: Sandia National Laboratories (neutron generators), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (plutonium/beryllium parts, detonators, tritium targets for neutron generators). ... Regardless of the size of the future nuclear weapons stockpile, substantial work must be completed to get the production complex to the point where it is 'ready' to begin refurbishment work on key systems later this decade. Additionally, new construction projects...are needed to ensure sufficient capacity for planned future-decade stockpile refurbishments. Modernize the R&D and Technology Base ... [I]n addition to modernizing production capabilities, efforts are underway to restore and improve the technical base of the nuclear weapons enterprise and to develop advanced capabilities to meet future requirements. Key needs include:
Implications of the NPR for Key NNSA Missions Next, I describe how specific NNSA missions will be affected by the NPR, and address the 'game plan' for implementation of the NPR initiatives. Stockpile Levels and Readiness Requirements The NPR stated a goal to reduce the operationally-deployed strategic stockpile to 3,800 nuclear warheads by 2007 and 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads by 2012. The force would be based on 14 Trident SSBNs (with 2 SSBNs in overhaul at any time), 500 Minuteman III ICBMS, 76 B-52H bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers. There would also be a non-strategic stockpile whose exact quantities and readiness requirements are still to be determined. Although the NPR did not determine specific stockpile quantities or readiness requirements, it did introduce to the stockpile lexicon the categories operationally-deployed and responsive. Operationally-deployed warheads are warheads fully ready for use and either mated on, or allocated to, operational delivery systems; these warheads are part of the active stockpile. Responsive warheads are warheads available to be uploaded to delivery systems in the event that world events require a more robust deterrent posture; most or all of these warheads would also be part of the active stockpile. Remaining warheads not slated for retirement or dismantlement would be retained in the inactive stockpile, available for use in stockpile evaluation support or as one-for-one reliability replacements for warheads in the operationally deployed or responsive forces. Several factors would determine the nature, size and scope of warheads in this 'other' category including: (1) progress in reestablishing lost production capabilities and infrastructure, (2) response times to fix problems in the stockpile, carry out other required refurbishments to sustain the stockpile, and develop and produce new or modified warheads, and (3) desire to retain a sub-population of non-refurbished warheads to hedge potential common mode failures. Some warheads in this category would, based on future decisions, be retired or eliminated. NNSA and DoD will work together to clarify the NPR 'drawdown' in terms of numbers and types of warheads, by year, to be maintained in the active and inactive stockpiles at various states of readiness. Stockpile Surveillance In the past, if a stockpile problem occurred, there was the flexibility, with larger warhead numbers, to maintain deterrence requirements by reallocating warheads to targets. With the force reductions planned under the NPR, these options diminish. As a result, as we go to lower numbers, we need increased levels of confidence in the safety and reliability of remaining deployed forces. This drives the need for an increasingly robust surveillance program to not only strengthen our ability to detect existing stockpile problems but also to predict and respond to stockpile problems...before they occur. Key efforts planned over the next few years will greatly increase our knowledge of component aging. ... Stockpile Refurbishments: Meeting our Commitments to DoD The NPR reaffirmed the current stockpile refurbishment plan jointly agreed by NNSA and DoD, including the 'block upgrade' concept which provides flexibility to adjust the plan to evolving weapons numbers. The plan calls for all eight warhead types in the enduring stockpile to be refurbished over the next 25 years. Near-term efforts focus on four warheads: the W87 (ICBM), the B61-7/11 (gravity bomb), the W80 (Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM-N)), and the W76 (Trident SLBM).
Revitalization of Nuclear Weapons Advanced Concepts Efforts ... To assess further nuclear weapons modernization options in connection with meeting new or emerging military requirements, NNSA has taken an initiative, endorsed by the NOR, to re-establish small advanced warhead concepts teams at each of the national laboratories and at Headquarters in Washington. DoD and NNSA will jointly review potential requirements for new or modified warheads, and identify opportunities for further study. The vision is for small, focused teams...to assess evolving military requirements, investigate options, and ensure our DoD partners understand what is and is not possible. The teams will carry out theoretical and engineering design work on one or more concepts, including options to modify existing designs or develop new ones. IN some instances, these activities would proceed beyond the 'paper' stage and include a combination of component and subassembly tests and simulations to introduce an appropriate level of rigor to challenge our designers. Importantly, this effort will provide opportunities to train the next generation of nuclear weapon scientists and engineers. ... Warhead Retirement and Dismantlements Although no new retirements or eliminations of warheads were announced in the NPR, DoD and NNSA will jointly address the broad question of the size and character of the active stockpile and inactive stockpile. It will be prudent for NNSA to maintain reserve capacity, in addition to that planned for the near-term refurbishment workload, for warhead eliminations, addressing unforeseen problems in the stockpile, and for possible new production. ... Enhanced Test Readiness President Bush supports a continued moratorium on underground nuclear testing; nothing in the NPR changes that. Over time, we believe that the stewardship program will provide the tools to ensure stockpile safety and reliability without nuclear testing. But there are no guarantees. It is only prudent to continue to hedge for the possibility that we may in the future uncover a safety or reliability problem in a warhead critical to the US nuclear deterrent that could not be fixed without nuclear testing. Based on a 1993 Presidential directive, NNSA currently maintains a capability to conduct an underground nuclear test within 24 to 36 months of a Presidential decision to do so. Test readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship experiments, especially the subcritical experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). During the NPR, two concerns were raised about our test readiness program. First, a two to three year readiness posture may not be sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel retire. Not all techniques and processes required to carry out underground nuclear tests are exercised with the work carried out at the NTS. As experienced personnel retire, it will become more difficult to train new people in these techniques, further degrading test readiness. This argued for an approach in which key capabilities required to conduct nuclear tests are identified and exercised regularly on projects making use of a variety of nuclear test-related skills. Second, the current two to three year posture may be too long. If we believed that a defect uncovered in the stockpile surveillance program, or through new insight gained in R&D efforts, had degraded our confidence in the safety and/or reliability of the W76 warhead - the warhead deployed on Trident submarines and comprising the most substantial part of our strategic deterrent - the ability to conduct a test more quickly might be critically important. To address these concerns, the NPR endorsed the NNSA proposal to enhance test readiness by reducing the lead-time to prepare for and conduct an underground nuclear test. To support this, NNSA has allocated $15 M in FY03 to begin the transition to an enhanced test readiness posture. Funds will be used, among other things, to:
NNSA will work with DoD over coming months to refine test scenarios and evaluate cost/benefit tradeoffs in order to determine, implement, and sustain the optimum test readiness time. Accelerate Planning for a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) Our inability to produce and certify plutonium pits is a shortfall in our stockpile stewardship program. Pit production was terminated at Rocky Flats in 1989 and is now being reestablished on a limited scale at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Only engineering test units of a single warhead type have been produced to date, however, and no 'war reserve' units are expected to enter the stockpile for about seven years. Current plans envision Los Alamos producing about 20 pits per year with a surge capacity to perhaps 50. ... One thing is now certain - the Los Alamos production capacity will be insufficient to meet future requirements for pits. As a result of the NPR, we seek to accelerate planning and initial design work to establish an MPF. Relevant activities about to begin include preliminary MPF design, associated technology development, and initiation of the National Environmental Act process. Tritium While the NPR will result in a smaller active stockpile of both operationally deployed and responsive forces, the nuclear stockpile - by warhead type, by year, and by readiness state - has not yet been determined. This will be done in detail as part of the NWC process and will enable NNSA to plan for the delivery of sufficient tritium to meet all military requirements. Because stockpile reductions will not be accomplished for several years, we do know that there will be no near-term reduction in the immediate demand for tritium. NNSA plans to begin tritium production in commercial reactors in Fall '03, and to complete construction and begin operations of a new Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF) at the Savannah River Site so that tritium can be delivered to the stockpile in advance of need. ... Source: US Senate, http://www.senate.gov/~armedservices/statemnt/2002/Gordon.pdf. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |