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Disarmament DocumentationCongressional Testimony by US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, March 6Statement by US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham to House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, March 6. FY 2003 Funding Request for National Security Programs The Department of Energy, through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), preserves US national security by ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of our nation's nuclear deterrent, working to reduce the global danger from the proliferation of nuclear materials and other weapons of mass destruction, and providing technical expertise in advancing Homeland Security. The FY 2003 budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration is $8.0 billion, a $433 million increase above the FY 2002 funding level. The increase supports the Administration's nuclear defense requirements and the national security needs arising from the September 11 attacks. National Nuclear Security Administration The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is in its third year of implementation. Created by Congress to respond to the changing and complex set of challenges in the national security environment, this year the NNSA takes on a national security role in a way Congress could not have envisioned. The NNSA has actively participated in the President's Strategic Review of deterrence and missile defense policy, the President's review of US non-proliferation programs with Russia, and the comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review. The request supports the recommendations from the Nuclear Posture Review to maintain nuclear weapons capability without underground testing; develop a stockpile surveillance engineering base; refurbish and extend the lives of selected warheads; and maintain a science and technology base needed to support nuclear weapons. This budget protects the operational readiness of the nuclear weapons stockpile through surveillance, experiments and simulations for individual weapons and weapon systems, and investment in advanced scientific and manufacturing capabilities for the future. Reflected within these funds is the Administration's full commitment to a major effort with Russia to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a down payment on that commitment, which fully supports the US policy on bilateral cooperation. Funding also maintains DOE's critical role in providing for homeland security through the Department's expertise in the detection of nuclear materials and the capability to respond to emergencies involving them, as well as capabilities in the detection of chemical and biological threats. The NNSA faces major challenges during the next 5-year period in responding to evolving customer requirements while maintaining and improving the health of the nation's national security enterprise. The expanded focus on international terrorism following the September 11 attacks underscores the importance of maintaining a strong national capability in the science and technology of nuclear security. As a related example, Federal authorities used a benign chemical and biological agent developed at the NNSA's Sandia National Laboratories for the decontamination of anthrax in the Capitol Hill buildings. The FY 2003 budget request for programs within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) totals $8.0 billion, a $433 million increase over the FY 2002 appropriation, and includes:
Weapons Activities One of the statutory missions of the National Nuclear Security Administration is to maintain and enhance the safety, reliability, and performance of the US nuclear weapon stockpile as well as meet national security requirements. The mission is carried out in partnership with the Department of Defense with NNSA providing research, development, and production activities supporting the US nuclear weapons stockpile. The program also supports national assets for the secure transportation of weapons, weapons components, and special nuclear materials, assets to respond to incidents involving nuclear weapons and materials, and weapons safeguards and security, including cyber security. Federal employees provide direction, management, and oversight of about 25,000 contractor employees who carry out program activities at a nationwide complex of government-owned, contractor-operated national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities. The FY 2003 $5.9 billion request for Weapons Activities supports all scheduled alterations, modifications, and limited life component replacements for the current stockpile; and scheduled surveillance evaluation and dismantlement activities. It supports all scheduled refurbishment for the W87, W76, and W80 refurbishments and will include the B61 refurbishment when approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council later this year. Included in the FY 2003 request is support for an advanced concept initiative, a Phase 6.2/6.2A study for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, which also maintains weapons design capabilities. The request continues to support the development of experimental and computational tools, including related facilities and technologies, necessary to support continued certification of refurbished weapons and aging weapons components without underground testing. However, it maintains the ability to conduct underground nuclear testing, if necessary, consistent with the current 24-36 month policy requirement and implements the recommendation from the study as requested by the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to refine test scenarios and evaluate the cost benefit tradeoffs to sustain the optimum test readiness that best supports the New Triad as outlined in the NPR. The request also supports manufacture of a certifiable W88 pit in 2003, and will continue to develop the capability to certify a pit by 2009, with a goal of achieving an earlier date of 2007. Funding provides for an assessment of manufacturing concepts for a Modern Pit Facility while maintaining warm-standby readiness for all infrastructure at all current facilities and sites. The facility and infrastructure recapitalization program restores, rebuilds, and revitalizes the physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. These components fund specific projects to ensure targeted improvements across the complex. The FY 2003 request will support over 60 restoration projects across NNSA's eight sites. Funding included within this budget provides for the continued safe transportation of nuclear warheads, components, and other Departmental materials, and supports Nuclear Weapons Incident Response national assets. This budget request also addresses the highest priority safeguards and security requirements, continues the cyber security program, and continues funding for the National Center for Counter Terrorism in support of national security needs. While the request addresses the critical skill concerns in Management and Operations contractor employment levels, it decreases Federal staffing levels through efficiencies while continuing support for corporate management and oversight of the expanding programs administered by the NNSA. Management savings and efficiencies will continue to be achieved as a result of the implementation of the NNSA organization. Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation As you can well appreciate, our work in Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation is proceeding with an increased sense of urgency. The gross budget request for FY 2003 of $1.2 billion for this set of programs (inclusive of $64 million in use of prior year balances) is the largest ever DOE non-proliferation budget request. It follows $223 million in FY 2002 supplemental appropriations that have helped us accelerate our work in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as speed our efforts with near-term payback in the war on terrorism. The Department of Energy is on the cutting edge of homeland security related technology. We develop advanced technologies that enable us to detect chemical, biological, and nuclear agents. We are accelerating the development of technologies that can be deployed in systems that will protect us in the near term against potential terrorist threats. One of our systems is in place in the Washington, D.C. Metro subway, providing the Metro with tools for early warning and emergency response. Another was at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games. Chemical/biological agents that we developed were used to help rid Capitol Hill of Anthrax. We have requested $283 million for Non-proliferation and Verification R&D to provide for timely, focused, and critical research, development, and engineering. Our Non-Proliferation and International Security request of $93 million will help us address vulnerable stores of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium in Central Asia and Eastern Europe; will develop capabilities to validate warhead dismantlement efforts in Russia; will develop lab-to-lab contracts with Russia to support US counter-terrorism efforts; will provide opportunities for international technical cooperation in a variety of regional security programs; will expand bilateral and multilateral physical protection cooperation to help protect WMD facilities against theft, terrorist attack or sabotage; will provide funding to work with US Customs personnel to enhance export control capabilities for dual use and nuclear technologies; and finally will provide support for work to improve foreign regulatory, legal, and industrial-level export control systems. Our FY 2003 request for $39.3 million for the Russian Transition Initiatives will help us refocus the combined Nuclear Cities Initiative and Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Programs to deal with the problem of adverse migration of WMD expertise from the former Soviet Republics. We have had notable success in negotiating a written commitment from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to end nuclear weapons work at the Avangard plant by the end of 2003, and have also successfully negotiated and signed an access agreement with MINATOM for access to the closed nuclear cities. With funding of $233 million, the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program will compress its schedule to protect nuclear materials storage sites through the placement of comprehensive upgrade contracts and will accelerate material consolidation and conversion efforts. Second Line of Defense efforts will be expanded sharply starting in FY 2002 and into FY 2003. At a funding level of $24 million, this program seeks to help the Russian Federation State Customs Committee deter illicit trafficking of nuclear materials at borders through installation of radiation detection equipment at strategic transit and border sites. We will also be working with the US Customs Service and sharing our nuclear and radiological monitoring experiences to protect our US borders. As my highest priority within the FY 2003 request is funding to accelerate the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. After a comprehensive review of alternatives, a path forward has been formulated that is a workable, technologically possible, and affordable solution that not only addresses the issue of US excess plutonium but paves the way for dealing with excess plutonium in Russia as well. Under the revised strategy, the program will rely on irradiation of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in commercial nuclear reactors to dispose of surplus US weapon-grade plutonium. Since the new approach eliminates immobilization, the bulk of the material previously destined for immobilization will be converted to MOX fuel. The MOX program will cost approximately $3.8 billion over 20 years. This budget includes $350 million for US Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition activities, including $220.4 million to proceed with the MOX-only approach [Note: Inclusive of construction and Operations and Maintenance funding], a $62.4 million increase over the FY 2002 funding level for MOX. The program includes the construction of two key facilities at DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility is scheduled to begin in FY 2004. Within US Fissile Materials Disposition, funding of $105 million, an increase of $49.7 million, provides for substantially increased scope of work in our important HEU disposition activities including the beginning of HEU blend-down activities, TVA off-specification HEU project integration, and LEU/HEU shipment operations. This program recovers the economic value in our HEU declared surplus to our US defense needs by converting this material to LEU fuel for our commercial reactors. The budget request , plus the use of prior year balances, provides $98 million for Russian Plutonium Disposition, which is a $37 million increase over the FY 2002 funding level, to support Russian efforts to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. In the near future, representatives of the National Nuclear Security Administration will engage their Russian counterparts to discuss ways to enhance the Russian program for plutonium disposition. We will also continue the successful Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Program that monitors the conversion of Russian weapons grade uranium into low enriched uranium for use as commercial reactor fuel in the US Through December 2001, we have monitored the conversion and processing of over 141 metric tons of HEU and the delivery of LEU to the US This is equivalent to some 5,600 nuclear devices whose HEU is now permanently converted to peaceful use as fuel to generate electricity in the United States. When I came into office, I began working closely with the White House to review the existing non-proliferation programs with an eye toward enunciating a more effective nuclear non-proliferation agenda. Presidents Bush and Putin further shaped that agenda in their historic meeting in which they reached agreement on a number of national security issues to control the proliferation of nuclear materials. In describing the agreements, President Bush stated, "We're transforming our relationship from one of hostility and suspicion to one based on cooperation and trust, that will enhance opportunities for peace and progress for our citizens and for people all around the world. The challenge of terrorism makes our close cooperation on all issues even more urgent. Russia and America share the same threat and the same resolve. We will fight and defeat terrorist networks wherever they exist. Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction." Shortly after the Bush-Putin meeting, I formalized the expansion of US-Russian efforts to strengthen nuclear material protection with Russian Federation Minister Alexander Rumyantsev. We agreed on the necessity of closer cooperation to enhance the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime, improve measures on nuclear materials physical protection, control and accounting, prevent illegal trafficking, and improve the handling of nuclear and radioactive materials. We also agreed to increase protection of fissile materials to strengthen international security and bolster safety and security in the peaceful use of atomic power. In total, for our crucial non-proliferation programs with Russia, we plan to expend $802 million, an increase of $115 million, or 17 percent above the FY 2002 appropriated level. Source: US Department of Energy, http://www.energy.gov. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |