Disarmament Documentation
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'Very Productive': US-Russia Arms Control Discussions, Geneva,
March 21-22
Russian Foreign Ministry Statement
'On Russian-American talks on START-ABM issues and the
formation of a new strategic relationship between the two
countries', Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document
528-22-03-2002, March 22.
Russia and the United States held a third round of talks on
START-ABM issues and the formation of a new strategic relationship
in Geneva on March 21-22. The Russian delegation was led by Georgy
Mamedov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, and the US delegation by John Bolton, Undersecretary of
State [for Arms Control and International Security]. The
delegations focused mainly on discussing a Russian-American
agreement on subsequent cuts in strategic offensive arms and a
declaration of a new strategic relationship which could be signed
during the May [23-26] visit of US President George W. Bush to
Russia. In the course of the talks the Russian side presented new
proposals on the drafts of the respective agreements, and made
reports on the nuclear doctrine of Russia and the prospects of ABM
cooperation. A rapprochement of the sides' positions on a number of
issues was noted. The sides agreed to hold the next, fourth, round
of strategic talks in Moscow on April 23-24.
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Remarks by Georgy Mamedov
Comments by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov,
Russian television, March 22.
Question: Has it been possible to come up closer to
specific parameters for the reduction of strategic offensive arms
in the talks with the Americans?
Georgy Mamedov: On the whole we are satisfied with the
talks held in Geneva. You know that it was the third round. The
specific numbers had been fixed by the Presidents: 1,700-2,200
warheads in 2012. Under the START I Treaty the sides currently have
approximately 6,000 warheads each. That is, one third as many. Now
we are chiefly discussing the question how to carry out these real
cuts so that they are irreversible and verifiable.
Question: How is the question of measures of control over
reductions being solved?
Georgy Mamedov: Our proposal is: in all respects follow
the START I Treaty, which clearly sets the procedures of control
and destruction and conversion and which will be in force - here
the Americans and we have reached very important agreement - until
the year 2009.
Question: About two months remain before the
Russian-American summit. The Americans are speaking of existing
differences. Still, in your opinion, how realistic is it to prepare
this document by the meeting of the Russian and US Presidents?
Georgy Mamedov: We have succeeded in reducing two texts
to one - this in diplomatic practice is already considered a great
achievement - and did so practically in a month. As you know, the
very important talks of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov took
place in Washington recently, his meeting with the US President,
where he transmitted a letter of Russian President Vladimir Putin,
in which specific proposals are contained as to how to reduce the
differences to a minimum and reach an agreement by May. As you
remember, after this meeting President George W. Bush spoke in
public and said he was looking forward to signing the agreement in
Moscow. We are also quite optimistic about this, although there
still remain two or three questions of principle which need to be
tackled so that the agreement is ready for signing.
Question: What other themes, apart from restraints on
strategic offensive arms, were discussed at your meetings with John
Bolton, US Undersecretary of State? The Americans, for example, are
outspokenly expressing displeasure with cooperation between Russia
and Iran in the nuclear field. Was this theme touched on?
Georgy Mamedov: The theme of Iran was not touched on.
Apart from strategic offensive arms, naturally, we discussed ABM
problems with the Undersecretary of State because both our
Presidents had agreed at the November summit that we were not just
leaving the ABM Treaty behind, but were agreeing on new rules for
cooperation in this area.
Question: Could you describe a little more fully the
bounds of the compromise that Russia is willing to make over the
Americans' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty?
Georgy Mamedov: We are not willing to make a basic
compromise, and that is why the Americans are withdrawing from the
ABM Treaty. Although some critics have accused us of willingness to
make concessions, it is because we have been upholding our national
interests that the Americans are withdrawing unilaterally, not at
all with our blessing. What has to be done now is to minimize the
damage caused by this erroneous US decision, and prevent a new arms
race, including in space, and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, and so we have advanced proposals - they were
transmitted today by Y. N. Baluyevsky, First Deputy Chief of the
General Staff of the Russian Ministry of Defense - how to agree
with the Americans immediately after June 13 [when the US
withdrawal takes effect]. The Americans took our proposals for
study and have counter proposals, and we hope that they will
already find reflection in the Moscow summit documents.
Source: Transcript of Remarks by Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov on ORT's 'Vremya' Program, March
22, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry Transcript, Document
540-23-03-2002, March 23.
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Press Conference by John Bolton
Press Conference by John R. Bolton, US Undersecretary of
State for Arms Control and International Security, Palais des
Nations, Geneva, March 22.
John Bolton: ... I was here today with a delegation from
the American side for the third negotiating session with our
counterparts from the Russian Federation, discussing potential
agreements that might be the subject of the Presidential summit
when President Bush visits Moscow on May 23. Yesterday and today we
discussed two documents, one a draft that we are negotiating on
offensive nuclear weapons, and second, a possible political
declaration discussing the new strategic framework between the
United States and Russia. This third meeting follows the meetings
held in Washington last week when the Russian Minister of Defense,
Sergei Ivanov, met with President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld,
Secretary Powell, and National Security Adviser Rice, and is in
preparation for a meeting of Secretary of State Powell and Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Madrid in early April. Obviously
all of these meetings are in preparation for the May summit.
Basically what we did over the past two days was to consider a
number of the issues that remain unresolved between the Russian and
the American sides on the offensive weapons document and on the
political declaration. We also reached agreement on a number of
more or less technical issues in further preparation for the
ministerial meeting. We covered such things as how to account for
the warheads that are the principal subject of this document. As
you will recall, during the Washington/Crawford summit, President
Bush announced that the United States would make substantial
reductions in its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
from just under 6,000 to a range of between 1,700 to 2,200 over a
ten-year period. President Putin made a similar announcement, and
the purpose of our discussions has been to try to codify those
announcements into a document that would be legally binding and
would survive the administration of the two Presidents. In addition
on the political declaration on the New Strategic Framework, we are
covering the whole range of strategic issues: offensive weapons
questions, defensive systems, non-proliferation,
counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism. There will obviously
be other issues addressed at the May summit, other political
issues, other economic issues, such as Russia's entry into the
World Trade Organization. Those other issues, that is to say the
non-strategic issues, did not play a part in our discussions here.
Those are being discussed by other of our colleagues in the
respective foreign ministries and other agencies. So, that's a
quick summary of what we have covered here over the past two days.
I would say in summary the talks were very productive. I thought we
made progress. We overcame a number of outstanding issues. We still
have a number of issues to resolve, but, as President Bush recently
said in connection with Defense Minister Ivanov's trip to
Washington, he is hopeful that we will be able to have a signing
ceremony in Moscow to codify the reductions in offensive weapons,
and those of us who work in the respective governments, with just
two months to go before that summit, would be working hard to try
carrying out their instructions. ...
Question: I wonder if you could be somewhat more specific
about the areas in which you have made progress and what the
differences are that remain? If you could perhaps also tell us what
the numbers are in term of the cuts you are envisioning and I
believe that the Russians are a little bit concerned that the
United States wants to store the warheads that it plans to cut
instead of destroying them. Was this discussed as well?
John Bolton: The major subject of discussion, of course,
is the reduction of approximately two thirds for the United States,
from a level of about 6,000 warheads to the range of 1,700 to 2,200
operationally deployed warheads. We have had, over the past several
months, extensive discussions on the subject of how to count that
reduction. I know that probably sounds like something fairly minor,
but in the world of arms control, the question of attributing
warheads to various weapon systems versus actually counting the
precise number of operationally deployed warheads can make a big
difference. We've been exchanging information with the Russians
over a several month period to give them a sense of what we mean by
our proposed way of counting for these reductions. I think it is
safe to say now that, although we have not reached agreement on
that question, we have fully explained to their satisfaction what
we have in mind. We have a number of other issues dealing with
transparency and verification questions. We've had extensive
discussions with them about the implications of having the START I
treaty continue in effect, which is certainly our hope for the
remaining life of that treaty. The issue of warheads that remain
after the two countries reach the reduced levels that we are
talking about, has also been the subject of conversation, and in
fact, was one of the principal topics that Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld and Defense Minister Ivanov spoke about in Washington last
week. The precedent in prior arms control agreements, of course, is
that past treaties have not made any mention of what happens to the
warheads that are downloaded. Some go into storage, some are
dismantled, some are used for other purposes. I think that while
there is not complete congruence on this point yet, the parties
have reached an understanding that in order to reach agreement by
the summit in May, we have to focus on the subject that is of most
concern to us, that is to say, the operationally deployed warheads.
That's certainly the direction that we have been urging, and I
think that we are going to continue to urge over the next several
months. But there is not agreement on it yet. ... The purpose of
attempting to reach agreement is to codify in a legally biding
document the reductions in operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons that the two Presidents announced in Washington. On the
part of the United States, President Bush has said that he wants to
reduce operationally deployed warheads to the minimum number
possible consistent with American national security; that's why he
picked the range of 1,700 to 2,200. We would be prepared to do that
whether we are able to reach agreement with the Russian side or
not. But as I say, the hope of the two Presidents is that they can
reach an agreement that would survive their respective
administrations. Speaking on my part I hope that's a long way away.
But, in any event, something would be legally binding beyond the
political declaration.
Question: Could you throw some light on what the Russian
perception is at this point on your draft Nuclear Posture Review?
We hear Russians privately express their concerns in the CD here.
They say that this program, for all practical purposes, starts the
arms race all over again.
John Bolton: I don't know how they can say that, frankly,
when we are talking about a reduction of two-thirds in our
operationally deployed nuclear warheads. I call going from 6,000 to
a range of 1,700 to 2,200 going down, not up. In the conversations
that we've had here, in the conversations we had in Washington last
week, it was my impression that the Russian side understood fully
what the Nuclear Posture review was about and it was a minimal
subject of conversation. They've got one of those in Moscow as
well. In fact one of the things that happened in this meeting was
that General Baluyevskiy, the equivalent of the Vice-Chairman of
their Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave us a briefing on their nuclear
doctrine and on some of their thinking on missile defense. So,
among the professional military and diplomatic personnel involved,
I must say there was not any surprise about it at all.
Question: Do we understand well that this new treaty, if
there is a new treaty, will replace START II which will never enter
into force?
John Bolton: We haven't decided on our part whether there
will be a treaty or some other form of legally binding agreement,
but the intention would be that START I would continue in force.
All of its provisions would continue in force, but because START II
has not entered into force, it would not. In other words, the
documents would be START I and then this agreement.
Question: Have you discussed the problem of the
replacement of the ABM Treaty?
John Bolton: We have had conversations, since the
announcement on December 13 last year by President Bush of our
notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, about a variety of
possible efforts at cooperation and transparency in connection with
the ongoing United States effort to develop a limited ballistic
missile defense system. We have explained to the Russian side at
some length, as we did before our notice of withdrawal, that the
limited national missile defense system we are contemplating was
not aimed at the Russian offensive capability. We've been willing
to provide them with information about what our thinking is, what
our development prospects have been for missile defense, and also
to engage them in cooperative kinds of activities, because in many
respects, the threats that the United States is concerned about
from rogue states - and I'll just name three, North Korea, Iran,
and Iraq - are threats that are likewise faced by Russia, which is
in fact geographically much more proximate to those states than we
are. We are hoping to have some concrete things to announce perhaps
as part of the political declaration that I referred to a moment
ago, when we arrive in Moscow for the summit. Just one little
footnote: one of the things that inhibits our cooperation with the
Russians on Missile defense is of course the ABM Treaty. So until
that treaty expires, we are limited in some of the things we can
do, but it's our hope to show to the Russian side that we are open
and transparent on missile defense and to engage in cooperation in
a way that might be mutually productive.
Question: Could you elaborate a little bit on your
possible cooperation on Missile Defense with the Russians? For
example are you looking for sharing data on early warning systems,
assisting the Russians in improving their radar system, or can you
elaborate on any concrete issues?
John Bolton: I think there are a number of measures that
are under active discussion relating to data exchange that would
allow us to work together to detect missile threats to both of our
countries. There are a series of other things that we might be able
to do in terms of scientific and technological exchanges on the
question of missile defense. As I say, it is still relatively early
in those discussions, although we were joined here, in Geneva - our
prospective delegations between Foreign Minister Mamedov and myself
- by one of the working groups that was set up earlier to discuss
missile defense cooperation. And I think I mentioned a moment ago,
General Baluyevskiy gave us a fairly extensive briefing this
morning which was continuing in the working group on some Russian
thoughts on cooperative mechanisms. Our hope is that by the time of
the summit in May that we will have some practical concrete areas
of cooperation that we can announce. But those are also discussions
that are under way, and I can't be more specific at this point
because they are not advanced enough to be more specific.
Question: Yes, you said that the second document would
try to reach some sort of new strategic framework. Can you outline
what the elements of that framework would cover and any detail on
what you may have agreed on or are close to agreeing?
John Bolton: The New Strategic Framework is a phrase that
President Bush has used to try to characterize our relationship
with Russia in the post-Cold War era, to say that we have obviously
moved beyond the Cold War antipathy between the two countries and
that it is time now, recognizing this new relationship where
neither side considers the other an adversary, to try to reflect
that in our daily bilateral relations. So the New Strategic
Framework really refers to the whole range of issues that we have
been discussing. But specifically, the work that we are doing
focuses on offensive weapons reduction, on missile defense, both of
which I have discussed, on questions of non-proliferation and
counter-proliferation, where we both have a substantial interest in
making sure that weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems do not spread around the world. Counter-terrorism,
particularly since September 11, has been a very fruitful area of
cooperation at several levels between Russia and the United States.
So that is an on-going process. It is not intended to be a fixed
agreement. We are going to reflect the progress that we have made
up until the time of the summit, but I have no doubt that the two
presidents in their conversations will take it even further in the
discussions they will have in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Question: I believe that the United States and Russia are
apart on verification issues: you don't agree on how the warhead
cuts should be verified. Have you been narrowing this down, and can
you tell us what the difference in the two positions is?
John Bolton: Actually, there is a substantial area of
agreement, beginning with the very firm view of both sides that we
will keep the START I inspection verification and compliance
mechanisms in place for the remaining life of that treaty. Both
sides also, over the years of experience with that treaty, have
come up with a number of suggestions that would reduce the
burdensomeness of some of the inspections without reducing in any
way their capacity to provide information. We have got some
additional thoughts that we provided to the Russian side last week
when defense minister Ivanov was in Washington, that are more
particularly tailored to the kind of transparency that we would
like to see as we come down to the lower levels that both sides
have agreed to. There are a number of issues now relating to the
fact that we will be talking about, at least in our view,
operationally deployed warheads, as opposed to the kind of
verification you need under the START I counting rules where
warheads are attributed to particular delivery platforms whether
they are carrying the warheads or not. We don't have at this point
a written response from the Russian side to the document we
presented to them last week, but we did talk about it in the past
couple of days. I think they will be responding to us fairly
quickly. We have a separate working group which is addressing
transparency and verification that we are hopeful will be meeting
again before the next meeting that we have with Deputy Foreign
Minister Mamedov, which we have agreed will be held in Moscow on
April 23 and 24.
Question: With respect to the agreement you are
negotiating, are you discussing a notification period for
withdrawal and if so what is the period being considered?
John Bolton: Almost every arms control treaty, in fact
almost every major international agreement provides for some kind
of withdrawal provision. The ABM Treaty that I mentioned a moment
ago obviously does. In our draft we have included a withdrawal
provision. We had also proposed to the Russians that, short of
actual withdrawal, there might be a mechanism whereby we could give
notice if we felt international geo-strategic circumstances have
changed to a point where the offensive nuclear weapons range might
need to be adjusted, so that we could adjust that range without
actually withdrawing from the treaty. And we have had some
interesting discussions on that. I think it would be fair to say
that we have not reached agreement. But I think that the Russian
side does not have a much different view of the importance of
flexibility for both countries, given the uncertainties that we
face looking into the future. So those are important questions. We
don't have agreement on them yet. In fact, I think it is important
to note that we don't have agreement on anything in particular
until everything is agreed. We say that nothing is agreed until
everything is agreed, but we are making progress on a number of
fronts. That is an issue that although we don't have agreement I
think there is a very clear understanding between the two sides of
what flexibility we are interested in. That is not an issue that is
going to be an insuperable obstacle for us.
Question: Can I just follow up on what you had just said
there? You are saying that you would like a mechanism which would
allow you to change the figures, to raise them, conceivably?
John Bolton: Right. If there were changed circumstances
in the world that might be necessary. It might also be possible,
within the range, for the United States to vary up or down, or both
sides, the way the drafts are written, to go below the range. That
is one of the things that we see as important, and I believe the
Russian side sees as important too, that is, when looking ten years
down the road you are looking into a very uncertain future. While
we are interested in providing for stability between ourselves, it
is less uncertainty about us, than about uncertainty in the world.
I think that is just a prudent way to proceed. And I am encouraged
that I think the Russian side, at least in big picture terms, sees
it the same way we do.
Question: Mr. Bolton, I was wondering if you have any
ballpark figures what it would cost to store an estimated 4,000
nuclear warheads, or...as the Russians wish, to have a lot of them
destroyed? Have you discussed the possibility of technical or
financial assistance to Russia if they do wish to destroy the
weapons systems that you might wish to store? And I understand
there are some concerns by members of Congress on the hazardous
side effects of storing thousands of weapons systems around the
United States.
John Bolton: Well, the question of storage or destruction
is one that we have had discussions with the Russian side about. We
are already providing a substantial amount of assistance, as are
other countries, in terms of cooperative threat reduction programs
and other programs [in] Russia, to reduce the amount of fissile
material that is in warhead form. Part of the subject of storage
versus destruction is a capacity problem. Dismantling a nuclear
warhead is not something you do casually over a weekend. It is an
involved, complicated and dangerous process so that there is a
certain limit that both sides face in the destruction process.
That's one of the reasons why I think we had a very productive
discussion between Secretary Rumsfeld and Defense Minister Ivanov
in understanding why, for purposes of reaching an agreement by the
time of the summit, we should really focus on what the two
presidents have already announced in terms of reduction of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Because once you
get into the subject of storage or destruction, you also have to
get into the question of production and a whole range of other
issues that would make it effectively impossible to reach an
agreement by May and therefore would give a misleading picture of
just how much progress we have made in the relationship on these
issues. So I think those are subjects probably for discussion
later. Our focus would be on reaching an agreement by May on the
operational coordinates. ...
Question: Could I just ask you, does the American
proposal foresee destroying all the warheads that will be made
non-operational, or did you present a figure already to the
Russians showing how many you would like to destroy and how many
you would prefer to store?
John Bolton: Well, we've talked in theoretical terms
about what happens when you come down from the current level of
approximately 6,000 deployed warheads to a range of between 1,700
and 2,200. But I would just say again, bear in mind the precedent
of earlier strategic weapons agreements where the subject of what
happens to the downloaded warheads was just not addressed in the
agreement because of the concern of focusing on what the immediate
issue before the treaty negotiators was. The net [result] of that
is that this agreement - I will predict a little bit ahead to what
I think it will look like - will not be any different from prior
arms control agreements in that respect. And, although we are not
there yet, I don't think that this is going to be an insuperable
issue between the two sides. We'll see. We've got two months to go,
and although it is not a lot of time, we are going to be working to
see if we can't overcome the remaining areas of disagreement.
Question: So, just for my understanding, your side would
like to store all the warheads you are making non-operational, or
you don't plan to destroy any?
John Bolton: Well, we haven't made a decision on what to
do with the warheads that will be downloaded. Some will be stored,
some are spares. We want to have insurance against a problem of
safety or reliability with an entire class of warheads. These are
all questions that the Russians face as well. They have got
thousands of warheads that are in storage now in Russia. The real
issue is whether they are operationally deployed, and whether that
constitutes a threat. And that is really the question we are
focusing on. ...
Question: Sir, how long would it take to make a stored
nuclear warhead operational again?
John Bolton: Well, that is a very hard question to answer
since a warhead that is not actually operationally deployed can be
in various states of dismantling. The answer to your question is,
in some cases a very short time, and in some cases a very long
time. That is one of the reasons why the difficulty of defining the
entire universe of pieces and parts of the nuclear weapons supply
system is so difficult to codify in an agreement, and one of the
reasons that both we and the Russians have focused only on the
issue of most immediate concern.
Source: Transcript - Bolton calls US-Russia arms talks
'very productive', US State Department (Washington File), March
22.
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© 2002 The Acronym Institute.
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