Disarmament Documentation
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UK Green Paper on BWC, April 29
Note: the full text of the Green Paper - 'Strengthening
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat
from Biological Weapons', published on April 29 - is available from
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at http://files.fco.gov.uk/npd/btwc290402.pdf.
Executive Summary
Work has been underway for many years to develop measures to
make the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention more
effective. The failure last year of the States Parties to agree on
the text of a Protocol to the Convention was undoubtedly a
disappointment. Despite this outcome it is still essential to find
ways in which the Convention can be strengthened. This Green Paper
explains why such efforts must continue (the proliferation of BW
capabilities, advances in technology which could be misused and the
terrorist threat). The paper identifies the following possible
measures for consideration:
- investigations into non-compliance with the Convention
(alleged use of BW, misuse of facilities and suspicious outbreaks
of disease).
- assistance in the event, or threat, of use of BW.
- national criminal legislation and extradition
procedures: in those cases where they have not already done so,
States Parties should pass national criminal legislation
translating the prohibitions in the Convention into domestic
law.
- Scientific Advisory Panel: in view of the dramatic pace
of technical change in the life sciences as described here, an open
ended body of government and non-government scientists should meet
every one or two years to review the rate of change and assess
their implications for the Convention and measures being taken to
strengthen it.
- revised Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): existing
CBMs should be revisited to see whether there is scope for
improving and expanding their breadth and scope. Expanded CBMs
might include more detailed voluntary exchanges on the level of
information as well as voluntary visits to be agreed between
participating States Parties to facilities notified under the
existing or revised CBMs, or indeed to any facilities that it was
agreed could be subject to visits, reciprocal or otherwise.
- a new Convention on Physical Protection of dangerous
pathogens: consideration should be given to the feasibility and
desirability of establishing a new international agreement that
would set standards for effective physical protection of dangerous
pathogens held or worked upon in academic, government, industrial
or research laboratories.
- a new Convention on Criminalisation of CBW: there are
already proposals, developed initially in the academic community,
for a Convention that introduces criminal responsibility for any
individual indicted for violating the prohibitions in the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
- increased efforts on disease surveillance, detection and
diagnosis and countering infectious disease generally: this
would be done through existing national and/or international
channels.
- codes of conduct: such codes would be developed by
academic and professional bodies to lay out standards for work
relevant to the prohibitions of the Convention.
- promotion of universal membership of the BTWC.
- withdrawal of reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol:
States Parties to the Convention should be encouraged to withdraw
any existing reservations they made on ratification or accession to
the Convention regarding circumstances under which they reserved
the right to use BW and CW.
The paper discusses UK priorities and the next steps ahead of
the reconvened BTWC Fifth Review Conference and invites comments on
the proposals outlined here and on any other ideas for
strengthening the Convention and seeks views from MPs, NGOs, other
organisations and individuals with an interest in this subject.
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© 2002 The Acronym Institute.
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