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"We didn’t need this treaty": Defense Secretary Rumsfeld Congressional Testimony, May 21

‘Transcript of testimony by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld at Defense Subcommittee of Senate Appropriations, Washington, D.C., May 21, 2002’, US Department of Defense transcript, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020521-secdef.html.

Opening Statement by Secretary Rumsfeld

I thank you for this opportunity to meet on the president’s budget request. ... As you, I am deeply grateful to the outstanding service of the men and women in uniform. It certainly makes all of us determined to make sure that they have everything they need to do their jobs, and I look forward to working with you and the committee to ensure that they are in fact the best-trained, the best-equipped fighting force on the face of the Earth, ready not only for the challenges we face today, but also for the challenges we face in the future - indeed, [the] increasingly deadly challenges in the 21st century. ...

In the course of last year’s defense reviews, we identified six key transformational goals around which we’re focusing our strategy: protecting the homeland and forces overseas; projecting and sustaining power in distant theaters; denying enemy sanctuary; protect US information networks from attack; use information technology to link up US forces so they can fight jointly; and last, to maintain unhindered access to space and protect US space capabilities from enemy attack. The president’s 2003 budget request advances each of those transformational goals by accelerating transformation programs and funding the objectives that I just outlined.

One of the programs the department is pursuing is a revitalized effort to test and develop ballistic missile defenses capable of defending the US, our friends and allies, and our forward-deployed forces from limited ballistic missile attack. On September 11, terrorists took commercial jetliners and turned them into missiles, killing thousands. Let there be no doubt, it is only a matter of time before terrorist states, armed with weapons of mass destruction, develop the capability to deliver those weapons to US cities, giving them the ability to try to hold America hostage to nuclear blackmail. With the power and reach of weapons today, we have little margin for error, and we need defenses that can deter and defend against such attacks. That’s why I’m concerned about the Senate Armed Services Committee’s decision to cut more than $800 million from the president’s request for missile defense. ...

Mr. Chairman, $379 billion is a great deal of money. But if we consider the estimated costs of September 11 attacks to the national economy, they range from about $170 billion to almost $250 billion in lost productivity, sales, jobs, revenues, not to mention the terrible cost in human lives and human suffering. We, as you know well, can’t put a price on defending our country. We have to deter and defend from those who may wish to attack and kill our people. The president’s budget amounts to about 3.3 percent of our gross national product. Compared to the cost in lives and treasure, if we underinvest, it’s a needed and a proper investment in our national security. ...

Questions and Answers

Senator Daniel Inoye (Democrat): ... I’m certain all of us are aware that members of the subcommittee are concerned about the status of systems such as Comanche, the Crusader, the Osprey, the F-22. But on the front pages of every morning paper, and very likely the headlines, speak of this new, massive threat, terrorist threat, against America. From the information you have received, Mr. Secretary, is there anything you can tell us as to the nature or the magnitude of this threat?

Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, I can. First, as to the nature, last year when we were revising our strategy, we moved from a threat-based strategy to a capabilities-based strategy, because it was clear that threats are going to come at us in ways that go for vulnerabilities. That is to say, we’re less likely to be attacked...against our Army or our Navy or our Air Force directly, because it would be expensive for people to try to develop those capabilities, and they serve a great deterrent effect. We’re more likely to be attacked through asymmetrical vulnerabilities - our space assets, cyber-attacks, our dependency on electronics as a...technologically-advanced country... [The likely targets are] things that go for seams in our circumstance as a free people... So we have to expect that the asymmetrical advantage of a terrorist is that he can attack at any time, at any place, using any conceivable technique, and it is physically impossible to defend at every time, in every place, against every conceivable technique. There is no way to do it. The only way to deal with those threats is to go after them where they are. And that’s why the president’s global war on terrorism is based on that principle, that we have to find the global terrorists, anywhere in the world, and we have to stop nations from providing safe haven for them. With respect to the nature of the weapon, there is no question but that we will continue to be surprised in the sense that who would have - if you think about taking one of our airliners filled with our people and using it as a missile, to fly it into the World Trade Center or the Pentagon - that is a new technique of terrorism. We can expect other new techniques of terrorism. The problem I see - and it’s a very serious one - is that there has been a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And the terrorist networks have close linkages with terrorist states, the states that are on the worldwide known terrorist list - Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, North Korea, one or two others. Now, those countries have been developing weapons of mass destruction for some time. They are testing and weaponize chemical and biological weapons. They are aggressively trying to get nuclear weapons. We know that. And I guess the second part of the question you posed as to the magnitude is I think realistically we have to face up to the fact that we live in a world where our margin for error has become quite small. In just facing the facts, we have to recognize that terrorist networks have relationships with terrorist states that have weapons of mass destruction, and that they inevitably are going to get their hands on them, and they would not hesitate one minute in using them. That’s the world we live in. Can we do that? Yes, we can. We can live in that world. We have to rearrange ourselves here at home. We have to rearrange ourselves worldwide. ...

Senator Thad Cochran (Republican): ... As you observed in your testimony, the Senate Armed Services Committee has recommended an $800 million cut in the missile defense programs. Obviously this is going to slow down, or in some areas maybe cancel programs that this administration has been supporting. Particularly I am concerned about theater programs that are now in the process of the last stages of development, and in some cases being fielded to protect troops in the field and assets overseas that are located in areas where there is a very real threat of missile attack. To what extent do you think we should seriously consider trying to restore these funds on the floor of the Senate or in conference with the House?

Rumsfeld: Well, I am certainly hopeful that the funds will be restored. We now have - the ABM Treaty will be behind us in June. We will for the first time be able to go out and test and experiment with the variety of things that had been inhibited by the treaty in prior periods. And we do not have a set of conclusions, but we clearly need to invest the money in theater - of course theater depends on where you live. This is our theater, and if our deployed troops are overseas, that’s a theater as well. And we do need to be able to address all that spectrum of issues with respect to ballistic missiles. You know, these things can be launched from ships at relatively medium distances off our shores. They could be launched from various locations at our friends and allies and deployed forces. The missile technologies are being proliferated around the globe. North Korea has been active helping all of the states, the terrorist states I mentioned earlier, develop their ballistic missile programs. We also have to recognize the risk from cruise missiles. And we - as I said earlier, we have to recognize that that is the kind of thing terrorism, cyber-attacks, the kinds of missiles with weapons of mass destruction that we talked about that our country is at risk from. ...

Senator Dianne Feinstein (Democrat): ... I can’t resist the opportunity, because I’ve written you two letters on the subject and haven’t had a response, and that’s on the nuclear posture review. I viewed with substantial consternation the leak that was carried in the Los Angeles Times that pointed out that certain rogue states were targeted for a first-use of a nuclear weapon, if we didn’t like what they were doing. Now, I can understand that with respect to biological and chemical weapons - perhaps - but China was also added to that list, with respect to any cross-straits military activity. And I would view that as one of the worst things we could possibly ever do in terms of its repercussions across the world. Now, I’m not alone in this. Bruce Blair in his writings points out that here’s America, the world’s juggernaut in military, economic and domestic terms, inducing the rest of the world to emulate US policy and lift the 50-year taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. I am very puzzled by it. I’ve asked you in two letters if I might have a more in-depth response to why this was done at this particular point in time, because I think it is just counterproductive. It says to everybody else, You better start building your supply of nuclear weapons. And if the United States is going to do this, why shouldn’t we countenance doing the same thing. If you could respond, I’d appreciate it.

Rumsfeld: You bet. If we have got two letters from you that haven’t been answered, I’ll get that fixed promptly. I apologize. ... With respect to this subject, the document you are talking about is highly classified. I do not intend to get into details with it. The way you have characterized it is not accurate. That is to say the article that you were referencing your comment off, to the extent it is roughly what you’ve said, is not accurate. The nuclear posture review...does not change the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons one bit. And clearly the thrust of the quotations you were using suggested to the contrary.

Feinstein: Correct. So you are saying that among the states that were mentioned - I think there were seven or so in the Times article that I read - and the addition of China, and the specific reference to a cross-straits military action, would not bring about a nuclear response from us? Is that correct?

Rumsfeld: What I am saying is, number one, it is a highly classified document which I do not talk about in open hearings. Number two, it - nowhere in it does it make judgments about when nuclear weapons would be used. Those are decisions for the president. And, third, the single most significant thing in the nuclear posture review, senator, was the fact that the president made a decision to reduce offensive strategic operationally-deployed nuclear weapons from thousands down to the 1,700 to 2,200 level. That is not something that anyone could characterize, who has an ounce of judgment, as something that is - if the article suggested it - that it’s something that is lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons or sending a signal to other nations that we would not want emulated. ...

Feinstein: Well, I’m not concerned about that part [regarding the reductions] because I know the facts on that part. What I am concerned is this new little twist in there that I had never heard before. And I really, respectfully, am not the only one. I mean, many others have commented, including the Center for Defense Information.

Rumsfeld: Well, I think I’ve said all I can on that classified subject. Thank you.

Feinstein: Well, I would appreciate a response or a classified briefing then, perhaps.

Rumsfeld: Sure. Let [Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Richard] Myers -

General Myers: Senator Feinstein...we have to be careful of how far we go into this whole issue in this forum, but I might just say that the nuclear posture review, in terms of the threshold for use and that issue, the way we put together a so-called ‘new triad’ actually would diminish the need to use nuclear weapons. I think it’s - and that’s the part we need to go into, I think, in another session, or maybe a letter can handle that. But...the kind of work that was done in the nuclear posture review actually makes it a lot less likely that we would ever have to resort to nuclear weapons...

Senator Richard Shelby (Republican): Secretary Rumsfeld, Senator Cochran brought up the cuts in the missile defense program that you’re very aware of and we are all going to be working with you to restore. What some of my concerns were in this area is cuts, yes, but where were these cuts? Some of them were specific to the program. In other words, if you stopped the critical development initiatives in the program, like systems engineering, system integration initiatives and so forth, you’re really going in the back door to kill missile defense, as I see it, and I think that’s what some...people would like to do... I appreciate your comments on that. I know that you’re going to fight to restore those cuts. We’re going to fight with you and I believe we will prevent it at the end of the day - at least I hope so.

Rumsfeld: Senator, thank you. You’re exactly right. Not only were the funds reduced, but the funds were reduced in a micro way... [O]ur efforts to have a broad based research and development program across a range of possibilities, and they are particularly harmful because not only of the total amount, which is significant in and of itself, but the way that it’s been done. ...

Senator Pete Domenici (Republican): I want to talk a little bit here about a memo that was circulated to senior Pentagon officials suggesting that the United States may be too reliant on space systems. I understand - I know that you’ve been a strong proponent of leveraging our advantage in space for military purposes, and I too have supported research being conducted at places like the Sandia Space Vehicle Directorate at Kirkland Air Force Base next to Sandia Laboratories in Albuquerque. Could you elaborate as to why you have raised this concern about our over-reliance on space? And has that concern been prompted by operations in Afghanistan?

Rumsfeld: Well, I don’t know what memo you’re referring to. Is it a memo that has my name on it?

Domenici: Yes.

Rumsfeld: Uh-huh. The concern that has been discussed - and I’d like to have General Myers comment as well; he used to head up the Space Command, as you know - the concern that exists is we have a wonderful advantage because of our space assets, and they began back in the Eisenhower era and they’ve contributed a great deal to our ability to do what we do. A great many of those assets are not hardened. And therefore, one has to ask the question, "If you have that potential vulnerability, how do you manage that?" And one of the things you can do is to harden them. The other thing you can do is to have certain types of redundancies and to see that you’re getting what you need from multiple sources rather than single sources. ...

Myers: Once I got to Space Command and had been there just a little bit of time, it really did become apparent that the wonderful advantage we acquire from having preeminent space systems can also be an Achilles heel if we don’t watch it. And I think the secretary is absolutely right. We often don’t even know if our systems are under attack. If you go back to - it was a commercial satellite five or six years ago that failed, and people’s pagers didn’t work; doctors couldn’t get to work; bank transactions couldn’t be made; you couldn’t swipe your card in a service station and expect to pay for the gasoline because it wouldn’t transmit through this one satellite. The frustrating thing to me was that until you investigate, you don’t know what the situation is. Are you under attack? Did you have a malfunction? What is it that’s causing this problem? ... If you look at our communications satellites, without going into a lot of detail in open hearing, they’re fairly vulnerable. Global position system satellites, that signal is a very, very weak signal, and vulnerable as well. And on and on you go on our space systems. And I don’t think anybody is proposing that we don’t need these space systems. We just need to take the steps to make sure that we know what’s happening to them when they’re on orbit, that we know the difference between malfunctions and attacks; that we will, if you will, the term "harden," as the secretary used, if we harden them, make sure they have the ability to tell us what’s happening so we can analyze it properly and take corrective action. ...

Senator Herbert Kohl (Democrat): President Bush will sign an arms control agreement very soon with Russia that will reduce our deployed strategic nuclear arsenal from roughly 6,000 weapons to between 1,700 and 2,000. The agreement does not call for destruction of the 4,000 or so weapons. Instead, the president intends to keep these weapons in storage. Clearly 1,700 to 2,000 strategic nuclear weapons are more than enough to deter any would-be adversary. The question I’m asking you is whether you envision any scenario that would require 6,000 strategic nuclear weapons. And after that, the question is, so why don’t we destroy those 4,000 or so instead of putting them in storage?

Rumsfeld: Yes, sir, Senator Kohl. Technically, the treaty that’s going to be signed is 1,700 to 2,200, as opposed to 2,000. ... And I think that the important thing that came out of the nuclear posture review was the dramatic downsizing of our offensive operationally-deployed strategic nuclear weapons that the president has proposed and that we are in the process of getting on that trajectory now with the decisions made with respect to Peacekeeper, for example, as well as some [Trident] submarines. What will actually happen to the warheads is an open question. Some will undoubtedly be destroyed. Some will replace warheads on other strategic nuclear weapons that we intend to maintain the fleet. Still others will be stockpiled for safety and reliability problems. One of the nightmares in this business is that the phone will ring and we’ll be told that a whole class of our weapons are no longer safe or reliable, for whatever reason. As you know, they’re looked at and checked from time to time, and the Department of Energy has that responsibility. And to the extent that we get that call - and it happens from time to time that some class of weapon is under question - then we would need to replace that class of weapons with some other weapons. And so it’s perfectly appropriate to have additional weapons. If you think about it, time and money can change the number of weapons you have. Russia today has an open production line for nuclear weapons. We do not. It would take us years to start up our ability to make nuclear weapons, warheads. Therefore, having additional weapons, to be able to use them in the event of a problem with safety or reliability, it would be mindless not to. It would be inexcusable for us to destroy all those weapons and not have them as a backup in the event they’re needed. The other issue that you didn’t mention, which is something that is important to me, and I know to the president, is the theater nuclear weapon issue... And the Russians have many thousands, multiples of the numbers we do. They also have a long queue of nuclear weapons that have not yet been destroyed. And they also have a lot of piece parts that could be reassembled, conceivably. So the problem of what we do with those is an important one, as you have suggested. But I think what’s even more important is the draw-down...to 1,700 to 2,200.

Kohl: I’d be very concerned about the other side not destroying, even more so than ourselves.

Rumsfeld: I wouldn’t put it that way. I would put it that we’re worried about their management of their nuclear weapons and the security of them...and the risk that they could get loose and be available to people who we would prefer not to have them. ... Quite honestly, it does not make a lot of difference whether they destroy them or not. If one’s worried about what they might do with them, it is more an issue, as you suggested, of the security of them. I mean, I would expect that they would have the same interest in keeping some for safety and reliability as we would, for example.

Kohl: Some minimum amount on both sides. But aren’t we, and haven’t we been for some time, concerned about the security?

Rumsfeld: You bet.

Kohl: And to the extent that nuclear weapons are stored and not destroyed, then that concern about security is there, isn’t it?

Rumsfeld: Absolutely. I’m not worried about the security of our weapons, sir.

Kohl: I agree with you. But in order for them to destroy their weapons, they would, what, need that agreement on our side?

Rumsfeld: Oh, I don’t think so. We didn’t need this treaty, in a sense. I mean, the president announced he was going to go down to 1,700 to 2,000, regardless of what the Russians did. And then Mr. Putin announced that he was going to do that. The agreement is useful, I suppose. But we were going to do what we were going to do, regardless. And [I’ve talked about] the problem with the issue of destroying those weapons... A second problem is this. There isn’t any way on earth to verify what people are doing with those weapons. To get that kind of transparency or predictability into what they’re doing, you would have to know what their production rates are, how fast they could increase their production rates and make new weapons - if you’re worried about how many weapons they had, the extent to which they could take tactical nuclear weapons, theater weapons, and reform them into strategic offensive nuclear weapons, the extent to which they could take piece parts and reassemble them into offensive nuclear weapons. So there are so many things one would have to look at, that the idea that you could verify it - we couldn’t verify it. Now, in our country, everyone knows what we do. Goodness, gracious, there isn’t anything that the General or I even think that doesn’t end up in the newspaper five minutes later. But everything we do is transparent. And when we destroy weapons, everyone in the world knows it. When we don’t destroy weapons, everyone in the world knows it. That’s not true in Russia. It’s not true even today. We don’t have a good grip on how many theater nuclear weapons they have. We don’t have a good grip on what their production rates are for nuclear weapons in a given year. So I think this understanding, which has been turned into a treaty, is a good thing. I think that the country is doing the right thing in attempting to turn Russia towards the West and take steps which will reassure them that we, in fact, intend to do this so that they can reassure those in their country who are doubting. And there are some people in their military who doubt these things and wonder if this turning West by Russia is really going to be the right thing for Russia or the permanent thing for Russia. And if a treaty helps in that regard, I’m all for it.

Kohl: I quite agree with you. And I also believe that it’s an excellent agreement. I would like to hope that as time moves on, we can move from stored nuclear weapons on both sides to destroyed nuclear weapons on both sides. I think you might agree with that. ...

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