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Senator Biden Comment on Moscow Treaty, May 28

'Beyond the Moscow Treaty', by Democratic Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, The Washington Post, May 28.

The Moscow treaty signed Friday by presidents Bush and Putin is an important step forward for US-Russian relations and toward a more secure world. Cutting the number of each country's strategic nuclear warheads from about 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 moves us away from preparing to obliterate each other. President Bush should be applauded for his leadership on this issue, his partnership with President Putin and his willingness to codify the agreement in a binding treaty.

But while the treaty as a whole is a step forward, some of its specifics risk moving us backward.

The treaty does not require the actual destruction of a single missile or warhead. Rather, each country may warehouse its weapons and redeploy them later. Unfortunately, persistent security shortcomings in Russia mean that warheads in storage are more likely to fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorists than if they remained attached to missiles. The treaty allows Russia to place multiple warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), contrary to long-standing US arms control goals. Multiple-warhead ICBMs are a cheap way to maximize Russia's forces, but they are vulnerable because an attacker can destroy many warheads with only one or two of its own. Russia is therefore likely to keep those missiles on hair-trigger alert, increasing the risk of accidental war.

The treaty sets no schedule for reductions and provides no new tools to verify each side's compliance. Russia cannot afford to maintain its strategic forces. Without US transparency, however, a weakened Russia could fear a US attack and keep a nervous finger on its remaining launch buttons. Nor does the treaty say how each country's strategic nuclear warheads should be counted. This omission could lead to acrimonious compliance disputes.

Can America move beyond the Moscow treaty? I believe that we can and must. Here are some steps that the president can take and that the Senate can consider during the ratification process:

(1) Keep only the weapons we really need. Maintaining excessive US nuclear forces is wasteful and would increase Russian anxiety, potentially increasing the risk of accidental war.

(2) Institute confidence-building measures that enable Russia to verify US compliance with the treaty. We don't want a nervous Russia thinking we have more warheads than we have. Let's make sure that we are transparent.

(3) Offer Russia more Nunn-Lugar assistance to dismantle its excess weapons and nonproliferation assistance to safeguard or demilitarize its excess warheads. We don't want Russia to maintain excess weapons or warheads. And we do want Russia to keep the weapons it maintains out of the wrong hands.

(4) Get a better handle on Russia's tactical nuclear weapons. The Moscow treaty does not deal with these short-range systems. Russia maintains thousands more of them than we do, and there is justifiable concern about how well the Russian weapons are protected against theft or unauthorized use. It's time for increased transparency and a limited, but real, arms-control agreement on tactical nuclear weapons.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will convene hearings on the treaty promptly upon its submission. President Bush has given us a good start, and in addressing the issues above, we should move beyond Moscow to fulfill the promise of a more secure future.

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