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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation, June 2002 The War Against Terrorism: UK Foreign Affairs Committee Report, June 19'Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism', UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), Seventh Report (Session 2001-2002), unanimously agreed by the Committee on June 19; FAC website, http://www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/fachome.htm.
Note: on June 19, Committee Chair Donald Anderson MP (Labour) issued a statement summarising the main findings of the report - "In this first interim Report of our continuing Inquiry intoForeign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, the Foreign Affairs Committee considers the attacks of 11 September and the subsequent actions of the international coalition against al Qaeda and its supporters. It now appears that important indications in Summer 2001 that an attack might be imminent were not acted upon. I note with interest that our Parliamentary colleagues on the Intelligence and Security Committee, who enjoy a degree of access to the security agencies which is denied to the rest of us, have concluded likewise. It is imperative that the official agencies tasked with gathering and assessing intelligence on possible terrorist threats have the human, financial and other resources they require to protect the United Kingdom and its posts and facilities overseas. While the 11 September attacks were carried out using civilian aircraft, future attacks might involve other means of delivery and, more importantly, the use of weapons of mass destruction. Countering this threat at national and international levels must be given the highest priority. Different strategies may be required to meet different circumstances. Relations with Iran should be based on critical engagement, not on confrontation; but Iraq should be given a deadline to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions. However, any military action against Iraq must conform with international law. It is not clear how some proposed actions - such as imposed regime change, and the use of pre-emptive military strikes - would satisfy this requirement. The Committee commends the Government on a number of aspects of its handling of the situation post-11th September. In particular, we welcome the decision to publish at an early stage information on the campaign objectives and on responsibility for terrorist atrocities, before taking military action. This approach should be followed before any further action is taken, whether against Iraq or elsewhere. At each stage of this war, the Government has to get public and Parliamentary opinion on side before it proceeds. The continuing Middle East conflict is a factor which severely complicates prosecution of the campaign against al Qaeda and its sympathisers, adding even greater urgency to the need for a settlement in the region. The war against terrorism must be accompanied by efforts to deal with the causes of Islamic extremism and of discontent among Islamic peoples. Only by tackling those causes will support for al Qaeda be reduced and the terrorists exposed for what they are - evil men waging a vicious war, which lacks any moral justification." I. Conclusions and Recommendations(x) We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government state clearly what is its policy on first use of nuclear weapons, with particular reference to dealing with the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (paragraph 171). (y) We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out its policy on the development of new tactical nuclear weapons (paragraph 173). (z) We conclude that the Government was right to highlight in grave but measured terms the threat of weapons of mass destruction attack by terrorists, including the threat to the United Kingdom (paragraph 176). (aa) We recommend that the Government continue to urge the international community to do its utmost to prevent nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials getting into the hands of terrorists (paragraph 181). (bb) We recommend that the Government do its utmost to ensure that the new director of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is able to act independently, and for the benefit of all member states of the Organisation (paragraph 185). (cc) We commend the Government for publishing its Green Paper on strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and recommend that it continue its efforts to persuade the United States to agree an effective verification regime (paragraph 189). (dd) We recommend that the FCO set out clearly and fully in its response to this Report its specific responsibilities for preventing weapons of mass destruction attacks against the United Kingdom, its citizens and its interests overseas (paragraph 190). (ee) Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) and the Secret Intelligence Service are agencies for which the FCO is responsible. We recommend that the FCO, through these agencies, ensure that the highest priority is given to identification and prevention of attack on the United Kingdom or on British interests overseas by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (paragraph 191). (ff) We conclude that the Government is right to maintain its constructive and - whenever necessary - critical engagement with Iran (paragraph 201). (gg) We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government clarify whether its policy is to bring about ' regime change' in Iraq (paragraph 209). (hh) We recommend that the Government propose a deadline for Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions requiring Iraq to allow inspection of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes (paragraph 212). (ii) The Committee recommends that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its response to this report sets out the British Government's view as to the circumstances in which a pre-emptive military strike would be legally justified (paragraph 224). (jj) We recommend that the Government work with the United States to ensure that any action taken against Iraq, or against any other state in the war against terrorism, conforms with international law (paragraph 227). (kk) We recommend that the Government follow the precedent which it set in the period leading up to military action in Afghanistan, and publish the fullest possible documentation on the need for any further military action, before such action is seriously contemplated. While nothing should be published which might compromise sources or methods of intelligence, the Government must try to secure the widest possible support in Parliament and among the British people if it is proposing to risk the lives of British servicemen and women as part of a further phase of the war against terrorism (paragraph 233). II. Terrorism, Nuclear Weapons Policy and WMD Arms ControlThe United States' Nuclear Posture Review168. In early March 2002, the Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review statement was leaked. The Los Angeles Times reported that the "Bush administration has directed the military to prepare contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries and to build new smaller nuclear weapons for use in certain battlefield situations, according to a classified Pentagon report. The secret report, which was provided to Congress on Jan. 8, says the Pentagon needs to be prepared to use nuclear weapons against China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Libya. It says the weapons could be used in three types of situations: against targets able to withstand nuclear attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons; or "in the event of surprising military developments." 169. In a news release, the Pentagon stated that it "would not comment on selective and misleading leaks;" the Nuclear Posture Review is "required by law" and is "a wide-ranging analysis of the requirements for deterrence in the 21st century." In a press conference on 11 March, Vice President Dick Cheney described the Nuclear Posture Review statement as "a regular report to the Congress on the overall state of our capabilities and gives some idea of the directions we would like to move in in the future - the notion that I have seen reported in the press that somehow this means we are preparing pre-emptive nuclear strikes against 7 countries I believe was a bit over the top." The US Embassy in London told us that "The Department of Defense continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the United States and its allies." 170. The Government's position on first-use of nuclear weapons is set out in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review: "Britain has repeatedly made it clear that we will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State not in material breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, unless it attacks us, our Allies or a State to which we have a security commitment, in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State." 171. The question then arises, whether the US or the United Kingdom would countenance using nuclear weapons first against a non-nuclear state in possession of - or harbouring terrorists in possession of - not just nuclear weapons but any weapon of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical or biological. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government state clearly what is its policy on first use of nuclear weapons, with particular reference to dealing with the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. Tactical Nuclear Weapons172. The destruction of deep cave complexes, such as those apparently used by al Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan as troop shelters, arms dumps or as factories for the production of chemical or biological weapons, requires the deployment of huge force. In March, there were reports that the US was considering development of a new generation of "bunker buster bombs". These would be tactical nuclear weapons, for use on the battlefield, rather than long-range strategic nuclear weapons, possession of which is limited by international treaty. 173. The development of a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons in response to the terrorist threat would have implications for arms control policy and would have to be conducted in such a way as to comply with existing treaty obligations, for example under the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out its policy on the development of new tactical nuclear weapons. Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism174. The Government has been clear from the beginning of the campaign that preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is part of the war against terrorism. In October 2001, the Government stated that its "wider campaign" objectives would be pursued through "renewed efforts to bear down on Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation." It also noted that the United Kingdom could be a target of terrorist attack. The Prime Minister had earlier said that "we know that [the terrorists] would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction." 175. George Tenet, the director of the CIA, stated in March 2002 that terrorist groups worldwide "have already access to information on chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons via the Internet, and we know that al Qaeda was working to acquire some of the most dangerous chemical agents and toxins. Documents recovered from al Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan show that bin Laden was pursuing a sophisticated biological weapons research programme." 176. We share the British and US governments' concern about the threat of WMD falling into terrorists' hands. Our predecessor Committee, in its Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction, stated that "the possibility that a terrorist organisation might obtain possession of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon is a matter of the utmost concern [and] has horrific potential" and was told by the FCO that "one hundred kilograms of anthrax released from the top of a tall building in a densely populated area could kill up to three million people." The attacks of 11 September highlighted the crucial importance of strengthening international controls over the nuclear, chemical and biological materials that could be used to create weapons of mass destruction. We conclude that the Government was right to highlight in grave but measured terms the threat of weapons of mass destruction attack by terrorists, including the threat to the United Kingdom. [WMD Terrorism and] Nuclear Weapons177. The House of Commons Defence Committee has cited evidence that, although terrorist organisations are unlikely to have obtained the technology to launch nuclear explosions, they may have been trying to obtain radiological materials which, when combined with conventional explosives, can produce radiological contamination. In his evidence to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 19 March 2002, the Director of the CIA also said that al Qaeda "may be pursuing a radioactive dispersal device-what some call a 'dirty bomb.'" He went on to state that "we are concerned about the possibility of significant nuclear technology transfers going undetected." 178. Our predecessor Committee noted the problems associated with proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, and non-compliance with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. North Korea and Iraq remain potential sources of nuclear materials for terrorists, as do black markets in Pakistan and China. The Russian Government's degree of control over nuclear materials also gives cause for concern. According to the CIA director, "Russian entities continue to provide other countries with technology and expertise applicable to CW, BW, nuclear and ballistic and cruise missile projects. Russia appears to be the first choice of proliferant states seeking the most advanced technology and training." The fear is that these materials may also become available to terrorists. 179. Mr Stephen Wright, Director of Security Policy, FCO, told us on 20 November that before and since 11 September the FCO had been "in touch with the Russian authorities about risks of terrorism in the WMD field... [to] discuss with them (within the limits of state security that they impose and we impose) the safety of nuclear materials in Russia... since 11 September those discussions and the degree of frankness has somewhat improved because there is no doubt about the political commitment of the Russian government to combatting these threats." Despite the "enhancement of political commitment," Mr Wright told us that the problems of controlling weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from Russia and other sources remain extremely "difficult to get at." 180. In our Report on British-US Relations, we noted "the crucial importance of co-operative threat reduction programmes in preventing further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" and recommended that "in view of the US Administration's proposal to cut the Department of Energy's funding for Co-operative Threat Reduction programmes, ... the Government continues to stress to the US the utmost importance it attaches to such programmes and reports to the Committee on progress to establish an international financing plan for them." This recommendation remains of central importance in the war against terrorism and we have therefore requested further information from the Government on CTR and related programmes, which we will report to the House. 181. We recommend that the Government continue to urge the international community to do its utmost to prevent nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials getting into the hands of terrorists. 182. We also welcome the agreement of the new NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which was signed on 28 May 2002 in Rome. We hope that the NRC will ensure even greater co-operation between Russian authorities and NATO members towards controlling the leakage of nuclear materials. [WMD Terrorism and] Chemical Weapons183. The House of Commons Defence Committee heard evidence on the dangers of terrorists obtaining chemical weapons materials, and this is detailed in their recent Report to the House. The US CIA director also gave evidence before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on the threat from chemical weapons in March 2002, in which he argued that China's export of CW-related materials to Iran was a particular source of concern. 184. In addition to the Defence Committee's conclusions, we note the important role played by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in monitoring and helping states to destroy CW stockpiles. According to NATO, the world's declared stockpiles of 70,000 tonnes of chemical weapons and more than 8 million munitions have been inspected by OPCW inspectors, and the four countries that have declared possession of chemical weapons are all actively engaged in their destruction, although one of them - Russia - has encountered problems caused by limited funding for CW destruction programmes. 185. The OPCW has also faced difficulties recently because of the removal of its director, José Bustani. We merely note here the importance of the OPCW for the international control of chemical weapons. We recommend that the Government do its utmost to ensure that the new director of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is able to act independently, and for the benefit of all member states of the Organisation. [WMD Terrorism and] Biological Weapons186. The threat from bio-terrorism was highlighted on 12 October 2001, when the first of a series of incidents of anthrax contamination was reported in the United States. These incidents, in which anthrax spores were packed into envelopes and delivered by the postal service, continued throughout October and November. By 14 November, twenty two cases of bio-terrorism anthrax had been identified by US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. These attacks prompted speculation that the next phase of the terrorist attacks would be through the large scale use of biological agents. 187. Fortunately, the spate of anthrax attacks that took place in the United States at the end of 2001 appears to have ceased. Yet the threat of biological weapons attack remains severe, as evidenced by the Government's sensible precaution of acquiring large stocks of smallpox vaccine. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which bans the development, testing, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, came into force in 1975. However, there are currently no agreed procedures to verify compliance with the Convention, and this accounts for the weakness of international controls over biological agents. The United Kingdom has played a leading role in negotiations among an ad hoc group of states, which has met twenty three times since 1995 to strengthen the BTWC through inclusion of a legally-binding verification protocol. 188. In our Report on British-US Relations, we noted the United States' rejection in July 2001 of the draft BTW verification protocol. This rejection led to suspension of the Ad Hoc Group's negotiations for 2001. The process was not seen as viable without the engagement of the United States. 189. We have previously encouraged the Government to bring the United States back to negotiations towards an international BWC verification protocol. We therefore welcome publication by the FCO on 29 April 2002 of a Green Paper on strengthening the Convention. It is our intention to hear evidence on the Green Paper later this year. Meanwhile, we restate the conclusion from our Report on British-US Relations, that the only way to establish whether states are developing biological and toxin weapons is to establish a mandatory, on the ground challenge inspection system to verify compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Improving states' control of biological and toxin agents is a necessary component of international co-operation to ensure that they do not fall into the hands of terrorists. We commend the Government for publishing its Green Paper on strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and recommend that it continue its efforts to persuade the United States to agree an effective verification regime. WMD and Terrorism: Conclusions190. The Ministry of Defence Document Defending against the threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, published in July 1999, states that "the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office hold the responsibility for co-ordinating the response to the terrorist threat to the UK itself and our interests overseas respectively." We recommend that the FCO set out clearly and fully in its response to this Report its specific responsibilities for preventing weapons of mass destruction attacks against the United Kingdom, its citizens and its interests overseas. 191. Terrorist groups are unlikely to advertise their attempts to possess or to develop weapons of mass destruction, but information on their intentions may nonetheless be gathered by good intelligence work. Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) and the Secret Intelligence Service are agencies for which the FCO is responsible. We recommend that the FCO, through these agencies, ensure that the highest priority is given to identification and prevention of attack on the United Kingdom or on British interests overseas by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. III. Military and Diplomatic Strategy & the 'Axis of Evil'The Bush Doctrine and the 'Axis of Evil'192. The "Bush Doctrine" has been gradually extended since 11 September. First, President Bush had sworn to go after terrorists. Then he had sworn to go after states which sponsor terrorism or harbour terrorists. By the beginning of 2002, he was pledging to include in his war against terrorism those states which possess weapons of mass destruction which might fall into the hands of terrorists. In the State of the Union address on 29 January, he set out his "two great objectives": "First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world." 193. In his State of the Union address, President Bush described North Korea, Iran and Iraq "and their terrorist allies" as an "axis of evil" which poses a "grave and growing danger... In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic." The "axis" states were clearly linked in the speech to terrorism, and Bush went on to declare that the US would "work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction." In May, Under Secretary of State John Bolton named Libya, Syria and Cuba as further states "beyond the axis of evil," against which the United States was prepared to take action if necessary. International Coalition Reactions to the 'Axis of Evil' Speech194. The President's State of the Union address exposed disagreements in the international coalition against terrorism, which until that point had displayed remarkable unanimity of purpose. One of the most vociferous critics of the "axis of evil" notion was European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, who described the President's speech as "absolutist and simplistic." Other European leaders expressed similar concerns. The French Foreign Minister described the "axis of evil" notion as "simplistic," and the German Deputy Foreign Minister stated that diplomatic rather than military means should be employed to deal with Iraq's WMD. 195. The Foreign Secretary commented after President Bush's speech that the "axis of evil" was more of a vote-winning tactic in forthcoming US elections than a military strategy. Speaking after talks with US Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Mr Straw said President Bush's comments were "best understood by the fact that there are mid-term congressional elections coming up in November." However, Condoleezza Rice said: "This is not about American politics, and I assume that when the British government speaks about foreign policy, it's not about British politics." 196. A different emphasis came from the Prime Minister, who in his speech during the Crawford summit with President Bush said that "where countries are engaged in the terror or WMD business, we should not shirk from confronting them. Some can be offered a way out, a route to respectability. I hope in time that Syria, Iran and even North Korea can accept the need to change their relations dramatically with the outside world. A new relationship is on offer. But they must know that sponsoring terrorism or WMD is not acceptable." 197. Where there was criticism of the President's speech, it focused on two areas of difference. Firstly, there was some concern about the effects that the speech would have on the policies of the countries mentioned as being part of the "axis". A number of EU members expressed concern that this notion would weaken reformers in Iran. The European Union has been engaging with regimes there and in North Korea in an attempt to promote gradual liberalization. There was also concern that these countries would be less likely, after the State of the Union address, to co-operate in the global campaign against terrorism. 198. We now consider two of the countries named by President Bush as members of the "axis of evil": Iran, and Iraq. Iran199. We heard in Washington in March that the response of democratic forces in Iran to the State of the Union address had been positive. According to those to whom we spoke, the compromise policies of the European Union are perceived to appease those in the existing government who are not genuinely committed to reform. However, [Dr] Rosemary Hollis [of the Royal Institute of International Affairs] told us a different story: "Contrary to what the Americans expected, that speech did actually play into the hands of the hardliners in Iran and made it more difficult for the reformists ... Maybe there is an idea here that they can be bullied into a more co-operative attitude, but I think there is a complete misunderstanding of where the Iranians are coming from." Dr Hollis felt that the European countries had an important role to play here, "to keep the lines open ... it would be most unfortunate if the Iranians thought that everybody in the West really did think that they were no better than the Iraqi regime." 200. In our Report on British-US Relations of December 2001, we urged the Government to continue to engage with Iran constructively. The Government, in its response, reaffirmed its policy of "deepening our relations... [while maintaining] a robust dialogue on issues of concern to both HMG and our allies." To its credit, the Government has maintained this position since President Bush's "axis of evil" speech. When he gave evidence before the Committee in April 2002, Foreign Office Minister Ben Bradshaw said that "We have a different analysis of how we encourage change for the good in Iran and, as on a number of other areas, where we disagree with our American friends we are not reluctant to say so." 201. The US Embassy in London told us that Iran needs "to stabilize Afghanistan, end support for terrorism and for groups violently opposed to the Middle East peace process, end development of WMD and ballistic missiles, and end human rights abuses." We agree, but we believe that in the case of Iran these aims are more likely to be achieved by robust dialogue and critical engagement with reformers than by sending Tehran a list of non-negotiable demands. In our judgment, to bracket Iran with Iraq was mistaken: Iraq is an unredeemed autocracy; while Iran has a number of elements of democracy and has been moving, however falteringly, in the direction of reform. We conclude that the Government is right to maintain its constructive and - whenever necessary- critical engagement with Iran. Iraq202. Shortly after 11 September, some commentators speculated that Iraq might have been responsible for the attacks. Iraq's enmity with the US and Britain and its refusal since 1998 to admit UN weapons inspectors to verify the dismantling of its weapons of mass destruction make it an obvious suspect as a state sponsor of terrorism. On 5 December, we asked the Foreign Secretary whether there would be a second phase of the war against terrorism. Though he replied that the war against terrorism would go on "in the general sense ... because we need to ensure the kind of threat that was before the world on 11 September cannot take place again," he was unwilling to speculate about military action against particular targets. Since December, Iraq has been identified as the state most likely to be targeted. 203. When we visited Washington DC in March, we gained some sense of the "widespread agreement" between government agencies over the need to proceed against Iraq, but also of the uncertainties over exactly how to proceed. Some of those with whom we discussed the issue suggested that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein might be possible without full scale invasion. Others have pointed to the difficulties associated with administering a defeated Iraq post-invasion. In mid-March, what was clear was that huge resources were being devoted to the development of plans to act against the Iraqi regime, and that few had faith in the UN route towards control of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Policy on 'Regime Change' in Iraq204. President Bush's State of the Union address initiated an energetic debate about whether and when the United States would take military action against Iraq.[210] Secretary of State Colin Powell stated before a House International Relations Committee hearing on 6 February that "The President is determined to keep [the issue of Iraq] on the front burner and is looking at all the options that are available for him to deal with this in a decisive way... We still have a US policy of regime change because we believe Saddam Hussein should move on and that the Iraqi people deserve better leadership." Secretary Powell also suggested that "regime change is something the United States ... might have to do alone." 205. We heard during our visit to Washington in March that Vice President Cheney had not heard anything unexpected during his tour of the Middle East, one aim of which was to gauge and promote support for action against Iraq. On 6 April, President Bush said that "the policy of my government is the removal of Saddam and... all options are on the table... Maybe I should be a little less direct and be a little more nuanced, and say we support regime change." 206. However, the implications of continuing conflict in Israel and the occupied territories, and the difficulty of mounting a military operation in Iraq, may have contributed to the Administration's apparent decision to postpone military action. By late April, senior administration, Pentagon and military officials had evidently reached a "consensus... that there is little chance for a military coup to unseat [Saddam] Hussein from within" and that not "even an expanded version of the strategy used to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan would work... Hussein's military... is strong enough to defeat any confrontation by proxy." Considerations over the security of oil supplies were cited as "another reason to put off any offensive against Iraq". 207. UK policy on regime change in Iraq was enunciated by the Prime Minister during the Crawford summit in April 2002: "I can say that any sensible person looking at the position of Saddam Hussein and asking the question, 'Would the region, the world, and not least the ordinary Iraqi people, be better off without the regime of Saddam Hussein?', the only answer anyone could give to that question would be 'yes'." The Prime Minister appears to have chosen his words carefully, and deliberately to have stopped short of supporting regime change by force. 208. On 25 April, Foreign Office Minister Denis MacShane said in Westminster Hall: "To debate whether a change of regime is desirable in Iraq - it certainly is, in my view - is a mistake. Our discussion on Iraq should focus on trying to press, and if necessary force Saddam Hussein to comply with the United Nations resolutions on weapons inspections."[215] There is thus a difference of emphasis between the British and American positions on regime change. 209. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government clarify whether its policy is to bring about 'regime change' in Iraq. Policy on Weapons Inspectors210. On 12 March, the Foreign Secretary told the House that "in our judgment it is more important than ever that inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency be given access to all relevant sites, to be allowed to inspect freely wherever they want to, at whatever time they wish to. That is the action which Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime must take to come back into the international community, for what lies at the heart of this issue is the rule of international law." 211. Our predecessor Committee, in its July 2000 Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction, urged the Government "strongly to resist any attempt to dilute the international inspectors' powers of inspection or to compromise with Iraq on the composition of the Commission." Iraq could attempt to bypass UNMOVIC completely, for example by acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), thereby opening its chemical facilities to the scrutiny of OPCW inspectors. Such a move would, however, leave Iraq's nuclear and biological weapons programmes unmonitored. We therefore remain strongly of the view that UNMOVIC should return to Iraq and we share the Government's position that this should be on the basis that inspections may be carried out at any time, in any place. 212. We recommend that the Government propose a deadline for Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions requiring Iraq to allow inspection of its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. The Legal Basis for Military Action against Iraq213. The legal basis for an attack on Iraq would depend on the circumstances in which such action was taken. On 16 April, we asked the FCO for a memorandum "setting out the Government's interpretation of the circumstances in which further military action against Iraq - unrelated to ongoing reinforcement of the no-fly zones - would be covered by existing Security Council Resolutions; if so, by which Resolutions such actions would be covered; and if not, on what legal basis such action might be carried out." The Government replied that: "The Committee will appreciate that it is difficult to answer a hypothetical question precisely. In general terms we would regard the use of force against Iraq, or indeed any State, as lawful if it had been authorised by the United Nations Security Council, or were in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, or, exceptionally, were carried out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe." 214. Mr Straw replied in the same vein on 5 December, that "if country X received very good information that country Y or terrorist group Z is about to attack it, and takes action in self-defence to avoid that attack, it is acting consistently with Article 51 but the exact circumstances are going to vary." The FCO memorandum goes on: "As to the relevant resolutions, following Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, the Security Council authorised the use of force in resolution 678 (1990). This resolution authorised coalition forces to use all necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw, and to restore international peace and security in the area. It provided a legal basis in addition to the right of collective self-defence for operation Desert Storm, which was brought to an end by the cease-fire set out by the Council in resolution 687 (1991). The conditions for the cease-fire in that resolution (and subsequent resolutions) imposed obligations on Iraq with regard to the elimination of WMD and monitoring of its obligations. Resolution 687 (1991) suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force in resolution 678 (1990). A violation of Iraq's obligations which undermines the basis of the cease-fire in resolution 687 (1991) can revive the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1990). Most recently, in resolution 1205 (1998) the Council condemned Iraq's decision to cease co-operation with UNSCOM as a flagrant violation of resolution 687 (1991). This had the effect of reviving the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1990), which provided the legal basis for our participation in operation Desert Fox. ... We do not rule out the need to take further military action in future. Whether further action by the Security Council was needed would depend on the circumstances at the time. But as we have always made clear, any military action the UK undertakes anywhere in the world will be carried out in accordance with international law." 215. All the UN Security Council resolutions cited by the FCO pertain to the specific case of Iraq. The FCO does not mention Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373, which were passed after 11 September and which would allow the United States to act in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter if had information that it was facing an imminent threat of attack from Iraq. This is consistent with the Foreign Secretary's statement to us on 5 December, that the question of Iraq's WMD is "a separate matter from culpability for the atrocities of 11 September. As I have said before... I have seen no evidence to link the Iraqi regime with Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda or the Taliban." The Foreign Secretary expressed grave concern about Iraq's weapons development, and stated the Government's belief that "dramatic steps... have to be taken." Again, in April 2002, we asked Ben Bradshaw whether sufficient evidence existed to link Iraq with al Qaeda which could give any basis in international law for military intervention in Iraq: he answered with a straight "No". 216. The United Kingdom's position, therefore, can be summarised as follows: an attack against Iraq could be justified under international law in response to Iraqi aggression or to prevent imminent Iraqi aggression. It could not be taken under the UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing military force against the perpetrators of the events of 11 September, unless clear evidence existed of a link between Iraq and the perpetrators. 217. The US view is set out in the memorandum from their London Embassy: "When governments violate the rights of their people on a large scale - be it as an act of conscious policy or the byproduct of a loss of control - the international community has the right, and sometimes even the obligation, to act. ... Countries affected by states that abet, support, or harbor international terrorists, or are incapable of controlling terrorists operating from their own territory, have the right to take action to support their own citizens." 218. That view is consistent with what the Director of Policy Planning in the State Department, Richard Haass, described recently as a "body of ideas ... about what you might call the limits to sovereignty. Sovereignty entails obligations. One is not to massacre your own people. Another is not to support terrorism in any way. If a government fails to meet these obligations, then it forfeits some of the advantages of sovereignty... Other governments, including the United States, gain the right to intervene. In the case of terrorism, this can even lead to a right of preventive... self-defence. You essentially can act in anticipation if you have grounds to think it's a question of when, and not if, you're going to be attacked." 219. We held talks with Mr Haass when we visited Washington DC in November 2001. We discussed with him then his ideas about how the US should work with allies. Haass explained his view that the US needs allies - "we can't impose our ideas on everyone" - but that "posses" of such allies should be coalesced according to the requirements of specific situations rather than necessarily through existing international institutions. "The goal of US foreign policy," he argues, "should be to persuade other major powers to sign on to certain key issues as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets." 220. The international coalition that has been assembled to fight terrorism since 11 September resembles in many ways Haass's "posse." It has no formal structure and the US can include or exclude partners according to whether they are willing to go along with US policy, or not: these partners simply have to choose whether they are "with us or against us." The benefits for the US of the use of this kind of coalition are clear. The US can avoid appearing to be acting unilaterally, yet it is not bound by the need to proceed through established international procedures and laws, nor must it make compromises to partners through joint decision making (as it was in the Kosovo war, where it acted through NATO). 221. Our discussions with a number of US officials in Washington and New York in March 2002 confirmed that the views articulated by Richard Haass have wide currency. To take the most immediate example, in the case of Iraq we gained the impression that established international legal standards would be of secondary importance compared with the need to take action in a world which has "seen an evolution in how the international community views sovereignty." The impression we obtained from those with whom we discussed the question was that, instead of establishing first whether military action would be legal, the US would act first and then use international law to defend its action retrospectively if it were possible to do so. 222. Currently such a right of pre-emptive attack exists only where the state concerned has information that it is under the threat of imminent attack. The notion that the US Administration has drawn up a new "body of ideas" which gives it the "right" to pre-emptive intervention suggests that either the Administration has a different interpretation of existing international law from that which generally persists, or it has limited confidence in the legal base for proposed action on the existing evidence. ... 223. A further articulation of the US Government's view of the right to pre-emptive military action came recently from the President himself. Speaking at the West Point military academy President Bush said "We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge." He went on to say "Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies... In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act." 224. The Committee recommends that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in its response to this report sets out the British Government's view as to the circumstances in which a pre-emptive military strike would be legally justified. ... 227. The Government specified in its "Campaign Objectives" document that "any action taken to achieve our objectives will need to be in conformity with international law, including the UN Charter and international humanitarian law." We strongly endorse this statement. It is in the United Kingdom's interests to ensure that international legal standards are respected and strengthened globally, and the war against terrorism should not be permitted to become an exception to this rule. We recommend that the Government work with the United States to ensure that any action taken against Iraq, or against any other state in the war against terrorism, conforms with international law. Making the Case for Further Military Action230. The Government promised to publish a dossier of evidence incriminating Iraq... However, no dossier of new information has been produced. According to the Financial Times, intelligence officials "believe Downing Street and sectors of the Foreign Office acted precipitately by letting it be known that such a dossier was in the pipeline before Easter and before a final draft had been fully cleared through the internal Whitehall machinery." On 19 April, the "Foreign Office confirmed that the dossier no longer had a firm publication date, and that a final draft had still to be agreed." A few days later, Mr Bradshaw told us that "We will put more evidence in the public domain and we will publish in whatever form we think is the most effective" 231. In late April 2002, we asked the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to supply the Committee with a copy of the dossier. In reply, the FCO stated that the document is still being prepared, and that no decision has yet been taken on when to publish it. From this reply, we infer that the dossier will be published at some point. 232. Then, on 1 May, the Government published information on material which is believed to remain in Iraq, and which could be used to develop or to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as follows: "The latest assessment of material unaccounted for by UNSCOM inspectors which has potential implications for Iraq's CBW programmes is as follows:
... [These findings] reinforce our judgement that Iraq's chemical and biological capabilities are substantial and a very real danger to the region and the wider world." The list constitutes alarming reading. It is information of this kind which, in combination with other information, might eventually persuade coalition allies, their governments and people, that further action is justified. ... © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |