Disarmament Documentation

Back to Disarmament Documentation, July 2002

'A New Way of Doing Business': Powell Testimony on Moscow Treaty, July 9

US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, statement as prepared for delivery to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 9.

My appearance before your committee on this particular occasion has a more formal character than the previous nine. On this occasion I am pleased to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee to seek its support for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions - the Moscow Treaty - signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002. By long tradition, the Secretary of State is the first member of the Administration to testify in support of treaties submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

The Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between the United States and Russia. It codifies both countries' commitment to make deep strategic offensive reductions in a flexible and legally binding manner. It facilitates the transition from strategic rivalry to a genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. The Moscow Treaty is one important element of a new strategic framework, which involves a broad array of cooperative efforts in political, economic and security areas.

On May 1st of last year, even before his first meeting with President Putin, President Bush outlined his vision of this new framework in a speech at the National Defense University (NDU). The President stated that, while the United States may continue to have areas of difference with Russia, we are not and must not be strategic adversaries. In that regard, President Bush said that he wanted to change our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror, to one based on common responsibilities and interests. The strategic nuclear dimension of the framework the President laid out had several elements.

The President made a commitment to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security requirements, including our obligations to our allies, and stated that his goal was to move quickly to reduce our nuclear forces.

He made clear his desire to leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that not only was outdated but also perpetuated a relationship with Russia based on distrust and mutual vulnerability. President Bush declared that we should work together with Russia to replace the ABM Treaty with a new cooperative relationship that would leave behind the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.

A little over fourteen months later, and after five meetings with President Putin, the President has acted on all of the elements of the strategic framework he proposed during his NDU speech and he has acted in a way that has significantly advanced our overall relationship with Russia. Let me briefly review that relationship to illustrate the broader context in which it now exists.

The tragic events of September 11 brought to the forefront a major shared objective of the United States and Russia to combat terrorism. Pursuing that objective has had a positive impact on our relationship. President Putin was the first world leader to call President Bush on the morning of September 11. Less well known is the degree of trust and cooperation that was manifest that day, and in subsequent days, in our strategic interaction. The events of September 11 resulted in the United States briefly raising the alert, or DEFCON [Defense Condition], level of our strategic forces, and, for a longer period, increasing Force Protection levels at our military bases, including those bases where our strategic forces are located. During the Cold War, any increase in alert levels by one side was likely to engender a reaction in kind because of mutual suspicions and distrust. It is a measure of the degree of transparency and trust that has developed in the United States-Russian relationship that President Putin felt no such need. In fact, to ensure there would be no miscalculation, the Russians let us know they were voluntarily suspending major elements of an ongoing strategic forces exercise and later agreed to our request to suspend temporarily some inspection activities under the START Treaty at bases that were placed under a heightened state of alert.

The developing strategic relationship between the United States and Russia was also evident on December 13 of last year, when President Bush announced that the United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Although Russia did not agree with our decision to withdraw, President Putin's response that same day was pragmatic in tone and recognized that the US decision did not present a threat to Russia's security.

As the United States-Russian relationship has broadened and deepened, the significance of US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has diminished. Our withdrawal has not spurred an arms race or undermined strategic stability. In fact, President Putin also used his December 13 statement to call for reductions in strategic offensive weapons to between 1,500 and 2,200, thus responding positively to President Bush's announcement during the Washington/Crawford Summit that the United States would reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade.

Since December 13, Russia has focused on how to move our bilateral relationship forward. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States and the Russian Federation that was signed on May 24th in Moscow reflects not only our agreement to deep reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, but also records our agreement to implement a number of steps aimed at increasing confidence, transparency, and cooperation in the area of missile defense.

Moreover, strategic issues are only a part of the broader 21st Century relationship we are developing with Russia. Very early on Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that our new relationship would be broadly based - encompassing political, economic, and security components. The Joint Declaration reflected the significant progress we have made in all of these areas.

On political issues we are already acting as partners in addressing many of the challenges we both now face. For example, the United States-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan has been invaluable in the war against terrorism. Its mandate has now been expanded to include other geographical areas and new and related threats and, as such, it has been renamed the Working Group on Counterterrorism.

The United States and Russia are cooperating to transform Afghanistan into a stable and viable nation. To illustrate, the degree of cooperation with Russia on our efforts in Central Asia has been unprecedented. Moscow's support has included intelligence sharing, search and rescue assistance, and endorsement of Central Asian states' decision to accept our troop presence on their territories. Russia has even dispatched two military liaison officers to US Central Command (USCENTCOM). We are also working together constructively to resolve regional conflicts, including those in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Middle East and, most recently, in South Asia.

Russia and NATO are also increasingly allied against regional instability and other contemporary threats. At the May 28 NATO-Russia Summit in Rome, we inaugurated a new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) which will allow NATO member states and Russia to work as equal partners in areas of common interest. The NATO Allies and Russia are ready to begin work in earnest on all of the NRC agenda items approved at the Rome Summit. Initial successes in the NRC will lay a basis for further expanding cooperation between NATO and Russia.

The United States and Russia are also cooperating effectively on transnational issues other than terrorism such as dealing with illegal drugs and combating organized crime. For example, the entry into force of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters earlier this year was a welcome step forward on the issue of fighting organized crime.

Our cooperation in the economic sphere, and encouraging the development of an efficient market economy in Russia, are also high on our mutual agenda. We want to expand economic ties between the United States and Russia and further integrate Russia into the world economy with full rights and responsibilities. We support Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization. By holding Russia to the same standards we would any country seeking to join the WTO, we are reinforcing Moscow's broader economic reform efforts and helping Russia prepare for a larger role in the global economy. Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations also demand that we move ahead. The Department of Commerce's recent decision to treat Russia as a market economy under the provisions of US trade law is an important step forward.

Mr. Chairman, the Moscow Treaty is emblematic of our increasingly broader, cooperative relationship with Russia. Just as our relationship now has a fundamentally different basis, so the Moscow Treaty also represents a new way of doing business in the strategic nuclear realm.

Let me take a moment and outline for you the essential parts of the Treaty.

Reduction Requirements

As I indicated, the United States and Russia both intend to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with our national security requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of our strategic relations. The Treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce and limit our strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by December 31, 2012, a reduction of nearly two-thirds below current levels. The United States intends to implement the Treaty by reducing its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 through removal of warheads from missiles in their launchers and from heavy bomber bases, and by removing some missiles, launchers, and bombers from operational service.

For purposes of this Treaty, the United States considers operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. In addition, a small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads are located at heavy bomber bases. The United States does not consider these spares to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only "nuclear" reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject to the 1,700-2,200 limits.

Relationship to START

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues in force unchanged by this Treaty. In accordance with its own terms, START will remain in force until midnight December 5, 2009, unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.

START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. As noted in the May 24 Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, may be agreed in the future.

The Bilateral Implementation Commission

The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic consultative forum that will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. The BIC will be separate and distinct from the Consultative Group for Strategic Security, established by the Joint Declaration of May 24, which will be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials and which will be a broader forum to discuss issues of strategic significance and to enhance mutual transparency.

Entry Into Force, Duration, and Right of Withdrawal

The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. It is to remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.

The Treaty also provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from the Treaty upon three months' written notice to the other Party.

Status of START II Treaty

The START II Treaty, which was signed in 1993, and to which the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1996, never entered into force because Russia placed unacceptable conditions on its own ratification of START II. Russia's explicit linkage of START II to preservation of the ABM Treaty and entry into force of several agreements, signed in 1997, which related to ABM Treaty succession and ABM/TMD demarcation, made it impossible for START II to enter into force. With signature of the Moscow Treaty, however, the United States and Russia have now taken a decisive step beyond START II that reflects the new era in United States-Russia relations.

How We Arrived at What You Have Before You

Mr. Chairman, the Treaty you have before you is different from Cold War arms control agreements because:

• It does not call for exact equality in numbers of strategic nuclear warheads. It is no longer appropriate to size our military capabilities against any single country or threat, and the end of superpower competition and adversarial style arms control negotiations has removed any political requirement for strict parity.
• It does not contain any sublimits or bans on categories of strategic forces. The need for a highly regimented strategic forces structure was the product of now outdated concepts of strategic stability that were necessary when we needed to regulate the interaction of the strategic forces of two hostile nations to reduce the structural incentives for beginning a nuclear war. Now we have nothing to go to war about.
• The Treaty does not contain its own verification provisions. United States security and the new strategic relationship with Russia do not require such provisions.

What you have before you is a Treaty that is both simple and flexible. Article I contains the single central obligation of the Treaty which is for the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 1,700-2,200 for each side. The Treaty deliberately focuses on strategic nuclear warheads. It does not limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs or their associated launchers; nor does it limit the number of heavy bombers. From the outset, our objective was to reduce dramatically the number of strategic nuclear warheads available for immediate use, and the Moscow Treaty clearly meets this objective.

The Treaty is also highly flexible. Article I, by referencing the individual statements of Presidents Bush and Putin, makes clear that the Parties need not implement their reductions in an identical manner. President Bush made clear on November 13 of last year that the United States will meet the 1,700 to 2,200 limit by reducing our number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. This is a departure from the way in which warheads are counted under the START Treaty, but one that more accurately represents the real number of warheads available for use immediately or within days.

During the course of the negotiations, we proposed a detailed definition of "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads," but we did not achieve it and so the Treaty does not contain such detail. Nor did President Putin state explicitly how Russia intends to implement its reductions. During the negotiations, the Russians suggested that they anticipated reducing warheads by eliminating or converting missiles, launchers and heavy bombers in a manner similar to the counting concepts in the START Treaties. Should Russia elect to achieve the 1,700-2,200 warhead level in this way, or by using the US method, the result in either case will limit the number of strategic nuclear warheads available for immediate use. Russia is also free to choose another method for making its required reductions.

Some have expressed concern that the Moscow Treaty does not require the destruction of warheads. No previous arms control treaty - SALT, START or INF - has required warhead elimination. Contrary to what was frequently reported in the press, the Russians did not propose a regime for verifiable warhead elimination during the negotiations. Given the uncertainties we face, and the fact that we, unlike Russia, do not manufacture new warheads, the United States needs the flexibility to retain warheads removed from operational deployment to meet unforeseen future contingencies and possible technical problems with the stockpile. That said, the Moscow Treaty does not prevent the United States and Russia from eliminating warheads and we anticipate that both Parties will continue to do so. For our part, some of these warheads will be used as spares, some will be stored, and some will be destroyed. Economics, our new strategic relationship with Russia, obsolescence, and the overall two-thirds cut in US and Russian inventories mandated by the Treaty will undoubtedly result in continued warhead elimination.

The Treaty is also highly flexible in other ways. Within the bounds of the aggregate limit on numbers of strategic nuclear warheads, each side is free to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. As I noted earlier, the Treaty does not limit the total number of strategic delivery vehicles or contain either numerical sublimits or bans on categories of forces. We saw no strategic need for such limits given our new relationship with Russia and the low levels of forces to which both sides will reduce. But today Russia is not our sole concern.

The international system is no longer bipolar. It has become more fluid and unpredictable. We cannot forecast with confidence what nation; combination of nations, or non-state actors may pose a threat to our vital national interests or those of our friends and allies in the years to come. Nor can we tell what WMD capabilities and delivery systems such adversaries may be armed with. We must maintain the freedom to determine the composition and structure of our nuclear forces. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers will be able to discuss with you in more detail the approach the Department of Defense has adopted to planning our strategic nuclear capabilities when they testify before this Committee next week.

The Treaty provides flexibility in another regard. Article IV permits either Party the ability to withdraw from the Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party. This period is shorter than has been typical in previous arms control agreements. The Moscow Treaty thus allows greater flexibility for each side to respond to unforeseen circumstances, whether those circumstances are technical problems in the stockpile, changes in the international environment, or the emergence of new threats.

In negotiating the Moscow Treaty, the Administration did not seek any new verification measures. As the President stated last November 13, the United States intended to carry out its reductions unilaterally, no matter what action Russia took. President Putin's welcome decision to reciprocate, and the recording of these reduction commitments in a legally binding Treaty, is a welcome sign of our new, cooperative strategic relationship - a relationship that does not depend on our ability to verify Russian reductions.

That said, Article II of the Treaty recognizes that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms. The START Treaty's provisions do not extend to the Moscow Treaty, and its verification provisions were designed with START's different counting rules in mind. However, we believe that the START verification regime, including its data exchanges, on-site inspections, and provisions concerning telemetry, conversion, and elimination, and mobile missile forces, will continue over the course of the decade to add to our body of knowledge regarding the disposition of Russia's strategic nuclear warheads and the overall status of reduction in Russia's strategic forces.

Most importantly, however, I would point once again to our new strategic relationship with Russia. The Preambles to both the Moscow Treaty and the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States and Russia state that this new relationship will be based on a number of principles, including mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. These are principles that help to define a normal relationship between two countries that now consider themselves to be partners.

The verification regimes that have accompanied our previous arms control agreements with Russia have, in contrast, been the product of two countries suspicious and distrustful of one another - two countries that considered each other as a strategic threat. I have submitted to the Congress a report required by Section 306 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act on the verifiability of the Moscow Treaty. In that Report, I conclude that the Treaty is not constructed to be verifiable within the meaning of Section 306, and it is indeed not. A treaty that was verifiable under the old Cold War paradigm was neither required nor relevant in this case.

As I indicated earlier, the Joint Declaration signed in Moscow establishes a Consultative Group for Strategic Security, to be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers, that will become the principal mechanism through which the United States and Russia will strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest across a broad range of international security issues.

The first meeting of the Consultative Group will take place in September on the margins of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. When we prepare for this meeting, we will consider whether to pursue expanded transparency as one of the early issues the Group will address. I believe the new strategic relationship will continue to mature over time, and over the lifetime of the Moscow Treaty, and that openness and transparency will become an accepted and normal part of all areas of our new strategic relationship.

Anticipating Some of Your Questions

As we went about negotiating the Moscow Treaty, one of the questions foremost in my mind as a former soldier and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was how will we address tactical nuclear weapons?

We continue to be concerned about the uncertainties surrounding Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), and I believe we should discuss inventory levels of NSNW with the Russians and press Moscow to complete the reductions it pledged to make in 1991 and 1992.

The United States has made very significant changes to its nuclear policy and force structure since the end of the Cold War. Since 1991, the types and numbers of NATO non-strategic nuclear forces have been reduced by approximately 85 percent, including the elimination of entire categories of NSNW. The Russians have also made significant parallel unilateral reductions in their NSNW.

Through NATO, we are now focusing on developing confidence building and transparency measures with Russia. NATO has presented Russia with four proposals for nuclear Confidence and Stability Building Measures (CSBMs) as part of a process established by the April 1999 NATO Washington Summit. These proposals are intended to enhance mutual trust and to promote greater transparency. I believe that NATO and Russia both have recognised the value of consultations on non-strategic nuclear forces. The Russians have agreed to continue to engage in this process.

Moreover, in addition to unilateral reductions and confidence building and transparency measures, the many ongoing Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with Russia are designed to improve the safety and security of all Russian nuclear weapons - including NSNW.

Mr. Chairman, again as a former military professional, I also wanted to know about Multiple, Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles, or MIRVs. In short, does the Moscow Treaty allow the Russians to restructure their strategic forces through a greater use of MIRVs, and if so, is this in the United States' interest?

The Moscow Treaty does not restrict a Party's decisions as to how it will implement the required reductions. The Treaty states that "Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads." Each Party will thus have flexibility in structuring its forces to reach these new low levels for strategic nuclear warheads. Specifically stated, the Moscow Treaty does not place restrictions on Russia's potential to restructure its strategic forces by using MIRVs. We are convinced that this will not adversely impact US national security. Since neither the United States nor Russia has any incentive to launch nuclear weapons at each other, we no longer view Russian deployment of MIRVed ICBMs as destabilizing to our strategic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, some committee members may want to question the ten-year deadline in the Moscow Treaty. Why is there such a distant deadline in the Treaty when it would appear that both the United States and Russia could reduce weapons much quicker? Also, why does the treaty end at the deadline for meeting its objectives?

The Treaty will take the United States and Russia along a predictable path to substantial reductions - from the current levels of 5,000-6,000 warheads to 1,700-2,200 warheads. For the United States, the reduction process will include deactivating all 50 ten-warhead Peacekeeper ICBMs and removing four Trident submarines from strategic nuclear service.

The process will also involve additional, yet-to-be-determined steps to reduce the number of US operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the 1,700-2,200 level. These reductions will be part of the development and deployment of the New Triad that was established by the 2001 United States Nuclear Posture Review.

These substantial United States and Russian reductions will entail careful planning and execution on both sides, and, therefore, will require considerable time to complete. Our best judgment is that allowing ten years for this process to be completed will give both Parties time to complete these actions in a sound, responsible, and sustainable manner.

Moreover, we can extend the Treaty at any time that both Parties agree to do so, just as either Party can leave the Treaty expeditiously. Likewise, over the duration of the Treaty, much can happen that could alter or modify our strategic analysis. As a consequence, we feel that the timeframe and the deadline are just what they should be.

Another question that may arise is how the Moscow Treaty squares with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In other words, in what ways does the Moscow Treaty promote implementation of the Parties' nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT?

The Committee members know that the NPT is the centerpiece of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It plays a critical role in efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including to terrorists and states that support them. The NPT's value depends on all parties honoring their obligations. The United States places great importance on fulfilling its NPT undertakings, including those in Article VI related to nuclear disarmament.

The elimination of nuclear weapons is a key goal of the NPT, but one that will not be reached quickly or without enormous effort. All states have a responsibility to work toward this goal. It can be achieved only though a step-by-step process. Article VI of the NPT reflects this reality and sets no timelines or specific milestones.

The Moscow Treaty represents an historic step in that process. It will take the United States and Russia down to the lowest levels of strategic nuclear warheads seen in decades. It is an important achievement and the actions called for under the Moscow Treaty represent significant progress in meeting the obligations set forth in Article VI of the NPT.

Finally, as the Treaty itself suggests, where do we go next?

Of course the next step, if the Senate gives its advice and consent to the Moscow Treaty and it enters into force, is to implement that Treaty. It will take time and resources on both sides to carry out the planned reductions by Dec 31, 2012.

More broadly, and covering strategic issues in general, we will use the Consultative Group for Strategic Security, chaired by the Foreign and Defense Ministers, to strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, and share information and plans, as I indicated earlier.

The Moscow Treaty was intentionally designed to give the United States and Russia flexibility in how each implements its obligations. Our changed strategic relationship, and the uncertainties of external conditions, dictated this. Throughout the duration of the Treaty, we will closely monitor developments and assess their implications for the Treaty's implementation and for the question of its extension. In addition, not later than one year prior to START's expiration date (December 5, 2009), the START Parties will have to meet to address the question of whether to extend that treaty.

President Bush made it clear from the outset of this Administration that he intended to reduce US nuclear weapons to the lowest number consistent with US and allied security requirements. Based on the Nuclear Posture Review, he determined that a strategic nuclear force in a range of 1,700-2,200 warheads provides the flexibility and responsiveness necessary to counter known and expected threats and hedge against surprise, technical or other developments.

I don't want to speculate about the more distant future; but as far out as I can see, nuclear weapons will continue to play an important role in US and allied security. Right now, I think we have enough work before us to implement the agreement we have, to solidify the new strategic framework we are building with Russia, and to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and other WMD to other states.

Summary

Mr. Chairman, I believe the Moscow Treaty is fully consistent with the President's promise to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security requirements. It reduces by two-thirds the number of strategic nuclear warheads available for ready use while preserving America's ability to respond promptly to changing future situations.

These nuclear force reductions will not be accomplished within the old Cold War arms control framework; rather the Moscow Treaty reflects the emergence of a new strategic relationship between the United States and Russia. We understand that this new relationship is still a work in progress. Russia is an emerging partner with the United States on a broad range of issues where we have increasingly shared interests and values. However, our relationship with Russia is not yet comparable to the kind of relationship we have with our nuclear-armed allies, Britain and France. Russia's transformation to a democracy and a market economy still faces a number of challenges, and its interests and those of the United States may not always coincide. We understand there is work to be done if we are to implement fully the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship. But our new strategic relationship gives us a strong foundation to stand upon - one that will allow us to discuss our differences candidly and work to resolve them in a constructive manner.

The Congress also has an important role to play in furthering the development of our new strategic relationship with Russia. There are a number of issues where we need the Congress' help in doing our part - ending Jackson-Vanik's application to Russia, authorizing Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status for Russia, and waiving Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) certification requirements so those important programs can continue, are all high priorities. The Senate's approval of the Moscow Treaty will also make an important contribution to the strengthening of our new relationship.

Some have said the Moscow Treaty will be the last arms control agreement with Russia. I won't go that far. But it will be an important indicator of the continued advancement of our relationship if it is the last Treaty that is the centerpiece of a Presidential Summit and if such agreements become increasingly less central to the United States-Russian relationship.

Mr. Chairman, by deeply reducing strategic nuclear warheads while preserving both Russia's and America's flexibility to meet unforeseen future contingencies, the Moscow Treaty will enhance the national security of both countries. I strongly recommend that the Senate advise and consent to its ratification at the earliest possible date.

Source: Text - Powell urges quick Senate action on Moscow Treaty, US State Department (Washington File), July 9.

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