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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation John Bolton Speech on BWC & Roundtable on Arms Control, Tokyo, August 26/27I. Speech on BWC, August 27'The US Position on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the BW Threat', speech by John Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Tokyo American Center, August 27. I am honored to be here at the Tokyo America Center in Japan and pleased to be able to speak to you about the US position regarding the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the international treaty that prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons. Over three decades ago, the United States foreswore biological weapons and became a driving force in negotiating the BWC. The United States strongly supports the global norm established by the BWC and places high-priority on combating the threat posed by biological weapons. We continue to be a strong supporter of this treaty. The Biological Weapons ThreatThe threat from biological weapons is real, growing, and extremely dangerous, and is evolving rapidly with the pace of technology. Given the deadly potential of such weapons of mass destruction, "there is no margin for error, and no chance to learn from our mistakes," as President Bush said. The United States believes that over a dozen countries are pursuing biological weapons (BW). These BW programs are at various stages of development. Some pose a considerable international security threat. Unrepentant rogues, such as Saddam Hussein, continue to seek illegal weapons to sow massive destruction on civilian targets with complete disregard to the BWC and other international legal agreements. Iran, Libya, Syria, and North Korea are also pursuing these illegitimate and inhumane weapons. There are still other states with covert BW programs that we have not named in BWC fora. The United States has spoken to several of these states privately over the last year. We have also noted that Cuba has at least a limited, developmental offensive biological warfare research-and-development effort. Terrorist groups are actively seeking the knowledge, equipment, and material necessary for biological weapons. In 1995, Japan experienced the most deadly terrorist attack in its modern history from the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which released sarin nerve gas into a rush-hour subway train in Tokyo, killing 12 and sickening thousands of others. In addition to its chemical warfare capabilities, the cult was later implicated in several smaller-scale attacks with biological agents, including anthrax and botulism, which it launched prior to the attack on the subway. And last year, soon after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States was further terrorized by anthrax attacks that were sent using a plain envelope and a 34 cent stamp. 23 people contracted anthrax, and 5 people lost their lives. Both events showed the world how much serious damage could be done - in both physical and psychological terms - by even a single person or small group with limited means but with access to biological or chemical weapons. All that was required to inflict harm and widespread panic in both cases was the relevant knowledge, the right materials, and the opportunity. In the aftermath of these events and of the attacks of September 11, the United States is more determined than ever to put an end to terrorism and to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We are grateful for Japan's unwavering support and cooperation in this effort. As partners in the war against terrorism, we must work together to ensure that those who seek to use disease as a weapon are never allowed access to the materials or technology that will assist them in their aims. Why We Rejected the Draft Protocol to the BWCSome have questioned the US commitment to combat the BW threat due to our rejection of the draft BWC Protocol. Put simply, the draft Protocol would have been singularly ineffective. The United States rejected the draft protocol for three reasons: 1) it was based on a traditional arms control approach that will not work on biological weapons; 2) it would have compromised national security and confidential business information; and 3) it would have been used by proliferators to undermine other effective international export control regimes. Traditional MeasuresTraditional arms control measures that have worked so well for many other types of weapons, including nuclear weapons, are not workable for biological weapons. Unlike chemical or nuclear weapons, the components of biological weapons are found in nature, in the soil, the air and even inside human beings. The presence of these organisms does not necessarily connote a sinister motive. They are used for many peaceful purposes such as routine studies against disease, the creation of vaccines, and the study of defensive measures against a biological attack. Components of biological weapons are, by nature, dual use. Operators of clandestine offensive BW programs can claim any materials are for peaceful purposes or easily clean up the evidence by using no more sophisticated means than household bleach. Detecting violations is nearly impossible; proving a violation is impossible. Traditional arms control measures are based on detecting violations and then taking action - military or diplomatic - to restore compliance. Traditional arms control measures are not effective against biology. Using them, we could prove neither non-compliance nor compliance. National Security and Confidential Business InformationTraditional arms control measures applied to biological activities yield no benefit and actually do great harm. Declarations and investigations called for under the draft Protocol at industrial plants, scientific labs, universities, and defense facilities would have revealed trade secrets and sensitive bio-defense information. The United States invests over a billion dollars annually on bio-defense. The US pharmaceutical and bio-tech industry leads the world; each year, US industry produces more than 50% of the new medicines created. It costs an average of $802 million to bring a new product to market and takes between 12-15 years to do so. Such disclosures, intentionally or inadvertently, also could result in putting the men and women in uniform at increased risk to biological weapons attacks. Protective devices and treatments could be compromised. Protecting Export ControlsThe draft Protocol would have also put in jeopardy effective export control regimes. Countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Cuba have fought the hardest for free access to the technology, knowledge, and equipment necessary to pursue biological weapons. Their argument was simple: as States Parties to the BWC they should be allowed free trade in all biological materials. These countries sought to dismantle effective export control regimes such as the Australia Group. They argued that export controls should not be applied to BWC States Parties. The problem is that some BWC States Parties are pursuing BW programs and it is no coincidence that these countries are also the ones pressing for access to sensitive technology. This "Trojan Horse" approach was not combated effectively by the draft Protocol. The result was a "Cooperation Committee" whose job would have been to promote scientific and technological exchanges. The Cooperation Committee was touted as a way to appease Iran and Cuba. We viewed it as dangerous, harmful, and unnecessary. Protecting existing export control regimes is another important reason for the United States to reject the draft Protocol. In SumA lot of pressure was put on the United States to continue to support the draft Protocol simply because it was the result of seven years of hard negotiations. Several states urged our support by telling us that the draft Protocol was "better than nothing." Well, this was simply not sufficient to win US support. We carefully studied the draft Protocol and found it to be a least common denominator compromise that, in our view, was worse than nothing. Let me tell you something else about the draft Protocol. Several nations came to the United States privately and thanked us for rejecting the Protocol, which in their view was seriously flawed but for them was untouchable for political reasons. I know the United States did the right thing in rejecting the draft Protocol. The time for "better than nothing" proposals is over. It is time for us to work together to address the BW threat. We will not be protected by a "Maginot treaty" approach to the BW threat. I know from my consultations with BWC parties that many states agree with us. US Position on the Biological Weapons ConventionOver the last year, however, there has been confusion about America's policy toward the Biological Weapons Convention. Today, I want to discuss this policy. "Naming Names"The world must end its silent acquiescence to illicit BW programs. The United States seeks to put maximum political pressure on proliferators by naming state parties that are violators of the BWC. We believe it is critical to put on notice such states that choose to ignore the norms of civilized society and pursue biological weapons. These states must realize that their efforts to develop these terrible weapons will not go unnoticed. Our President has set a standard all should meet: tell the truth; speak out; be clear. Advice worth following, especially when it comes to BW. The Ad Hoc Group and Its MandateThe Ad Hoc Group's raison d'être has been to see that a draft Protocol based on traditional arms control measures comes into force. Many nations want to use the Ad Hoc Group to revive the draft Protocol at a later date or negotiate a new agreement based on traditional measures. Having determined that traditional measures are not effective on biology and that those measures would put national security information and confidential business information at risk, the United States said there was no longer a need for the Ad Hoc Group. Our objections to the Protocol and those traditional measures on which it is based are real. We need to find a way to move beyond this debate and focus on what counts: a strengthened commitment to combat the BW threat. Effectively Combating the Biological Weapons ThreatMy speech up to this point may have led some to question what can be done to combat the threat. Well, I have good news. The United States last fall proposed several important measures to combat the BW threat, through means that would be far more effective than the draft Protocol. In the past year great progress has been made to combat the threat posed by biological weapons. National, bilateral, and multilateral efforts have made it more difficult for those pursuing biological weapons to obtain the necessary ingredients and made it easier to detect and counter any attack. Since the anthrax attacks last year, the United States has enacted two new laws to improve our ability to combat the threat.
The United States is committed to combating the BW threat. We will do so where we can and when we can. Recent efforts illustrate the US commitment to combat the threat. Other initiatives are underway in other effective forums. In each of the examples above, Japan has played a key role and deserves much of the credit for the work that has been done to combat the BW threat. ConclusionIn conclusion, I would like to point out that the approaches of Japan and the United States to combating the threat posed by biological weapons are actually quite similar, and our goal of stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction is the same. The Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Japan and the anthrax attacks in the United States have made both our nations painfully aware that biological and chemical weapons can be used against us at any time. And the tragic events of September 11 showed us that terrorist groups will use any means at their disposal to strike against innocent targets. We must not allow biological weapons to become part of their arsenal. Given the unique challenges involved in regulating biological agents and detecting their misuse, we must remain creative, vigilant and forward-looking in combating the BW threat. And we will remain steadfast in rejecting proposals that do not address the BW problem in a realistic manner but are simply the product of bureaucratic compromise. As the Japanese proverb goes, "Vision without action is a daydream. Action without vision is a nightmare." I ask Japan to join the United States in promoting an aggressive and effective anti-BW campaign that combats the BW threat without crippling other national and multilateral efforts. Stemming the proliferation of biological weapons cannot be accomplished by one country alone. "A single arrow is easily broken, a bundle of ten is not," as they say in Japan. By working together, and by exchanging ideas and proposals that will help us meet this critical security challenge, I am confident we can succeed in advancing the worldwide effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate the biological weapons threat. Source: US State Department text, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/13090pf.htm. II. Roundtable on Arms Control, August 26John Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, roundtable on arms Control with Japanese journalists, Tokyo American Center, Tokyo, August 26. John Bolton: I'm in Japan principally for a regular meeting of the Japan-US Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation Verification, which is a long-standing consultative mechanism that the US and Japan have used for some time. And we covered the whole range of international security, arms control, non-proliferation issues involving questions of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, ballistic missiles, various international agreements and conventions, and export control regimes, and I thought it was a very productive discussion. ... Question: Did you have...any new message with regard to North Korea? Bolton: No, I didn't have any new message with regard to North Korea. But we talked about a variety of issues that could arise in connection with North Korea's outward proliferation activities in connection with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. We talked about the implementation of the Agreed Framework and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency and North Korea's activities with respect to a number of other proliferant countries. ... Question: ... [C]ould you give us the latest US assessment on the development of WMD by North Korea? ... Bolton: Well, we remain very concerned about North Korea's outward proliferation activities. It is a state of concern in connection with ballistic missiles and possibly with nuclear technologies in particular. The United States recently issued sanctions against North Korea in the Missile Area, just as one example of that. It's one of the states that we've been concerned about in the biological weapons area for some time. So I don't have any information that I'm at liberty to reveal publicly about that, but the subject of North Korea's activities in the WMD area is something we do pay very close attention to. Question: And have you detected any signs of change of the attitude on the development of missile or WMDs recently? Bolton: I don't think there's been any diminution in their outward proliferation activities that we can see now. Question: Sir, may I ask you about nuclear testing and development of nuclear weapons in the United States? We understand by the Nuclear Posture Review that the United States is looking at a new way to make use of nuclear weapons. I was wondering whether that change of policy requires testing for a new type of warhead? Bolton: Well, the president's moratorium on nuclear testing is in force and will remain in force. The Nuclear Posture Review was principally directed at ascertaining what the optimal strategic nuclear force for the United States was over the next 10 years. And the purpose of the Review, which is both mandated by statute and requested by President Bush, was to look at the new international strategic situation 10 years after the end of the Cold War and try to make a judgment about what was the appropriate level of our strategic nuclear capability. Now this review came at a very important time because we had been in discussions with the Russians about seeking to see if there was a mutually acceptable way to move beyond the ABM treaty of 1972. And, as I'm sure you all know, it turned out that we were not able to find a mutually acceptable way to move beyond the ABM treaty and so we gave notice of our withdrawal from that treaty on December the thirteenth of last year. Many people around the world who were critical of our decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty said that withdrawing would undercut international strategic stability and possibly lead to a new arms race. And yet the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review was exactly the opposite. The conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review was that the United States could reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by essentially two-thirds over a ten-year period: from something just under 6,000 deployed strategic warheads now to a range of between 1,700 and 2,200 at the end of the 10-year period. That's a very dramatic conclusion and an important step toward a safer international environment as both we and the Russians draw our levels down. The Nuclear Posture Review, as was inherent in its charter, also considered possible developments in the future, making sure that the nuclear infrastructure in the United States was sufficient to assure the safety and the reliability of our weapons stockpile, and also to consider what might or might not be necessary in the future. But as a matter of policy there's no decision on designing new weapons and no decision on testing other than continuing the president's policy on the moratorium. Question: Mr. Secretary, what would be the constructive new measures you expect from DPRK, so that you can start or restart the talks with North Korea, and when would be the deadline for that action? Bolton: Well, there isn't any deadline. I think President Bush has made it clear that our policy is that we'll talk with the North Koreans at any time, any place, and that remains the policy. We've got a number of issues we want to talk to them about. Their compliance with the nonproliferation treaty on nuclear weapons, their compliance with the Agreed Framework, their outward proliferation activities that we discussed before, the disposition of conventional forces on the peninsula, the human rights situation, and the economic and humanitarian situation in the North. All of those things are things that we think are worth discussing, and the president made that policy clear last year and it remains in effect. So there's no deadline from our point of view, but we do have some serious issues we want to discuss. Question: Suppose if North Korea didn't take any action in limiting the proliferation-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction-related technologies and didn't allow the inspections to the nuclear facilities, would you think of any new actions? For example, the stopping of the oil supply to North Korea at a certain point in the near future, say in half a year or so? Bolton: Well, I wouldn't want to speculate on what we might do in those circumstances. Obviously, we expect the North to comply with the Agreed Framework and I think you're probably familiar - you may not be - but we declined this year to certify that the North was in compliance with the Agreed Framework as is required by our statutory framework to provide the heavy fuel oil. Now that wasn't certifying - I want to be careful in my English here - we didn't certify that the North was not in compliance. We simply declined to certify that they were in compliance. In other words, we were saying nothing as to whether they were in compliance or not. That was a change from the previous practice, where the last administration had certified that they were in compliance. As I say, we waived the compliance question as we are permitted to do by our statutes to supply the heavy fuel oil. But I think that, you know, you would really have to address the question more to the North Koreans as to what they intend to do about it. I think it's very clear that we have made the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction an important element of American foreign policy. That's why we're concerned about all of the activities of proliferator countries and proliferant countries, and that's why North Korea receives the attention that it does from us. ... Question: At your meetings with Japanese officials, did you talk about or did the Japanese officials refer to the speeches made by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the ceremonies marking the fifty-seventh anniversary of the atomic bombing? ... Bolton: Yeah, they did make reference to the speeches, although I have to confess I hadn't read the speeches and I assumed that meant they were critical of our policy. But I'd have to say, since I had not read the speeches, I was not familiar with what the specific criticism was. Maybe you can tell me. Question: They basically criticized the president's withdrawal from the ABM treaty as well as his attitudes toward the ratification of the CTBT and other issues. Bolton: Well, you know, on the withdrawal from the ABM treaty, I've said elsewhere that in foreign ministries, and editorial and newsrooms around the world, there used to be a key on the word processing machines that whenever somebody would type in the ABM treaty of 1972, all you'd have to do would be to press one key on the word processing machine and it would automatically print out: "comma, the cornerstone of international strategic stability, comma" and that's why people said if we withdraw from the treaty that it will enhance instability. And in fact, the opposite is the case. We have not an arms race in progress on strategic nuclear weapons, but continuing reductions over the next 10 years to the lowest levels since the early days of the Cold War. What that reflects is a substantial change in the relationship between the United States and Russia. The treaty doesn't drive the changes. The changes in the relationship drive the treaty relationship. And I think that's important. Also, the withdrawal from the ABM treaty allows us to address a threat to the United States and its friends and allies that didn't exist when the ABM treaty was written, when at that time basically a very limited number of states had access to ballistic missile technologies. Now almost thirty states have access to ballistic missile technologies, so that the threat that the United States faces is not from an opposing superpower, but from states that are relatively small, weak economically, that don't have large arsenals, but that might have a handful of ICBMs on which they could place nuclear, chemical or biological warheads that would threaten the United States and its friends and allies. It's not enough to say that in a crisis that we might have with such a state, that they only fired a handful of ballistic missiles at the United States and only destroyed a few cities. That is not an argument, that is not a result that's acceptable to us. So that the ability to defend, as we have said, against handfuls, not hundreds of incoming ballistic missiles...is a basic responsibility that a democratic government owes to its innocent civilians. So we think that what we've done is entirely consistent with our president's constitutional obligations to defend our civilian population, and with the ABM treaty gone, to be able to share ABM technology with friends and allies and protect their innocent civilian populations as well. Question: I know that during the previous administration, the Senate voted against the ratification of the [CTBT] treaty. However, the people in Japan, especially many of us are more and more concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear testing by your country. Bolton: Well, the ratification or not of the CTBT, in our judgment, would not affect nuclear proliferation. The states that are seeking nuclear weapons now are typically states that are already in violation of their treaty obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. If they were determined to seek nuclear weapons, violating two treaties rather than violating one treaty would not stop them. The issue for the United States on the CTBT is our responsibility to ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile, the umbrella of protection, that protects all of us - protects Japan as well. The feeling in the Senate when the treaty was rejected was that a complete ban on testing, essentially forever, did not leave us with the necessary level of assurances that we would need both on safety and reliability. Now, we have an active stockpile stewardship program to try and verify those two requirements, but I don't think it would be prudent to say that that program alone is enough. That's basically why the Senate rejected the treaty and why this administration is not going to resubmit it. For all of those who benefit from the protection of the stockpile, I think it's critical that they believe and have reason to believe that the stockpile is safe and that it's reliable in case it needs to be used. I think those who are our opponents also need to know that we consider the stockpiles safe and reliable. So those are the reasons that we have decided not to seek ratification of the CTBT, and I think our level of activity against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-nuclear in particular demonstrates how important we consider the objective of non-proliferation. So it's not from any lack of interest or lack of dedication to preventing the spread of nuclear technology that we're not ratifying the CTBT. It's a question of making sure that our stockpile does what we commissioned it to do in the unlikely event we would ever need to rely on it. Question: Do you have any other choice, any alternative to the CTBT treaty? Bolton: No. Under existing obligations, the amount of testing that could be done was already quite limited and we had extensive transparency with the Russians already, so that the CTBT was simply the last step. The issue is whether, in effect, you're going to reject the scientific method entirely and say there's never going to be any experimentation. There's no plan - and I want to stress this - no plan to change the moratorium against testing, but it is a question that our scientists and technicians are looking at now from the point of view of long-term safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. Question: If the presidential moratorium is still in place, why are you trying to shorten the preparation period for the testing? Bolton: Because if somebody were to say to the president, "Mr. President, the nuclear stockpile is no longer reliable," and the president were to say, "Alright then, I guess we need to begin testing again, how long will it take?" and the response was "Three or four years," I think the president would be shocked to learn that. Now this is a matter of really, I think, just a question of prudent planning for contingencies that we hope are not going to occur. But we have the capacity at the Nevada test site with a certain amount of work to reduce the time, so that if there were a substantial change in the international geo-strategic environment, or if there were a question of the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile, that a president should have the option to resume testing and not to leave the nation at risk for a period of three or four years while we work back to testing. I mean, to say - think about this for a minute - if somebody were to conclude that a substantial part of the stockpile were not reliable, that would mean that the nuclear umbrella had failed. That is something that we have not contemplated during the entire post-war period, when the United States led the international coalition to preserve freedom and keep the peace through the use of a strong deterrent. Saying that the stockpile was not reliable would mean that the deterrent had failed, and that's a very dangerous proposition in an insecure world. So I just regard this as a matter of prudence and careful planning. Question: Mr. Secretary, you talked about the nuclear umbrella, and I would like to know how you see an impact of 9/11 in the emergence of transnational terrorists who can make use of the weapons of mass destruction, because it seems to me that first of all, those guys can't be deterred, and second of all, those guys don't depend on ICBMs to deliver those weapons. They will take whatever unconditional means possible. So it seems to me that from the Allies point of view the necessity or credibility of an extended deterrence or nuclear umbrella is decreasing. Bolton: Well, I think the likelihood that we would have to use nuclear weapons in a Cold War style nuclear scenario is definitely reduced, and that's why we're able to reduce our operationally deplored strategic warheads by two-thirds over a 10-year period. I think that September 11 also tells us that there are people who are not susceptible to traditional theories of deterrents. I quite agree with you. As bad, as tragic as September the eleventh was, how much worse would it have been if Al Qaeda had nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons? So it means that the incentive for terrorist groups to try to acquire these technologies is substantial, and requires the kind of unremitting non-proliferation and counter-proliferation efforts that we're currently engaged in. It also means that, for the states that sponsor terrorism, the states that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and those two categories of states are almost completely the same, the same states that are sponsors of terrorism on our list, anyway, are pretty much the same states that are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, that if they reach that capability, we can't count on deterrence from stopping them from using them, which is why we need missile defense. We need other kinds of defense too. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said, we need defense not just against ballistic missiles, but against cruise missiles and against a range of other non-conventional forms of attack. But it's one of the reasons why facing asymmetric threats of the kind we're talking about, not traditional state versus state or large state versus large state, of the kind of confrontation that we're familiar with over the centuries, but from concern over the threat that a small, impoverished, dictatorial regime could pose to nearby democracies with just a handful of missiles and a small number of nuclear weapons. If such a state existed and threatened a city in Japan, it wouldn't matter that the country threatening might have an economy one-tenth the size of this country. It could still kill thousands and thousands of people and that risk would be unacceptable. ... Question: [W]hat kind of discussions are you going to have with China or the current status of the discussion on the missile defense issue with China? Bolton: Well, I don't think China reacted very decidedly one way or the other in a public fashion when we announced our withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Obviously, it was a bilateral treaty, so it was just between us and Russia. And I don't think China's decisions on its own strategic force levels were much affected by our withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which is not to say there aren't a lot of questions raised by what China is doing with its strategic forces and what it's doing with its proliferation activities, and we do discuss those with China, but I don't think our decision on the ABM treaty has really played into their thinking one way or the other. ... Question: Mr. Bolton, can I ask about the issue of Iraq? I think that President Bush repeated again, again and again that he wants to replace the leadership of Baghdad, but few countries are going to support it. So how are you going to explain the seriousness of the threat posed by Baghdad? Bolton: Well, I think actually there's not a lot of disagreement internationally with the policy of regime change. There's been comment on hypothetical ways in which that might occur, but in terms of the notion that the region would be more peaceful and more stable with a different regime in Baghdad, I don't really think there's much disagreement on that. There's no question that Baghdad, since it threw out the UN inspectors, has moved aggressively to acquire capabilities in the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons area and is seeking greatly enhanced ballistic missile capabilities as well. The pattern of activity is something that poses a very grave concern to us because of what Saddam Hussein's history of the use of these weapons has been in the past - and as recently as the invasion of Kuwait just over ten years ago. I don't doubt that there will be a need for explaining more fully what we know Saddam Hussein is up to, and I think at an appropriate time we'll make that information available. We're certainly having private conversations with a number of governments now, and we're also working to make sure that if Saddam does allow UN weapons inspectors back in that they are as prepared as possible to conduct inspections that will show just exactly what his efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction are. We have experience in that area, we're aware of his extensive efforts at what we call denial and deception to avoid detection of what his efforts are, and we would work with the inspectors to overcome that as well. It is a profound threat to international peace and security in the region, and it's typical of the threat that we see from states that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction around the world. It's something that we think is increasingly important, that all governments, particularly democratic governments, see in the conduct of the states that are seeking to acquire these weapons, and why they're such a threat to a peaceful way of life. ... Question: Given the very grave concern you have about the leadership in Baghdad, how quickly do you think you have to deal with him? Bolton: Well, I don't think there's any particular deadline, but it's clear that given his efforts to acquire WMD, the risk grows daily that he will have such a capability and could inflict very substantial damage. And it's one reason why I think it's only prudent that we consider what steps are taken in a very measured and careful fashion. And I think that's exactly what we are doing. ... Question: What constitutes a condition to decide to launch an attack on Iraq? Bolton: Well, I think that would be speculation for me to get into that. You know, there are a lot of ways that regime change can occur. People speculate a lot about military attack, but there are lots of other ways that regime change can occur as well, and there are substantial elements of resistance to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Diaspora. There are already substantial tracts of northern and northeastern Iraq under the control of the Kurds that Saddam Hussein does not control, and I think there are strong aspirations among the Iraqi populace to be free of this dictator. So it's not at all dictated one way or the other how regime change is going to occur, but I think what the president's trying to do, and I think he's making the arguments very compellingly, is to try to get people to understand why a government that terrorizes its own people, but is consistently seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, is a threat that you cannot simply allow to remain in place. The president said in the State of the Union message, "Time is not on our side," which is an unusual thing for an American to say. I mean, we're very optimistic, always looking to the future. He said, "Time is not on our side, and we cannot allow the world's most dangerous people to acquire the world's most dangerous weapons." If they acquire that capability, they can threaten everybody else. Imagine, for example, if during the Kosovo crisis, Slobodan Milosevic possessed ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads capable of reaching Western Europe. It certainly would have affected the way Western Europe treated the Kosovo affair. Well, I can imagine the impact here of the threat from a country with ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. I think that it's important that - and it's incumbent on the United States I would say this - to spell out what those consequences would be, and therefore why a regime like Iraq's does pose such a threat, and that is what we are trying to do. Question: Going back to the North Korean issue, it is supposed that North Korea is very much afraid of a possible US attack on Iraq. After that it may fall upon them...and that is said to be one of the reasons why they are so active these days in dialogues with the outside world. But in the talks with President Putin of Russia just last week, they didn't announce any new measures - for example, the extension of the stoppage of missile testing. Are you a little bit surprised that there was no new announcement of that sort? Or disappointed a little bit? Bolton: I'm not disappointed. That's for sure. You know, I can't judge what motivates the North Korean regime. Why it would allow widespread starvation among its people while pursuing ballistic missile technology is hard to understand. What we can do, I think, from our position is insist on North Korean performance, ceasing its proliferation activities and coming into compliance with its international obligations. That is how we have to judge what our response to North Korea will be ultimately. Question: When you refer to North Korea's proliferation activities, I think you mentioned this a bit earlier, but you could you be a bit more specific on what types of things you are concerned about? Bolton: Well, we're particularly worried about - given what we know they're doing and have done in the past in the field of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, biological weapons and a range of other things and given we know their outward proliferation activities in several of these areas - it's a problem that is posed both by what capacity North Korea itself may have and by what capacities it is helping other rogue states deliver. So it's really two-fold. It's a question of what they're doing themselves indigenously, and what other states they're helping through supply of components, technology and that sort of that thing-and what they may be acquiring from other states as well. You know, there a lot of things that we know that we can't discuss publicly for obvious reasons. A number of you asked earlier about trying to persuade people to our view on Iraq or other areas. It's a dilemma that we face, and it's legitimate for people to say, "Well, tell us what you know." And yet there are occasions when, since we don't comment on these matters publicly, we're just constrained from discussing as much as we do know. But we watch North Korea and we watch the rogue states very carefully, and we feel confident that when we talk about their proliferation activities we have the evidence to support it. Question: The nature of the attack against Iraq next time around will be preemptive. You won't wait for Iraq to launch an attack on US soil or US nationals, right? Then how, if you don't disclose that intelligence information, how do you expect that you can persuade other nations to support you? Bolton: Well, I don't necessarily agree with the premise of the question about what comes next on Iraq. As I say, there a lot of ways in which regime change can be accomplished. But I think there will come a point when we do explain, at least at some level, what we know. I think another way it might happen is if Iraq, after almost four years, finally lets UN weapons inspectors back in and then obstructs them, as Saddam obstructed UNSCOM almost from the first moments it landed in Iraq after the Persian Gulf War and obstructed it and tried to hide what it was doing right up until the time it actually expelled the inspectors. I think that's important for people, should the inspectors go back in and should Saddam Hussein obstruct them, to recognize what that means, which is he has something to hide. It's not because it's an inconvenience to one of the presidential palaces, it's because there's something he doesn't want them to see. Question: When you say that the US declined to certify that North Korea is in compliance, does that have any actual concrete ramifications? Bolton: Well, it doesn't this year because we waived the fact that we were not able to certify, and there were other conditions that had not been met in the past and those were waived as well. So the precise practical effect this year was that there was no practical effect. But I think what it signaled was a feeling on our part that we wanted to demonstrate what we believed was actually happening in North Korea, and that's why we declined to certify. Question: Regarding the speech that you're planning in Seoul, there was a report last week in The Washington Times that one draft of the speech contained the phrase "axis of evil." Do you plan to use that speech to describe ... Bolton: Jeez, I've got to keep something secret here so that somebody comes to my speech. You know, I personally think it's okay for a senior American official to quote the President of the United States. That's what I think. How's that for a dramatic statement? "State Department Official Supports President." Question: Back to this morning's paper. We read an article by [former Secretary of State] Mr. James Baker III about ... Bolton: My former boss. Question: Right. A new UNSC resolution to call on another inspection, and then that resolution would authorize military attacks on Iraq. What is the discussion on that idea...in the State Department? Bolton: Well, there's no decision on that point, although as Secretary Baker's article indicates, first, we could rely simply on Article 51 of the UN Charter; second, we could rely on the existing ceasefire Resolution 687. I guess I should reveal I was assistant secretary of state for international organizations during the first Bush administration when we wrote Resolution 687, so I could do everything but recite it by heart for you. Essentially, the point is when Iraq accepted the ceasefire, it accepted the obligation to comply with all of 687's obligations, including free and unimpeded access for UN weapons inspectors. Its failure to grant free and unimpeded access constitutes a breach of the ceasefire resolution, which in effect therefore terminates the ceasefire and reactivates Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force against Iraq, and that's what Baker's article says this morning. His argument is somewhat different, saying that it would be better to get another resolution because of the Clinton administration's failure to object strenuously enough when Iraq expelled the inspectors in 1998. He says further that if we sought a resolution and failed it would nonetheless leave us in a stronger position to launch military action. Like all arguments that Jim Baker makes, I have the highest respect for him and I think they'll be considered very seriously, but there's no decision on the point. It's pretty clear from the article, though: He supports the use of military force for regime change purposes in Iraq. And while we're counting former secretaries of state and so on, and where they line up, you can put Baker in the support column. I'm going to give a speech tomorrow about the biological weapons convention. That will be interesting too - I can guarantee you. Source: Transcript - Under Secretary Bolton Fields Queries on Iraq, N. Korea, US State Department (Washington File), August 26. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |