Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation US-Russia Statement on Fissile Material Reductions, September 16Joint Statement by Spencer Abraham, US Secretary of Energy, and Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, September 16. In their May 2002 Summit in Moscow, the President of the United States of America George W. Bush and the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin agreed to establish a joint experts group to work out proposals on near- and long-term, bilateral and multilateral means to reduce inventories of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. The United States and Russia recognize their common interest in guaranteeing the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, strengthening nonproliferation, and combating terrorism by accelerating the disposition of excess nuclear weapon materials. Ambassador Linton Brooks and First Deputy Minister Mikhail Solonin co-chaired the Expert Group on Accelerated Nuclear Material Disposition. We highly appreciate the results of the Expert Group. We are pleased with the accelerated pace the group maintained, finishing the report three months earlier than their initial deadline. The report will be forwarded to Presidents George W. Bush and V.V. Putin. The Expert Group identified several areas where joint cooperation could lead to reduction of HEU over-and-above commitments already in place under existing agreements. These include: 1. Creation of a strategic reserve in the United States from Russian HEU down blended into Low Enriched Uranium (LEU); 2. Increase in the rate and quantity of HEU converted to LEU under the Nuclear Material Consolidation and Conversion Project; 3. Use of LEU down blended from Russian HEU to fuel reactors in Western countries; 4. Use of Russian HEU to fuel selected United States research reactors, until cores are converted to LEU, and 5. In parallel, work on accelerated development of LEU fuel for both Soviet-designed and United States-designed research reactors. The Expert Group also identified potential new areas of near-term cooperation for weapon plutonium disposition. These include: 1. Fabrication of additional mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for use in Russian reactors, utilizing additional weapons-grade plutonium under the 2000 Agreement, and 2. A variation of this scenario that would provide for the possible use of some MOX fuel in Russia and for leasing or exporting of the remainder for use in other countries. The Expert Group will continue to study additional options that could be relevant in the future, taking into account their technical feasibility, impacts on commercial nuclear fuel market industries and required financial resources. Source: US Department of Energy, http://www.energy.gov. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |