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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation IAEA General Conference, September 16-20The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, 46th Regular Session, Vienna, Austria, September 16-20; IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/About/Policy/GC/GC46.
I. Message from UN Secretary-General, September 16'Strengthening of Nuclear Non-Proliferation More Critical Than Ever, Secretary-General Says', UN Press Release SG/SM/8383; message delivered to the General Conference on behalf of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala. As all of you and, indeed, the world at large, are all too aware, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation remain unfinished tasks. The strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including concrete steps to reduce the number of and dependence on nuclear weapons, is more critical than ever for the continuing sustainability and credibility of that regime. The IAEA continues to play a central role in that regime through its long-standing work to verify compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Effective measures are also needed to reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. I urge the IAEA to continue its initiatives for this purpose, including its programmes aimed at safeguarding nuclear material against non-peaceful uses, ensuring the safety and security of nuclear facilities, and preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear material and radiation sources. Despite these concerns, peaceful uses of nuclear technologies and materials will continue to be an important factor in economic development - not only in producing nuclear energy, but also in helping to fight disease, enhancing agricultural production, managing water resources and monitoring the environment. The IAEA must do its utmost to address the real concerns about safety and waste, and transform nuclear energy into a force for progress. I look forward to working with the IAEA in facing these and other complex challenges, and I wish you success in your important deliberations. II. Statement by IAEA Director General, September 16Statement by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, September 16; IAEA website (http://www.iaea.org). IntroductionRecent years have witnessed important changes and events relevant to every aspect of our work. The urgent need for a strengthened safeguards regime was graphically illustrated by our findings in Iraq. Similarly, the necessity of upgrading nuclear safety worldwide has been made abundantly clear in the post-Chernobyl era. More gradually, in the technology area, the role of nuclear power as a major source of energy supply and as a mechanism to mitigate climate change has been undergoing a steady re-evaluation - though it continues to be subject to mixed views - while other nuclear applications have gained broad recognition by many of our Member States as tools of choice for sustainable development. And just in the past twelve months, in nuclear security and the necessity for rapid improvement were made visible by the events of September 11th of last year. All these changes and events have had a profound impact on our activities and our priorities. And, I have to add, during this entire period of evolution, the Agency has been subject to a zero real growth budget. ... Verification of Nuclear Non-ProliferationThe universalization, consolidation and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including concrete steps to reduce the number of and dependence on nuclear weapons, are more important than ever for the continuing sustainability and credibility of the regime. The Agency continues to be central to that regime through its verification system. Safeguards Implementation Report for 2001In the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2001, the Agency was able to conclude that in the 141 States (and in Taiwan, China) which have safeguards agreements in force, no indication was found of diversion of nuclear material or misuse of facilities or equipment that had been placed under safeguards. On this basis the Agency concluded that the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. Moreover, for several States - each of which had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force - the Agency was able to provide broader assurance - not only about declared but also about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities. I am pleased to note that the levels of goal attainment for 2001 were comparable to those of 2000 - although the amount of nuclear material and the number of facilities under safeguards continued to increase. Status of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional ProtocolsDuring the past year, the Agency redoubled its efforts to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols in accordance with relevant General Conference resolutions. Regional seminars were held in Lima, Almaty and Johannesburg, with the active engagement of the host countries and generous support by the Government of Japan. These seminars were intended to deepen the understanding of participating State officials about the role of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in promoting global and regional security objectives. Since last year's General Conference, new safeguards agreements entered into force for Kuwait, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mali and Yemen. Ten States signed additional protocols, and additional protocols entered into force for China, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Mali, Panama and South Africa. Despite this incremental progress, the number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force remains well below expectations. Forty-eight States have yet to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to bring safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, and additional protocols have entered into force for only 28 States. I would urge all States who have not done so to conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements and additional protocols at an early date. For the Agency to provide the required assurances, it must have the required authority. Completion of Framework for Integrated SafeguardsThe Secretariat has continued its efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the Agency's safeguards system and make it more cost-efficient. A major milestone was the completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards and its presentation to the Board of Governors in March. The practical effect is that, for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force and in which the necessary safeguards conclusions have been drawn, the Agency will be able to implement safeguards in a way that makes the verification process more robust and more efficient. Integrated safeguards, and the conceptual framework that guides them, usher in a new system of verification that is more comprehensive in its outlook and more effective and efficient in its measures. Naturally, further evaluation, newly available technology and practical experience and feedback gained through implementation will be used to refine elements of integrated safeguards as we proceed. While this integration ultimately offers the potential for cost reductions, changes to the safeguards system will have to continue to be driven by increased effectiveness and not merely by cost considerations. As countries bring their additional protocols into force - particularly those with large nuclear programmes - the workload will initially increase, but reductions will ensue after the initial conclusions have been drawn and integrated safeguards initiated. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to IraqFor nearly four years, the Agency has not been in a position to implement its mandate in Iraq under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and related resolutions. At the time of our last inspection in December 1998, we reported to the Security Council that - based on our inspections over a period of more than seven years - there was no indication of Iraq having achieved its goal of producing a nuclear weapon, nor were there any indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon usable material of any practical significance. Since that time, however, the Agency has been unable to draw any conclusion or provide any assurance regarding Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the Security Council resolutions. It will therefore be essential for the Agency to resolve, upon recommencement of inspections, the key issue of whether the situation regarding Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities has changed in any material way since December 1998. Currently we have no additional information that can be directly linked without inspection to Iraq's nuclear activities. Resumption of inspections is therefore a crucial step towards providing assurance to the international community that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme has been neutralized and is not being revived. In May and July of this year, I participated in two rounds of talks between the United Nations Secretary-General and Iraq. During these meetings we made it clear that with the return of inspectors to Iraq, and provided that Iraq co-operates in all respects, the Agency could be in a position in about one year to report to the Security Council that as regards nuclear activities the conditions for the suspension of sanctions under Resolution 1284 had been met. I would therefore join the UN Secretary-General in urging Iraq to accept the resumption of inspections without delay. This indispensable step is clearly in the interests of both the international community and Iraq itself. I should note that, with the co-operation of Iraq, an inspection of declared nuclear material subject to safeguards was again completed in January this year, pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement. However, these NPT measures - as I have often emphasized - are no substitute for the broader and more intensive Security Council mandated verification measures that are necessary for the Agency to provide the assurances sought by the Council. I should also point out here that Resolution 1409, adopted by the Security Council earlier this year, requested the IAEA, in consultation with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), to evaluate applications submitted to the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme related to the export of products and commodities to Iraq, in order to identify nuclear related items referred to in Resolution 687 or in the Goods Review List referred to in Resolution 1409, to determine whether such items are either prohibited or require prior approval by the Sanctions Committee. Since the adoption of this resolution, the Agency has been receiving and processing nearly 1,000 such applications per month. Status of Safeguards Agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of KoreaSince 1993, the Agency has been unable to implement fully its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Agency continues to be unable to verify the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration - specifically, that the DPRK has declared all the nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards under its NPT safeguards agreement. Despite many rounds of technical discussions, no tangible progress has been made. In accordance with the Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the USA, however, the Agency since November 1994 has been monitoring the "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite moderated reactor and related facilities. As I have made well known for a number of years now, our estimation is that the work required to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration could take about three to four years, assuming full co-operation by the DPRK. This verification work is a basic obligation under the DPRK's safeguards agreement, as well as a prerequisite for the delivery of key nuclear components under the Agreed Framework. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has informed the Agency that it has provided the DPRK with a construction schedule for the light water reactor project, according to which the delivery of the key nuclear components for the first reactor would occur by 2005. Further delays in the start of the Agency's activities to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial DPRK declaration could lead therefore to a delay in the KEDO project. I would urge the DPRK to agree to the initiation of this long overdue verification process without further delay, and to that end start soon the necessary dialogue with the Agency on this as well as on other issues relevant to the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the Agency. Application of Agency Safeguards in the Middle EastPursuant to the mandate given to me by the General Conference, I have continued to consult with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, and the development of model agreements that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in that region. Once again, I regret to report that I have not been in a position to make progress in the implementation of this important mandate of direct relevance to security in the Middle East. As before, I will continue to exert every effort within my authority and, I trust, with the co-operation of all concerned, to move this mandate forward. Progress on Nuclear Arms Control EffortsDuring the past twelve months the US and Russian presidents signed a treaty to further reduce their strategic nuclear arms, and agreed to remove additional amounts of fissile material from military use. Also, at their June Summit, the G8 Heads of State established a Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and made a commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the next ten years to fund, inter alia, the disposition of fissile materials. These are clearly important steps that hopefully will lead to others. In this regard, preparatory work under the initiative by Russia and the USA to submit nuclear material released from their military programmes to Agency verification has now been largely concluded. Experts from Russia, the USA and the Agency have examined the technical, financial and legal issues associated with a future role in the verification of weapon origin fissile material. They have agreed that the technical solutions developed under that initiative could allow the Agency to verify any form of fissile material without disclosing sensitive information. Preliminary estimates of verification costs have been made, and a legal framework for this verification has been developed. I will naturally report to the Board once Russia and the USA have indicated the timing, modalities and types of material that they are ready to submit to Agency verification. ... Protection Against Nuclear TerrorismLast year, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the USA, the General Conference adopted a resolution requesting that I initiate a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. We moved rapidly to respond. In just over five months, a plan of enhanced and new activities to upgrade nuclear security worldwide was developed by the Secretariat and approved by the Agency's Board of Governors. The total cost of implementing the plan - initially through voluntary contributions - was estimated to be on the order of $12 million per year. Twelve Member States and one non-governmental organization - the Nuclear Threat Initiative - have pledged extrabudgetary funding totaling nearly $8 million for this year, and other Member States have pledged or already contributed in kind. While the primary responsibility for addressing these concerns continues to lie with individual States, it is essential that we work together to ensure effective national and international systems of nuclear security. I therefore call on all Member States to continue to contribute the resources needed for full implementation of our plan of activities. The plan covers eight areas: physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; detection of malicious activities (such as illicit trafficking) involving nuclear and other radioactive materials; strengthening of State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control; security of radioactive sources; assessment of safety and security related vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities; response to malicious acts or threats thereof; adherence to international agreements and guidelines; and enhanced programme co-ordination and information management for nuclear security related matters. Given the broad range of these activities, which cut across a number of Agency programmes, we have adopted an integrated approach to their implementation. I also established, in January, an Advisory Group on Nuclear Security (AdSec). Implementation of the plan has started in earnest: two International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions have been conducted in Romania and in the Czech Republic, one follow-up mission has been performed in Bulgaria and another two are being planned in Lithuania and Ukraine. Training courses and workshops have been held in a number of countries on physical protection, design basis threat, State systems of accountancy and control, and nuclear forensics. A workshop was held in Jakarta to promote enhanced nuclear security and combat illicit trafficking in that region under the ASEAN framework. A seminar was held in Islamabad to present Agency guidelines on the self-assessment of security related vulnerabilities of nuclear installations. The Secretariat also supported a trilateral Czech Republic-Hungary-Slovakia meeting on physical protection, as well as a EUROPOL conference on responding to threats of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. The Agency in December 2001 assisted in locating and securing a number of radioactive sources found in Georgia. Subsequently, in April, representatives from eight countries, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Agency reached agreement on a plan to conduct radiological surveys of selected areas in Georgia, to locate and secure additional orphaned sources. These surveys were supported by in-kind contributions from a number of countries, and carried out by teams that included Georgian specialists. In Kabul, in late March, the Agency secured a powerful cobalt source abandoned in a former hospital, and several smaller sources recovered from disused university laboratories. Given the current conditions in Afghanistan, this recovery operation highlighted both the safety and security issues associated with radioactive source control. In Uganda a week later, we helped to secure a source that may have been stolen for illicit resale. And in mid-June, a partnership was forged between Russia, the USA and the Agency to locate and secure powerful radioactive sources that were lost or abandoned during the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. In addition, the Secretariat is working to enhance the current characterization of radioactive sources, to assist Member States in identifying those sources that deserve the most stringent controls. Consensus has also been reached among Member States on strengthening the existing Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and the text of the new strengthened Code has been developed. As I have made clear on a number of occasions, the Agency's TC [Technical Cooperation] programme may prove to be an efficient mechanism for implementing some of these activities. In fact, the TC programme has for some time been playing an important role in upgrading safety and security in a number of recipient Member States, particularly in Europe, as part of their TC programmes and upon their requests. However, I would reiterate that while we view the improvements of nuclear security to be of high priority, they should not be implemented at the expense of other existing high priorities in the TC programme. The TC priorities will remain those of the recipient States, and the programme will continue to be demand driven. Additional funds will have to be provided to this financially stretched programme if it is to implement some of the new security activities. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear MaterialWith regard to the effort to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the group preparing a draft amendment to the Convention met again here in Vienna two weeks ago. I regret that, despite four meetings and agreement on the overall objective, there is still no final agreement on a text for the amendment. This is clearly very disappointing, given the importance that physical protection has acquired over the last year. The group has adjourned its meeting until November. Therefore, a diplomatic conference of the Parties does not seem possible this year as I had hoped. The activities relevant to protection against nuclear terrorism demonstrate the Agency's ability to respond rapidly and with flexibility to emerging priorities. Much more, however, clearly needs to be done. The Agency security assessment services (IPPAS missions) and threat assessment training are high priorities in helping to protect nuclear facilities and material against attack, sabotage or theft, and must be extended to cover other nuclear facilities, including research installations that also have nuclear and other radioactive material. We also must continue, as an equally high priority, to work to bring radioactive sources under appropriate control, whether in use, in storage, in transport or outside regulatory control. In the medium term, we are continuing work on a comprehensive set of guidelines and recommendations as benchmarks for nuclear security measures. And we must move toward global adherence to a strengthened CPPNM that will cover nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. ... Financial SituationWe are currently also in the process of calculating the resources - both human and financial - required to implement the proposed programme for the next biennium [2004-2005]. For fifteen years, despite steadily growing responsibilities, the regular budget of the Agency has been essentially frozen. This policy has resulted in inadequate levels of financing for many high priority activities in most of our areas of work. A primary example is in the safeguards area, where the Agency's legal obligations can no longer be met within the existing level of funding. The increase in the number of facilities and the volume of safeguarded materials - coupled with the need to strengthen the safeguards system - requires additional inspectors, additional equipment and other support measures. With the chronic and corrosive degree of underfunding of this programme, we are coming close to being unable to provide credible safeguards. This is a fact with which we all have to reckon. For us to fulfil our many statutory and other legal obligations and high priorities, in all our areas of activity, while continuing to maintain appropriate balance between development and other statutory activities, an increase in the level of resources for the next biennium is a must. An urgent need therefore exists for us all to think creatively about how we can rectify this untenable situation, and I am encouraged to see that a number of Member States have begun to do just that. The financial situation of the Agency is compounded by the fact that more than 30 Member States remain in arrears in amounts equal to or in excess of their regular budget contribution for at least two years. Since 1998, the Agency has offered Member States measures under which their arrears are consolidated and made payable in annual installments over a number of years, to facilitate the payment of their regular budget contributions. The results to date have been disappointing. Only two members - Belarus and Kazakhstan - have made use of payment plan agreements. I would urge all States to take the necessary action to pay their financial obligations in full and on time. This is a collective responsibility that all have to shoulder. ... III. Statement by US Energy Secretary, September 16'Remarks by US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, International Atomic Energy Agency 46th General Conference, Vienna, Austria, September 16, 2002'; US Energy Department (http://www.energy.gov). It is an honor to be here again, and I have the distinct pleasure of delivering to you a message from President Bush: "I send greetings to those gathered for the 46th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For more than four decades, the IAEA has helped to make the world more secure by working to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting the safe use of nuclear energy. The United States remains steadfast in its strong support for these important efforts. In our dynamic world, the IAEA is a pillar of stability, standing on the front line of international initiatives to secure nuclear materials and counter the threat of international terrorism. The United States appreciates the IAEA's valuable contributions to the war against terror, as well as its prompt and energetic response to last September's terrorist attacks. The threat from nuclear proliferation remains real, immediate, and dangerous. We must ensure that the IAEA has the resources it needs to carry out its mission effectively. I encourage all member states to adopt and implement the Additional Protocol and the safeguards agreements required by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. I was pleased earlier this year to submit to the United States Senate the US Additional Protocol, and my Administration will press for its ratification. The United States also applauds the IAEA's global leadership on issues such as the safe use of nuclear energy. We will continue to support your work in these areas, and many others. For more than four decades, the IAEA has helped to make the world more secure by working to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Best wishes for a successful conference.' It was one year ago tomorrow that I appeared before the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As we gathered together last September, you will recall, the horror of the attacks six days before was foremost in our thoughts. The work of the IAEA has always been important, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War. The events of last September, however, demonstrated to all just how important this organization is. After 9/11 there could be no doubt - if there ever was one in the first place - that terrorists would use nuclear materials to harm innocent citizens of the civilized nations of the world - if they could acquire them. President Bush immediately recognized the need for swift action - and he took it, pledging the full power of his office and of the United States to the task of winning a global war against an insidious and ruthless foe. He immediately recognized the need for an international effort - and he launched one. My appearance here last September was a part of that effort. And the message I delivered on behalf of the President made very clear how much he believes that we all must band together to counter the sorts of dangers that September 11th illuminated. I'm pleased to say, in the intervening twelve months we have done much on that front. Working together, we have made substantial progress toward securing a world that does not live under the constant threat of nuclear terror. Each of us has undertaken specific actions in our own countries. In the United States, for instance, we have focused on enhancing security at our facilities. A number of you, I am sure, have taken similar specific steps that, added up, are vital to a concerted international effort. We also have to work to strengthen and expand existing relationships, and, here, I would like to discuss the measures taken with our counterparts from the Russian Federation. Inspired by the close new relationship between our peoples forged by President Bush and President Putin, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev and I have worked very closely over the past year on a host of nonproliferation issues. We have been meeting regularly to discuss the need for greater cooperation, improved steps for protection of dangerous materials, enhanced international physical protection of fissile materials, and ways to boost safety and security in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Most importantly, Minister Rumyantsev and I have been able to work out an agreement for an expanded and accelerated US-Russian effort to strengthen the protection of nuclear material. In part due to this agreement, we're now planning on completing our efforts to secure Russia's nuclear material years ahead of previous schedules. And may I add, the Minister and I are personally engaged in supervising this agreement on a day-to-day basis, to ensure that no bureaucratic obstacles hinder this important work. The new relationship between our two countries is one of the reasons our joint operation to secure highly enriched uranium at the Vinca reactor in Belgrade was a success. The IAEA's involvement in this operation was crucial, and all of us should be proud of it. But ultimately it could not have been accomplished without the close working relationship our two nations have fostered. Another crucial step we have taken with Russia has been an agreement to work together to improve the security of radiological sources that might be used to develop a radiological dispersal device (RDD) - a so-called "dirty bomb." Because the materials that might be used in an RDD exist in many forms - medical isotopes, radiography sources, and sources that provide electric power - it is clear there are many serious challenges confronting us. And let me stress that none of us should underestimate the implications of the use of any kind of radiological device, be it a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb. While dirty bombs are not comparable to nuclear weapons in destructiveness, they are far easier to assemble and employ. And while the physical destruction they would cause is comparable to conventional explosives, the disruption caused by widespread contamination is far greater. And it is disruption that terrorists seek. We are looking at what we can do to preclude the sources presenting the greatest threat from becoming useful to terrorists. Accordingly we have created a joint US-Russian task force that is examining this threat in depth to recommend appropriate responses. Because of the large amounts of nuclear materials that remain unsecured in the former Soviet Union in the wake of the Cold War, we have focused special attention on working with our Russian counterparts on these issues. There can be no question, however, that the effort to secure dangerous nuclear materials must be an international undertaking that relies upon a multitude of partners. Accomplishment of the goals we all share will require cooperation and care and sacrifice - each of us must be prepared to do his part. Controlling nuclear material must remain high on the international agenda because there are regimes in the world that seek nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes and that cooperate with and sponsor terrorists. My President laid out the case against one such regime before the United Nations last week. As he said, "If an emboldened regime were to supply these weapons to terrorist allies, then the attacks of September 11th would be a prelude to far greater horrors." I think what we have accomplished by establishing the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates the seriousness of purpose we all must lend to this effort to control nuclear material. President Bush's leadership has been crucial to bringing the international community together to find the common ground necessary to counter a threat common to each of us. And the Global Partnership's pledge of up to $20 billion toward new and expanded cooperation projects to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues is an important step. That money will go a long way toward preventing terrorists or those that harbor them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and technology. This means addressing the problem at its source - such as the dismantlement and destruction of weapons, the disposition of fissile materials, and the employment of former weapons scientists. It means developing and maintaining effective border controls, as well as enhanced law enforcement efforts aimed at thwarting the trafficking in illicit nuclear materials. And it means further strengthening the international framework for accomplishing these things, such as by moving expeditiously to bring near-term closure to the IAEA initiative to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. As I said at the outset, the role of the IAEA is absolutely critical to ensuring the success of non-proliferation efforts on a global basis. This is especially true for our work on Radiological Dispersal Devices. I mentioned the efforts my government has made. While safeguarding weapons usable materials is and should be the highest priority of this organization, it is also important for all of us in the IAEA to act as partners to reduce the threat of other radioactive nuclear materials that could be used for dirty bombs. To that end, I call on all states to join the United States in working with the IAEA to address the threat posed by the potential misuse of radiological materials. I am proposing an international conference to discuss how the international community can build on the tripartite initiative launched by the United States, Russia, and the IAEA and extend our efforts globally. The IAEA has the technical expertise to help states respond appropriately to this problem. We must work together to develop appropriate national standards for accounting for and tracking radiological materials. The IAEA can help member states identify resources needed to safely dispose of unneeded radiological materials, serve as a clearinghouse for critical information, and make invaluable experience available to member states, as they address this concern. Addressing the threats posed by radiological dispersal devices cannot be put off to be handled later. The detailed instructions on how to make dirty bombs found in al Qaeda's caves make horrifyingly clear our need to have a firm plan to reduce the vulnerability of the most dangerous of these materials to acquisition by those seeking to use them as weapons of terror. There's one other area I think bears discussion at this meeting, and that has to do with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I do not believe the events of the last year should cause us to diminish to any degree our efforts to employ nuclear power for peaceful purposes on a broad international basis. There is no question that all of us should reexamine our security at nuclear reactors - both when building new ones and at older facilities. Richard Meserve, the chairman of our Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is here with us today, and he is doing precisely this in the United States. The simple truth is that we need to keep nuclear power as a key part of our energy mix. ... In advocating a heightened role for civilian nuclear power in the world's energy mix, however, it is incumbent upon us to address several issues. Obviously we have to increase safety, and we're doing that. A safer type of nuclear reactor is one of the goals of the programs many of us are pursuing together. Obviously, too, we have to deal with nuclear waste. The US took a very large step in this regard by electing to move forward with a permanent repository for our nation's radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain in the western United States. I know other nations are taking different approaches, but the point is that it can be done safely and responsibly. And, of course, it is imperative that we keep the goals of nonproliferation in mind. Ensuring that civil nuclear power is used only for peaceful purposes and that the materials that could be used to create nuclear weapons are properly secured and accounted for are fundamental to the long-term future and promise of nuclear energy. Developing proliferation-resistant technology is central to the long-term and peaceful use of nuclear power. It is very encouraging that we are on our way toward finding solutions to all these issues. I will meet with representatives of several countries in Tokyo later this week to hear about the impressive progress made by the Generation IV International Forum, which is leading the way toward safer, more economic, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear power. Our continued focus on advanced research will pave the way for a brighter future for civilian nuclear energy in this Century. There is one last topic I'd like to address, and it deals with the bottom line - a bottom line that became all too evident one year ago last week. That bottom line is this: We live in a very dangerous world. If we are going to address all the problems we have outlined here and through the Global Partnership program, we simply are not going to be able to do it on the same amount of money we have in the past. The purpose of the IAEA has never been greater. We all can be proud of the good job this organization has done so far, but as Director General El Baradei has just made so clear in his statement, it needs more resources to expand in the areas that September 11th forces us to address. The IAEA safeguards budget needs to be increased so the IAEA can fulfill its treaty-mandated safeguards obligations - the fundamental basis of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And in addition, the IAEA needs more resources to expand its efforts to help protect against the threat of nuclear terrorism. Because of the immense stakes, these threats require us to take new actions, to redouble our efforts, again and again. The United States is prepared to increase the amount of money we spend on such issues, because the purpose here justifies an increased investment. So I am today pledging an additional $3 million investment from the United States for IAEA nuclear security initiatives. I think we all recognize that each member nation of the IAEA will need to increase our annual contributions in the years ahead if we expect the IAEA to effectively address the threats posed by dangerous nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. I have every confidence we will. IV. US-Russia-IAEA Trilateral Initiative Meeting, September 16'IAEA Verification of Weapon-Origin Fissile Material in the Russian Federation and the United States', IAEA Press Release PR 2002/13, September 16. Russian Federation Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev, United States Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei met in Vienna on 16 September 2002 to review the status of the Trilateral Initiative and agree on its future direction. The parties concluded that the task entrusted to the Trilateral Initiative Working Group in 1996 has been fulfilled. The work completed has demonstrated practical approaches for IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material designated as released from defence programmes in classified forms or at certain sensitive facilities. The work included the examination of technical, legal and financial issues associated with such verification. The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament steps undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. IAEA verification of the materials declared excess to nuclear weapons programmes and made subject to this Initiative would build international confidence that this material will never again be used in nuclear weapons. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei recognized the value of the groundbreaking work completed over the last six years. Building on the work completed, they directed the technical experts to begin without delay discussions on future possible cooperation within the trilateral format. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei agreed that the Principals would meet again in September 2003 to review progress within the trilateral format. V. ResolutionsSafeguards: September 20, adopted without a vote'Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Model Additional Protocol', GC(46)/RES/12, September 2002. The General Conference, ... (b) Convinced that the Agency's safeguards promote greater confidence among States and thus contribute to strengthening their collective security, ... (f) Welcoming the fact that as of September 20, 2002, 68 states and other parties to safeguards agreements have signed additional protocols, 28 of which have entered into force and 1 is being provisionally applied pending entry into force, ... (j) Noting the considerable increase in the Agency's safeguards responsibilities since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ... 1. Calls on all member states to give their full and continuing support to the Agency in order to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its safeguards responsibilities; 2. Stresses the need for effective safeguards in order to prevent the use of nuclear material for prohibited purposes in contravention of safeguards agreements, and underlines the vital importance of effective safeguards for facilitating co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; 3. Bearing in mind the importance of achieving the universal application of the Agency's safeguards system, urges all states which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible; ... 7. Requests all concerned states and other parties to safeguards agreements which have not yet done so to sign additional protocols promptly; 8. Welcomes the fact that all nuclear-weapon states have signed protocols additional to their voluntary-offer safeguards agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol that each nuclear-weapon state has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that state, and as consistent with that state's obligations under article 1 of the NPT, and invites such states to keep the scope of those additional protocols under review; ... 10. Requests the states and other parties to safeguards agreements having signed additional protocols to take the necessary measures to bring them into force as soon as their national legislation allows; 11. Welcomes the completion by the Agency of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards laid down in document GOV/2002/8 and requests the Secretariat to implement integrated safeguards on a priority basis in an effective and cost efficient manner...; 12. Urges the Secretariat to continue to study in the context of implementation of integrated safeguards the extent to which the credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, including those related to enrichment and reprocessing, in a state as a whole could lead to a corresponding reduction in the current level of verification efforts with respect to declared nuclear material in that state and a corresponding reduction in costs associated with such efforts; 13. Notes the commendable efforts to some member states, notably Japan, and the IAEA Secretariat in implementing elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19...and recommends that the other member states consider implementing elements of that plan of action, as appropriate, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols... Nuclear Terrorism: September 20, adopted without a vote'Progress on Measures to Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism', GC(46)/RES/13, September 2002. The General Conference, (a) Recalling the 45th General Conference's unequivocal condemnation of the attacks which took place on September 11, 2001, ... (h) Mindful that every member state might face the threat of nuclear terrorism and would bear serious consequences if any were attacked, (i) Noting United nations Security Council resolution 1373's call for all states to work, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, to prevent acts of terrorism, (j) Reaffirming the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as the only multilateral legal instrument dealing with the physical protection of nuclear material, (k) Recalling that other international agreements, negotiated under the auspices of the Agency, are relevant to nuclear security and the physical protection of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources against the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, (l) Noting also the contribution of Agency safeguards agreements and additional protocols to preventing illicit trafficking, deterring and detecting diversion of nuclear materials, ... 2. Takes note of the progress report submitted by the Director General in document GC(46)/14 on nuclear security and measures to protect against nuclear terrorism; 3. Notes the arrangements implemented to provide funding for the Nuclear Security Fund through voluntary contributions, and notes further that those funding arrangements will be reviewed in one or tow years in accordance with the relevant decision taken by the Board of Governors in March 2002; 4. Calls upon all member states to continue to provide political, financial and technical support, including in-kind contributions, to improve nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism; and to provide the Nuclear Security Fund the political and financial support it needs; 5. Welcomes the activities in the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and the prevention and detection of and response to illicit activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials undertaken by the Agency to improve nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism; 6. Welcomes the Agency's programmes and renewed efforts to assist states in establishing and strengthening systems of radiation protection appropriate to their circumstances, which may include national registries of radioactive sources, and in particular commends the Secretariat and member states for the progress that has been made in upgrading radiation protection infrastructure through the relevant Model Projects and commends the Secretariat for the action it has taken in a number of countries, in cooperation with member states, to locate, secure and remove orphan sources; 7. Urges member states to strengthen their national efforts to secure all radioactive sources within their borders, and invites member states to take note of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and to consider means of ensuring its wide application; 8. Also welcomes the activities undertaken too provide for an exchange of information with member states, including continued maintenance of the Illicit Trafficking Database programme, as well as to improve the exchange of information by making best use of the modernised database, and invites all states to participate in the Illicit Trafficking Database programme on a voluntary basis; 9. Welcomes the decision of the Director General to convene and maintain an Advisory Group on Security...and invites the Director General to suggest that the Advisory Group place further emphasis on the issue of the security of radioactive sources, its scope, the associated threat and possible solutions; 10. Appeals to states that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and encourages states to apply the physical protection objectives and fundamental principles endorsed by the Board of Governors and set out in document GOV/2001/41; 11. Notes with concern the lack of progress of the work of the open-ended group ofd legal and technical experts convened by the Director General in order to prepare a draft of a well-defined amendment aimed at strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and calls for the early finalisation of the negotiations on such an amendment; 12. Takes note of the steps taken by the Secretariat to ensure confidentiality of information related to nuclear security...; 13. Invites the Director General to continue to implement...Agency activities relevant to nuclear security and protection against nuclear terrorism... North Korea: September 20, adopted without a vote'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea', GC(46)/RES/14, September 2002. The General Conference, ... (b) Noting with serious concern both the lack of tangible progress reflected in the Director General's report contained in document GC(46)/16 and that the DPRK has still not allowed the Agency to implement its NPT comprehensive safeguards agreements with the DPRK, (c) Recalling further resolution 825 (1993)...and...statements by the President of the United Nations Security Council, particularly the request to take all steps the Agency deems necessary to verify full compliance by the...DPRK with its safeguards agreement with the Agency, ... (e) Noting the previously stated intention of the DPRK to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the continuing IAEA-DPRK discussions on outstanding safeguards issues, (f) Noting that additional factors, as described in the Director General's report..., further underline the need for full and timely cooperation by the DPRK with the Agency in regard to the verification of the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration, (g) Regretting the withdrawal of the DPRK from the Agency and expressing the hope that the DPRK will rejoin, (h) Welcoming again both the presentation by the Agency in May 2001 of a detailed proposal for the first concrete steps needed for the verification of the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration and the Secretariat's continuing readiness to start this work at short notice, (j) Noting that some interaction has taken place between the Agency and the DPRK since the forty-fifth General Conference, but that this has not led to tangible progress on important outstanding issues, and (j) Noting ongoing political developments in North East Asia and expressing the hope that they may contribute to progress towards full implementation of the relevant agreements, ... 2. Recognises the important role of the IAEA in monitoring the freeze of nuclear facilities in the DPRK...; 3. Notes with growing concern that, although the DPRK is a party to the NPT, the Agency continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the DPRK and is therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK; 4. Reiterates its deep concern over the continuing non-compliance of the DPRK with the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement; 5. Urges the DPRK to comply fully and promptly with its safeguards agreement, inter alia by taking all steps the Agency deems necessary to preserve all information relevant to verifying the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration; 6. Encourages strongly the DPRK to respond positively and without further delay to the Agency's detailed proposal of may 2001 for the first concrete steps needed for verification of the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration; 7. Calls upon the DPRK to begin promptly full co-operation with the Agency for the verification of the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration in view of the considerations contained in paragraph six of the Director General's report...and the independent technical judgment stated since 1999 by the Director General that the work required would take three to four years assuming full cooperation by the DPRK... Iraq: September 20, adopted by 62 votes to 0 with 25 abstentions'Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to Iraq', GC(46)/RES/15, September 2002. The General Conference, (a) Recalling all United Nations Security Council resolutions relevant to the situation in Iraq and the Agency's role in Iraq, ... (d) Noting with increasing concern that three and a half years have passed since the Agency has been able to implement its mandate in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions, and that the Agency thus remains unable to provide any assurances regarding Iraq's compliance with its obligations under those resolutions, (e) Noting as a new development that Iraq's Foreign Minister in a letter of 16 September to the United Nations Secretary-General announced the decision of the Iraqi Government to let the weapons inspectors return to Iraq without conditions, (f) Noting that the Agency's technically coherent picture of Iraq's past clandestine nuclear programme and nuclear activities has not changed, and that, provided the Agency can satisfy itself that Iraq's nuclear activities have not changed since December 1998, remaining questions and concerns about Iraq's past nuclear programme would not prevent full implementation of the Agency's ongoing monitoring and verification plan, but, (g) Concerned by the assessment in document GIC/INF/2001/10 that the longer the suspension of Security Council resolution-related inspections in Iraq lasts, the more difficult it will be and the more time will be required for the Agency to re-establish a level of knowledge of the status of Iraq's nuclear-related assets comparable to that achieved at the end of 1998, (h) Noting that the IAEA's physical inventory verification (PIV) took place in January 2002 and that, with the cooperation of the Iraqi authorities, the Agency inspectors were able to verify the presence of the declared nuclear material remaining in Iraq, stressing, however, that such inspections do not serve as a substitute for the Agency's verification activities required by the relevant Security Council resolutions, nor do they provide the assurances that Iraq is in compliance with its obligations under these resolutions, ... 2. Calls upon Iraq to implement in full and without further delay all relevant Security Council resolutions, and in this regard to cooperate fully with the IAEA and provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to enable to Agency to carry out its mandate; ... 4. Welcomes the fact that the Agency remains prepared to resume implementation of its ongoing monitoring and verification plan at short notice; 5. Stresses that the Agency must, on return to Iraq, resolve the key issue of whether Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities have changed since December 1998, 6. Requests the Agency to continue to identify and investigate remaining questions and concerns mentioned in preambular paragraph (f), along with any other aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme that may come to its knowledge... Middle East: September 20, adopted without a vote'Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East', GC(46)/RES/16, September 2002. The General Conference, (a) Recognising the importance of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - both globally and regionally - in enhancing international peace and security, ... (c) Concerned by the grave consequences, endangering peace and security, of the presence in the Middle East region of nuclear activities not wholly devoted to peaceful purposes, (d) Welcoming the initiatives regarding the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in the Middle East and recent initiatives regarding arms control in the region, (e) Recognising that full realisation of these objectives would be promoted by the participation of all states of the region, ... 2. Affirms the urgent need for all states in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all states in the region and as a step in enhancing peace and security in the context of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ); 3. Calls upon all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and appropriate steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a mutually and effectively verifiable NWFZ in the region, and invites the countries concerned to adhere to international non-proliferation regimes, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a means of complementing participation I a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and of strengthening peace and security in the region; 4. Takes note of the importance of the on-going bilateral Middle East peace negotiations and the activities of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and regional Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East, including the establishment of an NWFZ, and calls on the Director General, as requested by the participants, to render all necessary assistance to the working group in promoting that objective; 5. Requests the Director General to continue consultations with the states of the Middle East to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of model agreements, as a necessary first step towards the establishment of an NWFZ in the region...; 6. Calls upon all states in the region to extend their fullest cooperation to the Director General in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to him in the preceding paragraph; 7. Further calls upon all states in the region to take measures, including confidence-building and verification measures, aimed at establishing an NWFZ in the Middle east; 8. Calls upon all other states, especially those with a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to render all assistance to the Director General by facilitating the implementation of this resolution... © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |