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John Bolton Speech on Export Controls,
October 3
'John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, Keynote address to the Fourth International
Conference on Export Controls, September 30-October 3, 2002,
Warsaw, Poland'; US State Department transcript.
When the United States and other nations began working together
on the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction over
30 years ago, the world was a very different place, where the
largest source of the most dangerous materials was contained within
two superpowers. Weapons of mass destruction were considered
weapons of last resort. Non-state actors were not yet linked to
abundant sources of supply. With the end of the Cold War, the
international security environment changed and the proliferation
problem increased. When the world witnessed the destructive
potential of terrorism on September 11, we were reminded of the
need to remain steadfast in recognizing emerging threats to our
security, and to think one step ahead of those who wish to do us
harm.
The United States believes that the greatest threat to
international peace and stability comes from rogue states and
transnational terrorist groups that are unrestrained in their
choice of weapon and undeterred by conventional means. There can be
no doubt that, if given the opportunity, terrorist groups such as
al-Qaeda would not hesitate to use disease as a weapon against the
unprotected, to spread chemical agents to inflict pain and death on
the innocent, or to send suicide-bound adherents armed with
radiological explosives on missions of murder. To ensure that
terrorist groups and their state sponsors are never able to gain
access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, or the means to
deliver them via missile, the United States is employing a variety
of methods to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
including multilateral agreements, diplomacy, arms control, threat
reduction assistance, export control and other means where
necessary.
Export control, the subject of our discussions this week, forms
a key component in our efforts to stem proliferation and terrorism.
Proliferation concerns are growing, more states are seeking
increasingly advanced WMD capabilities, more states are entering
the supply market, and all of this is compounded by the fact that
terrorists are also seeking weapons of mass destruction. A strong
export control system, properly enforced, can stem the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, related
dual-use items, and advanced conventional arms. Our critical
mission to keep sensitive goods and technology out of the hands of
terrorists and their state sympathizers requires us to enact strict
measures at the national level, to work bilaterally to assist other
countries in upgrading their tracking and enforcement capabilities,
and to use multilateral partnerships to help standardize and
strengthen export control laws. This annual conference has proved
successful in providing a venue for policy, licensing, and
enforcement officials to further those efforts on all levels.
This year's conference is co-hosted with our ally Poland. This
is the first year where a recipient country of export control
assistance has been chosen to co-host this important event. Poland,
a member of all four multilateral export control regimes, is an
excellent example of what national and multilateral efforts can
achieve. Poland has made great strides in tightening its export
control system within the past 10 years. It adopted a new export
control law in 2001, refurbished its border crossings, and has
strengthened its capabilities to enforce export controls.
Previous conferences have addressed information sharing, the
intangible transfer of technology, catchall regulations, and
industry compliance programs. This year's conference will focus on
the changed environment in the wake of the September 11 attacks
with an emphasis on countries efforts to standardize procedures,
share information, eliminate opportunities for criminal or
terrorist efforts, and improve enforcement.
As we look at the changes in our world over the past year and
review the task ahead of us, we must recognize the success or
failure of any multilateral effort to control the flow of sensitive
technology and dangerous material rests on a common purpose and
agreement on the source of the threat. Terrorist groups seek to
acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons any way they can;
state sponsors of terrorism are actively working to acquire weapons
of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems. Here lies a
dangerous confluence of nefarious motives, and we must prevent the
one from abetting the other. To do this, we must maintain an
unvarnished view of the proliferators, and we must disrupt their
supply of sensitive goods and technology before it contributes to
an increased WMD capability or falls into the hands of terrorists
or other rogue states.
Without question, the states most aggressively acquiring WMD and
their means of delivery are Iran, Iraq and North Korea, followed by
Libya and Syria. It is no coincidence that these states, which are
uniformly hostile to the United States, are among the ones we
identify as state sponsors of terrorism.
Iran, one of the most egregious state sponsors of terror,
is known to be seeking dual-use materials, technology and expertise
for its offensive biological and chemical weapons programs from
entities in Russia, China and Western Europe. It is also seeking to
upgrade its large ballistic missile force with the help of Russian,
North Korean and Chinese firms. Our intelligence clearly shows that
Iran seeks to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, and thus we are
extremely concerned about transfers to Iran of dual-use materials.
Once a rogue state's intentions become apparent, we can safely
assume that the dual-use technologies it acquires will be used for
nefarious purposes.
Iraq, despite UN sanctions, maintains an aggressive
program to rebuild the infrastructure for its nuclear, chemical,
biological and missile programs. In each instance, Iraq's
procurement agents are actively working to obtain both
weapons-specific and dual-use materials and technologies critical
to their rebuilding and expansion efforts, using front companies
and whatever illicit means at hand. We estimate that once Iraq
acquires fissile material - whether by securing the materials to
build an indigenous fissile material capability or by acquiring
fissile material from a foreign source - it could develop a nuclear
weapon well within one year. We also believe that Iraq has
continued to procure materials and technology, including controlled
items, for its biological, chemical, nuclear and missile weapons
programs.
North Korea is the world's number one exporter of missile
technology and equipment. These sales are one of its major sources
of hard currency, which in turn allow continued missile development
and production. As the CIA publicly reports: "North Korea has
assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing technology source
for many programs. North Korean willingness to sell complete
systems and components has enabled other states to acquire longer
range capabilities."
Libya continues to pursue an indigenous chemical warfare
production capability, relying heavily on foreign suppliers for
precursor chemicals, technical expertise, and other key chemical
warfare-related equipment. Moreover, Libya has not abandoned its
goal of having an offensive BW program. It continues efforts to
obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials, technology,
and expertise from foreign sources. Further, it continues its
longstanding pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the suspension of UN
sanctions against Libya increased its access to nuclear
technologies.
Syria seeks to expand its chemical weapons program and,
through foreign assistance, improve its capability to produce
biological weapons. Syria is also pursuing assistance from North
Korea and firms in Russia for its missile development programs.
Syria has become a major transshipment point for goods and
technology going to Iraq.
Among these regimes flow dangerous weapons and dangerous
technology. A growing concern is that cooperation among
proliferators is increasing, recipients have become suppliers, and
this "onward proliferation" presents yet another difficult problem.
These are the critical areas of concern for those of us in the
export control business, and it is on these rogue regimes in
particular that we should focus a watchful eye. States such as
these rely heavily on front companies and illicit arms traders to
seek out arms, equipment, sensitive technology and dual-use goods
for the benefit of their WMD programs. These front companies are
experts at concealing the actual end-use of an item and in finding
the path of least resistance for shipping an illicit commodity. If
there is a loophole in a law or a weak border point, these
companies will try to exploit it. All too often they succeed.
In an effort to plug the holes in this system, we are
encouraging countries around the world to adopt export controls
that conform to international standards, to put in place effective
licensing procedures and practices, and to back them up with
capable enforcement mechanisms. Through the Export Control
Assistance Program, we are helping other countries to control the
movement of goods and technology through their borders. For
example, Customs officials in a Caspian Basin country who had
received our training recently stopped a suspicious shipment headed
through their territory that contained military aircraft parts
destined for a false end-user in a Middle Eastern country.
Officials immediately contacted our export control advisor at the
US Embassy for advice on how to proceed. This case is still in
process, but demonstrates the progress we are making raising
awareness about export controls and strengthening enforcement
capabilities in the region.
We are also working to expand and update the inventory listed in
the four multilateral export control regimes, so as to keep ahead
of demands for new technology that could be used for the production
of weapons of mass destruction. The control lists must reflect not
only the items that could contribute to a full-scale WMD program,
but also those that would be useful to terrorists. The United
States imposes strict rules on its industry, the same ones it asks
other countries to apply to theirs. US companies are restricted
from doing business with firms involved in supplying equipment,
technology, or expertise to known proliferators or entities that
could potentially aid terrorists.
Thwarting the acquisitive aims of rogue states and terrorists
will require the determination and resourcefulness of all the
countries represented here today. Sensitive, dual-use goods and
technologies cannot be controlled effectively unless there is broad
consensus to do so, and unless these goods and technologies are
consistently denied to those we have identified as proliferators.
With the consequences of failure so great, we simply cannot afford
to have weak links in our common export control chain. As President
Bush said in June, "The gravest danger to freedom lies at the
perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread
of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with
ballistic missile technology occurs, even weak states and small
groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations.
Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught
seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to
blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends - and we will
oppose them with all our power." I encourage you to take full
advantage of this conference by discussing how to further
strengthen export controls and enforcement.
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© 2002 The Acronym Institute.
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