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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, November 14/15Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, November 14-15 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.ceip.org.
I. 'The Highest Priority': Speech by Spencer Abraham'Ten Principles for Nuclear and Radiological Materials Security', speech by Spencer Abraham, US Secretary of Energy, November 14. [L]et me say how pleased I am to discuss a matter on which I place the highest priority - the ongoing efforts of the United States to secure and reduce nuclear and radiological materials. The Bush administration is fully committed to this agenda, and I think what we have accomplished by establishing the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction indicates the seriousness of purpose we bring to it. Indeed, this is a challenge shared by all the civilized nations of the world, and certainly President Bush's leadership has been crucial to bringing the international community together to find the common ground necessary to counter a threat common to each of us. The president made this clear last May, when he and President Putin jointly committed to "work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material." It was a commitment taken very seriously throughout our administration and is reflected prominently in our recently published national security strategy. That document asserts that "strengthened nonproliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technology, and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction" are a very high priority for this administration. The materials necessary to build nuclear weapons - highly enriched uranium and plutonium - may not be widely available, but they can be extraordinarily dangerous. We know that too much uranium and plutonium remains under-secured. The materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices, or RDDs, while perhaps not as dangerous, are available in virtually every country in the world. Addressing the non-proliferation question is among the most serious responsibilities I have as Energy Secretary, and one on which I have spent a lot of time working. In nearly two years in office, I've organized my thoughts into 10 principles for nuclear and radiological security. Today I want to discuss these 10 principles, how the United States is implementing them, and I want to highlight the challenges the world faces. I hope you find this approach useful. Principle One: The threat continues to evolve. Over the past decade or so, thinking about the proliferation threat has focused mostly on rogue states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, or the materials needed to acquire them - and on the problems caused by under-secured nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. Now, the international community is additionally focusing on threats posed by terrorist networks that seek such weapons and materials. Such threats have long been a concern, of course, but now they are a far greater focus of attention. And much more attention is being paid to the risks associated with the misuse of radiological materials - a concern hardly thought about until the past year. September 11, 2001, made these concerns more immediate. That day demonstrated the unblinking commitment that terrorists have to mass destruction - including their blithe indifference toward killing thousands of innocents. If these purveyors of hate managed to acquire the deadly materials necessary for nuclear or radiological weapons, they would surely find ways to use them. The United States is meeting this challenge by accelerating programs, increasing their funding, and looking for new approaches. To that end we have forged a strong relationship with my counterpart from Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, who has played a key role in the progress we are making. Moreover, in three speeches to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna since 9/11, I have emphasized a simple but irrefutable message: We are all vulnerable, so we all have to work together. Principle Two: The margin of error is small. In the past decade alone, the IAEA has reported about 200 attempts at the illicit smuggling of nuclear materials. Some reports are more credible than others, and most involve materials not always considered a threat. But this phenomenon nonetheless tells us a number of things. First, there are any number of states and sub-state actors interested in acquiring nuclear or radiological materials. Second, we do not know what we do not know. In February 2002, the CIA's National Intelligence Council concluded, "We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, although we do not know the extent or magnitude of such threats." And third, even a little success in smuggling or theft can have a great impact. Terrorists or rogue states do not need exorbitant quantities of nuclear or radiological materials to achieve their ends. Based on IAEA calculations, only a relatively small amount of highly enriched uranium could be enough for a nuclear explosive device. And if the goal is to build a radiological dispersal device, or "dirty bomb," the amount can be even less, depending on the material used. So there is no margin for error. We all need to apply the best technologies, the best know-how, experience, and expertise that we can to this problem. The United States is employing a multi-pronged strategy, expanding materials protection programs, accelerating its assistance to other countries under the Second Line of Defense program, working with our own customs organization, and expanding research and development to detect nuclear materials. Others need to think about similar steps. Principle Three: The problem demands a broad array of responses. Nuclear and radiological materials security is a multifaceted problem. Physically securing nuclear materials is critical, but it is only part of the solution. I find useful the following framework for thinking about how to address nuclear material security: First, nuclear material can be made more physically secure. Border monitoring, export controls, and other measures, including the application of safeguards by the IAEA, also help to ensure that nuclear materials stay where they are supposed to be. Second, nuclear material can be consolidated. By reducing the number of sites storing this material, we can reduce vulnerability to threat or sabotage. Third, nuclear material can be reduced. The total amount of this material needs to be brought down - for example, through down blending HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium), or burning plutonium as MOX (Mixed Oxide - plutonium/uranium nuclear fuels) fuel in nuclear power plants so that it can no longer be used for nuclear weapons. Finally, the production of excess nuclear material can be ended. The value of reducing nuclear materials increases greatly, if at the same time no more such material is being produced. What all this tells us is that we need to address the nuclear materials security problem comprehensively - in all its dimensions. Principle Four: There are good reasons to focus on Russia. A January 2001 report noted that the fall of the Soviet Union led to "the dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear weapons, (and) over a thousand metric tons of nuclear materials," and that Russia lacked the infrastructure "to assure that chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and weapons-proliferating states." We've paid so much attention to Russia because that is where the material is. And we have had much success. In part, that is due to Russia's own strong commitment to reducing nuclear materials threats - as I have seen firsthand on numerous occasions. As a result, Russia and the United States have enjoyed unprecedented cooperation over the past few years. This has led to a number of agreements and accomplishments:
The United States and Russia have taken major steps to secure Russian materials, but there is much more to be done. Which brings me to my fifth principle: Principle Five: This is a worldwide problem demanding international solutions. I'm gratified to see steps being taken by many countries. Working with the United States, for example, the Ukrainian government has made significant progress in protecting materials at nuclear facilities. The United States recently completed critical physical protection improvements at the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez, in the Czech Republic. And the United States assisted Uzbekistan in completing security upgrades that reduce the vulnerability of sensitive facilities in that country. The international cooperation that was demonstrated in the recent effort at the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia, where enough nuclear material for more than two nuclear weapons was removed, was exemplary. Russia, Yugoslavia, the IAEA, and an American non-governmental organization, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, all made critical contributions to this operation. Vinca laid bare the potential security risks posed by HEU fuel at former Soviet-supplied research reactors in approximately 17 countries. This fuel needs to be repatriated to Russia, where it will be safer from the risk of theft or diversion. We - and the Russians - are committed to accelerating the conversion of these reactors, and removing the fuel posing proliferation risks. I'd be remiss if I didn't mention a recent effort in the Republic of Georgia that demonstrated international cooperation at its finest. With the help of the IAEA, Georgia recently recovered six radioactive thermal generators, or RTGs, that had been in that country since the days of the Soviet Union. These Soviet-era portable heat sources were radioactive and considered highly vulnerable. I'm proud that DOE is now assisting the Georgians in improving the security of these generators. The G-8 Global Partnership well demonstrates how nations can cooperatively address nuclear and radiological material security challenges. The G-8 has committed $20 billion over the next 10 years to pursue critical non-proliferation projects. I believe that the Global Partnership has the potential to establish a coordinated non-proliferation effort with a global reach - as reflected in the substantial resource commitments that the G-8 allies are making to address proliferation threats. The Global Partnership will affect United States nuclear non-proliferation programs in many ways. Allied contributions could help us move forward on plutonium disposition, for example, or permit us to accelerate the closure of Russia's remaining plutonium production reactors. The visible involvement of the world's leading economies in cooperative non-proliferation efforts demonstrates that eliminating such threats is a global responsibility. The challenges we face are global; the solutions must be global as well. The United States is already working closely with our G-8 partners to identify ways to carry out the ambitious goals the Global Partnership has established. I personally believe that the Global Partnership will make a major contribution to reducing nuclear and radiological materials threats, and it will be exciting to see its potential unleashed over the next few years Principle Six: The potential misuse of radiological sources needs to be addressed. I've focused my comments on nuclear materials security. But September l1 has also led many of us to think more about the potential misuse of radiological sources that are both much more abundant and much less secure. These materials could be used to make radiological dispersal devices, so-called "dirty bombs." This is an urgent problem and we need to treat it as such. As I said in Vienna at the IAEA General Conference two months ago, "Addressing the threats posed by radiological dispersal devices cannot be put off to be handled later.… (We need) to reduce the vulnerability of the most dangerous of these materials to acquisition by those seeking to use them as weapons of terror." Since September 11, the United States has begun working bilaterally with Former Soviet Union [FSU] states, including Russia, to enhance the security of radiological sources. We are also working with Russia and the IAEA as part of a "Trilateral Initiative" to locate Russian-origin sources in the FSU and return them to Russia for final disposition. Other nations must be involved to address this threat. At the recent meeting of the IAEA, I proposed an international conference to promote greater international appreciation of this potential danger, and to begin mapping out steps to address this problem. The relative simplicity of constructing a dirty bomb, coupled with the widespread availability of suitable radioactive material, made it clear to me that the civilized nations of the world must come together to address these threats. In fact, this is an area where virtually all the international community should play a role. Yesterday IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei and I formally announced that such a conference will take place next March in Vienna. I look forward to working with him and with all of you to identify meaningful steps we can take to reduce the threat posed by RDDs. Principle Seven: The IAEA's contribution is invaluable. I am gratified that soon after I speak, Director General ElBaradei will share his views with you. Over the past two years I have had the opportunity to work very closely with the Director General. He is a serious and deeply committed man. In working with him, I have come to appreciate just how important the IAEA is to helping nations grasp nuclear material security problems. The United States has worked with the IAEA to help conduct 30 training courses on physical protection, including one just a few weeks from now in Shanghai. Over 800 students from more than 60 countries have attended these courses. The IAEA is also leading the international effort to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material - a critical instrument in our efforts to better secure fissile materials - and we look forward to concluding that effort. Once agreed, the strengthened Convention will establish a new foundation to help all states adopt a set of shared standards, with respect to how we handle and transport nuclear material. Particularly in light of heightened concerns over terrorism, I encourage the international community to consider steps to help establish "best practices and procedures," thereby ensuring nuclear materials are as safe and secure as they can possibly be. The IAEA is also instrumental to our efforts to address radiological security issues. The IAEA can help its members identify resources to safely dispose of unneeded radiological materials and make available its invaluable experience, as those member states address radiological source concerns. But the IAEA needs resources to do its job. At the recent General Conference, I urged an increase in the IAEA safeguards budget. Under my direction, the Department of Energy has made significant voluntary contributions - totaling millions of dollars - to the IAEA to help it fulfill its mission. The United States will continue to support the IAEA strongly, because it is foolhardy to do otherwise. I urge all others to do the same. Principle Eight: Materials security is ultimately a national responsibility. One point that I cannot stress too much is that the responsibility for progress falls on each individual member of the international community. Those of us that actually have plutonium and HEU that could be used in weapons programs bear special obligations, but there is a role - indeed, a responsibility - for every nation. We must move beyond words to deeds. The United States has improved security since the attacks of September 2001. Now we call on other states to take comparable steps, where needed, including for civil nuclear materials. We are prepared to provide expertise and advice where we can. Principle Nine: This is a long-term effort. Many materials security challenges do not lend themselves to short-term solutions. Some of these materials have half-lives of tens of thousands of years. There are multiple dimensions to these problems, and numerous strategies need to be employed - on multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral levels - to address them. Resources must be committed, equipment must be procured and facilities built, and all of us must work together to develop solutions that will stand the test of time. And we need to address many aspects of the problem at once. All that said, these problems should not be judged as too overwhelming to address. Any journey must begin with small steps - this one is no different. Through the cooperative programs I have described, through our leadership in establishing the Global Partnership, and through the personal involvement of the President and his cabinet, the United States is setting in place long-term programs for a long-term challenge. We need others to join us in addressing these threats, however long it takes to achieve success. Which brings me to my last principle. Principle Ten: Success is possible. Two years into my job as Secretary of Energy, I am convinced that despite the enormity of the challenge, success is possible. The risks associated with under-secured nuclear and radiological materials can be reduced. The steps that the international community is taking - in Russia, with the IAEA, through bilateral relationships and international partnerships such as the G-8, through unilateral efforts - demonstrate the seriousness with which these problems are being addressed, and that is all to the good. Working together, we can make the world safer. We owe our people, our children, and their children, nothing less. We owe them a world where nuclear and radiological materials are secure, not just in Russia but elsewhere throughout the world. We owe them a world where terrorists have little chance of getting their hands on these materials - which just might discourage them from trying in the first place. We owe them a world where our borders are secure, and there is little risk of dangerous materials being shuttled about. And we owe them a world where nations work together to achieve these lofty objectives. I have no illusions that such a day is around the corner. But I do believe that through cooperation and determination, it is eventually attainable. And this administration is committed to that objective. II. 'The Asymmetry Remains': Speech by Mohamed ElBaradei'Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Revisiting the Basics', speech by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), November 14. In little more than half a century, the age of nuclear weapons has witnessed the manufacture of more than 125,000 nuclear warheads - most packing a greater explosive force than the "Little Man" device used at Hiroshima. Nuclear weapons testing has resulted in over 2,000 nuclear detonations - in the atmosphere, in space, underwater and underground. Despite the ending of the Cold War, non-proliferation and disarmament challenges abound in all categories of "weapons of mass destruction" - nuclear, biological and chemical - and one enduring legacy of the Cold War is a glut of weapon-usable fissile material, in the form of high enriched uranium and plutonium. And while we have not reached the predictions of the 1960s - of an eventual 15 to 20 nuclear-weapon States - the unfortunate reality 40 years later is that at least eight countries are believed to possess nuclear weapons, and the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world remains elusive. The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But if we are to move forward, I believe it is essential that we revisit a number of the basic assumptions and features of the existing regime, and consider a number of new approaches. Addressing the Asymmetry of the 'Haves' and 'Have-Nots'A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. Different interrelated commitments were undertaken by two distinct groups of States: for the five nuclear-weapon States - that is, States that had manufactured and detonated a nuclear weapon before 1 January 1967 - a commitment to divest themselves of those weapons through "good faith" negotiations; and for all other States, a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, and to accept IAEA verification of all their peaceful nuclear activities, in return for access to peaceful nuclear technology. But the record on upholding those commitments is mixed. Global access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology - related to energy generation, human health, water management, food production, and environmental restoration - has indeed made significant progress, through the technology transfer efforts of the IAEA and others. And the nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings which I will address later. Progress has also been made on the nuclear disarmament front, but much more remains to be done. Nuclear disarmament strategies have for the most part focused on the negotiation of bilateral nuclear arms control agreements between the holders of the two largest nuclear arsenals, and a few multilateral agreements designed to curb the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War as an impetus, some progress was made in the early- and mid-1990s, but the process unfortunately slowed in the latter part of the decade. While the START I Treaty, which entered into force in 1994, made significant cuts in the level of deployed strategic weapons, START II, signed in 1993, has been abandoned. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. These problems can be traced in general to the continuing reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the lack of an overall disarmament strategy. In some cases - for example, the CTBT and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - progress has faltered in part because of perceived doubts about the credibility of the respective verification regimes. These regressions have led to stagnation in the disarmament process and have put a damper on hopes for further progress. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in some cases discarded. This is not to say that there have been no encouraging signs. This summer, the Russian and US Presidents signed a treaty to further reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 and 2,200, respectively, by the end of 2012, and agreed to remove additional unspecified amounts of fissile material from military use. And at their June Summit, the G8 Heads of State established a Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and made a commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the next ten years to fund, inter alia, the disposition of excess weapons-origin fissile materials. But in every fundamental aspect, the asymmetry remains between what US President Kennedy referred to as the "haves and have-nots." Moreover, some nuclear-weapon States have reversed direction, by stressing the continuing value of nuclear weapons in defense of national security interests, including discussions of the feasibility of developing new types of nuclear weapons, and scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In my view, the longer this asymmetry is perpetuated, the more it will become a threat to the very foundation of the non-proliferation regime. As the Canberra Commission stated a few years ago, the present situation "cannot be sustained, [because] the possession of nuclear weapons by any State is a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them." While it may be unrealistic to expect complete nuclear disarmament in the very near future, it is essential that incremental steps be taken by all parties, which would signal a willingness to reduce the volume of and dependence on nuclear weapons, in fulfillment of existing commitments. A crucial step in moving towards nuclear disarmament will be to reexamine the longstanding doctrine of 'nuclear deterrence.' This doctrine remains deeply entrenched in the national security strategies of all the nuclear-weapon States, and continues to be relied on by many non-nuclear-weapon States, through the so-called 'nuclear umbrella' arrangements, as an important feature of their security portfolio. Indeed, irrespective of whatever deterrent effect nuclear weapons achieved during the Cold War, they are progressively losing their value as a currency of power - particularly in preventing local conflicts and in dealing with threats posed by sub-national terrorist groups. Given that the only perceived legitimate use of nuclear weapons is for the ultimate survival of a State, nuclear-weapon States should at the very least be able to move faster towards bringing their weapons inventory to a bare minimum. Strengthening the Verification RegimeThe discoveries of a clandestine nuclear weapon programme in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War made it painfully clear that the IAEA verification system, with its focus on declared nuclear activities and its limited rights of access to information and sites, was not adequate for the IAEA to provide the comprehensive peaceful use assurances required under the NPT. This stark realization prompted the international community to significantly expand the IAEA's verification rights. These new rights were incorporated into a 1997 protocol additional to safeguards agreements, with a request for all States to subscribe to it. For non-nuclear-weapon States with both a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is now able to provide credible assurance not only about the diversion of declared nuclear material but, equally important, about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Regrettably, however, many States have not taken the necessary steps to conclude the required safeguards agreements with the Agency, let alone the additional protocol: 48 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT are still without safeguards agreements, and since 1997, when the Model Additional Protocol was adopted, only 28 such additional protocols have entered into force. Clearly, more work needs to be done to ensure that States take their non-proliferation obligations more seriously; however, I should note that some non-nuclear-weapon States are hedging on their willingness to conclude required additional protocols to their safeguards agreements, by pointing to the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament. Naturally, without safeguards agreements, the Agency cannot perform any verification activities or provide any assurance of non-proliferation. And for States without additional protocols, IAEA rights of access remain essentially the same as in pre-Iraq days. For the IAEA to provide the required assurances, it must have the required authority. It is clear that the success of the IAEA verification regime will depend heavily on achieving universal adherence to the required safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT. The Agency must also have adequate financial resources; despite our growing responsibilities, the safeguards budget, as well as the rest of the Agency's budget, for that matter, has been frozen for over a decade-and-a-half as the result of a blanket zero real growth policy imposed on all United Nations system organizations, irrespective of their responsibilities, priorities or modes of operation. This situation, if continued, will inevitably undermine the Agency's ability to conduct credible verification. Fortunately, recently, a number of Member States - including the USA - have recognized the importance of increasing IAEA resources, and are now advocating such an increase. The IAEA verification regime would also benefit from closer cooperation with Member States in the area of information sharing. Irrespective of what information States might hold relevant to possible non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations, it is only through the IAEA that such information can be corroborated through inspection and conclusions drawn. The value of receiving timely information from States about alleged cases of non-compliance cannot therefore be overemphasized. I can report that good progress is being made in developing a modus operandi for the Agency to receive relevant information in a timely manner; while protecting the confidentiality of information, on the one hand, and respecting the independence of the Agency, on the other. Consistency in Addressing Non-ComplianceThe aspect of non-proliferation that receives the most attention relates to compliance questions - currently, the situations in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Iraq In a recent editorial to the Washington Post, I clarified what I see as the purpose and value of weapons inspections in Iraq. The inspection activities that came to an abrupt halt in December 1998 had successfully thwarted Iraq's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons programme. We had neutralized Iraq's nuclear programme. We had destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless all its facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production - mostly by the end of 1992. We had confiscated Iraq's weapon-usable material - essentially research reactor fuel - and by February 1994 had completed its removal from the country. And while we did not claim that we had absolute certainty, we were confident that we had not missed any significant component of Iraq's nuclear programme. In December 1998, the IAEA and UNSCOM inspection activities in Iraq were brought to a halt, with a military strike imminent. While satellite monitoring and other analytical work has continued since that time, no remote analysis can replace inspections, nor can it enable us to reach conclusions about what has occurred related to nuclear weapon development in Iraq in the intervening four years. The only way to establish the facts is through inspection. With the adoption last Friday of Security Council resolution 1441, we are now preparing to resume our inspection activities in Iraq as early as next Monday, when Hans Blix and I are expected to lead an advance team of inspectors to Baghdad. The success of inspections in Iraq will in my view depend on five interrelated prerequisites: (1) immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq, and full use of all the authority granted to us by the Security Council - including the additional authority provided for in the new resolution; (2) ready access to all sources of information - including timely intelligence information; (3) unified and unequivocal support from the Security Council, with the affirmed resolve to act promptly in case of non-compliance - this, in my view, is the best support that inspectors could have and the best deterrence against non-compliance; (4) active co-operation from Iraq, with a sustained demonstration of its stated willingness to be transparent and to enable inspectors to fulfil their mission without any conditions attached; and (5) the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspection process, free from outside interference, to ensure that conclusions are accepted as objective and credible by all parties. Efforts by national governments to infiltrate the inspection process are ultimately counterproductive, because they lead to the destruction of the very fabric of the process, let alone its credibility. I would hope and trust that, empowered with the appropriate authority and provided with the necessary information, inspectors should be able to verify effectively the disarmament of Iraq. In my view, the use of force should clearly be the last resort, and not the first option. But regardless of how events unfold in the foreseeable future, inspections will be the key, in the long haul, to ensuring that clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weapons - in Iraq or elsewhere - are detected and thwarted. There is no certainty, for example, that a new regime in Iraq, democratic or otherwise, would automatically renounce unconventional weapons, if such renunciation were perceived to be inconsistent with its threat perception. It is essential, therefore, that we make every effort to see to it that inspection - which is central to the entire nuclear arms control effort - succeeds both in Iraq and everywhere else. This requires that we continue to learn from our past experience, that we refine the system, and above all that we continue to work together towards that goal. DPRK The DPRK acceded to the NPT in December 1985, but its safeguards agreement did not enter into force until April 1992, six years after its NPT accession. Shortly afterward, in 1993, the DPRK was declared by both the IAEA and the Security Council to be in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. This is because the Agency has not been provided with the necessary access to information and locations to be able to verify that the DPRK has made a complete and correct declaration of its nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards. Our estimation is that the work required to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration could take up to three to four years, assuming full cooperation by the DPRK. In addition to being a basic obligation under the DPRK's safeguards agreement, this verification work is a prerequisite for the delivery of key nuclear components under the Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK - delivery that could begin as soon as mid-2005. I have therefore continued to urge the DPRK to agree to the initiation of this verification process. Recent information has suggested that, during the past few years, the DPRK has been working, in addition, on a programme to produce high enriched uranium. We have asked the DPRK to confirm these reports, and offered to discuss at a senior level these and all other issues relevant to their coming into compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, which require that all nuclear material in the country be declared and be subject to IAEA safeguards. We have yet to receive a response. As you are aware, comparisons continue to be made between the different approaches adopted with respect to Iraq and the DPRK - two countries in violation of their non-proliferation obligations. Various explanations have been advanced for these differences in approach. Obviously, the two situations differ and are highly complex, and it is understandable that incentives and disincentives - "the carrot and the stick" - have to be used with differing emphases. However, I believe that while differing circumstances may necessitate asymmetric responses, in the case of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations, for the credibility of the regime, the approach in all cases should be one and the same: zero tolerance. Consolidation of the Regime In parallel with the above, we should continue to explore pragmatic ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. A case in point is the approach to the three remaining countries outside the non-proliferation regime. In my view, we should not continue to treat these States only as 'outsiders', but rather induce them to act as partners in the global effort to consolidate the non-proliferation regime and to make progress in nuclear disarmament. A good example lies in the area of export controls. Both India and Pakistan continue to operate some nuclear reactors and related facilities that are subject to IAEA safeguards, yet - due to export controls - neither country is able to secure much-needed nuclear safety equipment and technology. Rather than focusing exclusively on a policy of denial, we must search for opportunities for engagement, through, inter alia, the application not only of sanctions but also of incentives. For example, in exchange for receiving nuclear safety assistance - an exception foreseen under the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - such States might commit themselves to follow the NSG guidelines and to actively support the CTBT and FMCT. Working on New Approaches to Security My final theme relates to the fundamental issue of security. To understand how to move forward, I believe we must examine not only the symptoms but also the underlying causes - the 'drivers' and motivations that give rise to nuclear proliferation. Why, for example, is the Middle East an area of recurring proliferation activity, as opposed to, say, Scandinavia? Clearly, it is the situation of enduring conflict and tension that creates this potential. The same might be said of South Asia, another 'hot-bed' of proliferation concern. In some regions, basic security concerns have been largely resolved - through the 'nuclear umbrella' arrangements to which I referred earlier and through regional arrangements and accommodations. And thus, in regions where security concerns have been addressed, there is little or no 'demand' for weapons of mass destruction. But it should come as no surprise that regions facing a security deficit and unresolved conflict are also the regions with a continuing 'demand'. In each of these problematic regions, the conflicts and proliferation concerns have been around for some time - in some cases sheltered or ignored. In such a regional context, the possession by one country of weapons of mass destruction provides a clear stimulus for their acquisition by others. Thus, for each of these regions, discussions of regional security cannot be de-linked from the settlement of regional disputes and must be addressed in parallel, in a comprehensive manner that takes into account the security concerns of all. A perfect security for one party may be a perfect insecurity for another. One strategy currently emerging involves greater reliance on regional systems of security, like the one that has been developed in Europe. How effective these systems will be remains to be seen. However, in my view, the feasibility of moving forward - not only on proliferation concerns but also towards meaningful cuts in current nuclear arsenals - depends critically on our ability to develop credible alternative security strategies, strategies that do not include nuclear deterrence as a feature, strategies that are functional and upon which all States can rely with confidence. To this end, there is an urgent need to re-energize the collective security system of 1945, as prescribed in the United Nations Charter, through a broader definition of the concept of threats to international peace and security, to encompass not only military threats but also threats that relate to the lack of good governance and the usurpation of people's sovereignty, to the desperate need for economic and social development, and to the denial of human rights. Equally important, there is an urgent need for Security Council reform to better reflect the changing realities of recent decades, and to enable the Council, through clearly defined 'rules of engagement,' not only to respond but also to prevent threats to international peace and security. Areas of reform could include: a functioning mechanism for the settlement of disputes - including as appropriate the resort to international adjudication and arbitration; a smart system of sanctions for dealing with non-compliance, adaptable to different regimes and different situations; readily available and better equipped UN forces to contain and manage incipient disputes; and agreed limitations on the use of the veto power. Conclusion Notwithstanding the challenges I have outlined today, I continue to believe strongly in the contributions that the multilateral treaty regimes make in preventing further proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction. It is worth recalling the words of General Omar Bradley, spoken virtually half a century ago: "We've unlocked the mysteries of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace." I trust that we will all continue to work together to prove that we have learned some lessons since General Bradley spoke those words. III. 'Works in Progress': Speech by Jayantha Dhanapala'The Relevance of Regimes', speech by Jayantha Dhanapala, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, November 15. The title of my remarks today - "the relevance of regimes" - is in fact a conclusion, for regimes do shape the behaviour of states. By buttressing the rule of international law, they bring order to an otherwise anarchic Hobbesian world. To elaborate, however, we must answer some basic questions, including - what are their goals, who sets these goals, who is a member, why do states join, why do they comply, what happens if they do not comply, and how does the regime change over time? And finally, are we better off with regimes than without them? This is no small challenge. Basically, a regime is a framework of rules or expectations that states create to regulate their interactions in an issue area. Regimes exist because of the unacceptable costs of unrestrained competition for selfish benefits without them. Countries join regimes because they recognize that their marginal loss of freedom or sovereignty by joining is far less than their marginal gains of membership. In short, states join regimes because multilateralism pays dividends that unilateralism cannot match. Disarmament Regimes and Non-Proliferation RegimesThis reasoning applies especially to multilateral regimes that deal with weapons-related issues, though the binding nature of the rules of these regimes varies widely as do their memberships. There are legally-binding regimes and there are regimes based exclusively on political commitments. Regimes also differ in their basic goal, as in disarmament versus non-proliferation. Some are more detailed than others in elaborating requirements for transparency and verification. The most legally-binding and universal are the treaty-based regimes aiming at the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Given the desired irreversibility of disarmament, it is not at all surprising that the regimes created to serve this goal would be set forth in formal treaties and that they would also be open to the membership of the entire world community. One could reasonably assume that states would not give up their most deadly weapons lightly - and that they would prefer to rely upon commitments registered in the most obligatory form possible, rather than just policy statements, handshakes, winks, nods, toasts, and other gestures of contingent consent. By contrast, the least-binding controls and most constrained memberships are those that deal strictly with the non-proliferation of such weapons, such as the export control regimes maintained by Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Regimes dedicated only to non-proliferation tend not to be universal and their rules are determined not by the many, but by the few. These rules are agreed in a clubby environment, typically in private meetings. A common denominator of these regimes is the existence of suppliers cartels - what some call "coalitions of the willing" on behalf of global norms, while others, usually from the developing South, believe such regimes are motivated by less noble goals. Many specialists view these regimes as weak since they lack any means of verification and enforcement, a weakness further compounded by their lack of universal membership. Disarmament regimes are different, however, because the goal they seek to achieve is truly universal in scope and undeniably equitable. In this sense, there are no double standards in these regimes - all the parties to the BWC and CWC have agreed to forswear these respective weapons systems. Nuclear-weapon-free zone regimes also confer equal benefits and have symmetrical obligations. The NPT falls into a different category, given the imbalance in the treaty requirements for the two categories of its members - the nuclear-weapon-states and the non-nuclear-weapon states - though all of its parties share a common commitment to disarmament. Despite their differences, both non-proliferation and disarmament regimes remain "works in progress" and must adapt to new challenges. They surely make the world more secure than it would be without them - the "worst-case scenarios" without such regimes are surely far worse than the worst-case scenarios with them. The regimes have especially important roles to play in promoting compliance and confidence-building. Though burdened by conditions attached by some states in becoming parties, the CWC's system of verification includes an organization that can perform on-site inspections and other functions necessary to ensure compliance. Yet the BWC still lacks any such verification mechanism, and the NPT - which never had an executive secretariat - only provides for verifying compliance with nuclear safeguards commitments. For its part, the CTBT also has an extensive global monitoring system, though because the treaty has still not entered into force, the world is left to rely on fragile, voluntary moratoria that a country can end simply by issuing a press release. Hence we find ourselves at a peculiar juncture with respect to these disarmament regimes. Weakened by erratic and often inadequate funding - and deprived of unqualified verification mandates or in some cases relevant institutions to implement them - the utility of these regimes has been questioned by commentators in some of the states that are responsible for these limitations. Some skeptics refuse to credit the treaty-based regimes for the pattern of compliance by the overwhelming majority of their states parties. Other critics and non-parties object that the treaties either are discriminatory or place them at security disadvantages regionally. Though the NPT has specifically been labeled as discriminatory, it remains the only treaty locking the five nuclear-weapon states into a binding legal obligation with respect to nuclear disarmament. With Cuba's recent accession, the treaty now has 188 states parties, just three short of universal membership. While impressive, the CWC (with its 147 parties) and the BWC (with its 144) still have some catching up to do before becoming fully universal. Nevertheless, these treaties together do far more on behalf of global norms than any of the non-proliferation regimes - regimes whose greatest contributions are in complementing efforts to achieve global disarmament goals. The relevance of both types of regimes is determined far less by specific attributes of the regimes, than by the policies and practices of the states that compose them. Their relevance will grow to the extent that states come to understand how regimes enhance their security, especially relative to their alternatives of armed self-help and unilateralism. This is not to say that the regimes are without their problems. Regimes have not grown very evenly across the wide variety of current or emerging weapons systems. Examples of weaponry that are not now subject to regime constraints include - missiles, small arms, light weapons and other conventional arms, outer space weapons per se, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and new types of WMD. All the regimes are weak in the area of enforcement - since none confronts potential violators with mandatory, multilaterally-imposed consequences - unless material breaches are reported to the Security Council and acted upon. We also continue to hear states accusing each other of violating their disarmament or non-proliferation obligations, yet we rarely see any hard evidence to support such accusations. Nor do we see such cases being brought before the UN Security Council for enforcement action - except of course in the case of Iraq. Then there is the problem of the lack of congruency between treaty obligations and domestic laws and policies - a problem that is especially apparent with respect to export controls and nuclear-weapons doctrines. It is also seen in the absence of specialized disarmament offices in governments, and the lack of investment in research and development to support disarmament goals - in contrast to the ample funds available for maintaining nuclear stockpiles and undertaking research on new weapons. Other state actions are limiting the contributions of these treaty-based regimes. Many key treaties are not yet in force, like the CTBT, or have been abandoned, like START II and the ABM Treaty. Some of the new treaties and non-binding regimes lack both disarmament commitments and even the goal of establishing an international means of verification - this includes the Moscow Treaty (SORT) and the soon-to-be-launched International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against ballistic missile proliferation. Many states still have an allergy to transparency. They continue to resist, for example, providing details about how many weapons they have destroyed or possess, and how much weapons-usable material they have produced or are stockpiling. Lastly, treaties have states as their parties - this leaves a gap in the rule of law with respect to the duties of individuals and groups - an alarming problem in light of global terrorist threats, and the difficulties of weak or failed states in implementing treaty obligations. Perhaps the International Criminal Court may one day fill this gap, but that is another problem for another day. If the treaty-based regimes are to achieve their full potential, they will require stronger support from all nation states, from the most powerful - who have the financial, political, and technological means - to the smallest and most vulnerable of states, whose desperate conditions can, if ignored, become a seedbed for future global catastrophes. The Different Stages of RegimesIt is of course impossible to predict the future of these regimes, and any discussion of this subject must recognize that regimes are not static arrangements, but dynamic, living systems. They even have their own life-cycles - with evolutionary stages that range from genesis, growth, decline, and collapse - in addition, of course, to the stage of steady state maintenance. Though there is no formal missile disarmament regime, for example, there are early signs that the world community is at least aware of the absence of norms for missiles - a point made in a statement by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan in April 1999 - and is taking some preliminary steps to address this problem. Evidence of such steps is seen in the UN General Assembly's adoption in 2000 of a resolution calling on the Secretary-General to undertake a study, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, on the subject of missiles in all its aspects. This year, the General Assembly received this report and its First Committee adopted another resolution requesting a follow-up study, beginning in 2004. Though these fledgling initiatives hardly constitute a satisfactory response to the goal set forth in the preamble of the NPT of eliminating delivery systems for nuclear weapons, they may over time lead to the genesis of a new, missile disarmament regime. Pursuant to the international Programme of Action adopted last year at the UN to curb illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons - and the expert group investigating the feasibility of a universal system of marking and tracing - we may someday witness the emergence of a new regime governing such weaponry as well. The "growth" stage of a regime is best documented by the sheer number of states that are members of regimes, the rate at which new states are joining, the track record of compliance by the states parties, and the extent to which the members are integrating their international commitments into domestic laws. All three WMD regimes also require further support from the administrative machinery of their member states in the field of disarmament, and their potential for further growth will also be a function of the level of understanding among the general public of the functions and benefits of these regimes. Warning signs of the decline of regimes are equally important to monitor. The most reliable are indicators of behavior that is in direct conflict with the fundamental norms of the regime. Doctrines that call for the first-use of nuclear weapons or that herald such weapons as "essential" or "vital" to maintain security are difficult to reconcile with the goal of disarmament, as are investments in new nuclear weapons and facilities to produce or to perfect them. Such practices give rise to a "do as we say, not as we do" syndrome that undercuts the legitimacy of the overall regime. Other hallmarks of a regime in danger of decline occur when its member states adamantly refuse to yield to the demands of transparency, or when they announce policies that are premised on the explicit or implicit assumption that disarmament and non-proliferation efforts will fail - policies that go far in helping us to understand why world military expenditures are now rapidly approaching the $1 trillion mark, with no ceiling in sight. We are all fortunate that no multilateral disarmament regime has yet entered into the stage of collapse, though this possibility cannot at all be excluded. Collapsing regimes - like the whole system of collective security between the two World Wars - owe their fates to actions and inactions of their member states. If the goals of the regime are not manifested in state policy, are not defended when they are challenged, are applied only selectively, are ignored in budget allocations, are starved of institutional support, and are allowed to be displaced by other priorities and expedient objectives - it is at this point that regimes are truly in danger of collapse. Even the mighty NPT is not invulnerable to this risk. The two proven cases of non-compliance by non-nuclear-weapon states - and the snail's pace of nuclear disarmament over the 34-year history of the NPT - have not contributed to the health of this regime. Additional concerns have arisen over the apparent unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon states to implement their "unequivocal undertaking" to nuclear disarmament made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference - as evidenced by the lack of progress on the 13 steps to nuclear disarmament agreed at that event. These and other such developments suggest strongly that comfortable assumptions about the indefinite existence of this treaty are ill-advised. In this respect, the recent US-sponsored General Assembly resolution on "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements" marks a welcome step forward, for it "Urges all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament and non-proliferation agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of all provisions of such agreements." The more this resolution is observed, the brighter will be the prospects for the NPT regime. Great care must of course also be taken with respect to protecting against the collapse of the other two key WMD-related treaties, the BWC and CWC. Technological advances in the field of non-lethal weapons may present some difficult challenges for the prohibitions in these treaties. Other problems arise from their lack of universality, continuing allegations of violations by states parties to these treaties, and the very slow pace of progress on chemical weapons disarmament. ConclusionOverall, despite the many challenges that lie ahead, treaty-based regimes remain enormously "relevant" in serving international peace and security. They offer many hard-law advantages over their ad hoc political counterparts among the various regulatory regimes. They are binding. They have or are approaching universal membership. They have the permanence of law. Some have institutions staffed with full-time professionals dedicated to building confidence in compliance. And they have the most precious treasure of all - legitimacy, both because they enshrine universal norms and because legislatures had to approve their ratification. With legitimacy, the regimes can continue to grow and to enhance the conditions of international peace and security. If they lost that legitimacy, they would lose all hope for effectiveness, and they would risk collapsing. We cannot rely on the regimes alone to prevent this from happening. We can only hope that the member states of these regimes will understand the benefits they stand to gain from the success and permanence of these regimes, and will provide them the support they deserve. Needless to say, the strength of governmental commitments to these regimes will be heavily dependent upon the understanding and support from civil society, not just the arms control and disarmament community. SIPRI and IISS give us their estimates of global military expenditure, which many Governments on their own do not. From the NGO community, we have initiatives like the "Landmine Monitor," the "Small Arms Survey," the forthcoming "Biological Weapons Monitor" by the Biological Weapons Prevention Project, and several monitoring efforts focusing on nuclear weapons. Together, they illustrate how civil society can reinforce regimes and the norms they represent. Just as the Charter of the United Nations was anchored among the "peoples of the United Nations," so too will the future of regimes be determined by the support they enjoy among the peoples of the world and their leaders. It is for this reason that I salute the Carnegie Endowment for its continuing efforts to promote a dialogue on security issues that involves both national and international participants, from both the public and private sectors. United in a just cause, the people can indeed move the world. IV. 'The Race of Our Lives': Speech by Sam NunnSpeech by former US Democratic Senator Sam Nunn, Co-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), November 14. This morning I will make a few assertions on non-proliferation and suggest several public policy imperatives that I believe flow directly from these assertions: (1) The gravest danger in the world today is the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. (2) The likeliest use of these weapons is in terrorist hands. (3) Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons should be the central organizing security principle for the 21st century. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union created a vulnerable supply of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials, as well as know-how. The rise of global terrorists created a new demand for these weapons and the willingness to use them. The acceleration of scientific discovery and the increased access to new technology - combined with this rising supply and demand - has put us in a perilous new arms race: terrorists are racing to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - we ought to be racing to stop them. Biologists tell us that strong, healthy organisms have a sophisticated system of stimulus and response: they are quick to perceive danger, the perception of danger creates a stimulus, and the stimulus triggers an instant and effective response. If a species is slow to perceive a danger and respond to a threat, it is threatened with extinction. Without taking this analogy too far, suffice it to say that I think we have been slow to perceive this danger and respond to this threat. Much of our military, diplomatic, and national security experience has been designed to engage and defeat an adversary that seeks to take or conquer land, defend its borders, protect its people, and control its territory. Terrorists have none of these aims or objectives. They aim to destroy and disrupt. They do not need armies, warplanes, battleships, or tanks. But if they gain nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, they can destroy lives, destabilize economies and change history. The media tells us that in October of 2001, top US government officials received a highly classified intelligence report, warning that terrorists had acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb and planned to smuggle it into New York City, where it could - if detonated - destroy much of lower Manhattan and kill hundreds of thousands of people. This intelligence report - thank God - was later judged to be false. But it was never judged to be impossible or implausible. This should focus our attention on two fundamental questions: First, if the report had been accurate, and the bomb had been real and had gone off, what would we wish we had done to prevent it? Second, why aren't we doing that now? Last November, standing with President Putin at the White House, President Bush said: "Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction." At the summit this past May, President Bush and President Putin agreed first, that the greatest danger in the war on terror is the prospect of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and second, the United States and Russia should spare no effort at preventing all forms of proliferation. These are encouraging words, but if this is our priority, what is our strategy? Where are we putting our resources? Have we rallied our friends and the world behind this "highest priority" to meet this "greatest danger?" This is not just an American question. This is a global question. If a catastrophic terrorist strike could hit New York, it could hit Paris, Moscow, London or Tokyo. We may not be able to make these terrorists less evil, but we must make them less powerful. We must keep them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. How difficult is it for terrorists to attack us with a nuclear weapon? That depends on how difficult we make it. It becomes obvious from analyzing the terrorist path to a nuclear attack that the most effective, least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to secure nuclear weapons and materials at the source. Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop. By contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take, and harder for us to stop. Once they gain access to nuclear materials, they've completed the most difficult step - and our nightmare begins. That is why homeland security and the defense against catastrophic terrorism must begin with securing weapons and fissile materials in every country and every facility that has them. Yes, this is an awesome challenge, but it is finite and doable. It is important to recognize that a small improvement in security can make a big difference in our future. Let me give you an example. Warren Buffett, who is financially supporting NTI's work, recently wrote me a letter containing some revealing statistics. He notes that:
My math is obviously not as good as Warren's, but according to my calculations, this means that if we make it ten times harder for terrorists or nations to use a weapon of mass destruction in any given year, we can make it 120 times less likely that we will suffer from a use of these weapons for the next fifty years. As Warren Buffett would say, that's real leverage. As we move to reduce the threat, we must remember that this is a global problem The threat includes but extends well beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union. Large amounts of civilian highly enriched uranium exist in dozens of civilian research facilities around the world, yet there are no international standards for securing these nuclear materials within a country. We are talking about the raw material of nuclear terrorism, stored in hundreds of facilities in dozens of nations. Some of it is secured by nothing more than an underpaid guard sitting inside a chain-link fence. This presents a global security imperative. A wide alliance of nations must work together to identify it all, account for it all and secure it all - as soon as physically possible. This will not happen without active leadership from Russia and the United States. It is my hope that those attending this conference - with your considerable expertise and knowledge - will begin to build the intellectual and political support to meet this challenge at home and abroad. I'd like to leave you with five essential steps to consider as we begin to map out a new strategy for global security in the 21st century. (1) The first step is to put our own houses in order - identifying, accounting for, and securing weapons and materials in Russia and the United States. Both the US and Russia should pledge to ensure that nuclear, chemical and biological materials and weapons in both countries are safe, secure and accounted for with reciprocal monitoring sufficient to assure each other and the rest of the world that this is the case. This would require rapid security upgrades, accelerated blend-down of weapons materials and consolidating weapons materials in fewer sites. Each President should appoint one high-level person, reporting directly to the President, to take full responsibility for this issue, and this issue alone. And both Presidents should pledge to complete this task at the fastest possible pace and urge other nations to do likewise. (2) The United States and Russia should insist on accurate accounting and adequate safeguards for tactical nuclear weapons, including a baseline inventory of these weapons and reciprocal monitoring. Tactical nuclear weapons have never been covered in arms control treaties. We can only guess at the numbers in each other's inventories. Yet these are the nuclear weapons most attractive to terrorists - even more valuable to them than fissile material and much more portable than strategic warheads. The relations between our two heads of state are warm. Our perception of our common interest is closer than it has ever been. If this new relationship is going to improve our security, then we must be able to melt the suspicion that for so many years has kept us from an accurate accounting and assured protection of these weapons. (3) Both President Bush and President Putin should order their military leaders, in joint consultation and collaboration, to devise operational changes in the alert status of their nuclear forces that would reduce toward zero the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation and expand the decision time available to each president before they would be forced to make the fateful decision to launch. They should begin by quickly identifying weapons designated for reduction under the Moscow Treaty signed in May, and then immediately stand them down. (4) Our two nations should combine our biodefense knowledge and scientific expertise and apply these joint resources to defensive and peaceful biological pursuits starting with a joint fight against infectious disease in Russia. The two Presidents could promote a bilateral effort to cooperate on our defensive research agendas and build upon what both nations know. This is an endeavor that should begin with Russia and the United States and expand to include the rest of the world. I want to close with a fifth point, which includes all of the rest and goes beyond them. It is the heart of the new initiative Senator Lugar, Senator Domenici and I launched last year. (5) The United States and Russia should launch and lead a Global Partnership against Catastrophic Terrorism. The Global Partnership would be based on the fundamental premise that the greatest dangers of the 21st century are threats all nations face together and no nation can solve on its own. We must never forget: the chain of worldwide security is only as strong as the link at the weakest, least-protected site. Clearly, this can't be done by one, two, or even a dozen countries. It has to be done by a worldwide coalition that would include every nation that has something to safeguard or that can make a contribution to safeguarding it. Terrorists seeking the raw material of nuclear terrorism won't necessarily look where there is the most material; they will look where that material is the most vulnerable. Our goal must be to see that all nations come under a system of international standards and inspection for the protection of dangerous materials. This global effort must involve every state with nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials - and assist them in establishing standards and cooperative programs for inventory control, safety, and security. It would improve border and export controls, and train international teams to respond in the event of terrorist nuclear explosion or the loss of control of nuclear weapons or materials. On the biological front - to deny terrorists access to dangerous biological materials without hindering important medical research - the Partnership would establish standards for safeguarding biological materials. It would devise approaches for limiting the spread of biological weapons know-how. It would develop effective measures to prevent bioterrorism and minimize the effects of any potential attack with effective responses, including developing more effective vaccines and medicines. It would direct more resources and attention to global infectious disease surveillance and prevention improving worldwide efforts in detecting and reporting disease outbreaks, reporting findings, and bringing forth an effective global response. In addition to the moral imperative of stepping up the fight against infectious disease around the globe, we now have a security imperative. From the Pentagon to HHS, to the CIA and the NSC, to the local police, fire and public health officials, the fight against infectious disease and bioterrorism are linked and vital to our national security. To succeed we must encourage and stimulate unprecedented cooperation from the private sector at home and abroad. This last summer, G-8 leaders met in Canada and took an important step toward building this Global Partnership. They said: "we commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missile, and related materials, equipment and technology." To implement these principles, they established the "G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction," committed $20 billion over ten years, and established a six-element program to guide their work. In brief, the six elements are to: 1) promote multilateral treaties that help prevent the spread of weapons, materials and know-how; 2) account for and secure these items; 3) promote physical protection of facilities; 4) help detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking; 5) promote national export and transshipment controls; and 6) manage and dispose of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons materials. It should not escape the notice of anyone here that the six-element program constitutes an important strategy and renewed dedication to the principles of "non-proliferation," which so many of you have championed. What the G-8 recognized and what we must all recognize is that the fight against catastrophic terrorism and the fight against non-proliferation are the same fight. But this fight requires new thinking, new technologies, new techniques, and a renewed seriousness of purpose. The establishment of the G-8 Global Partnership and the six principles are welcome and important developments, but it should concern us that this announcement received almost no attention. We must hold them to their words and their declaration - or this initial commitment will get crowded off the G-8 action agenda. All of us should press this commitment as hard as we can at the highest levels of government and with our citizens. Keeping weapons of mass destruction out of terrorists' hands is either a priority or an afterthought. If it's a priority, we must prove it by our actions. If it's an afterthought, after what? What matters most is what happens next. The G-8 governments meet again next June in France. By then, we should expect to see them turn these principles into a clear set of priorities, to establish a timeline to guide their work based on a risk-based analysis of the threats, and to dramatically increase funding to reflect the risk that catastrophic terrorism presents to the health, economy and security of every nation. Specifically, we should expect to see:
We're in the race of our lives. We are well past the time where we can take satisfaction with a step in the right direction. A gazelle running from a cheetah is taking a step in the right direction. But it's not just a question of direction; it's a matter of speed. We're not moving as fast as we can or as fast as we must. Today I have focused primarily on the supply side of the weapons of mass destruction challenge - restricting access to supplies of weapons, materials and know-how. We must also, however, address the demand side of catastrophic terrorism - terrorists and rogue nations who seek these weapons, materials and know-how. This is the subject for a much longer discussion, which I will not even attempt today. Broadly speaking, however, unless we learn to think anew, and find new ways to undercut the appeal of ideologies that wish us harm, we can win every battle and still lose the war. Some claim that discussing root causes of terrorism is blaming America. To me, looking at root causes is not about blaming America - it is about preventing our violent enemies from recruiting unlimited numbers of angry individuals who care more about killing than living. We have an obligation to do all we can to undercut those who seek our destruction. I am not saying that poverty creates terrorism. If poverty turned people into mass murderers, we would all be dead. But we must address disparities, conditions and conflicts that breed resentment, hate and humiliation. We must develop a strategy and a plan of action designed to separate violent extremists from the vast majority of the Islamic community. At the same time, the Islamic community has an obligation to condemn, disavow and isolate their own extremists. Keeping weapons of mass destruction out of terrorist hands requires unprecedented global cooperation. And it is very difficult to get people to address our priorities unless we are seen to be addressing theirs. I believe that we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. Our willingness to cooperate has always depended on our sense of our own self-interest, and particularly our sense of our own security. Human beings have often adopted new and unexpected forms of cooperation when all understood that survival depended upon it. I close with my original question - if a nuclear weapon detonated killing hundreds of thousands, what would our after-catastrophe reports say we should have done to prevent it? Why aren't we doing it now? © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |