|
Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct Launching Conference, The Hague, November 25-26Launching Conference for the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, The Hague, The Netherlands, November 25-26. I. The CodeInternational Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation PreambleThe Subscribing States: Reaffirming their commitment to the United Nations Charter; Stressing the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the field of international peace and security; Recalling the widespread concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; Recognizing the increasing regional and global security challenges caused, inter alia, by the ongoing proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; Seeking to promote the security of all states by fostering mutual trust through the implementation of political and diplomatic measures; Having taken into account regional and national security considerations; Believing that an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation will contribute to the process of strengthening existing national and international security arrangements and disarmament and non-proliferation objectives and mechanisms; Recognising that subscribing States may wish to consider engaging in co-operative measures among themselves to this end; 1. Adopt this International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'); 2. Resolve to respect the following Principles: a) Recognition of the need comprehensively to prevent and curb the proliferation of Ballistic Missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and the need to continue pursuing appropriate international endeavours, including through the Code; b) Recognition of the importance of strengthening, and gaining wider adherence to, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms; c) Recognition that adherence to, and full compliance with, international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation norms help build confidence as to the peaceful intentions of states; d) Recognition that participation in this Code is voluntary and open to all States; e) Confirmation of their commitment to the United Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States taking into particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 51/122 of 13 December 1996); f) Recognition that states should not be excluded from utilising the benefits of space for peaceful purposes, but that, in reaping such benefits and in conducting related cooperation, they must not contribute to the proliferation of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction; g) Recognition that Space Launch Vehicle programmes should not be used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes; h) Recognition of the necessity of appropriate transparency measures on Ballistic Missile programmes and Space Launch Vehicle programmes in order to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of Ballistic Missiles and Ballistic Missile technology; 3. Resolve to implement the following General Measures: a) To ratify, accede to or otherwise abide by:
b) To curb and prevent the proliferation of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, both at a global and regional level, through multilateral, bilateral and national endeavours; c) To exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of global and regional peace and security; d) To exercise the necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to Space Launch Vehicle programmes in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes may be used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes; e) Not to contribute to, support or assist any Ballistic Missile programme in countries which might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in contravention of norms established by, and of those countries' obligations under, international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties; 4. Resolve to implement the following: a) Transparency measures as follows, with an appropriate and sufficient degree of detail to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction: i) With respect to Ballistic Missile programmes to:
ii) With respect to expendable Space Launch Vehicle programmes, and consistent with commercial and economic confidentiality principles, to:
iii) With respect to their Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Vehicle programmes to:
b) Subscribing States could, as appropriate and on a voluntary basis, develop bilateral or regional transparency measures, in addition to those above. c) Implementation of the above Confidence Building Measures does not serve as justification for the programmes to which these Confidence Building Measures apply; 5. Organisational aspects Subscribing States determine to: a) Hold regular meetings, annually or as otherwise agreed by Subscribing States; b) Take all decisions, both substantive and procedural, by a consensus of the Subscribing States present; c) Use these meetings to define, review and further develop the workings of the Code, including in such ways as:
Annex: List of Subscribing States1. Afghanistan Source: The Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp? II. The Netherlands' Foreign Ministry Press Release'International Conference Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in The Hague concludes', The Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, November 26. Today, the second day of the International Conference in The Hague to mark the inauguration of a new global instrument against the proliferation of ballistic missiles, the Subscribing States to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation decided that the Code would as of now be known as 'The Hague Code of Conduct'. This underlined the important role of the city of The Hague as the world's legal capital. The Netherlands was appointed as the first Chair of the Code for a period of one year. One of the important tasks for the Netherlands will be to expand the number of Subscribing States to the Code, currently standing at 93. Austria was appointed as administrative Central Contact of the Code. Subscribing States decided to have regular meetings. A technical meeting is foreseen in Spring 2003. The Hague Code of Conduct will be submitted to the United Nations for information. The Conference was officially closed by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. Source: The Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, III. Selected Statements1) UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan'Secretary-General welcomes launch of International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation', statement issued by the Spokesperson for Secretary-General Kofi Annan, UN Press Release SG/SM/8523, November 25. The Secretary-General welcomes the launching of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The accumulation, technical refinement, proliferation, use or threat of use of ballistic and other types of missiles has long been a source of concern to the international community. The Code of Conduct, as a voluntary, non-legally binding instrument, is a positive step towards preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles and towards international peace and security. At the same time, the Secretary-General stresses the need to continue international efforts to deal with the issue of missiles in its totality. There is no universally accepted norm or instrument specifically governing the development, testing, production, acquisition, transfer, deployment or use of missiles. He looks forward to additional measures that will address this and related concerns. 2) Russian Foreign Ministry'On the International Launching Conference for the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation', Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, Official Spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Foreign Ministry Document 2452-27-11-2002, November 27. ... The International Code of Conduct, which is a document of a political nature, represents a set of basic principles of conduct in the field of missile non-proliferation. The Russian Federation has acceded to the International Code of Conduct on the understanding that the Code is only the first step along the road to elaborating a legally binding multilateral agreement on a global missile non-proliferation regime. The Russian Federation, based on the results of the successful holding of the Hague conference, expects that countries which for some or other reasons at this stage have not deemed it possible to accede to the Code will nevertheless be able to participate in international efforts for solving the problem of missile proliferation, both within the framework of the ICOC and under the aegis of the United Nations and, perhaps, in other formats. 3) UK Foreign Office Minister Mike O'Brien'International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles Launching Conference', Statement to Parliament by Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister of State Mike O'Brien, November 26. The ICOC is a politically binding agreement designed to tackle the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. It does so by promoting transparency and confidence building among States. It consists of principles, commitments and confidence-building measures. It will establish international norms for the first time in the area of ballistic missiles. The Code will complement the existing range of international instruments against WMD. The non-proliferation commitments in the Code include a commitment not to contribute to, support or assist any ballistic missile programme in countries which might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in contravention of international obligations. Also to exercise vigilance in assistance to Space Launch Vehicle programmes, given that these can be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes. The Code also calls for maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. The confidence-building and transparency measures are designed to promote confidence through information sharing, in the form of both pre-launch notifications and annual declarations about ballistic missile and space launch programmes. The aim is to boost confidence for instance that space launch vehicle programmes are not being used as cover for ballistic missile programmes. The Code represents a significant step forward for the international community in the area of arms control - in this case the control of one of the delivery systems of choice for weapons of mass destruction. The UK has played a leading role in the development of the ICOC since its inception. We are calling on all States to subscribe to the Code. Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk. 4) US Undersecretary of State John BoltonI am honored to represent the United States of America as an initial Subscribing State to the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). The entry into effect today of the ICOC marks an important contribution to the international effort against the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction - an effort that the United States has always strongly supported. The large number of countries that have subscribed to the ICOC and are represented here is a concrete demonstration that the international community has recognized and is looking for additional ways to address the proliferation of the most threatening means of delivery for weapons of mass destruction. It is no accident that the dangerous proliferation of ballistic missiles occurs predominantly in parallel with programs for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. International concern about such ballistic missile programs is heightened by the fact that weapons of mass destruction programs also often exist in parallel with support for terrorist groups. Viewed in this context, it is clear why the proliferation of ballistic missiles threatens international peace and security on a worldwide basis. The United States regards the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD as a direct threat to the US, our deployed forces, our friends and allies, and our interests in key regions of the world. The United States sees the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation as an important addition to the wide range of tools available to countries to impede and roll back this proliferation threat. One element of our strategy is multilateral efforts against missile proliferation, such as the ICOC and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Another important element is missile defense. We view our missile defense efforts as complementary to, and consistent with the objectives of, the ICOC and the MTCR. Each seeks in different ways to protect us from the dangers posed by WMD and ballistic missile proliferation. We are now in the process of discussing with allies and friends, including the Russian Federation, cooperation on missile defense programs because our nation is hardly alone in needing the additional protection that such programs can provide. Missile defenses, the MTCR, and the ICOC play important roles in deterring and reducing missile proliferation, and the United States will be ready to work with members of the ICOC, and of the MTCR, to ensure that these complementary efforts are mutually reinforcing. While an important new addition to the broad arsenal of non-proliferation measures, it is no secret that the ICOC has its limitations. For example, in taking on the political commitment pursuant to the ICOC to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the United States - like other countries - understands this commitment as not limiting our right to take steps in these areas necessary to meet our national security requirements consistent with US national security strategy. This includes our ability to maintain our deterrent umbrella for our friends and allies, and the capabilities necessary to defeat aggression involving WMD attacks. But all subscribing states will have the opportunity to discuss these issues in detail, and to participate in consensus decisions to evolve the text. Most of this implementation work will concern the ICOC's requirements for pre-launch notification of subscribing states ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle launches and test flights. The United States intends to make pre-launch notifications and annual declarations pursuant to the ICOC based upon current US proposals in its negotiations with the Russian Federation on a Pre-Launch Notification System, including on the question of which launches are to be notified. For example, the United States reserves the right in circumstances of war to launch ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles without prior notification. Once implementation is completed, the notifications and annual declarations that the United States provides pursuant to the ICOC will be based upon the US-Russian Pre-Launch Notification System, to be established in connection with the US-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center. Over the longer term, we agree with the Russian Federation that the bilateral US-Russian system should be multilateralized. We hope, in turn, that such a multilateralized system might provide the mechanism by which all ICOC subscribing states exchange pre-launch notifications. We plan to keep all subscribing states informed on the progress of the implementation of the US-Russia agreement on launch notification, and on the implications and opportunities that a multilateralized US-Russia Pre-Launch Notification System can present for the ICOC. Some have been concerned that the ICOC is simply a political declaration and not legally binding. But surely the real issue is not the nature of the commitment, but the extent of the political will to comply with the code that signatories demonstrate. Too often in the arms control and nonproliferation fields, countries make a great public flourish about adhering to codes and conventions, and then, quietly and deceptively, do precisely the opposite in private. In the context of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), for example, we know that several member states are violating their commitments to the treaty. To expose some of these violators to the international community, we have named publicly states the US government knows to be pursuing the production of biological warfare agents in violation of the BWC: including Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya, as well as Cuba, which we believe has at least a limited, developmental offensive biological warfare R&D effort, and which has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states. Even as we speak, we face a grave threat to the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea brazenly admitted last month to having a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. This egregious violation of its treaty commitments threatens the security of all nations, as well as the continued credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Surely, none of us wants this disdain and disregard to happen to the new ICOC. That is why we are not concerned about the states that have chosen not to subscribe to the code. Far better to know who is actually prepared to live under its terms, and who is not. Far better to know who is truly serious about stopping the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the risk that such technology could be used to carry weapons of mass destruction against innocent civilian populations. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the United States places great value on the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and has high confidence in its future potential. We pledge our full support to you and our fellow Subscribing States in the demanding tasks ahead. Source: Text US is Confident in Future Potential of Missile Code of Conduct, US State Department (Washington File), November 25. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |