|
Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation President Bush Announcement on Missile Defence Deployments, December 17
I. Statement by President Bush'Statement by the President', The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, December 17. When I came to office, I made a commitment to transform America's national security strategy and defense capabilities to meet the threats of the 21st century. Today, I am pleased to announce that we will take another important step in countering these threats by beginning to field missile defense capabilities to protect the United States, as well as our friends and allies. These initial capabilities emerge from our research and development program and build on the test bed that we have been constructing. While modest, these capabilities will add to America's security and serve as a starting point for improved and expanded capabilities later, as further progress is made in researching and developing missile defense technologies and in light of changes in the threat. September 11, 2001 underscored that our Nation faces unprecedented threats, in a world that has changed greatly since the Cold War. To better protect our country against the threats of today and tomorrow, my Administration has developed a new national security strategy, and new supporting strategies for making our homeland more secure and for combating weapons of mass destruction. Throughout my Administration, I have made clear that the United States will take every necessary measure to protect our citizens against what is perhaps the gravest danger of all: the catastrophic harm that may result from hostile states or terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Missile defenses have an important role to play in this effort. The United States has moved beyond the doctrine of Cold War deterrence reflected in the 1972 ABM Treaty. At the same time we have established a positive relationship with Russia that includes partnership in counterterrorism and in other key areas of mutual concern. We have adopted a new concept of deterrence that recognizes that missile defenses will add to our ability to deter those who may contemplate attacking us with missiles. Our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has made it possible to develop and test the full range of missile defense technologies, and to deploy defenses capable of protecting our territory and our cities. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to proceed with fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities. We plan to begin operating these initial capabilities in 2004 and 2005, and they will include ground-based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, additional Patriot (PAC-3) units, and sensors based on land, at sea, and in space. Because the threats of the 21st century also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against them. The Defense Department will develop and deploy missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies. The United States will also structure our missile defense program in a manner that encourages industrial participation by other nations. Demonstrating the important role played by our friends and allies, as part of our initial missile defense capabilities, the United States will seek agreement from the United Kingdom and Denmark to upgrade early-warning radars on their territory. The new strategic challenges of the 21st century require us to think differently, but they also require us to act. The deployment of missile defenses is an essential element of our broader efforts to transform our defense and deterrence policies and capabilities to meet the new threats we face. Defending the American people against these new threats is my highest priority as Commander-in-Chief, and the highest priority of my Administration. II. Pentagon Press Release'Missile Defense Operations Announcement', US Department of Defense News Release, No. 642-02, December 17; Defense Department website, http://www.defenselink.mil. In light of the new security environment and progress made to date in missile defense development efforts, the President has directed the Department of Defense to begin fielding initial missile defense capabilities in 2004-2005 to meet the near-term ballistic missile threat to our homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies. This initial capability will build on the planned Pacific Missile Defense Testbed and serve as a starting point for fielding improved, layered missile defense capabilities later. The Department of Defense is employing an evolutionary approach to the development and deployment of missile defenses over time. This means there is no final or fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, the composition of missile defenses, including the number, type, and location of systems deployed, will change over time to meet the changing threat and take advantage of technological developments. This approach includes the use of prototype and test assets to provide early capability, while improving the effectiveness of defensive capabilities over time. The initial set of capabilities planned for 2004-2005 will include:
These initial capabilities may be improved through additional measures, such as:
Because the threats of the 21st century also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is essential that we work together to meet these threats. The Department of Defense plans to develop and deploy missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also friends and allies. The missile defense program will also be structured in a manner that encourages industrial cooperation by friends and allies, consistent with overall US national security. In conjunction with the Department of State, the Department of Defense will promote international missile defense cooperation, including within existing mutual defense structures like NATO, and negotiate appropriate arrangements for this purpose. The deployment of missile defenses is an essential element of our overall national security policy to transform US defense and deterrence capabilities to meet emerging and evolving threats. The evolutionary approach to missile defense provides near-term capability to address the emerging ballistic missile threat and will evolve by the end of the decade into a multi-layered missile defense system capable of providing protection against the full range of limited ballistic missile attacks. This approach is flexible enough to provide defense for the United States and its friends and allies and, by reducing an adversary's confidence in ballistic missiles, can help deter the use of missiles and dissuade countries from acquiring these capabilities at the outset. III. Rumsfeld/Myers Pentagon BriefingDonald H. Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, and General Richard B. Myers, Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Press Briefing, The Pentagon, December 17. Question: Mr. Secretary, the president announced today that the United States intends to deploy an initial...operational missile defense by 2004, apparently in [Fort] Greely [in Alaska], aboard ships at sea, and elsewhere. And I'm wondering what gives you confidence that this will work, six days after the...third failure in eight tries in the midcourse phase of the missile defense. Could you comment a bit on the initial deployment and what gives you confidence it would work, sir? [Note: the reference is to a failed intercept test on December 11. According to a Pentagon press release - 'Missile Defense Test Conducted', December 11 - the Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency (MDA) "was not able to complete a test involving the planned intercept of a long-range ballistic missile target over the central Pacific Ocean when the exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) interceptor and the booster rocket failed to separate, preventing the EKV from engaging the target warhead in space.] Secretary Rumsfeld: Sure. I'd be happy to comment on both. First, I have not gone back to look at the records of other advanced development testing programs, but if one goes back and looks at things like Polaris and various others, the early days of the NRO, where there were failure after failure after failure, I think that anyone who thinks about it understands that when you're at the leading edge of technology, you expect that there are going to be - you're going to learn and gain knowledge both by your successes and also by your failures. It's just something that's a reality in research and development and in science and technological programs. ... There's lots of words that the Pentagon uses that have a meaning, like "capability," or "initial capability" or "deployment." And I think that rather than use those words that have strict meanings, it's better to describe what I see as our current missile defense approach, and it is this: It is to recognize that there is a threat of ballistic missiles to this country and to our friends and allies, and that our interest and the president's interest had been to be able to do a broad-gauged research and development program in missile defense, unconstrained by the ABM Treaty, which he now has been able to do for a period of some months - six months, I think, is all. A second principle that I have held is that it's - I like the feeling, the idea, of beginning, and putting something in the ground, or in the air or at sea and getting comfortable with it, and using it, and testing it and learning from that. A lot of things just don't arrive fully developed, full-blown - and there it is. So, by avoiding those words, I think we maybe come to a better understanding as to what's going to happen. I think the way to think about the missile defense program is that it will be an evolutionary program, it will evolve over a period of time. Any capability - with a small "c"; I'm not talking about initial capability, initial IOCs or any of that - but capability with a small "c" will probably, one would hope, improve as you go along. And it will - when we're - when it finishes some day out there in the years ahead, it very likely will look quite different than it begins. And it very likely will have layers. And it very likely will involve a variety of different locations. And it will very likely involve the participation of a number of countries. So what the president was announcing was that - and let me say one other thing. Think of the Predator [unmanned reconnaissance aircraft]. The Predator was still in the development and testing stage, and we've been using it in Afghanistan. We've been using it in a few other places. Now, had it...gone through all the checks and all the hurdles and was ready to go? No. But we used it. Could we use the missile defense capability - small "c" - in the event there were a need to use it, after some pieces of it get put in place? Answer: Yes. Does that mean it would have been - it would have been finished in any way? No. It would be a very preliminary, modest capability, and you would be learning - it would be in a testing and learning mode. But also, in the event it were needed, it would be able to provide you some limited capability to deal with a limited number of ballistic missiles. ... Question: Mr. Secretary, a related question, if I may. Some months ago, I asked you, when you were on the podium, if the United States would consider a preemptive strike against North Korea, if that country threatened the United States. And your answer to me at that time was, quote, "You got to be kidding," unquote. Things have changed, and North Korea now has nukes that it admits to, and that we admit to. Intelligence sources say it will have ICBMs... Secretary Rumsfeld: I bet you didn't ask that question quite that way, and I bet you I didn't answer it quite that way, did I? Question: I think so, sir. ... Close. Anyway, let me rephrase it. We have a situation now where North Korea is clearly moving toward being a threat to the United States, with nuclear weapons, with ballistic missiles capable reaching the West Coast by the year 2004, we're told. We have the possibility of a new presidential policy about preemptive strikes. I'm wondering if your feeling had changed at all, if North Korea should develop its weapons to the point where they would indeed threaten the US, would the United States consider a preemptive strike? Secretary Rumsfeld: Let me say a couple of things. Number one, when I was chairing the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, we reported on the threat that North Korea poses to the United States, and that was back four years ago. So I'm very sensitive and aware of what you're talking about. Those capabilities have evolved and developed since then, and the threat is more immediate and of a greater capability. I would also add that - and I don't believe there's anything secret about this - but as a former secretary of Defense, I was invited into the Pentagon back in the early '90s, early to mid-'90s by the Secretary of Defense along with a number of my colleagues and briefed on the fact that the United States was exceedingly concerned about the evolving North Korean nuclear capability. And there were discussions then about what one might do about it. So...this administration has, obviously, been working with our friends and allies, in South Korea and Japan particularly, but more recently with Russia and China, on the subject. And the president is determined to find ways, through working with other friends and allies around the world, to put the kind of pressure on North Korea that its behavior conceivably might be moderated. Question: A follow-up if I may, sir. All of that is all well and good, and it may work. But if it does not, what would you recommend, and what would the president do perhaps to remove the threat? Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, as you know, I can't speak for what the president might do. And what I recommend tends to be private to the president. ... Question: A question, and for General Myers also, on space-based systems that would be crucial to any kind of missile defense program. General Myers, if you could put your old space command hat back on. You've had - you have trouble now with both the SBIRS-high [space-based infrared system] and SBIRS-low programs, those eyes in the sky that would pick up enemy missiles being launched at the US And Mr. Secretary, you've been briefed on problems with the new spy satellite system, the FIA [Future Imagery Architecture] program. To what extent do problems and delays with those three programs complicate your effort to have even initial capability over the next two years, given that those would be the eyes in space that would let you know a launch has taken place and give you locations in space where these missiles were coming from? ... General Myers: I think the best that we can tell that the space-borne assets that would warn of missile launch will continue with the current systems we have up there, and then eventually be replaced with SBIRS-high, as you said. And that the delays in SBIRS-high program aren't going to affect that capability, it will be fielded in time to make sure that is there. As to the rest of the architecture, that's still being decided. And one of the good things that happened when - one of the many good things that happened when the ABM Treaty went away was that we could expand our horizons in terms of how we might put this architecture together. ... Question: Mr. Secretary, when you worked on the Ballistic Missile Commission, one of the things you discovered was that many Americans assumed or thought there was some basis on which the United States could defend itself. A false sense of security, I believe the commission suggested to Congress. Now many Americans might see two items in the newspaper - this rising North Korea nuclear threat, and this initial deployment at Fort Greely. What can you tell them about how effective the 10 initial interceptors, if they do come on line in 2004, could be in dealing with that threat, or is there - should no security be gained from the idea that that's going to be in there in two years, would something else larger and more diplomatic be necessary to defuse the nuclear threat, or will this be in some way helpful? Can you tell the American people about that? Secretary Rumsfeld: You're correct, we do not have a missile defense capability. The United States cannot defend itself, currently, against ballistic missiles coming from anywhere - from the sea or from another continent - wherever. And for whatever reason, a lot of people believed all along that we did have that capability. We don't. The initial capability, when it's there with the first 10, and then a following 10 set of interceptors - (to staff) - in how many years? One year? Staff: Ten in '04, 10 in '05. Secretary Rumsfeld: Ten in '05 - one year later - would give us a limited capability to deal with a relatively small number of incoming ballistic missiles, which is better than nothing. And it's a start. And these capabilities will evolve over time, in terms - both in terms of the sensors, as well as the interceptors, and as well as the locations. And some may be afloat, and some may be on land. ... Question: ... Should Americans feel marginally safer, as they think about North Korea and that particular threat, which you and others have identified, with these interceptors in place, or no? Secretary Rumsfeld: The - at the moment, when one looks out there, I think the answer is yes. I think that it is certainly better to have that capability than to not have it. That's why we're doing it. I wouldn't want to overplay it. I wouldn't want to oversell it. I wouldn't want to suggest that it has a depth or breadth or capability; that it will take some time to evolve. But certainly the answer is yes. ... Question: ... [T]he system is two years behind schedule. You were talking about... Secretary Rumsfeld: Let's hold right there. I don't think we are behind schedule. ... When I came in [to office in 2001]...we didn't have a schedule. We said, "Let's stop and look at this." And we did. And we said, "Wait. Let's get rid of the ABM Treaty. Let's see if we can't go ahead and look at a range of things that were prohibited by the treaty." And so we didn't have a schedule as such. And I think it would be - we may be off someone else's schedule, but certainly not any schedule that you could characterize as ours. ... Question: [Y]ou mentioned that earlier weapons systems had many failures, and most weapons systems that have had many failures are not being deployed at the time that they are having many failures. ... The radar system that you want to rely on to eventually use with this system has not yet been built. There are old radar systems that you're trying to modify, and yet you're putting this on the ground. Your critics say this is driven by politics. Can you address - is it driven by politics, or is it driven by what you feel is an acute national need? Secretary Rumsfeld: It is driven by acute rationality. There isn't anything we're doing in this department that it would be accurate to suggest is rooted in politics. That's just false. I don't know who our critics are who say that, but the...department has taken a fresh look at missile defense. We took a serious look at it, and we have had serious people attempting to see what is the best way to deal with this very clear problem and capability that exists in the world and is growing in the world, and which increasingly, if one looks around, our allies and friends around the world are asking us to assist them with. The - we are doing this in a very appropriate, methodical way, and we are putting things out there that we will then learn from. I think it is very clear that there have been any number of systems that have been put in place before they were fully developed. Indeed, part of what we're talking about in our whole acquisition process is spiral development, where you don't wait till something's completely done for 20 years; you begin the process, you put some capability out there, and then you improve that capability in successive blocks. ... Question: Mr. Secretary, you have said that it was important to begin a start with the missile defense program. I'm wondering if that also part of the importance of the start of this is that it's symbolic and it sends a signal to rogue nations. Secretary Rumsfeld: There's nothing symbolic about our missile defense activities, believe me. It is - there's nothing symbolic at all. It is - the reason I think it's important to start is because you have to put something in place and get knowledge about it and have experience with it, and then add to it over time. I mean, there isn't a single weapon system we have that hasn't gotten better successively over a period of time that I can think of. Question: I'm wondering if it - but it does send a signal to nations like North Korea, would you think? Secretary Rumsfeld: It should. Question: The start of it? Secretary Rumsfeld: Sure. I mean, look, there are no secrets around here. This capability will be what it is, and it will be fully understood by the world. Other countries will know what we are capable of. To the extent we have a capability, it will have a deterrent effect, you're quite right. To the extent it has a limited capability, it will have a deterrent effect only to that limit. ... Source: Transcript - Rumsfeld, Myers Pentagon Briefing, December 17, US State Department (Washington File), December 17. IV. Russian Foreign Ministry Statement'Regarding Step-Up of US Attempts to Create a "Global Missile Defense"', Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 2603-18-12-2002, December 18. Moscow is following with regret the step-up of US attempts to create a so-called global missile defense. Now, after its political decision to deploy by 2004 several strategic interceptors with "support" from space, the realization of these plans has entered a destabilizing new phase. In this connection the Russian side continues to adhere to the assessments which were given by us after the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the cornerstone disarmament ABM Treaty of 1972. Consigning its principles in oblivion may lead only to a weakening of strategic stability, to a senseless new arms race in the world, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their missile delivery means, and to the diversion of resources from combating the real challenges and threats of today - above all, international terrorism. As is known, within the framework of the molding of a fundamentally new relations of strategic partnership, the leaders of Russia and the United States adopted in their latest summit meetings a different - positive - program for further deep nuclear arms reductions and for combating terrorism and the spread of WMDs. It is important that in this program of joint actions a noticeable role belongs to our cooperation in a truly needed and real field of non-strategic missile defense. Moreover, cooperation both bilateral and multilateral, within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council. Moscow counts on the United States to pay priority attention to the realization of precisely this strategic partnership program agreed upon at the highest level and to enlist its friends and partners in it, not in a destabilizing race in strategic defensive arms (including in space). © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |