|
Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation Provisional Assessments of Iraq Weapons Declaration, December 19
I. Security Council Briefing by UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix'Notes for briefing the Security Council regarding inspections in Iraq and a preliminary assessment of Iraq's declaration under paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002)', briefing by Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), December 19; UNMOVOC website, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/main.htm. First Part: Situation Report on Inspection EffortBefore I take up the major subject of my briefing, which relates to the Declaration submitted by Iraq under operative paragraph 3 of resolution 1441(2002), I should like, with your permission, to report briefly on where the UNMOVIC inspection effort stands today, 41 days after the adoption of the resolution on 8 November. As you will recall, inspections resumed on 27 November.
The build-up could hardly have been faster. We have benefited from the extensive preparations which we made for deployment during the past years, the training of potential inspectors, the early identification of potential suppliers and the identification of sites to be inspected at the initial phase. We have also benefited from the excellent cooperation and assistance extended to us by many divisions of the UN Secretariat in New York and by the UN organizations in Baghdad, Cyprus and Brindisi. Here, in New York, we have been given more office space necessary for our functioning but difficult to obtain in the crowded buildings of the UN. For Baghdad, we plan to expand the premises as soon as possible. The Iraqi cooperation has been very helpful for our logistical and infrastructure build-up. Second Part: Results So Far of the Inspection EffortLet me next report on some of our activities and experiences from the past three weeks:
Criticism has been voiced by the Iraqi side regarding some inspections:
Let me report, lastly, two formal requests that we have directed to Iraq in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council. Under subparagraph 4 of paragraph 7 of resolution 1441 (2002), UNMOVIC has asked Iraq to provide the names of all personnel currently or formerly associated with some aspect of Iraq's programme of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. During my talks in Baghdad last month, I indicated that this request would be made and in the Declaration just submitted we find that, in several chapters, the Iraqi side has refrained from submitting names explicitly on the ground that they expected the request to come. We have asked that the names be submitted to us before the end of the year and suggested that Iraq may proceed in pyramid fashion, starting from the leadership in programmes, going down to management, scientists, engineers and technicians but excluding the basic layer of workers. The list of names may have several uses. It could, for instance, be of use to learn where those who earlier worked on the biological weapons programme, are now. Some persons on the list could be called for interviews. We certainly consider interviews in Iraq a potentially important source of information - as it has been in the past. Taking persons to be interviewed and family members out of Iraq is authorized under paragraph 5 of resolution 1441 (2002) and is an option. Although Iraq would be obliged to cooperate, the practical arrangements would have to be carefully examined. Clearly, we could not take anybody out of Iraq without his or her consent. The second formal request concerns legislation implementing Security Council resolutions. I have reminded the Iraqi side several times in the past year that it should be easy for it to enact such legislation, notably laws prohibiting legal and physical persons to engage in any way in the development, production or storing of weapons of mass destruction or missiles of proscribed range. Model legislation was, in fact, transmitted to Iraq by UNSCOM and the IAEA long ago. Third Part: a Preliminary Assessment of Iraq's Declaration of 7 DecemberI shall now turn to discuss those parts of Iraq's Declaration of 7 December, which concern biological and chemical weapons and long-range missiles. I hope that my comments may be of some assistance especially to those Members of the Council who have only had the working version one day and who are about to begin their analytical work. Although UNMOVIC has had access to this text a whole week before the working version was made available, our analysts have been fully occupied preparing the working version and my comments must necessarily be provisional. I trust there will be a further occasion for discussion, when all have had more time for study and analysis. The first point to be made is that Iraq continues to state in the Declaration, as it has consistently done before its submission, that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, when inspectors left at the end of 1998 and that none have been designed, procured, produced or stored in the period since then. While individual governments have stated that they have convincing evidence to the contrary, UNMOVIC at this point is neither in a position to confirm Iraq's statements, nor in possession of evidence to disprove it. The purpose of the Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to declare all WMD programmes and creating an extensive and intensive inspection system is to attain, through peaceful means, confidence that Iraq is rid of or ridding itself of all such programmes and proscribed items - verified disarmament. A declaration cannot, if it stands alone, create confidence. The listing of sites or of persons, the reporting of production, importation, destruction and consumption figures and the opening of doors, giving access to inspections, is not enough to create confidence that no weapons programmes and proscribed items remain. The statements need to be supported by documentation or other evidence. Only so do they become verifiable. During the period 1991-1998, Iraq submitted many declarations called full, final and complete. Regrettably, much in these declarations proved inaccurate or incomplete or was unsupported or contradicted by evidence. In such cases, no confidence can arise that proscribed programmes or items have been eliminated. Such was the situation at the end of 1998, when inspectors left Iraq. The many question marks are documented in a report to the Council early in 1999 (S/1999/94) and in the so-called Amorim Report (S/1999/356). To these question marks, nearly four years without any inspection activity have been added. In resolution 1441 (2002), Iraq was given an opportunity to provide a fresh declaration and to make it verifiable to the inspecting authorities by submitting supporting evidence. It remains to analyse in detail how much is clarified by the new declaration and supporting material. When we have performed a more thorough analysis, we may ask Iraq for supplementary information and clarifications. The overall impression is that not much new significant information has been provided in the part of Iraq's Declaration, which relates to proscribed weapons programmes, nor has much new supporting documentation or other evidence been submitted. New material has, on the other hand, been provided concerning non-weapons related activities during the period from the end of 1998 to the present time. It would appear that the part that covers biological weapons is essentially a reorganized version of a previous declaration provided by Iraq to UNSCOM in September 1997. In the chemical weapons area, the basis of the current Declaration is a declaration submitted by Iraq in 1996 with subsequent updates and explanations. In the missile field, the Declaration follows the same format, and seems to have largely the same content as Iraq's 1996 missile declaration and updates. Although it must be noted that much of what Iraq has provided in the weapons part of its Declaration is not new, there are some sections of new material. In the chemical weapons field, Iraq has further explained its account of the material balance of precursors for chemical warfare agents. Although it does not resolve outstanding issues on this subject, it may help to achieve a better understanding of the fate of the precursors. In the missile area, there is a good deal of information regarding Iraq's activities in the past few years. As declared by Iraq, these are permitted activities, which will be monitored by UNMOVIC to ensure that they comply with the relevant Council resolutions. A series of new projects have been declared that are at various stages of development. They include a design for a new liquid oxygen/ethanol propellant engine and replacement of guidance systems for several surface-to-air missiles. These projects will need to be investigated and evaluated by UNMOVIC. Iraq has also provided information on a short-range rocket that is manufactured using 81 mm aluminium tubes. Although this is not a new disclosure, the information may be relevant to well-publicized reports concerning the importation of aluminium tubes. At this stage, UNMOVIC has drawn no conclusions concerning the tubes, and further investigation of this will be conducted. While I am on the subject of new information, I would like to mention a document recently provided by Iraq. This is the so-called Air Force document, which was once in the hands of an UNSCOM inspector and which relates to the consumption of chemical munitions in the Iraq/Iran War. Potentially, it could assist in resolving some questions relating to the material balance of chemical weapons. We are now closely examining this document to establish the scope of the information and to evaluate it in the light of information in our archives. It is too early to say whether it will support the information in Iraq's Declaration. I now turn to some inconsistencies and issues that will need clarification. In the biological area, Iraq previously provided, in its submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999, a table concerning the additional import of bacterial growth media. Growth media was used by Iraq in the production of anthrax and other biological warfare agents. This table has been omitted from the current Declaration and the reasons for the omission need to be explained. In the civilian chemical area, Iraq has declared that it has repaired and installed equipment that had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, under Council resolution 687 (1991). The equipment is now at a civilian chemical plant and used for the production of chlorine and other chemicals. An UNMOVIC team has recently inspected both the plant and the equipment. Consideration will now need to be given to the fate of this equipment, as well as other equipment, which was presumed destroyed. In the missile area, Iraq has declared the development of a missile known as the Al Samoud, which uses components from an imported surface-to-air missile. A variant of the Al Samoud, with a larger diameter (760 mm) than the standard version (500 mm) has been declared. Because of the potential of such a missile, UNSCOM had informed Iraq that such a development should not proceed until technical discussions had resolved the question of capability. In the latest update of the semi-annual monitoring declarations, Iraq has declared that in 13 flight tests of the Al Samoud the missile has exceeded the permitted range. The greatest range achieved was 183 kilometres. The use of components from the imported surface-to-air missile, which I have just mentioned, was also the subject of the letters of March 1994 and November 1997 in which the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM stated that the activity was not permitted. Iraq disputed the UNSCOM view that the activity was in violation of its obligations. From its current Declaration, it appears that Iraq has, in fact, proceeded with the conversion in recent years. The whole issue will now need to be considered. I have covered new information in Iraq's Declaration, some inconsistencies, and issues that need to be considered or clarified through investigation or technical discussions. As there is little new substantive information in the weapons part of Iraq's Declaration, or new supporting documentation, the issues that were identified as unanswered in the Amorim report (S/1999/356) and in UNSCOM's report (S/1999/94) remain unresolved. In most cases, the issues are outstanding not because there is information that contradicts Iraq's account, but simply because there is a lack of supporting evidence. Such supporting evidence, in the form of documentation, testimony by individuals who took part, or physical evidence, for example, destroyed warheads, is required to give confidence that Iraq's Declaration is indeed accurate, full and complete. The issues that have previously been identified include the unilateral destruction of indigenously produced "training" missile engines, the accounting for 50 conventional warheads declared to be unilaterally destroyed but not recovered, 550 mustard gas shells declared lost after the Gulf War, declarations concerning the production and weaponization of the nerve agent VX, the declared unilateral destruction of biological warfare agents and Iraq's declaration concerning the material balance of bacterial growth media. While in most cases issues are outstanding because there is a lack of supporting evidence, in a few cases, there is information in our possession that would appear to contradict Iraq's account. At this point, I will only mention that there are indications suggesting that Iraq's account of its production and unilateral destruction of anthrax during the period between 1988 and 1991, may not be accurate. On this matter, we shall certainly ask Iraq to provide explanations and further evidence. Fourth Part: OutlookWhat role will the inspection system play if Iraq fails to provide evidence supporting its statements that there remain no weapons of mass destruction and that nothing was produced or developed or stored during the period from the end of 1998 until now? Inspections of sites have, as one important objective, the verification of industrial, military, research and other current activities with a view to assuring that no proscribed programmes or activities are regenerated at any site in Iraq. This side of the inspection system can be characterized as a form of containment. Through the other side of the system of reinforced monitoring, there is a continuation of investigations to complete the requirement of disarmament, as laid down in resolution 687 (1991) and many subsequent resolutions. The sites to be inspected in the future are not only those which have been declared by Iraq or inspected in the past, but also any new sites which may become known through procurement information, interviews, defectors, open sources, intelligence or overhead imagery. New techniques and increasing resources are available for this effort. The use of multiple teams - in all disciplines - operating in parallel all over Iraq has been the basis for planning our inspections. To decrease the possibility of prediction, no systematic patterns are being followed. Advanced technology will play its role once procurement is finalized. Not only monitoring equipment, such as cameras and sensors, will be used but also surveillance over-flights from various platforms, including fixed-wing aircraft, drones and helicopters. Inspection activities at sites seek to establish the operational objectives of sites. They comprise searches for proscribed material and equipment, as well as documents and computers. Sampling may also provide important information related to any undeclared activities at sites. Arrangements are in place for the procurement of chemical and biological analytical facilities to be installed at our Baghdad Centre. None of these tools and inspection activities will guarantee that all possibly concealed items and activities will be found, but based on the extensive authority given in resolution 1441 (2002) and backed by a united Security Council, they will make any attempted concealment more difficult. II. Security Council Briefing by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei'Preliminary Analysis of the Nuclear-Related "Currently Accurate, Full And Complete Declaration" (CAFCD) Submitted by Iraq', Informal Briefing of the United Nations Security Council by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, New York, December 19; IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org. 1. On 8 December 2002, the IAEA received at its Headquarters in Vienna, under cover of a letter dated 7 December 2002 from Dr. Amir Al Sa'adi, Advisor to the Office of the Presidency of Iraq, the nuclear-related declaration submitted by Iraq in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002). The declaration consists of seven volumes: the first six are entitled "The past Iraqi nuclear programme" and cover Iraq's nuclear activities prior to 1991; the seventh is entitled "Nuclear programme from 1991 up to 2002". The six volumes of the first part are predominantly in the English language; the seventh volume is largely in Arabic. 2. The Security Council has before it an edited copy of the Iraqi declaration. As explained in the cover letter to the President of the Security Council conveying the edited version of the declaration, the IAEA excised aspects of the declaration which included:
3. The IAEA's editing of Iraq's declaration prior to providing it to the Security Council has been minimal consistent with the principle that proliferation sensitive information should not be released. The IAEA has attempted to balance what should be deleted to prevent the dissemination of sensitive information with the aim of providing as much information as possible to Members of the Security Council. 4. In carrying out its preliminary assessment of the Iraqi declaration, the IAEA has concentrated on:
5. Iraq's overall conclusion with respect to its nuclear programme is as follows: "No activities of any substance related to the former INP were carried out during and beyond April 1991. All nuclear program activities were practically terminated and abandoned during April 1991 and only reports of previous accomplishments and new missions (non-proscribed) were issued later." (Extended Summary, page 86/113) 6. Iraq's current declaration of its nuclear programme prior to 1991 contains no substantive changes from the FFCD provided to the IAEA in 1998. The declaration does contain numerous clarifications, but does not include any additional documentation related to areas which were identified in previous IAEA reports as requiring further clarification, particularly weapons design or centrifuge development. 7. Iraq states that its nuclear activities from 1991 to 2002 have been limited to the use of radioisotopes for non-proscribed purposes (e.g. medical, agricultural and industrial uses), in conformity with Security Council resolution 707 (1991). The remainder of the declaration covering the post-1991 period is devoted to a description of the activities conducted at current and former Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) sites, at locations established since 1991 to which a number of former IAEC personnel were transferred, and at other industrial locations that had supported the weapons development programme. 8. The IAEC sites were heavily damaged during the Gulf War. IAEA inspection teams, pursuant to the Security Council mandate in resolution 687 (1991), eliminated all remaining weapons development infrastructure at these sites. In its CAFCD [Currently Accurate, Full And Complete Declaration], Iraq has declared that the current and former IAEC sites, as well as the locations to which former IAEC personnel were transferred, are now devoted to the conduct of non-nuclear commercial activities. The other support locations are declared as being involved in a variety of industrial and military applications. All of these sites and locations were subject to on-going monitoring and verification prior to 1998. 9. It should be noted that, in the course of the meeting that took place in Baghdad on 19 November 2002, the Iraqi counterpart, referring to a number of published reports, acknowledged that Iraq had made several unsuccessful attempts since 1991 to import high-strength aluminum tubing, but stated that the tubing had been intended for the manufacture of 81-millimetre rockets and not for the enrichment of uranium. These attempts are not mentioned in the Iraqi declaration covering post-1991 activities, although the IAEA understands that it is referred to in the part of the declaration that deals with missiles. The IAEA intends to pursue this matter further with Iraq. In addition, during that same meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi authorities, referring again to published reports, denied any efforts to import uranium after 1991. The declaration makes no mention of this issue, but the matter will be pursued further by the IAEA. As previously reported to the Council by the IAEA, all nuclear material known to exist in Iraq (mostly natural uranium) remains under IAEA control at a storage location in Iraq, and has been subject to periodic verification since 1998 pursuant to Iraq's Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). 10. As a result of our assessment to date of the Iraqi declaration, the following preliminary conclusions can be drawn: a. Iraq's declaration concerning its past nuclear programme contains no substantive differences from the 1998 FFCD [Full, Final and Complete Declaration]; accordingly, like the FFCD, the recent declaration appears to be consistent with the coherent picture of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme drawn by the IAEA (as reported to the Security Council in S/1997/779) and its conclusions with respects to that programme. These conclusions were refined through additional analyses carried out by the IAEA after 1997 and last reported to the Security Council in October of this year (S/2002/1150). b. The Iraqi declaration concerning its programme between 1991 and 1998 is also consistent with the conclusions drawn by the IAEA on the basis of its verification activities conducted throughout that period and regularly reported to the Security Council. c. The key outstanding issue for the IAEA is the accuracy and completeness of Iraq's declaration that there have been no material changes in its nuclear programme since 1998 and that its nuclear activities have been limited to the non-proscribed use of radioisotopes. 11. A detailed assessment of Iraq's CAFCD is underway. This will involve an extensive comparison of the CAFCD with all information available to the IAEA, including that which may be provided by States as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 10 of resolution 1441 (2002), information derived from past inspections and analyses, and information which is being acquired through present verification activities in Iraq. Resumption of Inspections12. Following the Security Council approval of resolution 1441 (2002), an advance team of IAEA and UNMOVIC personnel, including the Director General of the IAEA and the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, visited Baghdad on 18 November 2002 for a meeting with their Iraqi counterparts to establish logistical arrangements and to re-instate the inspectorates' office in Baghdad. IAEA inspections began on 27 November 2002 and have been ongoing since then. The IAEA's presence in Baghdad was increased to about 30 inspectors, and this level will be by and large maintained through at least the period required for the assessment of Iraq's CAFCD. 13. Since the resumption of Security Council mandated activities in Iraq, the IAEA has conducted sixty-eight inspections, including inspections at a Presidential Site and at six sites that had not previously been inspected. Inspections have been carried out without prior notification to Iraq except where notification was necessary to ensure that specific support from the counterpart would be available at the facility (e.g. a crane for the removal of Agency air samplers), and immediate access has been provided by the Iraqi authorities. No evidence of prohibited activities has been detected, though the results of the collection of environmental samples are not yet available. 14. The objective of current inspections, beyond gaining assurance that Iraq is not carrying out prohibited activities, is to re-establish knowledge of Iraqi nuclear capabilities, including the identification of the location of major equipment and of key technical personnel. In the coming weeks, the scope of the inspections will be expanded to include a detailed investigation of Iraq's activities over the last four years, the follow-up of issues identified as a result of our analysis of the CAFCD, and the seeking of additional clarifications on certain aspects of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme. 15. The verification activities carried out by the IAEA in Iraq will involve exercising all of the IAEA's rights under relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1441 (2002). These activities will include: follow-up with Iraqi authorities on CAFCD related issues; on-site inspection activities; the collection of environmental samples at known and new locations; satellite imagery analysis; gamma radiation monitoring; and interviews with Iraqi officials and other persons, subject to modalities and at locations deemed appropriate by the IAEA. 16. A detailed assessment of the CAFCD and of the results of two months of inspections will be undertaken expeditiously and progress achieved will be described in the IAEA's update report to the Council in January 2003. III. Remarks to the Press by Blix and ElBaradei'Press encounter by Messrs. Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei following Security Council consultations, 19 December 2002'; unofficial transcript, UNMOVIC website. Hans Blix: Good morning. Mr. El-Baradei and I had been briefing the [Security] Council on our preliminary assessment of the declaration submitted by Iraq. I also told the Council...about the build-up of our efforts in Iraq, and the first experiences of the inspections. As to the assessment of the declaration, we are consistent in the view that there has been relatively little given in the declaration, by way of evidence, concerning the programmes of weapons of mass destruction. There's been some material concerning the period between 1998 and 2002 in their non-nuclear weapons field. We will evidently continue the analysis and the Council is clear that it wants us to come back sometime in January for a more profound, thorough briefing than we've been able to do so far. Mohamed ElBaradei: We have, as Dr. Blix mentioned, we have done our first reporting to the Council. We have indicated that we are at a very initial phase of assessing the report. I referred to it as our reconnaissance phase of looking at the report. Later on we will have to move into the investigation part of our work, visiting more sites, doing more environmental sampling, talking to people. I think we are making, we have both of us indicated, we are making good progress in having access to sites. Iraq is cooperating well in terms of process. We both, I think, agree that we still need much more cooperation from Iraq in terms of substance, in terms of uncovering of evidence, to exonerate themselves that they are clean from weapons of mass destruction. And I think that's a challenge for both of them and us. If they come with additional information, then our task will be much shorter, much easier. Our conclusion would be much more credible. And I think there was a sense in the Council that Iraq needs to come up with additional information. We both certainly would like to see more information from Iraq. We are going to report regularly to the Council. We will have another meeting with the Council some time in early January, I think, and then we will come with a status report around the 27th of January, I believe. Question: Do you have a feeling that the declaration has omissions in which Iraq has not provided information that would allow you to account for weapons of mass destruction that were reported by UNSCOM, for example, at the end of its inspection period? Blix: There were a lot of open questions at the end of 1998 which are registered by UNSCOM and also by the Amorin Report, as you say. And these had not been answered by evidence in the new declaration. And this we are pointing out. The absence of that evidence means, of course, that one cannot have confidence that there do not remain weapons of mass destruction. Evidence would be needed for that purpose and we will continue to look for that in the inspection process. Question: Could you be more specific about what these items are that you are looking for, that you knew were there in 1998 that are not in this declaration? And a second question is how is Iraq treating this? Are they saying simply they no longer have this, it never existed, they got rid of it? Blix: Well, it is a long catalogue which would bore you to listen to here and you can read it in your own newspapers most of the time. ... [Y]ou have questions of anthrax, you have questions of munitions, etc. It's a long catalogue and we will repeat that also in our analysis. El Baradei: We probably can just give you an example. There was report by Iraq during our meeting in Baghdad that there were efforts to procure aluminium tubes. There is nothing in the report to give us details about this effort to procure. We need more details on it. I think that in Dr. Blix's area, for example, we know there was a lot of production of different chemical agents, for example. But there is no evidence that these agents have been destroyed. And I think that's the kind of evidence we need. We need either to see documents, we need people to speak to us and confirm that these things have been destroyed or we need even to see [a] sample of that, of what has been destroyed. The more we see, the more credible assurance we can provide to the Council, the more the Council can come to closure on this issue and come to the conclusion that Iraq has been disarmed. That's the objective and the more we get from Iraq, the more we can provide assurances to the Council, the more the Council can state categorically yes, Iraq has been disarmed. Blix: Wait a minute, I will give you another example, since he gave you two of them. About anthrax - well, Iraq declared earlier that they had produced 8,500 litres of anthrax and there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it was limited to 8,500. If it was so, we must ask ourselves was there more. ... UNSCOM actually calculated that, with the capacity that they [Iraq] had, they could have produced about three times as much, something like 24,000 litres. Then Iraq declared that they had destroyed it all and there was some evidence given that they had destroyed some of it. There was not sufficient evidence to show that all was destroyed. Hence, there is a question, is there still some anthrax in Iraq? And we would need more evidence, either by someone who participated in the destruction or in the way of records as to that production, etc. This is the kind of questions that we have on many items. Question: You have been studying this report now, both agencies, for the last few days ... Blix: and nights. Question: ...and nights, okay great. Now you have raised a few questions. You have found gaps, omissions. What is the initial reactions you find from Iraq? Do they tell you, okay bring your next questions on and we will answer them, or are they saying this is the declaration, take it or leave it? What is your initial [reaction] from the Iraqis. Are they cooperating fully? El Baradei: As I said, Iraq has been opening doors to us, Iraq has been giving us immediate access to sites. However, we have not gotten what we need in terms of additional evidence and clearly we are going through our detailed analysis of the report. We will go back to Iraq. We will clearly ask lots of questions. We will expect that we will get answers and hopefully additional evidence. ... I will have to wait until we do the analysis. I will have wait until we go to Iraq and we are not optimistic or pessimistic. We are trying to provide objective assessments. Blix: One should say, in addition, I think, that an opportunity was missed in the declaration to give a lot of evidence. And well, they can still provide it and I hope they provide it to us orally, but it would have been better if it had been in the declaration. Question: Are you dissatisfied with the report at this moment, and what is the next step you are going to take? Blix: Well, as I said, it would have been much better if the report had provided a lot of evidence and much of it was repetition of what has been said before. So I don't think that you can put together a report of 10,000 pages within one month without taking a lot of old material. But there is also some new material and we are analysing that, mostly relating to non-weapons related activities. ... Mr. Baradei said they [the Iraqis] opened the doors. The cooperation on proceedings, on procedure, has been good. They have been helpful, helped us also in the terms of logistics - we have been setting up an office in Mosul. And on all these scores, access, prompt access, yes, there has been good cooperation, presumably an instruction to their people to let us in, in sites of the type we have visited so far. ... [But] we still have these outstanding questions from the past, where evidence is needed. ... Question: There's been a lot of talk about the need for countries to come forward with intelligence. Clearly, the US has given several hints. They have stuff to give. Have they come forward? Have they told you when they'll come forward? Blix: I am hopeful that we will get more intelligence, but we won't tell you when and what. ... Question: There were cases of closed doors - once last Friday and one, I understand, yesterday. The closed doors - how do you see that and does it show you anything? Blix: Well, there was an occasion, I think, this was in a hospital or something. This was on a Friday, the Muslim day of rest, and the place was practically empty. There were some doors inside to offices which were closed, so they didn't have the keys. The Iraqis offered to break down the doors, and we suggested no, it might not be a good idea. Instead, we suggested, and they agreed, that we seal the doors until the Saturday morning. ... IV. Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell'Press Conference, Secretary Of State Colin L. Powell, Washington, December 19, 2002'; US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. Secretary Powell: On November 8th, the United Nations Security Council responded to the challenge issued by President Bush in his 12 September speech to the United Nations General Assembly. On that day, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, requiring Iraq to disarm itself of its weapons of mass destruction and to disclose all of its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. Resolution 1441 was the latest in a long string of Security Council resolutions since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Previous resolutions, which included requirements to disarm and to end the cruel repression of the Iraqi people, have all been defied or ignored by Iraq. Resolution 1441 recognized that Iraq "has been and remains in material breach of its obligations," but gave the Iraqi regime, again, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. Iraq's answer came on December 7th in a 12,200-page document submitted to the Security Council. Resolution 1441 required Iraq to submit a declaration on all its mass weapons program of destruction, a declaration that was "currently accurate, full and complete," in the words of the resolution. The inspectors told the Security Council this morning that the declaration fails to answer many open questions. They said that in some cases they even have information that directly contradicts Iraq's account. Our experts have also examined the Iraqi document. The declaration's title echoes the language of Resolution 1441. It is called, "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration." But our experts have found it to be anything but currently accurate, full or complete. The Iraqi declaration may use the language of Resolution 1441, but it totally fails to meet the resolution's requirements. The inspectors said that Iraq has failed to provide new information. We agree. Indeed, thousands of the document's pages are merely a resubmission of material it gave the United Nations years ago, material that the UN has already determined was incomplete. Other sections of the Iraqi declaration consists of long passages copied from reports written by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The only changes the Iraqi regime made were to remove references critical to its own conduct. The declaration totally fails to address what we had learned about Iraq's prohibited weapons programs before the inspectors were effectively forced out in 1998. And let me just touch on a few examples, and we'll be giving out a fact sheet later with additional examples. Before the inspectors were forced to leave Iraq, they concluded that Iraq could have produced 26,000 liters of anthrax. That is three times the amount Iraq had declared. Yet, the Iraqi declaration is silent on this stockpile, which, alone, would be enough to kill several million people. The regime also admitted that it had manufactured 19,180 liters of a biological agent called botchulinum toxin. UN inspectors later determined that the Iraqis could have produced 38,360 additional liters. However, once again, the Iraqi declaration is silent on these missing supplies. The Iraqi declaration also says nothing about the uncounted, unaccounted precursors from which Iraq could have produced up to 500 tons of mustard gas, sarin gas and VX nerve gas. Nor does the declaration address questions that have arisen since the inspectors left in 1998. For example, we know that in the late 1990s, Iraq built mobile biological weapons production units. Yet, the declaration tries to waive this away, mentioning only mobile refrigeration vehicles and food-testing laboratories. We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear weapons program. The Iraqi regime is required by Resolution 1441 to report those attempts. Iraq, however, has failed to provide adequate information about the procurement and use of these tubes. Most brazenly of all, the Iraqi declaration denies the existence of any prohibited weapons programs at all. The United States, the United Nations and the world waited for this declaration from Iraq. But Iraq's response is a catalogue of recycled information and flagrant omissions. It should be obvious that the pattern of systematic holes and gaps in Iraq's declaration is not the result of accidents or editing oversights or technical mistakes. These are material omissions that, in our view, constitute another material breach. We are disappointed, but we are not deceived. This declaration is consistent with the Iraqi regime's past practices. We have seen this game again and again - an attempt to sow confusion and buy time, hoping the world will lose interest. This time, the game is not working. This time, the international community is concentrating its attention and increasing its resolve as the true nature of the Iraqi regime is revealed again. On the basis of this declaration, on the basis of the evidence before us, our path for the coming weeks is clear. First, we must continue to audit and examine the Iraqi declaration to understand the full extent of Iraq's failure to meet its disclosure obligations. Second, the inspections should give high priority to conducting interviews with scientists and other witnesses outside of Iraq, where they can speak freely. Under the terms of Resolution 1441, Iraq is obligated - it is their obligation - to make such witnesses available to the inspectors. Third, the inspectors should intensify their efforts inside Iraq. The United States, and I hope other Council members, will provide the inspectors with every possible assistance, all the support they need to succeed in their crucial mission. Given the gravity of the situation, we look forward to frequent reports from Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. Finally, we will continue to consult with our friends, with our allies, and with all members of the Security Council on how to compel compliance by Iraq with the will of the international community. But let there be no misunderstanding. As Ambassador John Negroponte said earlier today, Saddam Hussein has so far responded to this final opportunity with a new lie. The burden remains on Iraq. Not on the United Nations. Not on the United States. The burden remains on Iraq to cooperate fully and for Iraq to prove to the international community whether it does or does not have weapons of mass destruction. We are convinced they do until they prove to us otherwise. Resolution 1441 calls for serious consequences for Iraq if it does not comply with the terms of the resolution. Iraq's non-compliance and defiance of the international community has brought it closer to the day when it will have to face these consequences. The world is still waiting for Iraq to comply with its obligations. The world will not wait forever. Security Council Resolution 1441 will be carried out in full. Iraq can no longer be allowed to threaten its people and its region with weapons of mass destruction. It is still up to Iraq to determine how its disarmament will happen. Unfortunately, this declaration fails totally to move us in the direction of a peaceful solution. ... Question: I'm a little confused because this was to have been Iraq's last chance and you've just laid out four additional things, including interviewing scientists, and you're still saying that Iraq has the opportunity to so-and-so and so-and-so. I don't know if you're saying an airtight case hasn't been made or somehow you have some slim hope it can be turned around by Iraq. Secretary Powell: It remains to be seen. The resolution was its last chance and there were obligations for Iraq in that resolution: one, to accept the resolution; two, to provide a declaration. We have begun our analysis of that declaration and we find so far that it has failed to do what it was supposed to do. But we will continue to work with UNMOVIC and IAEA and we'll consult with other members of the Council to see what conclusions the Council members arrive at, and to see whether or not more evidence can be brought forward to make the case to the Council that Iraq has totally missed its opportunity. But so far, with respect to complying with the conditions and the terms of 1441, Iraq is well on its way to losing this last chance. Question: Mr. Secretary, you've used the expression "material breach." Can you tell us why you've chosen to use this? And how would you answer those who have been saying this morning that by using this without taking action you are, in fact, devaluing the expression? Secretary Powell: "Material breach." I think, perhaps, too much has been made of the term. Material breach is a term that comes from the law that says a party to a commitment has failed in meeting the terms of that commitment. Iraq has done that repeatedly in the past. That's why 1441 begins with that statement of past material breach on many occasions by Iraq, still in material breach, and this is a new material breach. I don't think we are devaluing the term. I think we are using the term to make it clear to the world that, once again, we have a breach on the part of Iraq with respect to its obligations and therefore the spots have not changed. Now, I'll let the other members of the Council make their own judgment as to whether they wish to characterize it as such right now. The important point, I think, is that from what we heard from Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei this morning, and what I heard from other members of the Council who have spoken, is that there is no question that Iraq continues its pattern of non-cooperation, its pattern of deception, its pattern of dissembling, its pattern of lying. And if that is going to be the way they continue through the weeks ahead, then we're not going to find a peaceful solution to this problem. Question: Mr. Secretary, is there a deadline by which Iraq has to show this compliance, and will the United States return to the Security Council and seek another resolution authorizing military action toward the end of next month if Iraq does not comply? Secretary Powell: There is no calendar deadline, but obviously there is a practical limit to how much longer you can just go down the road of non-cooperation and how much time the inspectors can be given to do their work. In the weeks ahead, we expect both the IAEA and UNMOVIC to give regular reports as they get deeper into their inspection work, and as they analyze the declaration further. There are still long sections of the annexes that came with the declaration that have to be carefully examined. So I would not put a timeline on it, but obviously it is not indefinite. This situation cannot continue. A body of evidence is slowly building since the passage of Resolution 1441, and that body of evidence shows that Iraq is still not cooperating. It is Iraq's obligation to cooperate and they are the ones who are supposed to be coming forward under this resolution to demonstrate to the international community what they have done in the past, what they might still be holding, and to come clean. And what we have seen in this declaration is they still have not made a decision to come clean. And the inspectors will not be able to do their work until Iraq demonstrates that they are cooperating and they are coming clean and bringing forward the information. And until that happens, we should be very skeptical, and I'm afraid we should be very discouraged, with respect to the prospects of finding a peaceful solution. Question: Mr. Secretary, when is the US planning to share its intelligence with the inspectors, if at all? I think we were told they were waiting until after the initial assessment. Is now the right time to do that? Secretary Powell: We have, of course, been sharing our evaluation of the declaration with the inspection teams of both IAEA and UNMOVIC with respect to providing them additional forms of support that would make the inspection effort perhaps more targeted and effective. We are prepared to start doing that and we'll be in contact with them. Question: Mr. Secretary, as you know, the Vice President, in particular, has been very skeptical about inspections. So far, the inspectors have not turned up anything. Are you not concerned that if another month elapses and the inspectors are not able to find any of these weapons that you say are hidden, that that's going to undermine your case to the world that there is, in fact, violations? Secretary Powell: We have all been skeptical of inspections because we are basically distrustful of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime, and for good reason, and so, the President took the case to the international community. The declaration, I think, is further evidence of Iraq's unwillingness to comply with the requirements of the international community. And I don't want to prejudge what the inspectors might or might not find and it is not clear, exactly, what they have found or not found yet. They are getting up to speed. The number of inspectors has increased. Bits and pieces of information will come together. I hope that when members of the Council provide more support to the inspectors, it may make their work even that much more effective. But I wouldn't prejudge. The President has said repeatedly, he is interested in the disarmament of Iraq peacefully, if possible, but if that is not possible, it will be done by force. Question: Mr. Secretary, if the US goes to war with Iraq, what kind of war would it be? Will it be swift, or will it be bloody? How will it differ from Desert Storm? Secretary Powell: We are doing everything we can to avoid war. The President has made that clear. But if war comes, the only thing I would say about the nature of that conflict is that it will done in a way that would minimize the loss of life, and it would be done to be accomplished is as swift a manner as possible, and for the purpose of getting rid of weapons of mass destruction and liberating the Iraqi people. But I wouldn't go any further right now. ... Question: ... [W]ould the United States be ready and willing to accept more [Iraqi] qualifications of what they already said? Would you take into consideration that they said, "Oh, yes, we forgot this year what we actually have done with this"? Will that be possible to prevent a war? Secretary Powell: Let's see what happens in the days ahead. I can't hypothesize on that because I have little confidence that the Iraqis will do anything but try to - see, we answered your question here, but we're not answering all these other questions that perhaps you haven't even asked us yet. The resolution was clear: currently accurate, full and complete. It means the burden is on them to come forward and say, "You know we've been doing this. You know we've done it in the past. We have now changed, turned over a new leaf, and we're giving you all the information you need to see that we are giving this up, or anything we still are doing we will not do and we are demonstrating to you where this is so it can be destroyed, and we are in compliance." But that has not been the attitude of the Iraqi Government for the past 12 years, it is not the attitude of the Iraqi Government today, and the world should view this with great skepticism, keep the pressure on, make sure Iraq knows that it will be disarmed one way or the other, and hope that the Iraqi people and Iraqi leaders, besides Saddam Hussein, realize that they are going to disarm one way or the other. ... Question: Mr. Secretary, Mr. Blix said today that he had asked for lists of Iraqi scientists who had worked on these programs. He said that there were no efforts yet to try and work on modalities for access to these people. Are you going to push them harder... Secretary Powell: We are working on modalities now and we are putting in place, working with Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei, putting in place means by which one could accomplish this interview task. It has some complex aspects to it. And there will be names that will be made available. And let us remember this. Under the resolution, when those names are presented to the Iraqi Government, they are required to provide these individuals for interview, and for interview in a safe place, and for their families to be in a safe place where they will not be in danger of losing their lives for telling the truth. And so we are hard at work on all of these modalities. Thank you. V. US State Department Fact Sheet'Illustrative Examples of Omissions from the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations Security Council', Fact Sheet, US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, December 19. Anthrax and Other Undeclared Biological Agents
Ballistic Missiles
Nuclear Weapons
VX
Chemical and Biological Weapons Munitions
Empty Chemical Munitions
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Programs
Mobile Biological Weapon Agent Facilities
SummaryNone of these holes and gaps in Iraq's declaration are mere accidents, editing oversights or technical mistakes: they are material omissions. VI. Statement by UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw'Jack Straw's statement on Iraq after weapons inspectors' report, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), December 19; FCO website, http://www.fco.gov.uk. The reports from the inspectors, Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei, to the Security Council this afternoon show clearly that Iraq has failed to meet the obligations imposed on it by Security Council Resolution 1441, which requires them to make a full and complete disclosure of their weapons of mass destruction, the material to put those weapons of mass destruction together. And, as Dr. Blix has said, this means that we cannot have confidence - I would add, to put it very mildly - that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction as it has claimed. This now means that Iraq faces even greater responsibilities to comply fully with the inspectors and co-operate fully with the United Nations if military action is to be avoided. This disclosure does not of itself trigger military action under Operational Paragraph Four, but it is a very serious failure to comply, and a clear warning has to go out to Iraq that they now have to co-operate fully with the United Nations and its inspectors as is required of them by international law. VII. Statement by French Ambassador to the UN Jean-David Levitte'Statement to the press from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations following consultations at the Security Council, December 19'; French Foreign Ministry website, http://www.france.diplomatie.fr. 1. The preliminary assessment of the Iraqi declaration brought in this morning to the Council by Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei is very similar to ours :
2. This preliminary assessment confirms the necessity to go forward in the implementation of resolution 1441, and to fully support the work of the inspectors. It is precisely with the view to address and lift these uncertainties that inspection mechanisms have been established. It is through UNMOVIC and IAEA that the international community will be able to verify whether weapons of mass destruction programs are still going on in Iraq. VIII. Remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov'Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Interview with NHK, Japanese Broadcasting Corporation, Tokyo, December 19, 2002'; Russian Foreign Ministry transcript, Document 2632-20-12-2002, December 20. Question: How do you assess the situation around Iraq now? Are you satisfied with the way Iraq treats UN inspectors? Foreign Minister Ivanov: The international community, and in the first place the members of the Security Council, made a very strong political move by unanimously approving Resolution 1441. This cleared the way for the resumption of inspection activity in Iraq. Now it is the task of the international community to ensure the inspectors' efficient work there. We, for our part, intend to contribute to this actively, using all our possibilities. In so doing we must trust the international inspectors, the commission of Hans Blix and the commission of IAEA, who should enjoy full support and trust from the Security Council and we must orient ourselves to their assessments and not exert any pressure on them in this or that direction. According to the information we have at hand, the current activity of the inspectors is generally proceeding normally. We will closely be following it, as big, painstaking and complex work lies ahead and it is important to do everything possible for Resolution 1441 to be fully complied with. Question: Recently the United States and Britain said there are problems in the document which Iraq has presented. What can you say about that? Foreign Minister Ivanov: The report presented by Iraq is being studied at UNMOVIC and IAEA, and we will orient ourselves precisely to their assessments. They must give an assessment to this report, whereupon we will draw our conclusions. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |