Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation Working Against Provocation: Interviews with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov, December 23/24
I. 'There Should Be No Provoking An Arms Race': Interview with Vremya Novostei, December 24'There Should Be No Provoking an Arms Race', interview with Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov, Vremya Novostei newspaper, December 24. Note: the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs prefaced its reproduction of the interview with the following note - "Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Russian G8 Political Director, gives no interviews to Russian print media. For the readers of the newspaper Vremya Novostei, the authoritative diplomat made an exception, and shared with special correspondent Katerina Labetskaya his analysis of pressing international problems through the prism of disarmament issues." ('Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov Interview with the Newspaper Vremya Novostei, Published on December 24 Under the Heading "There Should Be No Provoking an Arms Race"', Russian Foreign Ministry, Document 2650-24-12-2002, December 24.) Georgy Mamedov: The situation on the Korean Peninsula, Iraq, the US plans in the field of missile defense - topics quite different, one would think, but they all come down to arms control. Today this is also a question of the use of force: do you conduct negotiations or use brute force? It is also a question of national sovereignty: do you respect it or consider yourself entitled to deliver preemptive strikes on suspicion of someone developing some types of weaponry. Fighting terrorism is also a question of arms control. Question: Almost each diplomatic document contains the words "strategic stability," "strategic partnership." Why? Mamedov: Few people know that at the beginning of the '90s, a secret Yeltsin decree prescribed changing relations with the major countries of the world in the domain of security and disarmament where strategic arms played a special role. There was set up a group for consultations on strategic stability, consisting of officials from the Foreign and Defense Ministries and the Foreign Intelligence Service. Today this has a slightly different significance: strategic stability is the world's basic process that influences the easing or growth of tensions, ecology, all things. "Strategic partnership" is mentioned when people want to underline the guideline in relations for durable collaboration, for a radical change of military-political, economic relations or underscore traditional historical roots. This is a kind of symbol, a "target designation": we want to have with this country enduring long-term relations of cooperation. But in each case it has some particular filling. Question: And how do the US missile defense initiatives affect strategic stability? Answer: As before, we consider the United States' withdrawal from the ABM Treaty a mistake. A global missile defense with an outlet to space, which President Bush on December 17 declared an absolute means of defense, is unfeasible. But this, unfortunately, can lead to an arms race because a number of countries fear an adverse impact on their security. This will steeply lower the possibility of nuclear deterrence in crisis. Question: Won't problems arise in this context with the ratification by our Duma of the Treaty with the US on Strategic Offensive Reductions? Answer: Reduction to the planned level of 1,700 nuclear warheads will not tell on the security of Russia, whatever may happen in the ABM field in the long term. The General Staff had figured this out, reported to the President and the President had agreed. Question: But Russia is critical of the United States... Answer: Better to spend the money on real security, on aid to the developing countries. Their poverty and social contradictions are the breeding ground for regional conflicts, religious extremism and the same terrorism. Question: What is meant by "real security"? Answer: We divide missile defense systems into global, unfeasible and destabilizing, and regional. Terrorists might indeed seize small-range missiles, defense is needed against that. We are engaged in consultations with NATO on deploying a mobile ABM system in "threatened sectors." We have this kind of system, [the] S-300 [missile], and S-400 is now under development; deployable wherever necessary, although we aren't publicizing that. It exists in Israel too, and the US is developing such a system. On a regional missile defense we are ready to cooperate with any countries on the observance of the following two conditions: that the cooperation should not become an appendage to a global missile defense and that it should proceed under the aegis of the UN and international law. Now the Americans and we are working on a new statement on cooperation in the ABM field. For we are not engaged in carping with regard to their actions but rather suggest a constructive alternative against real threats. There should be no provoking an arms race. Question: What is the position of Russia on Japan's involvement in the US global missile defense? Answer: The Americans insist that Japan as an ally under a military treaty join the global missile defense. As to the regional level, they view it as only an appendage to global. The Japanese are thinking. We do not want to exert pressure on them in any way and simply explain the destabilizing essence of a global missile defense. And we are prepared to discuss a regional one. Question: How actively is Russia, having at the last summit in Canada become a full-fledged G8 member, involved in the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction? Answer: The G8 decisions in Kananaskis this summer marked a great shift, including in the struggle for international arms control. The Russian President's personal participation in the negotiations helped find the right working for the final document, which made it possible to launch the program. Within 10 years, 20 billion dollars will be allocated for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Already the allocation of 18 billion has been announced. Russia, second in amount of contribution after the US, will contribute approximately 2 billion dollars. Thanks to the efforts of Russia, the destruction of chemical weapons and disposal of decommissioned nuclear submarines in Russia were assigned to top-priority projects at Kananaskis. They pose an ecological threat not only to us. A summit to be held in Evian, France, next year will sum up the first results of the implementation of the program. Our chemical and atomic industries have already submitted to the G8 their specific financing requests. Question: Is the American Nunn-Lugar program for the destruction of chemical weapons included in the Global Partnership? Answer: Yes, but the importance of the Global Partnership, on which we insisted, lies in the fact that additional funds have been allocated. The Nunn-Lugar program is somewhere half of the American contribution to the Global Partnership. Question: But the US Congress for some reason is in no hurry to finance the Nunn-Lugar program... Answer: Initially the Americans themselves offered to finance a significant portion of the establishment of a large center for the destruction of chemical weapons in Shchuchye in Russia. But then a number of US senators unexpectedly began having doubts about the credibility of the stockpiles declared by us - although this contradicts common sense, for we are interested most of all in having everything declared and destroyed. We have presented all the documentation to the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Question: Information has leaked into the media that the money is being given to us for disarmament, so that other people's chemical weapons are disposed of in Russia. Answer: A piece of nonsense. I am responsibly telling you: no one was ever going to give us any chemical munitions for disposal, and even less so, made this a condition. It's another thing that there are international projects where our technologies are being used for the destruction of chemical weapons in the territories of third countries. II. '"Axis of Evil" - a Provocative Phrase': Interview with Vremya Novostei, December 23'"Axis of Evil - a Provocative Phrase', interview with Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov, Vremya Novostei newspaper, December 23. Georgy Mamedov: The phrase "axis of evil" is extremely unsuccessful, even provocative. It has engendered many problems, frightening a number of countries. Russia surely can feel calm, never allowing anyone to blackmail itself under any circumstances. And all know this. But what about a little state which is being told that it is almost part of the biblical forces of evil that have to be fought until their full destruction. To use the words of the song, "I know of no other country" where officially a law would be passed to change the leader of an independent state. One can hardly expect passivity from the countries included in the "axis of evil." Trying to do something, they, naturally, may violate some international agreements. But to accuse them of provoking the entire crisis is unfair. Responsibility should indeed be borne by those who are unfolding the campaign of intimidation and by those who because of this consider themselves entitled to violate international agreements. We do not recognize such a right and we have issued many statements. Not all were "warmly embraced" by some of our partners. Russia's principled stand stems from the protection of its national interests. What counts most is the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For, all these regional crises are very close to our borders. Question: All are intently watching Iraq. What is the position of Russia? Mamedov: The statements by Hans Blix and ElBaradei are evidence of the effectiveness of their work and of the possibility by peaceful means exactly, via generally adopted civilized arms control to solve the problem and provide guarantees that there will be no prohibited weapons in Iraq. Question: Are we satisfied with Iraq's report on its weapons? Are there any gaps or omissions in it? Mamedov: No one is ever completely satisfied: there is no such thing as absolute knowledge. There are questions which have yet to be answered, but no one had in fact expected that a single document would answer everything. That's what the inspectors are there for. If they have a question, and they are hindered from getting an answer, then this is a breach, this has to be prevented. But so far there are no complaints against the Iraqis that they hinder the inspectors' work, according to Blix and ElBaradei. That's what matters! The statements by US officials that they've learned little new or that there are gaps - now that had been predicted. Such is their position. I hope that it is prompted not by the search of a pretext for war, but by a desire to just exert pressure on Iraq, to make it cooperate better. I hope so because at the presidents' meeting in Pushkin [in November, 2002] we asked the Americans bluntly: "What do you want these inspections for? To have a pretext for a strike?" Question: You asked precisely so? Mamedov: Approximately. "No. We want to disarm Iraq preferably by peaceful means," the US president answered us. How it will be - we'll see. But that such responsible statements are made by the highest-placed state official is also important. Question: How do you evaluate the situation with the DPRK? Mamedov: To blackmail North Korea with its difficult economic position is counterproductive, dangerous. Russia promotes dialogue, encourages the creation there of joint ventures, the construction of a railway between North and South. This is the right policy. To call someone part of an "axis of evil," try to intimidate him and then charge that after such intimidation incautious statements are made, as they were made by Pyongyang, seems to me incorrect. Here I disagree with my friend John Bolton, who said to my question in this regard whether he was pleased by what had happened: "Yes, I am." I told him: "There you're wrong. This is very dangerous. You forgot the Korean war and the incidents in the demilitarized zone, where your own servicemen were killed." People's memory is short, and so we have to concern ourselves with strategic stability. Question: The Americans are interested in our assessments of the Korean situation? Mamedov: Not always, but often. And we sincerely share them. It is in our common interest that nuclear weapons should not appear on the Korean Peninsula. Meaning the absence of nuclear weapons in the DPRK and in South Korea and in the US forces on the territory of South Korea. Question: Does the 30,000-strong US military contingent in South Korea have nuclear weapons? Mamedov: The Americans say it hasn't. The official US policy, though, is to neither confirm nor deny their existence. Question: Russia is also being accused of nuclear cooperation with Iran... Mamedov: The Americans say: "We are against the development of nuclear weapons in Iran." We answer them: "So are we. But you as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons forget about your obligations to help develop peaceful nuclear power production." The NPT Treaty not only prohibits nuclear weapons development, but also encourages cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear power production. Russia is ready to provide all the guarantees, to cooperate with the IAEA and to work with Iran in such a way that the spent nuclear fuel that will be supplied there returns back, so that it is impossible even secretly to make from it any components of nuclear weapons. By the way, the Iranian foreign minister has invited inspectors to visit the two nuclear facilities that had supposedly been photographed from space. Let the specialists have a look; they are neither Russians nor Iranians, but Anglo-Saxons entertaining no particular liking towards Iran. Source: Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov Interview with the Newspaper Vremya Novostei, Published on December 23 Under the Heading "'Axis of Evil' - A Provocative Phrase", Russian Foreign Ministry, Document 2642-23-12-2002, December 23. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |