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UNMOVIC/IAEA Interim Security Council Briefing on Iraq, January 9

• I. UNMOVIC Briefing
• II. IAEA Briefing
• III. White House Press Briefing
• IV. Russian Foreign Ministry Statement

I. UNMOVIC Briefing

'Notes for Briefing the Security Council', Statement to the United Nations Security Council by Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, New York, January 9; UNMOVOC website, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/bx9jan.htm.

Introduction: On the Pattern of Reporting

I appreciate the opportunity to brief the Council informally on the issue of inspections in Iraq and our work in New York. As I understand it, today's meeting is intended to allow Members, who have now had the opportunity to examine Iraq's Declaration, to comment upon it. On behalf of UNMOVIC, I shall make some further comments on the Declaration, on the inspections in Iraq and on the build-up, which is taking place.

As I see it, my briefing today and the "updating" due on 27 January are part of a more frequent reporting that is needed after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002) and the resumption of inspections. UNMOVIC's next quarterly report to the Council is not due until 1 March but new "updates" can obviously be given whenever the Council wishes. Should some inspection event call for an immediate report to the Council, I would, of course, ask permission to present it, as allowed for in paragraph 11 of resolution 1441 (2002).

Role and Results of the Current Inspections

I now turn to the role and results of our current inspections. Evidently if we had found any 'smoking gun' we would have reported it to the Council. Similarly, if we had met a denial of access or other impediment to our inspections we would have reported it to the Council. We have not submitted any such reports.

In their very active media exposure, Iraqi officials have sought to construe the prompt access, which has been given to inspection teams and the fact that no weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items have been found, as confirmation of their assertion that there are no weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items in Iraq. The matter is not, of course, that simple.

The absence of 'smoking guns' and the prompt access which we have had so far and which is most welcome, is no guarantee that prohibited stocks or activities could not exist at other sites, whether above ground, underground or in mobile units.

On the other hand, the absence of dramatic finds is no indication that the inspections have been futile. After four years without international inspections a steadily increasing number of industrial, administrative, military, scientific and research sites are again being opened for inspections under the authority of the Security Council. The transparency is increasing - but does not exclude dark corners or caves.

The awareness in Iraq that industrial facilities, military installations, public or private offices and dwellings, may be the subject of no-notice inspection is further likely to deter possible efforts to hide items or activities or, at the very least, to make such action much more difficult. This is no small gain. Saying this is in no way to ignore the special value of inspections directed to sites, which have been indicated by fresh and reliable intelligence.

Let me conclude: the prompt access/open doors policy that has been pursued so far by Iraq vis-à-vis the inspectors is an indispensable element of transparency in a process that aims at securing disarmament by peaceful means. However, prompt access is by no means sufficient to give confidence that nothing is hidden in a large country with an earlier record of avoiding disclosures. Iraq is very familiar with the fact that only declarations supported by evidence will give confidence about the elimination of weapons. In this respect we have not so far made progress.

Unresolved Disarmament Issues Remain

As I mentioned on 19 December, the UNSCOM document S/1999/94 and the Amorim Report (S/1999/356) list a number of issues on which doubts exist as to whether all proscribed items or activities had been eliminated. UNMOVIC is not bound by every conclusion in these reports, but they are, in our view, professionally written. They give Iraq a clear idea of questions, which need to be answered and of doubts, which must be dispelled by very active efforts. These doubts will not disappear by the resubmission of old documents or by conversations between teams of experts.

The overall impression, which I reported to the Council on 19 December and which remains after some weeks of examination of the Declaration, is that it is rich in volume but poor in new information about weapons issues and practically devoid of new evidence on such issues. It appears that the vast majority of the supporting documents are the same as those provided in previous "Full, Final and Complete Declarations" or obtained by UNSCOM through the inspection process. Those documents that are new do not seem to contribute to the resolution of outstanding questions.

The Declaration repeats the assertion that there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that there is no more evidence to present. However, in order to create confidence that it has no more weapons of mass destruction or proscribed activities relating to such weapons, Iraq must present credible evidence. It cannot just maintain that it must be deemed to be without proscribed items so long as there is no evidence to the contrary. A person accused of the illegal possession of weapons may, indeed, be acquitted for lack of evidence, but if a state, which has used such weapons, is to create confidence that it has no longer any prohibited weapons, it will need to present solid evidence or present remaining items for elimination under supervision. Evidence can be of the most varied kind: budgets, letters of credit, production records, destruction records, transportation notes, or interviews by knowledgeable persons, who are not subjected to intimidation.

I have not asserted on behalf of UNMOVIC that proscribed items or activities exist in Iraq, but if they do, Iraq should present them and then eliminate them in our presence. There is still time for it.

If evidence is not presented, which gives a high degree of assurance, there is no way the inspectors can close a file by simply invoking a precept that Iraq cannot prove the negative. In such cases, regrettably, they must conclude, as they have done in the past, that the absence of the particular item is not assured.

The Weapons and Missile Dossiers in the Light of the Declaration and Recent Inspections

On 19 December, I made a number of preliminary observations on various points covered in the Declaration, e.g. on the production and destruction of anthrax, on evidence about the import of bacterial growth media, and on the 81 mm aluminium tubes. I shall not revert to these issues today, but I note that these questions still remain.

Comparisons between the Iraqi Declaration and earlier full, final and complete declarations have shown several cases of inconsistencies in terms of numbers declared.

The so-called Air Force document, which was provided separately from the Declaration, relates to the consumption of chemical munitions in the Iraq/Iran war. It was hoped that the submission of this document would help verify material balances regarding special munitions. After having analysed the document, we have concluded that it will in fact not contribute to resolving this issue. There remains therefore, a significant discrepancy concerning the numbers of special munitions.

I will also note that Iraq, in the Declaration, has declared the import of missile engines and raw material for the production of solid missile fuel. This import has taken place in violation of the relevant resolutions regulating import and export to Iraq. Inspections have confirmed the presence of a relatively large number of missile engines, some imported as late as 2002. We have yet to determine the significance of these illegal imports relating to the specific WMD-mandate of UNMOVIC.

Another outstanding issue regards the chemical agent VX. We have found no additional information in the Declaration that would help to resolve this issue. Instead, it contains information that is contradicted by documents previously found by UNSCOM. Iraq will have to further clarify the matter.

Lists of Iraqi Personnel Engaged in Proscribed Programmes

As I reported to you on 19 December, UNMOVIC asked Iraq, on the basis of paragraph 7 of resolution 1441 (2002), to provide the names of all personnel currently or formerly associated with some aspects of Iraq's programme of weapons of mass destruction.

A list was submitted to us before the end of last year as requested. It consisted of 117 persons for the chemical sector, 120 for the biological sector and 156 persons for the missile sector. This is an inadequate response. The lists do not even comprise all those who have been previously listed in Iraq's Full, Final and Complete Declarations, besides the numerous Iraqi personnel that are known from UNSCOM interviews and found in Iraqi documents, to have participated in past weapons programmes.

We do not feel that the Iraqi side has made a serious effort to respond to the request we made. We shall, therefore, ask for supplementary information. If the persons who were listed as once engaged in a particular banned weapons programmes can be shown through further information by Iraq or, in some cases, through interviews, to have moved to non-proscribed areas of work, this could actually bring a measure of support to the assertion that the weapons programme had ceased. The efforts we make are thus very far from the spy operation, which some Iraqi comments have talked about. Rather they seek to verify that staff capable - shall we say - of dual-use, are in peaceful employment.

Expansion and Consolidation of Inspection Activities in Iraq

Let me conclude with some information on the expansion and consolidation of our inspection activities in Iraq.

Inspections resumed on 27 November 2002 and since then, almost everyday, including Christmas and New Year, inspection teams have been out in the field.

There are presently about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors and 58 support staff in Iraq. In addition, there are 49 air crew for the fixed-wing and helicopter operations.

One hundred and fifty inspections of 127 sites have taken place up to 8 January 2003.

Conditions for the work of inspectors at BOMVIC and in the field have improved considerably since the initial period, including the availability of personal computers and transport vehicles. Eight helicopters are now in Baghdad and the first helicopter flight in support of inspections took place on 5 January. Helicopters are planned to be used routinely in inspection work, both in the fly and the so-called "no-fly zone". UNMOVIC is also planning to commence high-altitude surveillance over Iraq in the near future, in accordance with the mandate given in the Security Council resolution.

A provisional regional office in Mosul has been established in a hotel since the beginning of January 2003. UN security guards are guarding the office premises in the hotel, and there is also a small number of support UNMOVIC personnel stationed there. A team of 19 inspectors has already started to use this regional office as a base for inspections of sites in the area. Plans are being made for the expansion of the regional offices to include Basra in February/March 2003.

With regard to the analytical capability in Iraq for the screening and analysis of samples, the situation has also improved. Chemical experts are now able to screen samples, both at BOMVIC and in the field using portable units, while a modular chemical laboratory, acquired commercially, is expected to arrive at BOMVIC within the next three weeks. Within the next few weeks, the biological analytical capability will be enhanced. We have screened several chemical and biological samples in Baghdad, and in the near future, some samples will be sent for further analysis to outside laboratories.

Mr. President, Members may have questions for us on the Declaration and we shall try to answer them, but as we are dealing with subjects, which are often technical and complicated, it might be advisable to allow us some time before the answers are supplied. One way would be for us to take account of them when we draft the "update", which is to be given to the Council on 27 January - shortly after the visit that Dr. ElBaradei and I are scheduled to make to Baghdad on 19 and 20 January.

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II. IAEA Briefing

'Status of the Agency's Verification Activities in Iraq As of 8 January 2003', Informal Briefing delivered to the United Nations Security Council by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), New York, January 9; IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org.

1. The following information is provided to update the Council on the activities of the IAEA pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions. It describes the verification activities performed thus far, next steps, and where we are at this stage.

Verification Activities

Inspections, Interviews and Analysis

2. The initial priority of the IAEA, upon resumption of its verification activities in Iraq, was "reconnaissance": the re-establishment of its knowledge of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, including confirmation of the locations of major equipment, of nuclear material and significant non-nuclear materials, and of key technical personnel.

3. We have already achieved good progress in re-establishing our knowledge of Iraq's nuclear capabilities. While we are still continuing with our reconnaissance, we have now initiated the investigative phase, with particular emphasis on Iraq's activities over the last four years, focussing on those areas of concern identified by States, as well as those identified by the IAEA on the basis of its own analysis.

4. Since 27 November 2002, when the Security Council-mandated inspections in Iraq were resumed, the IAEA has conducted 109 inspections at some 88 locations. A majority of these inspections have taken place at industrial facilities (State-run as well as private), research centres and universities where most of Iraq's significant technical capabilities were known to have existed in the past. The inspections have included facilities identified through commercial satellite imagery as having been modified or constructed since 1998, in addition to some new locations. All of the inspections have been carried out without prior notification to Iraq, except where notification was necessary to ensure that specific support would be available.

5. The Iraqi authorities have consistently provided access without conditions and without delay. They have also made available additional original documentation in response to requests by IAEA inspectors. These documents, however, do not include any which are relevant to the questions and concerns outstanding since 1998, in particular as regards weapons design and centrifuges. As previously noted, these questions and concerns, though not unresolved disarmament issues, are nevertheless in need of further clarification.

6. The IAEA has also started the process of interviewing key Iraqi personnel. While the determination of the modalities for interviews, including location, is vested by resolution 1441 in the IAEA, the willingness of the interviewees to accept the IAEA preferred modalities remains a limiting factor. For example, in the case of the two interviews which the IAEA requested be conducted in private, the individuals to be interviewed requested the presence of an Iraqi government observer. Although not optimum, the inspectors in these two instances acceded to the request by those interviewed for the presence of an Iraqi observer with a view to gaining whatever information was available under the circumstances. The IAEA will continue to report on its efforts to interview Iraqi personnel according to its preferred modalities and its degree of success in that regard.

7. Analysis of all information now available to the Agency is continuing in parallel with, and in support of, inspection activities. In this context, the IAEA has integrated the new declarations submitted by Iraq, including the updated backlog of semi-annual declarations provided in September 2002 and the "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration" (CAFCD) submitted in December 2002, with the information accumulated between 1991 and 1998 (e.g., original documents collected by the IAEA; results of inspection activities; commercial satellite imagery; and information provided by States) and information acquired after 1998.

Specific Issues Raised by Member States

Aluminium Tubes

8. In response to IAEA questioning, the Iraqi authorities indicated that unsuccessful attempts had been made in 2001 and 2002 to procure high-strength aluminium tubes in connection with a programme aimed at reverse engineering 81-millimetre rockets.

9. With a view to verifying information provided by Iraq on this issue, the IAEA has conducted a series of inspections at sites involved in the production and storage of reverse engineered rockets, held discussions with and interviewed Iraqi personnel, taken samples of aluminium tubes, and begun a review of the documentation provided by Iraq relating to contracts with the traders.

10. While the matter is still under investigation, and further verification is foreseen, the IAEA's analysis to date indicates that the specifications of the aluminium tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it. It should be noted, however, that the attempted acquisition of such tubes is prohibited under paragraph 24(a) of resolution 687 (1991), which, inter alia, proscribes the supply to Iraq of components of arms and related matériel.

Other Dual Use Items

11. The relocation and consumption of some dual use materials has been among the questions raised in connection with Iraq's backlog of semi-annual declarations. The high explosive "HMX" is a prime example of such material. The removal of Agency seals on the HMX and the declared relocation and consumption of some of the HMX must be explained and documented by Iraq before the Agency can reach a conclusion with regard to the use of such material. The Iraqi declarations indicate that out, of the 228 tonnes of HMX available in Iraq at the end of 1998, 196 remained at the facility where the HMX was previously under IAEA seal. Iraq also declared that it had blended the remaining 32 tonnes with sulphur and turned them into 45.6 tonnes of "industrial explosive" provided mainly to cement plants for mining. The material balance, current stock, whereabouts and final use of such material are currently being investigated.

Uranium Import Efforts

12. There have been recurrent reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium after 1991. The Iraqi authorities deny any such efforts. The matter continues to be pursued by the IAEA. It would be useful to receive from States any specific information they may have in that regard.

Next Steps

13. The Agency will continue to seek additional clarification of certain aspects of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme, and will follow up any other issues identified as a result of its field activities, its own analysis and information that may be provided by States. To this end, the IAEA intends to exercise of all its rights under all of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including on-site inspection activities at any location which the IAEA deems appropriate; collection of material and environmental samples at known and new locations; satellite imagery analysis; radiation monitoring; interviews with Iraqi officials and other persons; and the use of any other technology assessed to be necessary to enhance the IAEA's verification activities.

Concluding Comments

14. At this stage, the IAEA is able to report the following progress:

a. Through access to buildings identified, through satellite imagery, as having been modified or constructed during the period 1998-2002, the IAEA has been able to clarify the nature of activities currently being conducted at such buildings.

b. Although not complete, significant progress has been made in the verification of Iraq's explanations regarding its attempts to procure high-strength aluminium tubes.

c. Steps have been taken to clarify the disposition of the HMX that had been subject to verification prior to 1998.

15. To date, no new information of significance has emerged regarding Iraq's past nuclear programme (pre-1991) or with regard to Iraq activities during the period between 1991 and 1998.

16. To date, no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities has been detected, although not all of the laboratory results of sample analysis are yet available. It should be noted that IAEA's verification activities serve not only as a mechanism for verifying that Iraq is not currently carrying out any proscribed activities, but equally as an important deterrent to the resumption of such activities by Iraq.

17. The IAEA will endeavour to provide the Security Council as early as possible with credible assurance of the absence of prohibited nuclear and nuclear-related activities in Iraq, but there still remains a significant amount of work to do. While it has been possible to accumulate significant information through field activities, an important part of that information will require additional follow-up before the IAEA is able to draw definitive conclusions.

18. The IAEA's efforts to draw such conclusions will be greatly facilitated by the active cooperation of Iraq, not only in continuing to secure access to locations, but, importantly, in providing documentation, making available Iraqi personnel for interview and encouraging them to accept IAEA modalities for such interviews, and providing the IAEA with any physical evidence which would assist it in reaching its conclusions. To this end, I intend to visit Iraq with the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC in the third week of this month to discuss with the Iraqi authorities outstanding issues and to impress on them, once more, the importance of their active co-operation.

19. As requested in paragraph 5 of resolution 1441 (2002), IAEA activities and achievements in Iraq during the two months of inspection since 27 November 2002 will be described in greater detail in an update report to the Council to be available by 27 January.

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III. White House Press Briefing

Press Briefing by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, January 9; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary.

Question: Can we presume that the President is very happy that Mr. Blix says there is no smoking gun in the search for weapons in Iraq?

Ari Fleischer: Well, the problem with guns that are hidden is you can't see their smoke. And so we will still await to see what the inspectors find in Iraq and what events in Iraq lead to. The report that we understand was conveyed in the meeting up in New York this morning said that the work of the inspectors is still underway, they continue to gather information. And the report also cited a number of concerns and a number of problems in what Iraq has been doing.

Question: But it wouldn't be disappointing, would it, if there were no weapons there?

Fleischer: We know for a fact that there are weapons there. And so - the inspectors also went on -

Question: What's the search all about if you know it so factually?

Fleischer: Let me cite to you what...the inspectors have said at the United Nations. And this is from their reports. "In order to create confidence that it has no more weapons of mass destruction and proscribed activities related to such weapons, Iraq must present credible evidence. It cannot just maintain that it must be deemed to be without proscribed items so long as their is no evidence to the contrary." Now, continuing in the words of the inspectors, "A person accused of illegal possession of weapons may indeed be acquitted for lack of evidence. But if a state which has used such weapons is to create confidence it no longer has any prohibited weapons, it will need to present solid evidence or present remaining items for elimination under supervision." And they continue, "If evidence is not presented which gives us a high degree of assurance, there is no way the inspectors can close a file by simply invoking a precept that Iraq cannot prove the negative. In such cases, regrettably, they must conclude, as they have done in the past, that the absence of a particular item is not assured." So while they've said that there's no smoking gun, they said the absence of it is not assured. And that's the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem is Iraq is very good at hiding things.

Question: The heart of the problem is there is a lack of confidence in anybody speaking the truth there, isn't that...

Fleischer: Are you accusing the inspectors of not speaking the truth when they say that it's not assured?

Question: No, I think they're speaking the truth, and the country won't accept it.

Fleischer: So when they say the absence of the particular item is not assured, you accept that as the truth. You agree with the President. I'm very proud.

Question: I mean, the point is, wouldn't you be happy if there were no weapons there?

Fleischer: There would be nothing that would make the President happier than there being no weapons in Iraq. And the best way to make certain that there are no weapons in Iraq is for Saddam Hussein to disarm himself of the weapons he has.

Question: The inspectors have also said that there's no deadline to their inspections. They need time. Prime Minister Blair has said that they need time and space, that the January 27th report that they'll deliver should not be seen as any kind of deadline. And Secretary Powell said that, as well. Is this an indication that the President is willing to let the inspectors go at this for a good, long while?

Fleischer: Terry, I've never heard the President put a time line on it. The President wants the inspectors to continue to do exactly what they are doing, which is to do their level best to carry out the search, given the fact that Iraq has thrown up hurdles and isn't complying in all aspects, continuing with what the inspectors have reported in New York. They cited a number of issues that are real causes for concern by the United States government. And among the things that the inspectors themselves have said are discrepancies and inconsistencies. These deal with special munitions, illegal imports on a relatively large number of missile engines, contradictions involving the chemical agent VX, inadequate response by Iraq to provide the names of all personnel who have been involved in weapons of mass destruction programs. Indeed, the inspectors found that the list that Iraq provided of who has been involved in the weapons of mass destruction programs left out known names of people who have been involved in the weapons of mass destruction programs. The inspectors themselves have concluded that Iraq failed to make a serious effort to respond to this information that the world has required. Inspections that the IAEA conducted, which the IAEA, per their rights under the UN resolution, asked to be conducted in private without any Iraqi minders were rejected. The inspections could only take place if Iraqi minders were in the room - hardly a welcoming environment if anybody has information that they want to share. And so there were a number of things that were said that still give cause for concern in this report.

Question: But is the President willing to give the inspectors the time and the space that they say they need, the months that they say they'll need in order to determine the answer to the question?

Fleischer: Again, I have not heard the President put a time line on it. The President has said that he wants the inspectors...to be able to do their jobs, to continue their efforts, and that's what we support.

Question: The head of the IAEA said today that the suspect aluminum tubes Iraq has obtained were not used for - or not suitable for enriching uranium. Do you still maintain that Iraq has an active nuclear weapons program?

Fleischer: Well, let's be clear on what he said. What Mr. ElBaradei has said is, "While the matter is still under investigation and further verification is foreseen" - so it's not a closed matter - "the IAEA's analysis of data indicates that the specifications of the aluminum tubes sought by Iraq in 2001 and 2002 appear to be consistent with the reverse engineering of rockets. While it would be possible to modify such tubes for the manufacture of centrifuges, they are not directly suitable for it. It should be noted, however, that the attempted acquisition of such tubes is prohibited under the United Nations resolutions in any case." So it remains a cause for concern that they are pursuing acquisition of elements that are banned to them, that have purposes that still can be used for military purposes. And we do have concerns about their potential of developing nuclear programs. As you know, we have always been explicit on this topic. We have always said that we know that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction of a biological nature. We know they have weapons of mass destruction of a chemical nature. We have not said that conclusively about nuclear. We have concerns that they are seeking to acquire and develop them, of course.

Question: And do the Blix statement, the ElBaradei statement, do they make it harder for you to persuade world opinion that Iraq is a threat?

Fleischer: I think when you hear the list of concerns that Hans Blix and Dr. ElBaradei have delineated about the failure of Iraq to comply fully with all their obligations, it gives ongoing cause for concern to the world. They have said that they have not gotten everything they have sought, they have not gotten everything that they need, that the inspections need to continue. And they also walked the United Nations through how they are now getting more material and more resources themselves so they can better do their jobs, which we were very pleased to hear.

Question: Ari, going back to the timetable, you said you've never heard the President lay out a timetable. But he said and you've said that January 27th is a very significant day.

Fleischer: That's true.

Question: Is it a deadline?

Fleischer: No, the President has not said it's a deadline. The President has said it's...

Question: What do you plan to determine by January 27th?

Fleischer: We will hear from the inspectors. So we want to hear what the inspectors are able to find about their abilities in Iraq to find and pursue whether or not Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, and to ascertain what type of compliance Iraq has been providing to the inspectors.

Question: So your expectation is that they will be able to give you that information in just the next couple of weeks?

Fleischer: It's an important reporting date. And we will see what the inspectors have to say in this three-week period.

Question: And if they say, we need months more to go do our jobs?

Fleischer: I can't speculate. Let's see what they say.

Question: Well, presumably, we're not sending thousands of troops to the region, spending millions of dollars deploying them now if the administration is willing to let them sit there and twiddle their thumbs for six months while the inspectors do their job.

Fleischer: I think the fact is that the presence of the military has an effective influence on diplomacy and making sure that Saddam Hussein understands that he needs to comply, because if he doesn't, the United States has the means and the ability to make him comply.

Question: So that's why the troops are there now, to send that message?

Fleischer: It certainly does send that message. And the President has said that either Saddam Hussein disarms, or we will disarm him. It's a serious message. ...

Question: On the interviews, one of the problems in the past, according to Blix, is what the concerns of the scientists themselves are. And in fact, in the two cases you referenced the scientists themselves asked for Iraqi government minders, perhaps out of necessity. How do they get around that fact? And what is the US doing to help address some of the logistical concerns that Blix expressed about interviews with scientists, either outside the country or in private?

Fleischer: Well, you've put your finger on one of the ongoing issues that make matters difficult for the inspectors. In fact, the IAEA in its report up in New York continued to say that, the IAEA's efforts to draw such conclusions will be greatly facilitated by the active cooperation of Iraq - not only in continuing to secure access to locations, but importantly, in providing documentation, making available Iraqi personnel for interview and encouraging them to accept IAEA modalities for such interviews, and providing IAEA with any physical evidence which would assist in reaching its conclusions. So IAEA has said to the United Nations Security Council that they require more cooperation from Iraq if they are able to make valid judgments about whether Iraq is pursuing nuclear weapons, and they have the tools available to them, per the United Nations' resolution, to interview Iraqi scientists, scientists who aren't on the list that Iraq provided, and to do so in a place and a time where they think they'd be most productive, not necessarily limit it to Iraq.

Question: Are there things that the US is doing to facilitate these things? There were logistical problems, as Blix put it, sometime before and we have been led to believe that the US was offering to eliminate any obstacles that might present themselves.

Fleischer: Specifically, I don't know the answer to that question. And generally, the answer is, yes, of course, we're working with the inspectors as part of the international community to help them to have the tools to do their job. They also, as I indicated, have new equipment arriving in the country that makes it easier for them to do their jobs. ...

Question: Is there not a contradiction, on the one hand, for the President to say publicly he will have zero tolerance for Iraqi non-compliance, and for the administration to say the burden is not on the inspectors to find things, the burden is on Iraq to show what happened to its weapons programs - and then on the other hand, say, as you just said, that even the inspectors say Iraq left out names of scientists known to be working in the weapons program, has not accounted for mustard gas, other chemical agents known to be there in the last violation? Why doesn't the President say, zero tolerance, failed the test?

Fleischer: Well, this is why I began this by saying, taking the broad view about what we learned in New York today. What we learned in New York today gives further concern for people who want to keep peace, because Iraq has failed to comply with the United Nations resolutions. The President has said that he will have zero tolerance for this. The President has also said that Saddam Hussein will have to figure out exactly what zero tolerance means and when he means it. ...

Question: Ari, Turkey has indicated that they will not let at this point US bases be established there. You had the red carpet treatment from Mr. Ervogan several weeks ago, and he indicated that Turkey may change its position. Now public opinion is very much against any military action in Iraq and the government has taken consideration for that. Isn't this coalition which was envisioned in the beginning kind of falling apart with the Turkish situation?

Fleischer: I would say that the United States and Turkey have a very common interest in making certain that any security threat from the Iraqi regime is neutralized. And we have an interest in working together to foster political and economic stability in the region. The United States and Turkey have long enjoyed a very healthy and good strategic relationship, diplomatic relationship, and economic relationship. We continue to coordinate very closely with Turkey on the best approach to issues in the region and we will continue to do so.

Question: Ari, Prime Minister Blair is facing growing dissent within his own Labor Party over possible military action with us against Iraq if there is no actual smoking gun. Are we concerned that this dissent could bubble over and in some way hamper or restrict our options of dealing with Iraq?

Fleischer: No, I think the United States and Great Britain have been working shoulder to shoulder on a common approach to confronting the threat to peace that Iraq presents. The President continues to work very closely with Prime Minister Blair. He remains a very good ally, a very good representative of the people of Britain, all the people of Britain, and we will continue our relationship. It's been a very healthy and productive one for both sides. ...

Question: [Is] the time that is elapsing...an ally or a foe in dealing with Iraq? It seems as we go along further and further down the road...

Fleischer: I'm really not sure that, when you talk about the time elapsing, that the President never said that there was a timetable here where on January 9th something had to happen or not happen. That's not how the President has ever approached this. The timetable is actually unfolding very much as the President sought when the President went to New York, I think, on September 12th and went to the United Nations. The inspectors have returned to Iraq; they are in the middle of conducting their business. And the President is appreciative to them for their efforts.

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IV. Russian Foreign Ministry Statement

'On the United Nations Security Council's Consultative Meeting on Iraq', Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 40-10-01-2003, January 10.

A consultative meeting of the United Nations Security Council was held on January 9, at which UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei spoke, reporting the interim results of international inspection activities in Iraq. The UNMOVIC and IAEA chiefs confirmed that Iraq provides immediate and unconditional access for inspectors to all the sites being checked, as a rule, without prior notice. No signs of the existence of WMDs or the implementation of prohibited programs have been found in the course of 250 inspections. The checks have made it possible to form a more complete idea of the state of affairs in the so-called disarmament dossiers of Iraq, above all in the nuclear field. Yet the IAEA and, in particular, UNMOVIC still have questions to Baghdad, which require further clarifying. For these purposes it is planned to continue inspections and contacts with the Iraqi side, including holding interviews with persons who had a bearing on the now-prohibited programs. On the whole, the briefings of the Security Council confirm that the resumed inspection activities in Iraq have opened a real way to the removal of "blank spots" in the disarmament dossiers and to resolving the situation exclusively by politico-legal means on the basis of relevant UNSC resolutions. In this regard, it is crucial that Iraq continue to show constructive cooperation with UNMOVIC and IAEA, promptly answering in full all the questions they may have, and that the international inspectors go on fulfilling the duties placed on them with maximum professionalism and objectivity. ...

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