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Non-Proliferation & US-Russia Relations: Comments by Alexander Vershbow, US Ambassador to Russia, January 9

'The Reflections of the US Ambassador to Moscow on the US-Russian Partnership: Presentation by the Honorable Alexander Vershbow, Ambassador of the United States to the Russian Federation', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (http://www.ceip.org), Washington, January 9.

Opening Remarks by Ambassador Vershbow

[I]t's a very impressive record that President Putin will be running on for re-election in March 2004. But if the internal changes are significant, the transformation of US-Russian relations is, if anything, much more remarkable. 2002 was a very successful and productive year as we continue to build on and consolidate the foundation laid by the first Bush-Putin meetings in 2001, including the Washington-Crawford Summit, and the new sense of common purpose that followed the events of September 11. Putin's turn to the West, as it's called, remains the basis for the widening areas of US-Russian cooperation, and it has, in my view, proven to be a strategic rather than a tactical shift in Russian foreign policy. I think Putin remains convinced, as he was even before 9/11, that Russia's interests can be best advanced through closer alignment with the West in general and the United States in particular, rather than through the zero-sum policies of the Cold War.

The number one driver in all this is economics. Russia needs foreign capital and integration into the global economic system if it is to achieve Putin's modest goal of overtaking Portugal in per capita GDP by the end of the next decade (and already he is behind schedule). It means seeking a calm international environment and removing as many irritants as possible in relations with us and with Europe that can get in the way of business. We heard this view expressed very clearly when Putin gave the marching orders to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all the assembled ambassadors from the Russian Foreign Service last summer.

Apart from economics Putin has, I think, far more than many other Russian leaders, including many of the people in his own administration, been able to escape the ideological straitjacket of the Cold War and to see that Russia's security interests in the 21st century increasingly coincide with those of the West. And following the pattern of many of our traditional allies, he has sought to maximize Russia's influence at a time of relative weakness by working with, rather than at cross purposes with, the United States - to try to leverage American power like some of our European allies do. This is one of the factors behind the extraordinary cooperation on terrorism, Russia's support for UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq, and Russia's pursuit of closer ties with NATO rather than harping on NATO enlargement.

Now we, of course, still do have some very important differences, such as over Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, on how to deal with North Korea. And Russia continues to maintain active diplomacy in other parts of the world - it's not a total shift in the westward direction. He just completed a swing through East, South and Central Asia - Beijing, New Delhi and Bishkek - but I think his priority remains relations with us, and I think our differences are increasingly over tactics rather than reflecting a fundamental conflict of interest, at least in most cases.

Now, the exceptionally close relations between our two Presidents have helped a lot in managing those remaining differences and in keeping up the momentum of change. The relationship is based on more than just camaraderie. I think our two presidents really connected when they first met because President Bush was also determined to break out of the Cold War paradigm, and he saw Russia as a potential ally in dealing with the very different set of security threats that we face in 21st century - terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and the like. And I think it's also a simple fact that Russia's proximity to the world's most unstable regions and to the sources of terrorism and WMD proliferation gives it the potential to be an even more important partner for the United States than some of our traditional allies.

If I have concerns, one of the most important concerns is that the political base for Putin's new foreign policy line still remains very weak, particularly among the elite. Only this summer did we see, in the speech I mentioned, the first efforts by Putin to explain why cooperation with the West makes sense for Russia. There are still many voices who see our presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, NATO enlargement into the Baltics, and our recently announced missile defense deployment plans as posing not just long-term but immediate threats to Russian security, and who charge that Putin hasn't received enough in return for his post-9/11 cooperation. And we still must contend with xenophobic, anti-Western feelings in the security services, the military and parts of the bureaucracy, and the slanted, even tendentious analysis and policy advice to Putin and other leaders that results from this world view. Putin still retains substantial freedom of maneuver on foreign policy - more so than on domestic policy, in my view - but he certainly must watch his back, especially in an election year.

So, given these constraints, it's perhaps all the more significant that the balance sheet of Russian-American relations for 2002 is so impressive. We have continued our close cooperation in the war on terrorism, building on the early support that we saw during the campaign in Afghanistan, involving intelligence sharing, air transit rights and support for basing of US forces in Central Asia. We have an institutional mechanism now for keeping up the pace on counter-terrorism cooperation, the working group co-chaired by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and his Russian counterpart Trubnikov, which will be meeting in two weeks in Moscow. This gives political impetus from on high and keeps the bureaucratic wheels turning, especially on the Russian side.

We had the May summit in Moscow, which produced a whole series of very important deliverables - the Moscow treaty on strategic arms reductions, the launching of an energy dialogue, the first recommendations of the Russian-America business dialogue, and a document that I think has gotten too little attention but is quite remarkable - the political declaration on the new strategic relationship, which if implemented could be the framework not just for a long-term partnership but even a long-term alliance between Russia and the United States, incorporating cooperation on security affairs as well as political, economic and people-to-people links. The spring also saw the NATO-Russia Summit and the establishment of the new NATO-Russia Council, the launch of the Global Partnership at the G-8 Summit as a new initiative on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. ... In the fall we had the first meeting of our Consultative Group on Strategic Security. We've launched working groups on potential cooperation on missile defense. ... And of course, during the fall Russia worked with us closely and in good faith in the UN Security Council to arrive at a strong resolution that makes clear to Saddam that he can no longer evade his responsibility to disarm Iraq of WMD.

So, we had a very upbeat mini-summit to cap all this cooperation in St. Petersburg at the end of November. It was upbeat despite the fact that it took place just after NATO had invited the Baltic states to join the alliance. The meeting covered the whole gamut of issues - counterterrorism, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, NATO, the energy relationship, and sensitive issues like Chechnya and media freedom. I think the open dialogue and the positive spirit surrounding that discussion symbolized the enormous progress we've made and the shared interests that are increasingly guiding the relationship.

I wish that really did cap the year. Unfortunately, there were a few sour notes that ended 2002. Despite the solidarity that we displayed during the hostage crisis in October and our efforts in Georgia and elsewhere to reduce external support for the Chechen insurgency, there's been little movement by Russia toward a political settlement there. ... Also, in late December, Moscow exercised its right to terminate the Peace Corps' ten-year program in Russia. Their declared rationale - that Russia is not a developing country and has outgrown the need for Peace Corps training - is not the issue. We can respect that decision, but unfortunately the decision was accompanied by groundless allegations by the head of the FSB about spying by Peace Corps volunteers that are not only outrageous but an ominous departure from the Moscow summit's commitment to expanding people-to-people links. And at the end of the year we saw a visit by the Russian atomic energy minister to Iran that highlighted our continued concerns about Russia's assistance that could help Teheran obtain nuclear weapons. ...

Let me close by offering a few thoughts on what I see as the biggest challenges for 2003.

The Iraq crisis is, needless to say, approaching the moment of truth. Russia is clearly eager to avoid military action and to keep the issue firmly within the UN Security Council. But Russia also does share our interest in demanding that Saddam fulfill his obligations to disarm. So we will certainly have a lot of difficult diplomacy with Russia and many others in the weeks ahead, but I don't see any scenario that is likely to stress the relationship to the breaking point. Russia has made clear that its paramount concerns are economic and we have sought to assure Moscow that we will take their economic interests into account when we think about post-conflict Iraq. We also welcome Russian engagement in the post-conflict stabilization of the region, so I think Iraq, while it will be difficult and it will be a challenge, will not necessarily be the hardest challenge.

Other non-proliferation issues may pose greater challenges. As I noted, the Russians continue their nuclear assistance to Iran, which we believe is not only a danger to the region, but to Russia's own long-term interests. In the coming year Russia really needs to make some fundamental choices. It needs to fully contain the proliferation risks from the light-water reactor that they're building at Bushehr. The recent agreement that they announced to take back all the spent nuclear fuel is encouraging, it's a good start, but it's not enough to contain the risks from Bushehr. In addition, the Russians need to crack down more effectively on other transfers of technology to Iran, both for WMD and for ballistic missiles. If the situation doesn't get better, it will likely get worse in terms of pressures for new sanctions and new political frictions. On the other hand, if there were a serious change for the better, it could unlock very profitable cooperation in the nuclear and aerospace fields that is now blocked by the Iran Nonproliferation Act. So the challenge there is for Russia to make the right choice.

North Korea is an area where we think Russia could play a more substantial and positive role in bringing Pyongyang to its senses. The question is whether the Russians, and this applies to the Chinese as well, will put much more substantial pressure on the North Koreans, including economic sanctions, before it's too late. The Russians are still showing a tendency towards denial of the significance of the threat and they need to wake up fast. At the same time, I think there might be ways that Russia could play the role of face-saver if and when Kim Jong Il starts looking for one. So we hope to engage the Russians more in the coming weeks to try to get them to be more part of the solution to the North Korean problem.

There are some other challenges on the bilateral security front for the coming year. The Russian military has been historically very reluctant to engage in serious military-to-military cooperation and this remains the case today, and it reflects lingering Cold War hostility, as well as a resistance to change and to reform, which is seriously overdue. Russian officers who sometimes do participate in unit exchanges or inter-academy exchanges with our military often find themselves ostracized upon their return; their careers are sometimes finished. Dialogue on missile defense cooperation, which has been launched, still remains handicapped by Russian military suspicions that we are just trying to steal some of their technology rather than collaborate against real threats that are here today and emerging in the future. So, here, I think, both sides need to overcome inhibitions to more substantial cooperation on missile defense which could encompass joint early warning and even joint development of the architecture and the systems. One would think that the North Korean situation would be a reminder to the Russians that the need for missile defense against rogue regimes is all the more urgent.

The NATO-Russia relationship will also present challenges. In this case, we've seen a good start to the new work in the NATO-Russia Council. The challenge is to move beyond the useful but modest initial projects that have been undertaken by the new forum to more substantial activities. Only then will we fulfill the promise of the new forum and avoid repeating the disappointments that set in the last time around in the earlier forum, the Permanent Joint Council.

Missile defense cooperation and enhanced military-to-military cooperation, again, should be among top priorities for NATO-Russia work as well as for bilateral military cooperation. And if we can get to some initial level of interoperability of NATO and Russian forces, we could begin to think of even bolder steps, such as some kind of link between Russian forces and NATO's new Response Force as a vehicle for joint training and joint exercises to meet unconventional threats. ...

Questions and Answers

Question: You mentioned several times the Russian relationship with Iran on nuclear issues. I wonder if you could clarify what exactly was agreed between Russia and Iran on this latest trip by [Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander] Rumyantsev and if there has been any communication between the US and Russia on that. And in particular if you could comment on the agreement to take back, or lack of agreement to take back spent fuel and on plans to build further reactors in Iran beyond the first Bushehr unit.

Ambassador Vershbow: Well, we stay in continuing contact with the Russians on their nuclear relationship with Iran. I should say, we're in their face all the time because we still have serious concerns. We think that the best course still would be for them to terminate the Bushehr project, but if that can't be achieved, we are pushing for a variety of steps to contain the proliferation risk. One of the keys is the notion of taking back all the spent nuclear fuel so it can't be diverted to a weapons program, and they reached an agreement at least in principle during Rumyantsev's visit at the end of the year - provisions whereby the Russians would provide all the fresh fuel for the life of the reactor and then take back all the spent fuel as soon as it's cooled sufficiently. So if this is translated into a formal agreement, which we hope will be within the coming weeks, [it will be] at least a step in the right direction. But we'd also like to see other steps because we believe the evidence is increasingly clear that the Iranians are not just interested in the peaceful use of the atom but are working on a weapons program as well. And we think that the Russians definitely should not build any more reactors, despite provisional agreement in the '90s to build a second one at Bushehr and potentially another four at other sites. So far there seem to be no serious efforts to move ahead with any of the other reactor projects. We don't have any ironclad commitments in that regard, but we think the Russians have gotten the message that there should be no more Bushehrs. Beyond that project, of course, there is some evidence still that other expertise and know-how is still finding its way to Iran, that some Russian specialists are still helping the Iranians obtain the know-how for other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. So it's an area where there are some steps in the right direction but we still have very profound concerns. ...

Question: How much influence do you think Russia really has with North Korea, and what if anything has the United States asked Russia to do in the way of interceding in this dispute?

Vershbow: I think the Russians have significant influence there. They've developed a closer relationship over the last year. Kim Jong Il has paid two visits to Russia, one including a fairly bizarre cross-country train ride. So we think he listens to his Russian friends and there are developing economic links as well. Russia may have less leverage than China, which has much more substantial economic ties and historical ties to the North, but we are urging the Russians to come down much harder on the North and to insist that they come back into compliance with their obligations under the NPT, terminate the covert uranium enrichment program and their efforts to re-start the plutonium reactor, and basically pull back from the brink. What the Russians might offer the North Koreans as a sort of added inducement is something we could speculate about. We haven't made any specific requests of the Russians in that regard, but the Russians could perhaps offer some assistance in fulfilling North Korea's energy needs. There may be other things they could do if, as I said earlier, Kim Jong-il is looking for a face-saver - and that's not clear, or whether he really is determined to go all the way and acquire nuclear weapons. But right now the Russians have been reluctant to put - to raise the specter of sanctions. I think that as one of the P-5, they have a responsibility to be a bit more proactive to help solve this. ...

Question: It's very interesting to hear you talk about the new working group on missile defense cooperation, and I do think that that has had some very active and in some ways unexpected dialogue going on. I know there are other working groups that work, however, including ones that are looking at additional transparency measures beyond the Moscow treaty of perhaps some unfinished business from the Moscow treaty. I wonder if you could talk about that arena and whether you think there are agenda items on the agenda for strategic offensive reductions that will be active in the coming year.

Vershbow: Yes, we have agreed to get back to the subject of additional transparency measures, which we were ready to discuss in the context of the Moscow treaty but we never really got fully engaged with the Russians, and so we opted for the streamlined treaty and to defer that issue. I'm frankly not sure when that work will get underway in earnest. I think we want to wait for ratification before we get into serious work on further elaboration of the treaty. But we already have proposals that were on the table last year which we're prepared to pick up with whenever those talks get moving. Then there will be a whole structure to review of implementation and compliance with the new treaty, in addition to the continued implementation of the START treaty, which remains in effect as part of the Moscow package. So that, and then the missile defense are the main areas that I'm aware of. But we're always open to new suggestions. ...

Question: Could you say a word about how the recent expansion of NATO has been received in Russia and particularly the Baltics with the elite. Does this remain a major issue or has it receded into the past?

Vershbow: It is no longer a major issue. The issue passed surprisingly quietly, and as I said the meeting between our two presidents the day after the Prague summit was a very upbeat affair. I think the Russian leadership, at least, recognizes that there's no real threat to Russia from the membership of the Baltic states or any other Central European state in NATO and that their real security threats lie to the south and to the southeast. I think that they see the positive possibilities of NATO-Russia cooperation as much more of an important issue for Russia's security, and I think they are quite serious this time around, again at the political level, in trying to develop a real strategic partnership with NATO. That's been facilitated by their perception that NATO is evolving in its orientation to deal with the very same threats that Russia is worried about - terrorism, WMD proliferation - and that's making it easier for them to see NATO in a more positive light. I say this is where the political leadership is, and I think the general public has become more and more indifferent to NATO expansion. I think they realize the sky isn't falling. But the military and the security elites may not be quite as converted, and so you still hear some grumbling and some lone voices asserting that this is a new case of capitalist encirclement and that sort of thing. But those kinds of voices are becoming, thankfully, fewer and far between. ...

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