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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation UNMOVIC/IAEA Report to UN Security Council: Statements & Reaction, January 27/28
IV. Reaction & Comment1. IraqUN Ambassador Mohammed al-Douri, January 27[Iraq] has actively cooperated...[and] has expressed its sincere willingness to clarify any questions. ... We open all doors to Mr. Blix and his team. We have no hidden reports at all." 2. United StatesUN Ambassador John Negroponte, Addressing the Security Council, January 27I would like to thank Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei for the briefing they have presented to the Council as well as for the work they and their teams of inspectors have done over the past two months in Iraq in the face of innumerable challenges. My government will have a further response to today's briefings in Security Council consultations on Wednesday. However, as an initial reaction, I must say that there is nothing in either presentation that would give us hope that Iraq has ever intended to fully comply with Resolution 1441 or any of the 16 resolutions that preceded it over the last 12 years. We see no evidence to indicate that Saddam is voluntarily disarming his nation of its biological and chemical weapons, nuclear capabilities and ballistic missiles. We see no evidence that he intends to account for Iraq's weapons programs or to proffer the active cooperation required to assure us that he will do so. Without cooperation, disarmament cannot be proven. Without disarmament, Iraq cannot comply with Resolution 1441. I would like to stress that the purpose of 1441 is disarmament. Twelve years ago, this Council decided that Iraq must give up its WMD and long-range ballistic missile program. Iraq accepted this condition as part of the cease-fire agreement to stave off further coalition military action. For 12 years, the international community has demanded the disarmament of Iraq but has settled for less, trying to limit the damage Saddam Hussein could inflict, while we sought to induce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations. And throughout that time Saddam has constantly tested, and correctly assessed that none of these measures had any real teeth. We are living with the results of this failed strategy: Iraq continues to deceive the world concerning ongoing programs for weapons of mass destruction; it has failed to cooperate with inspections; indeed it has an active program of denial and deception. It was never the task of the inspectors to look under every rock to find Iraq's hidden weapons. It must not be the purpose of the Council to condone Iraq's continuing defiance of its obligations. This Council passed Resolution 1441 to bring to an end an intolerable situation - one that threatened both the region and the integrity of the UN itself. With 1441, the Council returned to its original demands of 1991 - full, verifiable disarmament, if not peacefully, then by other means. Today there is still no sign that the regime intends to comply fully with the terms of that resolution. But the threats to the region and the threat to the UN's integrity remain. It benefits no one to let Saddam think he can wear us down into business-as-usual as he has practiced it over the past 12 years. Resolution 1441 provided at least two tests to see if Iraq was prepared to seize that Resolution's "final opportunity": The first test was the Declaration, intended to determine whether Iraq would submit a currently accurate, full and complete account of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programs and delivery systems. The Iraqis failed this test - their Declaration was neither "currently accurate," "full," nor "complete." Dr. Blix told us the document was "rich in volume" but "poor on information and practically devoid of new evidence." As we said at the time, it was a further material breach and yet another challenge in Iraq's long list of challenges to the United Nations' authority. Council members similarly expressed their disappointment during our meeting on January 9. More recently, the Iraqis failed to take the opportunity of their recent meetings with Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei to provide the missing information required; instead, the Iraqis hollowly insisted that all the answers were in their already-discredited Declaration. In UNMOVIC's own words, "the Declaration does not answer the questions; it does not help." Some of you may not remember the "UNSCOM Compendium of Outstanding Disarmament Issues". This is my copy. This 463-page document, available on the Internet, is the product of much hard work at UN Headquarters by UNSCOM inspectors after they had departed Iraq in 1998. The Compendium includes both priority issues on disarmament as well as a separate annex detailing actions by Iraq to obstruct disarmament. The Compendium is an important source for much of UNMOVIC's work today. It also provides an outline of the key questions Iraq still must answer. Some have asked for more clarity in what the Iraqis need to do. Disarmament was the Council's requirement in 1991; it remains so in 2003. Resolution 687 spelled out this requirement, which has been repeated in a succession of resolutions and decisions in the intervening 12 years. The Iraqis have chosen not to comply with any of those resolutions, and indeed continue not only to hide but to advance prohibited programs. In what was supposed to be the "currently accurate," "full" and "complete" declaration demanded by 1441, Iraq failed even to address the questions UNSCOM raised in the Compendium in 1999. There are indeed questions that I would like to raise here - questions that are illustrative of the gaps that need to be filled in order to judge Iraqi compliance: Where is the evidence to account for what has happened to 26,000 liters of anthrax and 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin? UNSCOM concluded that Iraq vastly understated production of botulinum toxin. On December 19, Dr. Blix said that Iraq's declaration on anthrax "may not be accurate" and Iraq needed to provide further evidence.
The unavoidable truth is that Iraq hopes that the Council will accept a façade of cooperation instead of true disarmament. And the reality we must confront is that this Declaration makes no real progress in disarming Iraq. Mr. President, the second test posed by Resolution 1441 was one of cooperation. It demanded that Iraq "comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution," and "cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA." Eighty days after Resolution 1441 was passed, we see none of the cooperation the Resolution called for: As Resolution 1441 requires, has Iraq allowed "immediate, unrestricted, unimpeded and private access" to all officials, inside or outside Iraq? No. We have witnessed the relentlessness of "minders" - at times five minders for each inspector. We know Iraq is using this show of force to intimidate potential witnesses. Last weekend Iraq with great fanfare agreed to "encourage" officials to meet privately with inspectors. Since then, interviews have been cancelled and Iraq on January 23 said it could not "convince" its officials to meet the inspectors privately. This is a tactic Iraq used with UNSCOM and now is using again with UNMOVIC and the Council. Promise one thing; do another. The regime's latest claim that no Iraqi is willing to be interviewed in private is, on its face, laughable. If the regime wanted them to, they would. We know the fate of those who resist the "encouragement" of this totalitarian regime.
When the Council adopted Resolution 1441, our message was simple: Non-compliance is no longer an option. We clearly explained that 1441 afforded Iraq a "final opportunity" to disarm. "Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance," we committed the United Nations to living up to its responsibilities, if the Government of Iraq persisted in its refusal to disarm. Others joined us in articulating this final opportunity. The time is fast approaching that we will have to demonstrate that we meant what we said on that November day. Security Council Resolution 1441 said that Iraq is required to immediately, unconditionally and actively cooperate. It does not say that Iraq is to negotiate the terms of cooperation. At Iraq's initiative, UNMOVIC and the IAEA issued an "Agreed Statement", which gives us very little confidence in Iraq's willingness to comply. The statement merely highlights Iraq's failure to meet obligations to which it had already agreed. And even as this agreed statement was being noted, Iraq was planning public demonstrations against the inspectors and chalking up its latest violation of Resolution 1441 by seeking to impose restrictions on UNMOVIC's use of the U-2 aircraft for aerial surveillance. We've seen all of this before: the partial results, inadequate disclosures, reluctant confessions, active evasion rather than active cooperation and promises made in the face of danger only to be abandoned when the pressure is off. By passage of Resolution 1441, the Council made clear its unwillingness to go down that road again. The Iraqis were presented with an opportunity, but they have chosen the path of non-compliance. On September 12, President Bush gave a speech on the challenge posed by Iraq to the United Nations. He could have delivered that speech anywhere - to the US Congress, to a political rally, or indeed on a military base. He deliberately chose to give his Iraq speech at the United Nations, asking us whether we could show that the promise of the United Nations could be fulfilled in our time. He challenged the delegates to the United Nations - us - to take action and not to stand by while dangers gather. As President Bush said on September 12, "We created the United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions more than wishes." Let us remember why we are meeting here today, 60 days after the return of inspectors to Iraq. Resolution 1441 reaffirmed the Council demand that Iraq must be disarmed. We must not mislead ourselves into believing that inspections are our ultimate goal, or that not blocking access to sites from which prohibited materials have been dispersed represents full procedural cooperation, or for that matter, that procedural cooperation is the same as substantive compliance. No one here today should be under any illusion. In the view of my government, there were two tests established in Resolution 1441 - a full and accurate declaration and immediate, full, and active cooperation. Iraq has failed both tests. In the days ahead we believe the Council and its member governments must answer the following questions:
There is little time left for the Council to face its responsibilities. Source: Text - Iraq Failed Two Key Tests of UN Compliance, Negroponte Says, US State Department (Washington File), January 27. Ambassador Negroponte, Remarks to Reporters, January 27Eighty days ago, on November 8, in a historic display of unity, the Security Council passed Resolution 1441 and gave Iraq a final opportunity to voluntarily disarm. Unfortunately, nothing we have heard today gives us hope that Iraq intends to fully comply with Resolution 1441 or any of the 16 resolutions that preceded it over the last twelve years. The purpose of 1441 was disarmament. It was never the task of the inspectors to look under every rock to find Iraq's hidden weapons. Inspections are a means to verifying and achieving disarmament when a country has determined that it will voluntarily disarm. Inspections are a means to an end and they cannot be expected to achieve disarmament when a country has an active program of denial and deception, as is the case with Iraq. The international community knows what voluntary disarmament looks like. We've seen it with South Africa, the Ukraine and other nations. And what we have seen from Iraq over the past 12 years and over the past 80 days is not it. Resolution 1441 presented Iraq with at least two important tests. First, would Iraq submit a "currently accurate, full and complete" Declaration of all aspects of its WMD programs and delivery systems and second, would Iraq "cooperate immediately, unconditionally and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA"? What we have seen over the past 80 days is that, in spite of the urgency introduced in Resolution 1441, Iraq is back to business as usual. The danger is that the Council may return to business as usual as well. We received a revealingly inadequate declaration that the inspectors themselves have called "rich on volume and poor on information." It was a declaration that did not even address the most basic questions of concern dating back to 1999 as contained in the Compendium of Outstanding Disarmament Issues, prepared by UNSCOM. And we have seen nothing since the December 7 Declaration to indicate that they plan to remedy this situation and come into compliance with Resolution 1441. In the past few weeks alone, inspectors found 12 chemical warheads that should have been in the declaration but were not. They also found 3,000 pages of secret Iraqi government documents - documents, I would note, that should have been included in the declaration but were not - hidden in the home of an Iraqi scientist. This is physical evidence that Iraq's declaration is inaccurate and incomplete. In terms of cooperation, there is an entire state apparatus in Iraq whose sole purpose is to obstruct the inspections. Inspectors are outnumbered by minders, sometimes by as many as 5 to 1 each time they head out on a mission. Iraq has cancelled interviews and has refused Dr. Blix's request to employ the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, a clear violation of Resolution 1441. They are not cooperating unconditionally. Iraq is failing both of these tests and in the days ahead, we believe the Council and its member governments, must face its responsibilities and consider what message Council irresolution sends to Iraq and other proliferators. It benefits no one to let Saddam think he can wear us down into "business as usual" as he has practiced it over the past twelve years. Source: Transcript - Little Hope Iraq Intends to Comply, Negroponte Says, US State Department (Washington File), January 27. Secretary of State Colin Powell, January 27'Remarks, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Washington, D.C., January 27, 2003'; US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. Opening Remarks Earlier today, in accordance with UN Resolution 1441, Doctors' Blix and El Baradei provided the United Nations Security Council their 60-day reports on inspection activity in Iraq. We listened carefully as the inspectors reported that Iraq has not provided the active, immediate and unconditional cooperation that the Council demanded in UN Resolution 1441. As Dr. Blix said, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it." Let me repeat, because this is the essence of the problem. Dr. Blix said, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament that was demanded of it." 1441 is all about the disarmament demanded of Iraq. The inspectors' findings came as no surprise. For 11 years before 1441, Saddam Hussein's regime refused to make the strategic decision, the political decision, to disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction and to comply with the world's demands. To this day, the Iraq regime continues to defy the will of the United Nations. The Iraqi regime has responded to 1441 with empty claims, empty declarations and empty gestures. It has not given the inspectors and the international community any concrete information in answer to a host of key questions: Where is the missing anthrax? This is not just a question of historical curiosity. It is essential for us to know what happened with this deadly material. Where is the VX? Also not just a trivial question. We must know what happened to this deadly material. Where are the chemical and biological munitions? Where are the mobile biological laboratories? If the Iraqi regime was truly committed to disarmament, we wouldn't be looking for these mobile labs. They'd drive them up and park them in front of UNMOVIC headquarters for inspection. Why is Iraq violating the restrictions on ballistic missiles? Why is it violating the ban on missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers? Where are the credible, verifiable answers to all of the other disarmament questions compiled by the previous inspectors? Today, we heard that the inspectors have not been able to interview any Iraqi in private. We heard that the inspectors have not been allowed to employ aerial surveillance. Why not? If Iraq was committed to disarmament, if Iraq understood what 1441 was all about, they would willingly allow this kind of surveillance, they would willingly allow people to be interviewed without minders, without fear of retribution. We have heard that the inspectors have still not received, a full list of Iraqi personnel involved with weapons of mass destruction. If Iraq no longer has weapons of mass destruction, they should willingly give the names of all who were involved in their previous programs to the inspectors for examination and interview. The inspectors told us that their efforts have been impeded by a swarm of Iraqi minders. Why, if Iraq was committed to disarmament, would they be going to these efforts to deceive and to keep the inspectors from doing their work? Passive cooperation is not what was called for in 1441. The inspectors have also told us that they have evidence that Iraq has moved or hidden items at sites just prior to inspection visits. That's what the inspectors say, not what Americans say, not what American intelligence says, but we certainly corroborate all of that. But this is information from the inspectors. And the inspectors have caught the Iraqis concealing "top secret" information in a private residence. You all saw the pictures of that information being brought out. Why? Why, if Iraq was committed to disarmament, as required under 1441, would we be finding this kind of information squirreled away in private homes, for any other reason than to keep it away from the inspectors? The list of unanswered questions and the many ways Iraq is frustrating the work of the inspectors goes on and on. Iraq's refusal to disarm, in compliance with Resolution 1441, still threatens international peace and security. And Iraq's defiance continues to challenge the relevance and credibility of the Security Council. The international community's goal was, is and remains Iraq's disarmament. The Security Council and the international community must stand behind Resolution 1441. Iraq continues to conceal quantities, vast quantities, of highly lethal material and weapons to delivery it. They could kill thousands upon thousands of men, women and children if Saddam Hussein decides to use these against those men, women and children, or, just as frightening, to provide them to others who might use such weapons. Iraq must not be allowed to keep weapons of mass terror and the capacity to produce more. The world community must send a clear message to Iraq that the will of the international community must be obeyed. Last September, the United Nations acted at the request of the United States. We acted through 1441 with the hope - the President had the hope, the other members of the Security Council who voted unanimously for this resolution had the hope - that Iraq would take this one last chance presented to it by the international community to disarm peacefully. And remember the key elements of that resolution. Iraq has been and continues to be in material breach of all of its earlier obligations. We are giving, the resolution said, one more chance to Iraq. We put a firm list of conditions for Iraq to meet and what they should allow the inspectors to do to assist them in that disarmament. And let's not forget a vital part of the resolution that comes toward the end: there would be serious consequences for continued Iraqi violation of its obligation. Those serious consequences are the lever that was needed to get the inspectors in to get the inspectors to be able to do their work, which was to assist Iraqi in disarmament. Iraqi intransigence brings us to a situation where we see that regime continuing to confront the fundamental choice between compliance with 1441 and the consequences of its failure to disarm. Even at this late date, the United States hopes for a peaceful solution. But a peaceful solution is possible only if Iraq disarms itself with the help of the inspectors. The issue is not how much more time the inspectors need to search in the dark. It is how much more time Iraq should be given to turn on the light and to come clean. And the answer is not much more time. Iraq's time for choosing peaceful disarmament is fast coming to an end. ... Questions and Answers Question: It's my understanding that although you guys...are convinced that Iraq is neither cooperating nor complying with the resolution, you're not yet prepared to go to the Security Council with the serious consequences part. Is that correct? And if it is, can you explain... Secretary Powell: Our plan is straightforward. We passed 1441 with a unanimous vote in the Security Council. Fifteen nations acted. Now that we have received this report from the two chief inspectors, I think it is important for us to ask questions of the inspectors. That is happening this afternoon in New York and it will also happen on Wednesday as members of the Security Council pose questions to Dr. Blix and to Dr. El Baradei. The President will be in touch with fellow heads of state and government about this matter. I will be in touch with my colleagues in the Security Council. And after these consultations are completed, and you know Prime Minister Blair is coming on Friday, Mr. Berlusconi is coming this week as well to see President Bush, and after we have had these consultations and considered the entire situation, and have a little time pass, Security Council members need time to consult with their capitals on what they have heard and seen today, and when those consultations are through and the President has had a chance to discuss this with his fellow heads of state and government and I've done my consultations, we will determine what the next steps are. ... Question: ... [D]oes this report...move the administration closer to a showdown with Iraq? And if you care to, and I'd understand if you chose not to, have you got a response to the Iraqi Foreign Minister who doesn't think you tell the truth? Powell: With respect to the first part of your question, time is running out. We've made it clear from the very beginning that we could not allow the process of inspections to string us out forever. There are some who would like to take months. Dr. El Baradei made a reference today that he needed a few more months. But make careful note of the context in which he was making that observation; and that is, if there was active cooperation on the part of the Iraqis. If there isn't that kind of active cooperation, you can be sitting on the things you know and looking at the things you know about, but there may be many other things that you don't know about that you are unable to get information on. And so inspections only work in the presence of cooperation, active cooperation, and a willingness on the part of the other side to participate in the disarmament. And we have examples of this, in South Korea and Kazakhstan, Ukraine and other nations that have gone down this road. With respect to the Iraqi Foreign Minister calling me a liar, this will not cause me any distress or loss of sleep. Question: Mr. Secretary, you have spoken...about a connection between Iraq and terrorist groups, including al-Qaida. Are you saying there is evidence that that has happened in the past, or is there evidence currently that there's still a connection? Powell: I think we have said consistently all along, through last fall and into this year, that we have seen contacts and connections between the Iraqi regime and terrorist organizations, to include al-Qaida. As we have been able to focus on this more and look back in time, I think we're more confident of that assessment and we see no reason not to believe that such contacts and the presence of al-Qaida elements or individuals in Iraq is a reasonable assumption, and we have some basis for that assumption. And the information that we can divulge in greater detail, we will be divulging in the days ahead. Question: Mr. Secretary, can you say whether you are willing, whether the US is willing to give the inspectors a couple of more weeks, maybe a month, but no more than that, in order to complete their work? Powell: We are going to do exactly what I described earlier: consult with leaders around the world. President Bush has been on the phone this morning with President Aznar [of Spain]. He'll be on the phone and he'll be meeting with others. I'll be doing likewise. And when all these consultations are finished, we will let it be known what our next steps are going to be. Question: ... Up until a week ago yesterday, you were a strong advocate for a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi situation. Powell: I still am. Question: In fact, to the point where many of my brethren even labelled you a dove. Powell: I've been labeled many things over the years. Question: But as of the talk shows a week ago yesterday, last Sunday, you started talking tough, and you've been talking very tough ever since... Now...what changed your mind? ... Powell: It has been clear from the very beginning - you know, I am one of the principal authors of 1441, and for better or worse, I can take some credit for having been one of its champions as we drove it through the United Nations Security Council process for a period of seven and a half weeks. And we always insisted on three elements to that: one, Iraq is in material breach; two, this is their last chance; there have to be serious consequences. And those serious consequences meant the use of force. And you've heard me say that repeatedly, repeatedly. And I've also said that if the international community through the UN, when the time comes, does not wish to use force, the United States reserves its right as a sovereign nation to make a judgment within this clear record of violation to use force alongside likeminded nations who might wish to be part of such a coalition. So I have been consistent throughout this entire process. And as I've watched the process unfold, I have watched Iraq go by every exit ramp - diplomatic exit ramp - that was put there for them. They could have made a full, complete and accurate declaration in December, which would have given us some confidence that they were serious about disarmament. Instead, they gave us 12,200 pages of nothing very useful. The inspectors said that today. There was nothing new. They added nothing to the body of knowledge. They tried to deceive the inspectors. They tried to deceive us. One ramp gone by. We have watched subsequently as they have kept reconnaissance planes from doing the work that could be helpful to the inspectors. They have done all of the things that I have described and you have heard other of my colleagues describe - Deputy Secretary Armitage, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, last week. And so we are getting closer and closer to the point where the Security Council is going to have to look at the options that it had anticipated it would have to look at when 1441 was originally passed. And so hang any label you want on me. I am a great believer in diplomacy and a great believer in finding a peaceful solution. But I also recognize that when somebody will not accept a peaceful solution by doing their part of creating a peaceful solution, one must never rule out the use of force to implement the will of the international community, but more importantly, to protect our people and to protect the world. ... Question: Whether it's a few weeks or it's a month, what do you think of the idea of one final deadline? One final exit ramp for Iraq to answer the questions that you laid out at the start? Powell: Iraq could answer this this afternoon, if it chose to. Rather, the Iraqi Foreign Minister spent his time calling me a liar. I will stick with what I said earlier. We will have our discussions and consultations this week and then we will announce next steps at an appropriate time. Question: Regarding the Wednesday debate at the Security Council, what are the objectives of your delegation going to be going into the debate? Powell: It's a consultation, really, and it began, to some extent, this afternoon. But our delegation, Ambassador Negroponte, and I think, the other delegations, will be putting questions to the inspectors. We have a number of issues that we want to raise with the inspectors that perhaps might indicate areas they want to look in and give us answers to questions we have about the work they've done so far. That is really the purpose of these consultations. These consultations this week are not for the purpose of determining what the next steps should be, I think. We'll need more work and heads of state and government talking to one another and foreign ministers talking to each other before one would make a judgment as to what those next steps should be. So I think this is an opportunity for the 15 members of the Council to learn more about what the inspectors have found out. Keep in mind there are new members on the Council. Not - there's been some changeover since 1441 was passed, and it gives these new elected members an opportunity to learn more about the process, about the spirit and intent of 1441, and to ask questions of Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. Question: ... The Germans are calling - as president [of the Security Council] next month, they're calling for another report on February 14th. Do you think this is just a waste of time? Do you think it's another delaying tactic by the Germans, by the French, to say that they're not ready to make such a decision? Powell: No, I wouldn't characterize it that way. It was always part of the process that Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei report on a regular basis to the Council. They reported in early December. They were there not too long ago. The 27th of January was the first report really required directly by 1441, and I think it's quite appropriate for the new president of the Council, Germany, that takes over on the 1st of February, to call for reports as the presidency or other members of the Council see fit. But what we can't do is just keep kicking the can down the road in the absence of a change in policy and attitude and go from passive to more than active cooperation, not cooperation alone, but a demonstrated willingness on the part of Iraq to participate in the disarmament and not try to frustrate the disarmament effort. ... Question: Secretary Powell, as impassioned as you are and as adamant as you are that you...in the inspectors' reports examples of Iraq noncompliance, many of your colleagues on the Security Council feel equally as strong that there are cases of compliance. The French, the Germans, the Russians have all come out today saying that they think the inspectors should be given more time. How are you and the President planning to convince your colleagues and...persuade them to... Powell: What we're going to do is consult with our colleagues, and I'm sure that the President will be talking to leaders of all these countries, and I'll be talking to the ministers. We will consult, just as we did when 1441 was put together in the first instance, and try to come to a collective judgment as to what should be the next steps. And as I'll say for about the fifth time, in due course those next steps will be announced. Yes, there are disagreements. There are some who are satisfied with passive cooperation at this point. Passive cooperation is not what 1441 was all about. Dr. Blix, it seems to me, made it rather clear today that he is not getting the kind of cooperation and Iraq has not made the fundamental choice it has to make that it is going to be disarmed. Richard Lugar, Republican Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 27The weapons inspectors' report to the UN today indicates that Iraq has been uncooperative. UN Resolution 1441 was the last chance request by the Security Council for Iraq to explain what has happened to its weapons of mass destruction. If the weapons have been destroyed, the Iraqis are expected to give evidence of that. The report indicates that they have not given evidence of the destruction and leaves open the great possibility that Iraq still possesses substantial weapons and continues to pursue weapons and technology. For the inspectors, this is not hide-and-seek, trying to hunt down all the mobile laboratories that can be moved on a moment's notice. It is up to the Iraqis to produce documentation and evidence of what has or has not happened. This report indicates they have not done that. By failing to declare any of it, they are in material breach and what to do about it is the big issue now before the UN Security Council. Ultimately we need to know where the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and materials are. The president is prepared to lead a coalition of the willing - preferably the entire UN Security Council that approved resolution 1441 - to disarm Saddam, if he does not disarm himself Sadden must understand that this time is different from past inspection regimes, the weapons will be destroyed. The big question is what will happen after the disarmament. Source: Text - Senator Lugar Says Weapons Reports Show Iraq Uncooperative, US State Department (Washington File), January 27. 3. United KingdomForeign Secretary Jack Straw, January 27What we've heard today from New York is clear evidence that Saddam Hussein is not engaged in effective cooperation with the weapons' inspectors or the United Nations, but he's practising concealment. There's clear evidence now that Saddam has made this a charade of an inspection, cooperating on process, but not on substance. And I believe that as people heard those very careful words from Dr Blix about VX nerve gas, about the development of mustard gases, about much else that has been found by the weapons' inspectors, about the failure of cooperation by Iraq in all sorts of ways including crucially in respect of interviews with Iraqi scientists who know the truth of all this, people will be deeply disturbed. And overall what we have heard today confirms the United Kingdom Government's position in respect of Iraq and confirms our view that it was essential that this matter went back to the Security Council as it did in the autumn and that we put together resolution 1441 with a very tough and clear message that this was and is the final opportunity to Iraq to comply fully with twelve years of uncomplied-with obligations from the Security Council. And also as we said in the final paragraph of 1441 if this failure to comply continued then Iraq would have to face, and I quote, "serious consequences." Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk. Foreign Secretary Straw, Statement & 10-Question List, January 28The report which the Chief Weapons Inspector, Dr Hans Blix, gave to the United Nations Security Council yesterday is damning and disturbing. It shows beyond doubt that the Iraqi regime is responding to Resolution 1441 not with active co-operation but with a consistent pattern of concealment and deceit. Dr Blix has listed a number of questions which Saddam Hussein has failed to answer. The onus is now on Saddam to answer those questions not with bluster and delay, not with evasion, but with credible evidence that Iraq's terrible weaponry either has been destroyed or will be destroyed in full and active co-operation with the UN inspectors. Saddam Hussein must answer these questions. He has already wasted 60 days since the inspections began and 600 weeks since the first of the many Resolutions which he has flouted. Minor concessions, dragged reluctantly from the Iraqi regime, will not do. The world can now see what Saddam is working so hard to conceal and the pattern of non-co-operation with which he aims to hide his weapons. I am today publishing a list of 10 key questions from Dr Blix's report, so that the British public can judge for itself whether Saddam is complying with the United Nations. For example: How does Iraq account for 6,500 missing bombs which could carry up to a thousand tonnes of chemical agent?
These questions, raised by Dr Blix, point to a persistent programme to equip the world's most aggressive rogue state with some of the deadliest weapons known to man. The United Nations is now facing a fundamental challenge to its authority. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1441 lays down two tests that 'false statements or omissions' in Iraq's declaration 'and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation of this Resolution, shall constitute a further material breach'. Iraq has failed both tests and the inescapable conclusion is that Iraq is now in material breach of Resolution 1441. War is not inevitable. But the responsibility to avoid conflict rests with Saddam Hussein. No country can be disarmed peacefully by guesswork and game playing. It can be done only with Iraq's active co-operation. The regime does not have long to change its behaviour fundamentally. We cannot let Saddam Hussein get away with never-ending deceit and delay. Document: Ten Questions Iraq Must Answer1. Co-operation Blix: 'Co-operation might be said to relate to both substance and process. It would appear from our experience so far that Iraq has decided in principle to provide co-operation on process, notably access. A similar decision is indispensable to provide co-operation on substance in order to bring the disarmament tasks to completion through the peaceful process of inspection and to bring the monitoring task on a firm course.' Will Iraq now provide co-operation on substance? 2. U2 Plane Blix: 'Iraq has refused to guarantee its safety, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled... we note that Iraq is not so far complying with our request.' Will Iraq now agree to U2 flights on UN terms? 3. Harassment Blix: 'I am obliged to note some disturbing incidents...' Will Iraq now end all harassment of inspectors? 4. VX Blix: 'There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilisation and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared. There are also indications that the agent was weaponised'. Will Iraq now either provide evidence of the destruction of its VX or co-operate fully with its destruction? 5. Chemical Bombs and Rockets Blix: 'The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for. The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicised. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg.' Will Iraq now account for all its chemical bombs and rockets? 6. Mustard Gas Blix: 'Inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of Thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.' Will Iraq now credibly explain the purpose of this precursor chemical? 7. Anthrax Blix: 'There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared (8,500 litres), and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq's submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax.' Will Iraq now provide the evidence that it destroyed its anthrax or cooperate fully with its destruction? 8. Missiles Blix: 'There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant.' Will Iraq now account for the extended range of its missiles? 9. Documents Blix: 'The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of documents, much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium support a concern that has long existed that documents might be distributed to the homes of private individuals. We cannot help but think that the case might not be isolated and that such placements of documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents by placing them in private homes. Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be serious.' Will Iraq now produce all documents from their places of hiding? 10. Interviews Blix: 'To date, 11 individuals were asked for interviews in Baghdad by us. The replies have invariably been that the individual will only speak at Iraq's monitoring directorate or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have evidence that they have not said anything that the authorities did not wish them to say. At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed itself to encourage persons to accept interviews 'in private', that is to say alone with us. Despite this, the pattern has not changed.' Will Iraq now actively provide interviews on UN terms? Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk. 4. Russia UN Ambassador Sergei Lavrov, Interview with Russian Television, January 27 Question: As far as we can judge, the report of Hans Blix, the UNMOVIC head, is steeped in rather harsh tones with regard to Iraq. Does it give any grounds for terminating inspections and starting military action against Iraq? How is the situation now being assessed by the United Nations Security Council members? Ambassador Lavrov: Two reports were submitted in the UNSC today - the reports by Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei. They concerned the four dossiers: nuclear, chemical, biological and missile. With regard to the nuclear dossier ElBaradei reported very serious progress and his intention to close this dossier in the coming months. With respect to the other issues, on which Blix reported, he himself acknowledged that the Iraqis had presented in their declaration of a month ago, which the inspectors have studied, new information on missiles and biotechnologies, which is very useful. A second important observation based on the communications of Blix and ElBaradei is that their joint visit to Baghdad made it possible to agree with Baghdad on the steps which actually spell more active cooperation by the Iraqis with the inspectors. In particular, a special commission will be set up to investigate the specific facts which the inspectors have uncovered. Blix called for establishing such commissions on other issues as well. The third conclusion, which is very important: all the discovered evidences of past programs (and the inspectors did find something) - the materials and documents - do not alter the major conclusion drawn by UNMOVIC and IAEA that now they cannot say that they have proofs that programs for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction have been resumed in Iraq. They again urged countries claiming they have such proofs to furnish them to the inspectors. And the very last, and the most important point is that both Blix and ElBaradei called upon the UN Security Council to continue to render support to the inspectors. The inspection process is proceeding effectively. Now in Iraq a unique human, technological, communication, and aviation potential is concentrated that is designed for inspection activity. They called for making full use of this potential. Question: Ahead of the meeting, the United States had promised to furnish convincing evidence of Iraq's violations of resolution 1441. You said that so far the inspectors have found nothing. Did the US provide anything that could substantiate the use of force? Are we to understand the words of Blix that Iraq has never really accepted the demand that it disarm as meaning that Baghdad has after all breached the resolution of the UN Security Council? Lavrov: I would not say so. The US today again through its United Nations Ambassador repeated its questions to Iraq, which are well known to all. But no proofs that development of weapons of mass destruction is continuing in Iraq were submitted. Hans Blix spoke of the necessity to study the new aspects that are being uncovered in the course of inspections, including on the basis of information which countries provide. The information which he has hitherto received from individual countries, as I understand, from the US among them, does not permit him to change his view that so far he has no proofs of a resumption of weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq. Question: Tomorrow the United States is going to call upon the UN Security Council members to create an international coalition for carrying out a military operation in Iraq. In your opinion, will the US manage to organize that coalition and what will be the stand of Russia in this case? Lavrov: That proposal so far has not been made. Today, speaking after the Security Council meeting, the US Ambassador said that, in Washington's estimation, there remains less and less time and that the Security Council should think what to do next. He wasn't more specific. ... Source: Transcript of Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Sergei Lavrov's Live Interview on the Vremya (Channel One) Television Program Regarding the Outcome of the UN Security Council Meeting Held on January 27, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry Transcript, Document 200-27-01-2003, January 27. 5. FranceUN Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière, Remarks to Reporters, January 27They [the inspectors] have already produced some results but there are still question marks. This is the reason why Iraq must cooperate more actively in accordance with resolution 1441. Source: After briefing by inspectors, Security Council plans to consult on Iraq Wednesday, UN News Service, January 27. 6. ChinaZhang Yishan, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, January 27We share the view of many that this process needs to continue and more time is needed for the inspectors and we trust that UNMOVIC and the IAEA will continue their homework impartially, objectively and professionally. Source: After briefing by inspectors, Security Council plans to consult on Iraq Wednesday, UN News Service, January 27. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, January 28We have taken note of the assessment positions of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and the response from various sides. China has always stood [for the position] that the Iraqi question should be solved politically within the UN framework and that Iraq should implement the relevant UN resolutions in full. We maintain that currently no conclusion [with respect] to the weapon inspection [process] in Iraq should be jumped to. The Security Council should respect the opinions of the two agencies and support the continued inspection[s] to sort out questions. We also hope to see enhanced Iraqi cooperation with the UN. Source: Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn. 7. Other ReactionUN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, speaking to reporters after the UNMOVIC/IAEA briefings, January 27I think if they [the inspectors] need more time, they should be given the time to do their work and all of us - the Council when they sent them - must have realised that time will be necessary, a reasonable amount of time... I'm not saying forever, but they do need time to get their work done, and I suspect the Council will allow for that time to be done... They [the inspectors] expect a more proactive engagement and I hope the Iraqis will do what the inspectors have asked them to do... In my own speech to the General Assembly on September 12, I stressed the need for multilateralism, the need for Council action, the need for Council legitimacy, and that position has not changed. I really hope that Iraq will comply and we will be able to get on and disarm Iraq peacefully. .... I have not give up on peace and you shouldn't, either. Source: UN arms inspectors need time 'to do their work,' Annan says, UN News Service, January 27. Gunter Pleuger, German Ambassador to the UN, Remarks to Reporters, January 27We should give the inspectors the realistic opportunity to achieve their goals in a peaceful manner... On the other hand, the question whether this can be done peacefully, is up to Iraq. Source: After briefing by inspectors, Security Council plans to consult on Iraq Wednesday, UN News Service, January 27. Non-Aligned Movement (South African UN Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo), January 27We would hope, in the Non-Aligned Movement, that the Security Council will allow the inspectors sufficient time to do what we agreed they should be doing in Iraq. Source: After briefing by inspectors, Security Council plans to consult on Iraq Wednesday, UN News Service, January 27. © 2002 The Acronym Institute. |