Text Only | Disarmament Diplomacy | Disarmament Documentation | ACRONYM Reports

Disarmament Documentation

US Undersecretary of State John Bolton, Interview on North Korea, January 24

John Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, interview with Japanese news company NHK, American Embassy in Tokyo, January 24.

Question: You have just toured China, South Korea, and now you are here in Japan. What is your perception about the tension surrounding the North Korean nuclear development program in the region?

Undersecretary Bolton: I think that we're quite concerned, obviously, about North Korea's aggressive pursuit of nuclear weapons, but I think it's important to try and keep this in perspective. There is still ample time for a diplomatic solution, and North Korea's effort to turn this into a crisis, and particularly to turn it into a bilateral crisis with the United States, is not something that we have to accept. So while our diplomatic activity is quite intense, and we are committed, as President Bush has directed us, to find a peaceful solution, we're not going to play this to North Korea's tempo.

Question: The big question is North Korea's intent. North Korea has stressed that they are not seeking to make nuclear weapons. Do you believe that?

Bolton: Certainly not. We know for a fact that North Korea has an ongoing program to enrich uranium to create weapons-grade uranium that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. They have been pursuing this program in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Agreed Framework for at least five years. In addition, they have recently unsealed the plutonium reprocessing facility at Yongbyon to put them in a position to begin reprocessing the spent fuel rods there that would give them weapons-grade plutonium. North Korea has been pursuing nuclear weapons since 1955. Their actions that they have kept clandestine until we discovered them and their actions since late December all show just how seriously they are pursuing nuclear weapons. Their recent declaration that they were withdrawing from the Nonproliferation Treaty, but only to produce electricity, is just nonsensical. If they were serious about not producing nuclear weapons, they would rejoin the Nonproliferation Treaty, stop the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon, and stop their uranium enrichment program.

Question: Why do you think they have decided to acknowledge that they have started a new nuclear program at this time?

Bolton: It's been a matter of intense speculation for us why they admitted the program. One possibility is that they realized we had uncovered what they were doing and that they drew the wrong lesson from the negotiations over the Agreed Framework back in 1993-94. They may have felt that if the uranium- enrichment program has been discovered that they would put it out on the table and see what we'd be willing to pay in response to their blackmail to stop the program. I think they badly miscalculated, because we're not going to go through their blackmail playbook. We're not going to reward their bad behavior. They have to dismantle both the uranium-enrichment program and now the plutonium-reprocessing program before there is any possibility of a new relationship with the United States.

Question: President Bush named North Korea as one of the "axis of evil" countries. Do you think they are afraid about the US policy of seeking preemptive strikes towards countries that are seeking weapons of mass destruction?

Bolton: The threat of aggression in this region does not come from the United States. It comes from North Korea, which has nearly a million men under arms, and an incredible concentration of conventional and weapons of mass destruction along the militarized zone. If anybody needs assurances of non-aggression, the rest of us need those assurances from North Korea. It's just not a credible notion that somehow the North Koreans have been responding to the "axis of evil" or any statements by our administration. As I mentioned a moment ago, the North Korean uranium-enrichment program, as far as we know, began at least five years ago. So that goes well before President Bush was even elected, and it shows the extent of North Korea's commitment to obtaining nuclear weapons. That's what we all are really concerned about.

Question: So now you are seeking to put this matter to the Security Council. You had just said in the press conference that the IAEA Board is likely to pass a resolution, probably soon. When is that?

Bolton: We had hoped to have a resolution before the end of the month of January. We still think that's possible. It's important that the IAEA Board of Governors be unanimous on that point, and you know there have been two previous resolutions since November by the IAEA. So we've been proceeding in a very deliberate and prudent fashion. We're not rushing the IAEA, but we do think that the clear violation by the North Koreans of the Nonproliferation Treaty amounts to a threat to international peace and security, and according to the IAEA statute they are required to refer that matter to the Security Council. So that's an appropriate thing to do, and that's what we've been seeking. ...

Question: And what measures are you going to seek there [in the Security Council]?

Bolton: I think the first thing that's important to do is to show to the North Koreans, perhaps through a presidential statement at the Security Council, just how seriously the rest of the world takes their ongoing efforts to get nuclear weapons. I think it will be a further demonstration of how isolated they are and how worried the rest of the world is about this course that they've taken, but also a way for the Council to show that we will not submit to blackmail and we will not allow the North Koreans to get away with keeping these nuclear weapons.

Question: Do you have sanctions in mind?

Bolton: We don't have any intention at the moment to seek sanctions, but I think, certainly, that is one of the options that the UN Charter provides for the Security Council, and I think that's something that at some point the Council might have to consider. It really underlines what I think is a very important point here, and that is the disposition of this matter lies largely in North Korea's hands. If they were to take concrete steps to give up their nuclear weapons program, a lot of possibilities would emerge. But if they remain defiant, if they remain in violation of their international commitments, if they keep up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons then this matter will continue to grow more serious.

Question: I wonder whether or not you predict North Korea will resume missile tests in the future?

Bolton: They have threatened to resume missile tests. I think they would be very ill advised to do that. It would simply make this a more serious matter. I think it's one of the reasons that their neighbors in the region - in South Korea and in Japan - are so concerned about what the North is up to. Japan obviously has no hostile intent towards North Korea, and yet North Korea's missiles are capable of reaching Japanese cities. Especially containing nuclear warheads, they would be an extraordinary danger to the innocent civilian population here. If North Korea thinks that by threatening and blackmailing other states it's going to be rewarded, however, I think that's a big mistake. We are committed - strongly committed - to a peaceful resolution of this problem, but it's not going to be through submitting to blackmail. North Korea needs to understand that very clearly.

Question: It must be a very big point for thinking how to act towards North Korea, because the repercussions of war with North Korea would be so grave.

Bolton: Well, it's not in our consideration at all. No one wants military action on the Korean Peninsula, and President Bush has been very clear on a number of occasions that we have no intention to invade North Korea. Our objective is to get the matter resolved peacefully. But that requires action by the North Koreans, and it's one reason that we've been in very close consultation with the government of South Korea and the government of Japan to show that we're united for that proposition, and why all three of us in separate channels have been in consultation with China and with Russia, whom we hope can exert - because of their historical relationship with North Korea - we hope they can exert influence on Pyongyang to back off this very dangerous course of action.

Question: The United States-North Korean relations have been based on the 1994 Framework Agreement. Do you now consider the agreement nullified?

Bolton: The North Koreans have said that, and Secretary Powell said, "When one side says an agreement is nullified, that pretty well means it's nullified." The North Koreans violated the fundamental basis of that framework, which was that they were going to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. For at least five years, in a covert fashion, while all of us were focused on the plutonium facility at Yongbyon, they were over here enriching uranium in a way that they hoped we wouldn't find out. When there is such a fundamental breach of an agreement, it really shreds North Korea's credibility.

Question: So whatever happens in the future will not be based on the Framework Agreement. I was wondering, we have the cooperation with North Korea in building the light water reactor. Is the construction going to continue, or do you prefer a coal-fire plant instead?

Bolton: Well, I think it's not appropriate at this point to talk about any kind of concrete steps for the North. I think it's very unlikely the reactors will ever be completed. Given North Korea's history with radioactive material, I'm not sure that we want to be in a position of trusting them to do the right thing for some considerable period of time. I don't think it's appropriate to look at specific quid pro quos of energy for this or food aid for that or something like that. What we see as the way to proceed toward a new arrangement is for a substantial transformation of North Korea's behavior. The verifiable dismantling of their nuclear weapons program. When they begin to behave more like a normal state, then certainly the United States and I think Japan and others will be more willing to treat them like a normal state. But the first step lies with a change in North Korean behavior.

Question: So how do you go about bringing that about? First the United States said that it ruled out any talks until North Korea's nuclear ambitions were gone. And then you softened your tone, saying that perhaps a package with energy and humanitarian aid with a written document to guarantee their security of non-aggression may be offered if they abandon their nuclear program. It's very confusing, because the United States has said something very, very hard-line and then softened. So what kind of approach are you going to be taking?

Bolton: I don't think we've really changed our position. I think we've said consistently that we have no objection to talking to the North Koreans to explain to them how to come back into compliance with their international obligations. We've said also we're not going to negotiate with them in a way that rewards bad behavior. I think it's very important that people understand that this is not a conflict between the United States and North Korea. We have no designs on North Korea. We care deeply about the starving people that are so oppressed by the Kim Jong Il regime, but what we care about is eliminating the threat of their nuclear weapons program. That's the principle focus of our interest.

Question: So may I make it clear, there will be no incentive for North Korea to abandon their nuclear program?

Bolton: We are not going to succumb to blackmail or go through their blackmail playbook. That's absolutely right.

Question: You said a bold initiative or a complete transformation of their behavior is needed. Secretary Powell has been talking about a new arrangement. What is the principal thinking behind the US policy for a new arrangement?

Bolton: Well, really the idea is President Bush's, to say that this pattern of trying to deal with North Korea, as revealed by the failure of the Agreed Framework and other failed negotiations, should lead us to try a dramatically different approach, which is basically to say to North Korea, "If you will change the way you go about doing business on a fundamental basis, we're prepared to change the way we deal with you on a fundamental basis." And that's a very broad conceptual approach. If the North Koreans are willing to entertain that, then I'm sure we'll be willing to follow through on it. But we have reached a point, because of this dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons, where the time for rhetoric really is overtaken by the need for them to act. What they need to do is dismantle that nuclear weapons program.

Question: Are you going to ask for a reduction of conventional weapons as well?

Bolton: I think since the summer of 2001, we've said that the disposition of conventional forces on the peninsula is a matter of concern. Why does North Korea have a million troops near the Demilitarized Zone? The United States has thirty-seven thousand troops in all of South Korea. It's an important force, but it's obviously not one that threatens the North. Why do they have that concentration of forces? Why do they have artillery aimed at the civilian population of Seoul? I think those are all things that are worth discussing. ...

Question: We have been talking about North Korea and Iraq. What impresses me is the stark contrast between the policies toward each country. North Korea has said that they have a nuclear development program and they have many, many conventional forces and maybe perhaps other weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein says that they have no nuclear weapons and the inspectors have not been able to find a "smoking gun." Why is it that the United States is moving towards military action towards Iraq while stressing diplomacy with North Korea?

Bolton: I think in both cases our policy objectives are exactly the same, and that is the elimination of the weapons of mass destruction programs in both countries. The particular policy roots that we're following are different because the circumstances in the two countries are different. We've had right now a twelve-year history with Iraq that has exhausted, by any reasonable person's definition, every opportunity to resolve this by peaceful and diplomatic means. As the President has said, it's now time to bring the matter to a conclusion. In the case of North Korea, we believe that a diplomatic solution is still possible, and we are pursuing it very vigorously. But there's no double standard here. The policy objective in both cases is the same - the elimination of these very dangerous programs of weapons of mass destruction. ...

Question: Is it possible for the US to send a declaration or statement, as [Deputy Secretary of State] Dr. [Richard] Armitage said, of not invading North Korea? Is it coming soon, or how long is it going to take?

Bolton: I don't know about the timing. President Bush has said we have no intention of invading North Korea, and there is no higher authority or better assurance that we can give. As Rich Armitage said, if it would help to put that in writing I'm sure we can find some way to memorialize the President's commitment. But the President has been very clear about that. The real issue is not some dream about America's so-called aggressive intent toward the North. The real problem is North Korea's aggressive actions toward its neighbors in the region, and the highly militarized state of its population, what they call their "military first" policy, which is evident in the misery and starvation among the civilian population. That's really the sort of thing we ought to be concerned about: Why they have concentrated so much on the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to the detriment of the poor civilians living there. ...

Source: Transcript - Threat of Aggression Comes From North Korea, Not US, US State Department (Washington File), January 27.

Back to the Top of the Page