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'This Body Places Itself In Danger of Irrelevance': US Secretary of State Powell Presentation on Iraq, UN Security Council, February 5

• I. Secretary Powell Presentation
• II. Initial Iraqi Response, February 5
• III. Initial Security Council Reaction, February 5

I. Secretary Powell Presentation

'"Iraq: Failing to Disarm", Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Remarks as Delivered to the United Nations Security Council, New York, February 5, 2003', US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, New York.

Presentation: Iraq - Failing to Disarm

Mr. President [German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer] and Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special effort that each of you made to be here today. This is an important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Last November 8th, this Council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years. Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this Council has repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No Council member present and voting on that day had any illusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply. And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA. We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job. This Council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm, and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.

I asked for this session today for two purposes. First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this Council on January 27th, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it." And as Dr. El Baradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7th "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998." My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions. I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.

The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are US sources and some are those of other countries. Some are the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to. I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts and Iraqis' behavior, Iraq's behavior, demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort, no effort, to disarm, as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.

Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November 26th of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq. The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard.

(The tape is played.)

Let me pause and review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard between these two officers. First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohammed El Baradei is coming, and they know what he's coming for and they know he's coming the next day. He's coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things. But they're worried. We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it? What is their concern? Their concern is that it's something they should not have, something that should not be seen. The general was incredulous: "You didn't get it modified. You don't have one of those, do you?" "I have one." "Which? From where?" "From the workshop. From the Al-Kindi Company." "What?" "From Al-Kindi." "I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried you all have something left." "We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left."

Note what he says: "We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up. "I will come to you tomorrow."

The Al-Kindi Company. This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity.

Let me play another tape for you. As you will recall, the inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on January 16th. On January 20th, four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors it would search for more. You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters issuing an instruction to an officer in the field. Their conversation took place just last week, on January 30th.

(The tape is played.)

Let me pause again and review the elements of this message. "They are inspecting the ammunition you have, yes?" "Yes. For the possibility there are forbidden ammo." "For the possibility there is, by chance, forbidden ammo?" "Yes." "And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there. Remember the first message: evacuate it."

This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind. You go a little further into this message and you see the specific instructions from headquarters: "After you have carried out what is contained in this message, destroy the message because I don't want anyone to see this message." "Okay." "Okay."

Why? Why? This message would have verified to the inspectors that they have been trying to turn over things. They were looking for things, but they don't want that message seen because they were trying to clean up the area, to leave no evidence behind of the presence of weapons of mass destruction. And they can claim that nothing was there and the inspectors can look all they want and they will find nothing.

This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one or two isolated events. Quite the contrary, this is part and parcel of a policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years, a policy set at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. We know that Saddam Hussein has what is called "a Higher Committee for Monitoring the Inspection Teams." Think about that. Iraq has a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq's disarmament - not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs. The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is headed by Iraq's Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan. Its members include Saddam Hussein's son, Kusay. This committee also includes Lieutenant General Amir al-Sadi, an advisor to Saddam. In case that name isn't immediately familiar to you, General Sadi has been the Iraqi regime's primary point of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei. It was General Sadi who last fall publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. Quite the contrary, Sadi's job is not to cooperate; it is to deceive, not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not to support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn nothing.

We have learned a lot about the work of this special committee. We learned that just prior to the return of inspectors last November, the regime had decided to resume what we heard called "the old game of cat-and-mouse." For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration that Iraq submitted to this Council on December 7th. Iraq never had any intention of complying with this Council's mandate. Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration to overwhelm us and to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information about Iraq's permitted weapons so that we would not have time to pursue Iraq's prohibited weapons. Iraq's goal was to give us in this room, to give those of us on this Council, the false impression that the inspection process was working.

You saw the result. Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration rich in volume but poor in information and practically devoid of new evidence. Could any member of this Council honestly rise in defense of this false declaration?

Everything we have seen and heard indicates that instead of cooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing.

My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources.

Orders were issued to Iraq's security organizations, as well as to Saddam Hussein's own office, to hide all correspondence with the Organization of Military Industrialization. This is the organization that oversees Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities. Make sure there are no documents left which would connect you to the OMI. We know that Saddam's son, Kusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We know that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection. Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors recently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched the homes of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000 pages of documents. You see them here being brought out of the home and placed in UN hands. Some of the material is classified and related to Iraq's nuclear program.

Tell me, answer me: Are the inspectors to search the house of every government official, every Baath Party member and every scientist in the country to find the truth, to get the information they need, to satisfy the demands of our Council?

Our sources tell us that in some cases the hard drives of computers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took the hard drives? Where did they go? What is being hidden? Why? There is only one answer to the why: to deceive, to hide, to keep from the inspectors.

Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction, to keep them from being found by inspectors. While we were here in this Council chamber debating Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agent to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection. We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities.

Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a couple. The photos that I am about to show you are sometimes hard for the average person to interpret, hard for me. The painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts with years and years of experience, pouring for hours and hours over light tables. But as I show you these images, I will try to capture and explain what they mean, what they indicate, to our imagery specialists.

Let's look at one.

[The slide is shown.]

This one is about a weapons munition facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji. This is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical munitions. In fact, this is where the Iraqis recently came up with the additional four chemical weapons shells. Here you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The four that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers. How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemical munitions. The arrow at the top that says "security" points to a facility that is a signature item for this kind of bunker. Inside that facility are special guards and special equipment to monitor any leakage that might come out of the bunker. The truck you also see is a signature item. It's a decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong. This is characteristic of those four bunkers. The special security facility and the decontamination vehicle will be in the area, if not at any one of them or one of the other, it is moving around those four and it moves as needed to move as people are working in the different bunkers.

Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at two of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents are gone. It's been cleaned up. And it was done on the 22nd of December as the UN inspection team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right. The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They found nothing.

This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji. As it did throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively using its considerable intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities. From our sources, we know that inspectors are under constant surveillance by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all of their communications, both voice and electronics. I would call my colleagues' attention to the fine paper that the United Kingdom distributed yesterday which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.

In this next example, you will see the type of concealment activity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption of inspections. Indeed, in November of 2002, just when the inspections were about to resume, this type of activity spiked. Here are three examples.

[The slide is shown.]

At this ballistic missile site on November 10th, we saw a cargo truck preparing to move ballistic missile components.

At this biological weapons-related facility on November 25th, just two days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan appeared - something we almost never see at this facility and we monitor it carefully and regularly.

At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before inspections began, five large cargo trucks appeared, along with a truck-mounted crane, to move missiles.

We saw this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites. Days after this activity, the vehicles and the equipment that I've just highlighted disappear and the site returns to patterns of normalcy. We don't know precisely what Iraq was moving, but the inspectors already knew about these sites so Iraq knew that they would be coming.

We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections if they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or did not have?

Remember the first intercept in which two Iraqis talked about the need to hide a modified vehicle from the inspectors. Where did Iraq take all of this equipment? Why wasn't it presented to the inspectors?

Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved before, during and after inspectors. This refusal to allow this kind of reconnaissance is in direct, specific violation of operative paragraph seven of our Resolution 1441.

Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to conceal weapons; they are also trying to hide people. You know the basic facts. Iraq has not complied with its obligation to allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons, as required by Resolution 1441. The regime only allows interviews with inspectors in the presence of an Iraqi official, a minder. The official Iraqi organization charged with facilitating inspections announced publicly and announced ominously, that, "Nobody is ready to leave Iraq to be interviewed." Iraqi Vice President Ramadan accused the inspectors of conducting espionage, a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with UN inspectors was committing treason.

Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs. Iraq's list was out of date and contained only about 500 names despite the fact that UNSCOM had earlier put together a list of about 3,500 names.

Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have told us. Saddam Hussein has directly participated in the effort to prevent interviews. In early December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqi scientists warned of the serious consequences that they and their families would face if they revealed any sensitive information to the inspectors. They were forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging information is punishable by death. Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should be told not to agree to leave Iraq; anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be treated as a spy. This violates 1441.

In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqi experts were ordered to report to the headquarters of the Special Security Organization to receive counter-intelligence training. The training focused on evasion methods, interrogation resistance techniques, and how to mislead inspectors.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are facts corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligence services of other countries. For example, in mid-December, weapons experts at one facility were replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors about the work that was being done there. On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate for one scientist and he was sent into hiding. In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was related to weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been ordered to stay home from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi military facilities not engaged in illicit weapons projects were to replace the workers who had been sent home. A dozen experts have been placed under house arrest - not in their own houses, but as a group at one of Saddam Hussein's guest houses.

It goes on and on and on. As the examples I have just presented show, the information and intelligence we have gathered point to an active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key materials and people from the inspectors, in direct violation of Resolution 1441.

The pattern is not just one of reluctant cooperation, nor is it merely a lack of cooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful inspection work.

My colleagues, operative paragraph four of UN Resolution 1441, which we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that false statements and omissions in the declaration and a failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute - the facts speak for themselves - shall constitute a further material breach of its obligation.

We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test, to give an Iraq an early test. Would they give an honest declaration and would they, early on, indicate a willingness to cooperate with the inspectors? It was designed to be an early test. They failed that test.

By this standard, the standard of this Operative Paragraph, I believe that Iraq is now in further material breach of its obligations. I believe this conclusion is irrefutable and undeniable.

Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for in UN Resolution 1441. And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately.

This issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's non-compliance before we, as a Council, we as the United Nations say, "Enough. Enough."

The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those deadly weapons programs and describe why they are real and present dangers to the region and to the world.

First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here about biological weapons. By way of introduction in history, I think there are just three quick points I need to make. First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM four long and frustrating years to pry, to pry an admission out of Iraq that it had biological weapons. Second, when Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in 1995, the quantities were vast. Less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax, a little bit - about this amount. This is just about the amount of a teaspoon. Less than a teaspoon full of dry anthrax in an envelope shut down the United States Senate in the fall of 2001. This forced several hundred people to undergo emergency medical treatment and killed two postal workers just from an amount, just about this quantity that was inside of an envelope. Iraq declared 8,500 liters of anthrax. But UNSCOM estimates that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated into this dry form, this amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material. And that is my third point. And it is key. The Iraqis have never accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and we know they had.

They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make them. And they have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with these agents such as there are 400 bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This is true. This is all well documented. Dr. Blix told this Council that Iraq has provided little evidence to verify anthrax production and no convincing evidence of its destruction. It should come as no shock then that since Saddam Hussein forced out the last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons. One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents.

Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eyewitness accounts. We have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails. The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.

Although Iraq's mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, UN inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000. The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. 12 technicians died from exposure to biological agents. He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting, the biological weapons agent production always began on Thursdays at midnight, because Iraq thought UNSCOM would not inspect on the Muslim holy day, Thursday night through Friday. He added that this was important because the units could not be broken down in the middle of a production run, which had to be completed by Friday evening before the inspectors might arrive again. This defector is currently hiding in another country with the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him. His eyewitness account of these mobile production facilities has been corroborated by other sources.

A second source. An Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the program confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers.

A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer, 2002, that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road-trailer units and on rail cars.

Finally, a fourth source. An Iraqi major who defected confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier.

We have diagrammed what our sources reported about these mobile facilities.

[The diagram is shown.]

Here you see both truck and rail-car mounted mobile factories. The description our sources gave us of the technical features required by such facilities is highly detailed and extremely accurate. As these drawings, based on their description show, we know what the fermenters look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like. We know they fit together, we know how they work, and we know a great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted. As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealed easily - either by moving ordinary looking trucks and rail-cars along Iraq's thousands of miles of highway or track or by parking them in a garage or a warehouse or somewhere in Iraq's extensive system of underground tunnels and bunkers.

We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile, biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few - perhaps 18 trucks that we know of. There may be more. But perhaps 18 that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day.

It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making biological agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward as they are supposed to with the information about these kinds of capabilities.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry, biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. A dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings. By 1998, UN experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs. Now Iraq has incorporated this drying expertise into these mobile production facilities.

We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. But Iraq's research efforts did not stop there. Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas-gangrene, plague, typhus, tetanus, cholera, camelpox, and hemorrhagic fever. And he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox.

The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disperse lethal biological agents widely, indiscriminately into the water supply, into the air. For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM some years ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft.

[The video is played.]

Note the spray coming from beneath the Mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying. In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Salleh Abdul Latif told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons. Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks, but to this day, it has provided no credible evidence that they were destroyed, evidence that was required by the international community.

There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction.

If biological weapons seem too terrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling. UNMOVIC already laid out much of this and it is documented for all of us to read in UNSCOM's 1999 report on the subject. Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us need to keep in mind. First, Saddam Hussein has used these horrific weapons on another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare, no country has had more battlefield experience with chemical weapons since World War I than Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents. If we consider just one category of missing weaponry, 6,500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq War, UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in them would be on the order of a thousand tons.

These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for. Dr. Blix has quipped that, "Mustard gas is not marmalade. You are supposed to know what you did with it." We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did with it and he has not come clean with the international community. We have evidence these weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still waiting for.

Third point, Iraq's record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons. The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law. UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery, yet to this day Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this Council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program.

We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on simultaneously or on a dime. This dual-use infrastructure can turn from clandestine to commercial and then back again. These inspections would be unlikely, any inspections at such facilities, would be unlikely to turn up anything prohibited, especially if there is any warning that the inspections are coming. Call it ingenious or evil genius, but the Iraqis deliberately designed their chemical weapons programs to be inspected. It is infrastructure with a built-in ally.

Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical weapons. For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tariq State Establishment. Tariq includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq's chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past programs.

That's the production end of Saddam's chemical weapons business. What about the delivery end? I'm going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called "Al Musayyib", a site that Iraq has used for at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field. In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture.

[The slide is shown.]

Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So it's not just the photo and it's not an individual seeing the photo. It's the photo and then the knowledge of an individual being brought together to make the case.

This photograph of the site taken two months later, in July, shows not only the previous site which is the figure in the middle at the top with the bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous site, as well as all of the other sites around the site have been fully bulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity.

To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons programs, Iraq procures needed items from around the world using an extensive clandestine network. What we know comes largely from intercepted communications and human sources who are in a position to know the facts.

Iraq's procurement efforts include equipment that can filter and separate microorganisms and toxins involved in biological weapons, equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent, growth media that can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin, sterilization equipment for laboratories, glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors. Large amts of Thionyl Chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor.

Now, of course, Iraq will argue that these items can also be used for legitimate purposes. But if that is true, why do we have to learn about them by intercepting communications and risking the lives of human agents? With Iraq's well-documented history on biological and chemical weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I don't. And I don't think you will either after you hear this next intercept.

Just a few weeks ago we intercepted communications between two commanders in Iraq's Second Republican Guard Corps. One commander is going to be giving an instruction to the other. You will hear as this unfolds that what he wants to communicate to the other guy, he wants to make sure the other guy hears clearly to the point of repeating it so that it gets written down and completely understood. Listen.

[The tape is played.]

Let's review a few selected items of this conversation. Two officers talking to each other on the radio want to make sure that nothing is misunderstood. "Remove, remove." "The expression, the expression, I got it." "Nerve agents, nerve agents." "Wherever it comes up." "Got it." "Wherever it comes up." "In the wireless instructions." "In the instructions." "Correction. No, in the wireless instructions." "Wireless, I got it." Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful in making sure this is understood? And why did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening. Well, somebody was. "Nerve agents." "Stop talking about it." "They are listening to us. Don't give any evidence that we have these horrible agents." But we know that they do and this kind of conversation confirms it.

Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly five times the size of Manhattan.

Let me remind you that of the 122 mm chemical warheads that the UN inspectors found recently, this discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip of a submerged iceberg.

The question before us all, my friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg?

Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again - against his neighbors and against his own people. And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn't be passing out the orders if he didn't have the weapons or the intent to use them.

We also have sources who tell us that since the 1980s, Saddam's regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons. A source said that 1,600 death-row prisoners were transferred in 1995 to a special unit for such experiments. An eyewitness saw prisoners tied down to beds, experiments conducted on them, blood oozing around the victims' mouths, and autopsies performed to confirm the effects on the prisoners. Saddam Hussein's humanity, inhumanity, has no limits.

Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons.

To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today, remember that in 1991 the inspectors searched Iraq's primary nuclear weapons facilities for the first time, and they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program. But, based on defector information, in May of 1991, Saddam Hussein's lie was exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussein had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons program that covered several different techniques to enrich uranium, including electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge and gas diffusion. We estimate that this illicit program costs the Iraqis several billion dollars. Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that it had no nuclear weapons program. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq could have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worst case assessments that had been made before the war.

In 1995, as a result of another defector, we find out that, after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had initiated a crash program to build a crude nuclear weapon, in violation of Iraq's UN obligations. Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise and he has a bomb design.

Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been focused on acquiring the third and last component: sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium. Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed. These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium.

By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most US experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher.

Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq. I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but this is an old army trooper. I can tell you a couple things.

First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds US requirements for comparable rockets. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so. Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including in the latest batch an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications? Why would they continuing refining the specification, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off?

The high-tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines. Both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium.

In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That's the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War. This incident, linked with the tubes, is another indicator of Iraq's attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.

Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer showed that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq.

People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind. These illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material.

He also has been busy trying to maintain the other key parts of his nuclear program, particularly his cadre of key nuclear scientists. It is noteworthy that over the last 18 months Saddam Hussein has paid increasing personal attention to Iraqis' top nuclear scientists, a group that the government-controlled press calls openly his "nuclear mujaheddin." He regularly exhorts them and praises their progress. Progress toward what end?

Long ago, the Security Council, this Council, required Iraq to halt all nuclear activities of any kind.

Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is developing to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq's ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.

First, missiles. We all remember that before the Gulf War Saddam Hussein's goal was missiles that flew not just hundreds, but thousands, of kilometers. He wanted to strike not only his neighbors, but also nations far beyond his borders. While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade from sources inside Iraq indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen scud-variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers. We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions that Iraq's alleged permitted ballistic missiles, the Al-Samud II and the Al-Fatah, violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this Council in Resolution 687. These are prohibited systems.

UNMOVIC has also reported that Iraq has illegally imported 350 SA-2 rocket engines. These are likely for use in the Al-Samud II. Their import was illegal on three counts: Resolution 687 prohibited all military shipments into Iraq; UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these engines in surface-to-surface missile; and finally, as we have just noted, they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range limit. Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as December, after this Council passed Resolution 1441.

What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly over 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well as I can, who will be in danger of these missiles.

[The map is shown.]

As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had.

[The slide is shown.]

Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the left, the old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust vent on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on the left. The one of the left is used for short-range missiles. The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers. This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what's going on underneath the test stand.

Saddam Hussein's intentions have never changed. He is not developing the missiles for self-defense. These are missiles that Iraq wants in order to project power, to threaten and to deliver chemical, biological - and if we let him - nuclear warheads.

Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs. Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV would look like.

[The slide is shown.]

This effort has included attempts to modify for unmanned flight the MIG-21 and, with greater success, an aircraft called the L-29. However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes but on developing and testing smaller UAVs such as this. UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs. And in the little that Saddam Hussein told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth. One of these lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by intelligence we collected on June 27th last year.

According to Iraq's December 7th declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the racetrack pattern depicted here.

[The slide is shown.]

Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers that the United Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq's December 7th declaration. The UAV was flown around and around and around in this circle and so that its 80-kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers, unrefueled and on autopilot - violative of all of its obligations under 1441.

The linkages over the past ten years between Iraq's UAV program and biologic and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or if transported to other countries, including the United States.

My friends, the information I have presented to you about these terrible weapons and about Iraq's continued flaunting of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1441 links to a subject I now want to spend a little bit of time on, and that has to do with terrorism.

Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it's the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world.

Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains Palestine Liberation Front members in small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front to funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in order to prolong the Intifadah. And it's no secret that Saddam's own intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s.

But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Massad Al-Zakawi an associate and collaborator of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants.

Zakawi, Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. One of his specialties, and one of the specialties of this camp, is poisons.

When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zakawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp, and this camp is located in northeastern Iraq. You see a picture of this camp.

[The slide is shown.]

The network is teaching its operatives how to produce ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Less than a pinch - imagine a pinch of salt - less than a pinch of ricin, eating just this amount in your food, would cause shock, followed by circulatory failure. Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote. There is no cure. It is fatal.

Those helping to run this camp are Zakawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein's controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization Ansar al-Islam that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000, this agent offered al-Qaida safe haven in the region.

After we swept al-Qaida from Afghanistan, some of those members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today.

Zakawi's activities are not confined to this small corner of northeast Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May of 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day. During his stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These al-Qaida affiliates based in Baghdad now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they have now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months.

Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al-Qaida. These denials are simply not credible. Last year, an al-Qaida associate bragged that the situation in Iraq was "good," that Baghdad could be transited quickly.

We know these affiliates are connected to Zakawi because they remain, even today, in regular contact with his direct subordinates, include the poison cell plotters. And they are involved in moving more than money and materiel. Last year, two suspected al-Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide.

From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zakawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond. We in the United States, all of us, the State Department and the Agency for International Development, we all lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Lawrence Foley in Amman, Jordan, last October. A despicable act was committed that day, the assassination of an individual whose sole mission was to assist the people of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell received money and weapons from Zakawi for that murder. After the attack, an associate of the assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for further operations. Iraqi officials protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zakawi or of any of his associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We know of Zakawi's activities in Baghdad. I described them earlier.

Now let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zakawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zakawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zakawi still remains at large, to come and go.

As my colleagues around this table and as the citizens they represent in Europe know, Zakawi's terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Zakawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions against countries including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia. According to detainees Abu Atia, who graduated from Zakawi's terrorist camp in Afghanistan, tasked at least nine North African extremists in 2001 to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.

Since last year, members of this network have been apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116 operatives connected to this global web have been arrested. The chart you are seeing shows the network in Europe.

[The chart is shown.]

We know about this European network and we know about its links to Zakawi because the detainees who provided the information about the targets also provided the names of members of the network. Three of those he identified by name were arrested in France last December. In the apartments of the terrorists, authorities found circuits for explosive devices and a list of ingredients to make toxins.

The detainee who helped piece this together says the plot also targeted Britain. Later evidence again proved him right. When the British unearthed the cell there just last month, one British police officer was murdered during the destruction of the cell.

We also know that Zakawi's colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia, and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zakawi's network say their goal was to kill Russians with toxins.

We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zakawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and al-Qaida. Going back to the early and mid-1990s when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an al-Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that al-Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early al-Qaida ties were forged by secret high-level intelligence service contacts with al-Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with al-Qaida. We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service.

Saddam became more interested as he saw al-Qaida's appalling attacks. A detained al-Qaida members tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist al-Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Saddam was also impressed by al-Qaida's attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.

Iraqis continue to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam's former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to al-Qaida members on document forgery. From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan played the role of liaison to the al-Qaida organization.

Some believe, some claim, these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.

And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999 and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel.

Al-Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with the story of Zakawi and his network, I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to al-Qaida. Fortunately, this operative is now detained and he has told his story. I will relate it to you now as he, himself, described it.

This senior al-Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of al-Qaida's training camps in Afghanistan. His information comes firsthand from his personal involvement at senior levels of al-Qaida. He says bin Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased al-Qaida leader Mohammed Atef, did not believe that al-Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help.

Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq. The support that the describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qaida associates beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abdullah al-Araqi had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gasses. Abdullah al-Araqi characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.

As I said at the outset, none of this should come as a surprise to any of us. Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name, and this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.

With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting terrorism take their place alongside the other Iraqi denials of weapons of mass destruction. It is all a web of lies.

When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction, and provides haven and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past; we are confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even more frightening future.

And, friends, this has been a long and a detailed presentation and I thank you for your patience, but there is one more subject that I would like to touch on briefly, and it should be a subject of deep and continuing concern to this Council: Saddam Hussein's violations of human rights.

Underlying all that I have said, underlying all the facts and the patterns of behavior that I have identified, is Saddam Hussein's contempt for the will of this Council, his contempt for the truth, and, most damning of all, his utter contempt for human life. Saddam Hussein's use of mustard and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988 was one of the 20th century's most horrible atrocities. Five thousand men, women and children died. His campaign against the Kurds from 1987 to '89 included mass summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary jail and ethnic cleansing, and the destruction of some 2,000 villages. He has also conducted ethnic cleansing against the Shia Iraqis and the Marsh Arabs whose culture has flourished for more than a millennium. Saddam Hussein's police state ruthlessly eliminates anyone who dares to dissent. Iraq has more forced disappearance cases than any other country - tens of thousands of people reported missing in the past decade.

Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein's dangerous intentions and the threat he poses to all of us than his calculated cruelty to his own citizens and to his neighbors. Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him.

For more than 20 years, by word and by deed, Saddam Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means he knows: intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world's most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he must hold to fulfill his ambition.

We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?

The United States will not and cannot run that risk for the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.

My colleagues, over three months ago, this Council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today, Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continue defiance of this Council.

My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens. We have an obligation to this body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war. We wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not, so far, taking that one last chance.

We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are represented by this body.

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II. Initial Iraqi Response, February 5

Statement by Mohammed A. Aldouri, Iraqi Ambassador to the UN, to the Security Council, February 5; remarks as paraphrased in UN Press Release SC/7658 ('Briefing Security Council, US Secretary of State Powell Presents Evidence of Iraq's Failure to Disarm'), February 5.

[Iraq] would provide detailed and technical explanatory answers to the allegations made in Mr. Powell's statement. What had been mentioned in the presentation was utterly unrelated to the truth. No new information had been provided, except for sound recordings that could not be ascertained as genuine. What had been presented contained incorrect allegations, unnamed and unknown sources, as well as assumptions in line with the American policy towards one known objective. ... President [Saddam] Hussein had reiterated in his interview yesterday that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction, a statement repeated by numerous Iraqi officials for more than a decade. Mr. Powell could have spared himself, his team and the Council the effort by presenting his allegations directly to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in accordance with resolution 1441. He could have left the inspectors to work in peace and without pressure. At any rate, the forthcoming visit of Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei on the eighth and ninth of this month would be another opportunity to verify the validity of those allegations... The ongoing inspections had proven the falsity of previous allegations and reports issued by the United States and the United Kingdom. Iraq had submitted an accurate, comprehensive and updated declaration of 12,000 pages... It included detailed information on previous Iraqi programmes, as well as updated information on the country's industries in various fields. The inspectors had begun their activities in Iraq as of 27 November... By 4 February, the inspection teams had conducted 575 inspections all over Iraq covering 321 sites. The sites referred to by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair in their September reports, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report of October 2002, topped the list of the sites inspected by the United Nations teams. The inspections had ascertained that all the allegations contained in those reports were not true. That confirmed Iraq's declaration that it was free from weapons of mass destruction. It was well known that the inspectors had taken samples of water, soil, plants, air, factory and production remnants throughout Iraq. The analysis of those samples conducted by UNMOVIC and the IAEA confirmed the absence of any indication of proscribed chemical, biological or radiological agents, or any proscribed activities in any part of Iraq.

In his statement to The New York Times on 30 January, Mr. Blix had confirmed that the inspectors had not ascertained any of the scenarios alleged by Mr. Powell, including movement of proscribed materials aiming at concealment. He had confirmed that he had not found enough reasons to believe that Iraq was sending scientists out of the country to prevent them from being interviewed. He also had no reason to believe what President Bush had said in his State of the Union address regarding Iraqi intelligence agents posing as scientists for the interviews. Iraq was encouraging its scientists to participate in the interviews requested by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. As for the mobile laboratories...Mr. Blix had stated that UNMOVIC to date had found no proof of those laboratories' existence. ... [Iraq] did not object to overflights of U2 planes. The obstruction to those overflights stemmed from the presence of United States and United Kingdom warplanes in the illegally imposed no-flight zones. It would be sufficient if those flights were suspended during the U2 overflights. Allegations that trucks had left sites before the arrival of inspection teams were unfounded. Inspection teams, after all, arrived unannounced, and UNMOVIC and the IAEA had their own resources for surveillance.

Programmes for weapons of mass destruction were not like an aspirin pill easily hidden. Such programmes required huge facilities which could not be concealed, and inspectors, criss-crossing the country had not found them. Regarding the sound recordings...scientific and technical progress had allowed for fabrication of such allegations. As for the alleged relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda...recently, Saddam Hussein had said that if such relationship had existed, he would not have been ashamed to admit it. Such a relationship did not exist... Analysts at the CIA had complained that administration officials had exaggerated reports on that issue... Mr. Straw of the United Kingdom had set aside intelligence reports from his own Government asserting that such a relationship did not exist. Mr. Powell's assertion that Iraq had used chemical weapons against his own people was surprising. A CIA official had recently stated that the United States Administration had known since 1998 that Iraq had not used such weapons for the simple reason it did not have the weapons used in the mentioned incident.

The clear goal of the Council meeting today and Mr. Powell's presentation was to sell the idea of war against Iraq without any legal, moral or political justification... [Iraq reaffirms its] commitment to continue proactive cooperation with the inspection teams so they could verify as soon as possible that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction in order for unjust sanctions to be lifted. Regional security could be ensured by disarming weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, including the huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in Israel, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 14 of Council resolution 687 (1991).

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III. Initial Security Council Reaction, February 5

Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan

... I wish to thank Secretary Powell for his presentation. Now I would like to share the following views on Iraq:

I. The fact that foreign ministers from most of the Council members are present at today's meeting shows the importance all parties attach to the authority and role of the Security Council and their support to the resolution of the Iraqi issue within the framework of this world body. The Security Council has basically maintained unity and cooperation on this issue. This is of crucial importance to its appropriate resolution and represents the desire of the international community.

II. China welcomes the US move to provide the United Nations with its information and evidence on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which we believe is consistent with the spirit of Resolution 1441 and could help increase transparency. We hope that various parties will hand over their information and evidence to the UNMOVIC and the IAEA. This will help them with more effective inspections and through their on-the-spot inspections, these information and evidence can also be evaluated. The two agencies should report their findings to the Security Council in a timely way.

III. The inspections have been going on for more than two months now. The two agencies have been working very hard and their work deserves our recognition. It is their view that now they are not in a position to draw conclusions and they suggested continuing with the inspections. We should respect the views of the two agencies and support the continuation of their work. We hope that the upcoming trip to Iraq by Chairman Blix and Director-General El Baradei on the 8th would yield positive results. The two agencies pointed out not long ago some problems in the inspections. We urge Iraq to adopt a more proactive approach, make further explanations and clarification as soon as possible and cooperate with the inspection process.

IV. The Security Council has a common stand on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This is fully reflected in relevant Security Council resolutions, particularly the unanimously adopted Resolution 1441. The most important aspect at present remains the full implementation of this resolution. As for what would be the next step, the Security Council should decide through discussions by all members on the basis of the results of the inspections.

V. It is the universal desire of the international community to see a political settlement to the issue of Iraq within the UN framework and avoid any war. This is something the Security Council must attach due importance to. As long as there is still the slightest hope for political settlement, we should exert our utmost effort to achieve that. China is ready to join others in working toward this direction.

Source: Chinese Mission to the UN, http://www.china-un.org.

French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin

I would like to thank Colin Powell for his initiative in convening this meeting. I listened very carefully to the elements he gave us. They contain information, indications, questions that deserve to be explored. It will be up to the inspectors to assess the facts in accordance with resolution 1441. Already his report brings a new justification to the path chosen by the United Nations; it must strengthen our common determination.

1. In unanimously adopting resolution 1441, we chose to act through inspections. This policy rests on three fundamental points:

• A clear objective on which we cannot compromise: the disarmament of Iraq;
• A method: a rigorous system of inspections which demands Iraq's active cooperation and affirms the central role of the Security Council at each stage;
• A requirement: our unity. This gave the message we unanimously addressed to Baghdad its full force. I hope that our meeting today will strengthen this unity.

Significant results have already been seen:

• UNMOVIC and the IAEA are at work: more than a hundred inspectors are deployed on the ground and they are making 300 visits a month on average; the number of sites inspected has increased; complete access to the presidential sites in particular is a major gain;
• In the nuclear domain, the first two months of inspections allowed the IAEA to make good progress in its knowledge of Iraq's capacity as Dr. ElBaradei has stated. This is a key element;
• In the areas covered by UNMOVIC, the inspections have provided us with useful information. Mr. Blix has confirmed, for example, that no trace of biological or chemical agents has so far been detected by the inspectors: not through analyses of samples taken from inspected sites nor on the 12 empty warheads discovered at Ukhaider on January 16.

There are still gray areas in Iraq's cooperation:

• The inspectors have reported real difficulties. In his January 27 report, Mr. Blix gave several examples of unresolved questions in the ballistic, chemical and biological domains. These uncertainties are not acceptable. France will continue to pass on all the information it has so they can be better defined;
• Right now, our attention has to be focused as a priority on the biological and chemical domains. It is there that our presumptions about Iraq are the most significant: regarding the chemical domain, we have evidence of its capacity to produce VX and yperite; in the biological domain, the evidence suggests the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly a production capability;
• Today the absence of long-range delivery systems reduces the potential threat of these weapons. But we have disturbing signs of Iraq's continued determination to acquire ballistic missiles beyondthe authorized 150-km range;
• In the nuclear domain, we must clarify in particular any attempt by Iraq to acquire aluminium tubes.

2. So it is a demanding démarche, anchored in resolution 1441, that we must take together. If this path were to fail and take us into a dead-end,then we rule out no option, including in the final analysis the recourse to force as we have said all along. But in such a hypothesis, several answers will have to be clearly provided to all governments and all peoples of the world to limit the risks and uncertainties:

• To what extent do the nature and scope of the threat justify the recourse to force?
• How do we make sure that the considerable risks of such intervention are actually kept under control? This obviously requires a collective démarche of responsibility on the part of the world community.

In any case, it must be clear that in the context of such an option, the United Nations will have to be at the center of the action to guarantee Iraq's unity, ensure the region's stability, protect civilians and preserve the unity of the world community.

3. For now the inspections regime, favored by resolution 1441, must be strengthened since it has not been explored to the end. Use of force can only be a final recourse. Why go to war if there still exists an unused space in resolution 1441?

Consistent with the logic of this resolution, we must therefore move on to a new stage and further strengthen the inspections. With the choice between military intervention and an inspections regime that is inadequate for lack of cooperation on Iraq's part, we must choose to strengthen decisively the means of inspection. To do this, we must define with Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei the requisite tools for increasing their operational capabilities:

• Let us double or triple the number of inspectors and open up more regional offices. Let us go further: Why not establish a specialized body to keep under surveillance the sites and areas already inspected?
• Let us substantially increase the capabilities for monitoring and collecting information on Iraqi territory. France is ready to provide full support: it is ready to deploy Mirage IV observer aircraft;
• Let us collectively establish a coordination and information-processing center that would supply Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei, in real time and in a coordinated way, with all the intelligence resources they might need;
• Let us list the unresolved disarmament questions and rank them by importance;
• With the consent of the leaders of the inspection teams, let us define a demanding and realistic time-frame for moving forward in the assessment and elimination of problems. There must be regular follow-up to the progress made in Iraq's disarmament.

This enhanced regime of inspections and monitoring could be usefully complemented by having a permanent UN coordinator for disarmament in Iraq, stationed in Iraq and working under the authority of Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. But Iraq must cooperate actively. The country must comply immediately with the demands of Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei, in particular by:

• permitting meetings with Iraqi scientists without witnesses;
• agreeing to the use of U2 observer flights;
• adopting legislation to prohibit the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction;
• handing over to the inspectors immediately all relevant documents on unresolved disarmament questions, in particular in the biological and chemical domains; those handed over on January 20 do not constitute a step in the right direction. The 3,000 pages of documents discovered at the home of a researcher show that Baghdad must do more. Absent documents, Iraq must be able to present credible testimony.

The Iraqi authorities must also provide the inspectors with answers to the new elements presented by Colin Powell.

Between now and the inspectors' next report, on February 14, Iraq will have to provide new elements. The upcoming visit to Baghdad by the leaders of the inspectors will have to be the occasion for clear results to this end.

4. This is the demanding démarche that we must take together for a new stage. Its success presupposes, today as yesterday, that the international community remains united and mobilized.

It is our moral and political duty first to devote all our energy to Iraq's disarmament, in peace and in compliance with the rule of law and justice. France is convinced that we can succeed on this demanding path so long as we maintain our unity and cohesion.

Source: French Mission to the UN, http://www.un.int/france.

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer

I would like to thank Secretary of State Colin Powell for the information he has just given us. The place and timing of this detailed account underline once more that the UN Security Council is and remains the centre of decision-making on the Iraq crisis. Germany supports this approach. Given the implications they could have for future decisions, the findings have to be examined carefully.

We can already see that they coincide in part with information that we also have. They are based on close exchange of information. It is now decisive that the UN inspectors are also provided with this extensive material, in so far as this has not yet happened. They have to work with this information to be able to clarify the unresolved questions quickly and fully. The more expert information they have at their disposal, the more targeted their work can be. Thus from the outset, Germany, too, passed on the information it had to Hans Blix, Mohamed ElBaradei and their teams.

The Security Council has been dealing with Iraq for 12 years. As a matter of principle, the unity of the Council is of central importance in this context. Baghdad has time and again violated the obligations laid down in the relevant Council resolutions. Nor do we hold any illusions on the inhumane and brutal nature of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. Under his rule, Iraq has attacked its neighbours Kuwait and Iran, fired missiles at Israel and deployed poison gas against Iran and its own Kurdish population. The regime is terrible for the Iraqi people. This is why a policy of containment, sanctions and effective military control of the no-fly zones have been implemented since the Gulf War.

Iraq has to comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions in their entirety and completely disarm its WMD potential. The presence of the inspectors in Iraq has already effectively reduced the danger of this potential. Nevertheless, the aim of Resolution 1441 is the full and lasting disarmament of Iraq. In his last report, Hans Blix listed many open questions. The regime in Baghdad must give clear answers to all these concrete questions without delay.

Despite all the difficulties, UN efforts to disarm Iraq in the past were not without success. In the 1990s, the inspectors were able to destroy more WMD capacities than the Gulf War. The threat potential of Iraq for the region was thus clearly reduced. The current basis for the inspections is laid down in Resolutions 1284 and 1441. The weapons inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA have further-reaching powers than ever before. They have to be given a real chance and the time they need to fully exhaust their possibilities.

Chief Inspector Blix and IAEA Head El Baradei will travel to Iraq again next weekend and thereafter update us. The success of this trip will be of paramount importance. It depends crucially on the full cooperation of Baghdad.

Quite a few states suspect that Saddam Hussein's regime is withholding relevant information and concealing military capabilities. This strong suspicion has to be dispelled beyond any doubt. This is exactly why Resolution 1441 provides for the instrument of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

The dangers of a military action and its consequences are plain to see. Precisely because of the effectiveness of the work of the inspectors, we must continue to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis. In the world of 21st century the UN is key to conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building.

On the basis of Resolution 1441 and in the light of practical experience, we need to enhance the instruments of inspection and control. We need a tough regime of intensive inspections that can guarantee the full and lasting disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. By tightening inspections, we are creating an opportunity for a peaceful solution. Such a tough system of inspections could also be effectively applied by the Security Council in other cases. Our French colleague made some very interesting proposals on this matter which deserve our further consideration. Moreover, we ought to support all endeavours of states in the region that are currently engaging in considerable diplomatic efforts to bring the Iraqi Government to fully implement the resolutions. Iraq has to disarm openly, peacefully and in cooperation with the inspectors without any delay.

Source: German Embassy in Washington, D.C., http://www.germany-info.prg.

Mexican Foreign Minister Dr. Luis Ernesto Derbez

The delegation of Mexico has taken due note of the useful information presented to the Council by the Government of the United States of America. This presentation clearly contains valuable information to help determine and guide the Council's decisions. It will also give us additional elements of judgement in determining the extent to which Iraq has complied with the resolutions adopted by this organ.

The presentation by Secretary of State Powell reinforces Mexico's firm belief in the need for progress towards the effective and verifiable elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, as well as the facilities for developing them. Mexico's position in the Security Council has been unequivocally aimed at achieving the disarmament of Iraq in the most effective way possible and by peaceful means, while ensuring at all times that this goal is achieved at the lowest cost in terms of human suffering and economic instability and without undermining the urgent battle against international terrorism.

Consistent with this position, the Government of President Fox has made direct approaches to the Iraqi authorities, urging them to cooperate without delay in the manner required by the inspectors. We have shared the content of these initiatives with other members of the Security Council so that this message could be conveyed to the Iraqi authorities as forcefully as possible and through the greatest possible number of channels. Once again, with the presence of the representatives of Iraq at this table, we repeat our call for their authorities to concretely translate, without delay and urgently, in order to fully comply with their declared intentions into active cooperation and genuine collaboration with the inspection process, as provided for in resolution 1441 of this Security Council.

Mexico reaffirms its confidence in the inspection activities now under way as the best possible way to detect, destroy and verify the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. We are in favour of intensifying and strengthening those inspections, as well as the assistance which members of the Council and the international community in general may provide to UNMOVIC and to the IAEA to successfully accomplish their delicate mission. It is in this context that Mexico recognizes the importance of the presentation to the Council by Secretary Powell. It welcomes the presentation of elements to support the work of the inspectors, to enhance the accuracy and effectiveness of their mission, and, in general, to help expedite and increase the reliability of the disarmament process.

Mexico's emphasis on a multilateral approach is in fact consistent with the views and convictions of Mexican society. But it is also in keeping with a pragmatic concern to build the international consensus required by a task of such global implications, as is the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. That is why Mexico reiterates its willingness to continue to make a constructive contribution to the work of the Security Council, in the conviction that cooperation and the search for multilateral solutions will give greater weight to the decisions of this body. Even more important, perhaps, we reiterate our demand to the Iraqi government to work permanently and urgently in granting all the facilities to enable this inspection to be well carried out. This will help to ensure that, at the conclusion of this process, not only would we have succeeded in strengthening a revitalized United Nations system, but also in ensuring that the international community can be guaranteed that the mission of disarmament has been fully accomplished.

Source: Mexican Mission to the UN, http://www.un.int/mexico.

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov

Russia views the present meeting through the prism of the consistent efforts by the United Nations Security Council for a political resolution of the situation around Iraq on the basis of full and strict compliance with the existing resolutions. The unanimous adoption of the resolution 1441 of the UN Security Council, and the unfolding of the activity of international inspectors in Iraq have demonstrated the ability of the world community to act together in the interest of attaining a common objective. We are convinced that preserving the unity of the world community, above all within the framework of the Security Council of the United Nations, and our concerted actions in strict accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the Council are the most reliable way for solving the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by political means. And that all of us want to solve this problem, no one should have any doubt.

From this point of view, we heard with the utmost attention the report of US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Russia has presumed and continues to presume that the Security Council, and in its person the international community, should have all the necessary information in order to answer the question whether any weapons of mass destruction still remain in Iraq or none exist there. The information presented to us today, of course, requires the most serious and comprehensive examination. The experts of our countries should immediately get down to its analysis and draw appropriate conclusions. And most importantly, this information has to be immediately handed over for processing to UNMOVIC and IAEA, including by way of verification directly on the ground in the course of inspections in Iraq. As to Baghdad, it must present the inspectors with answers to the questions which were heard in the speech of the US Secretary of State. Simultaneously we should once again appeal to all states urgently to hand over to international inspectors any information that can help in the performance of their mandate.

The information presented by the US Secretary of State once again shows convincingly that international inspectors' activity has to be continued, for they alone can give an objective answer to the question how Iraq complies with the Security Council's demands, and they alone can help the Council with the elaboration and adoption of carefully considered and optimal decisions.

The reports by Mr. Hans Blix and Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei in this hall on January 27 have shown that a unique inspection mechanism has been set up in Iraq which has everything necessary for ensuring the implementation of resolution 1441 and the other decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations. This strong potential needs to be used in full.

The UN Security Council, and all its members should comprehensively support the inspection process. Russia, for its part, intends to assist further the creation of the most favorable conditions for the work of international inspectors in Iraq. We, in particular, are ready to provide a plane for aerial monitoring, and if necessary, additional inspectors as well.

Russia welcomes the continuation of the dialogue by the Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA with Iraq on the issues still outstanding. We count on this discussion to be extremely concrete and productive. This, in particular, is facilitated by the transfer of work to the schedule of resolution 1284, which must impart to international inspections and monitoring an even more systemic and effective character, first and foremost, in clarifying key disarmament tasks by the end of March, 2003.

It is abundantly clear that the work of UNMOVIC and IAEA can be effective only with full and honest cooperation by Iraq. First of all, it is Iraq that must be interested in clarifying definitively the issue of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, for this is the only road towards a political settlement, including the lifting of sanctions on Iraq. Baghdad ought to be clearly aware of the crucial moment it now faces, and do everything in its power for the performance by international inspectors of their mandate.

Of late with reference to Iraqi settlement one can often hear that "the time is running out." Of course, resolution 1441 is aimed at the speediest achievement of practical results. But it envisages no specific timeline. The inspectors alone can recommend to the Security Council how much time they need to fulfill the tasks set for them. In this connection it cannot be ruled out that the Security Council at some stage may need to adopt a new, and, perhaps, more than one resolution. The main thing is that our efforts should be further directed to ensuring the inspection process in every way, which has proved its effectiveness and makes it possible to achieve the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations by peaceful means.

The present situation around Iraq, unfortunately, is far from the last problem, on the solution of which we will have to work. The international community in the 21st century has encountered new global threats and challenges, requiring joint response on the part of all states. A graphic example of that approach is the creation of a broad coalition to counter the chief and the most dangerous threat of our time - international terrorism. It has been thanks to the unity of the world community that the first successes have been achieved in the struggle against this evil. At the same time it is abundantly clear that we are only at the beginning of a very difficult road of combating terrorism. And the information of the US Secretary of State on the activities of Al-Qaida is an additional proof of this.

The unity of the world community will continue to be the main guarantee for the effectiveness of its actions. It is unity that should remain the pivot of our approach to any problems, however complex they may be. Yes, tactical differences may arise and most likely they aren't going to be few, taking into account the complexity of the tasks being tackled. But they should not overshadow the strategic aims that meet the interests of general security and stability.

Source: Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs, http://www.ln.mid.ru.

UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw

Mr President, we have just heard a most powerful and authoritative case against the Iraqi regime set out by Secretary Powell. The international community owes him its thanks for laying bare the deceit practised by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and worse, the great danger it represents.

Three months ago we united to send Iraq an uncompromising message: co-operate fully with weapons inspectors or face disarmament by force. After years of Iraqi deception when resolutions were consistently flouted, Resolution 1441 was a powerful reminder of the importance of international law and of the authority of the Security Council itself. United and determined, we gave Iraq a final opportunity to rid itself of its weapons of mass terror, of gases which can poison thousands in one go; of bacilli and viruses like anthrax and smallpox which can disable and kill by the tens of thousands; of the means to make nuclear weapons which can kill by the million.

By 1441 we strengthened inspections massively. The only missing ingredient was full Iraqi compliance - immediate, full and active cooperation. Without that full and active co-operation, inspections in a country as huge as Iraq, however strong the inspectors' powers, could never be sure of finding all Iraqi WMD. Sadly the inspectors' reports last week and Secretary Powell's presentation today can leave us under no illusions about Saddam Hussein's response. Saddam Hussein holds UNSCR 1441 in the same contempt as all previous resolutions in respect of Iraq. Let us reflect on what that means - that Saddam is defying every one of us, every nation here represented. He questions our resolve and is gambling that we will lose our nerve rather than enforce our will.

Paragraph 1 of 1441 said that Saddam was and remained in material breach of Security Council resolutions. Paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1441 set two clear tests for a further material breach by Iraq. First that Iraq must not make 'false statements' or 'omissions' in its declaration. But the Iraqi document submitted to us on 7 December as we have heard from Secretary Powell, was long on repetition, but short on fact. It was neither full, nor accurate, nor complete. By anyone's definition, it was a 'false statement'. Its central premise - that Iraq possesses no weapons of mass destruction - is a lie. This outright lie was repeated yesterday on television by Saddam Hussein. The declaration has obvious omissions, not least a failure to explain what has happened to the large quantities of chemical and biological weapons materiel and munitions unaccounted for by UN inspectors in 1998. And there is no admission of Iraq's extensive efforts to develop WMD since the last round of UNSCOM inspections ended in December 1998.

Paragraph 4 goes on to set a second test for a further material breach, namely a 'failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation' of Resolution 1441. Following the presentations by the inspectors last week, and today's briefing by Secretary Powell, it is clear that Iraq has failed this test. These briefings have confirmed our worst fears - that Iraq has no intention of relinquishing its WMD, no intention of following the path of peaceful disarmament set out in Security Council Resolution 1441. Instead of open admissions and transparency, we have a charade, where a veneer of superficial co-operation masks wilful concealment, the extent of which has been devastatingly revealed this morning by Secretary Powell.

In his report last week, Dr Blix set out a number of instances where Iraqi behaviour reveals a determination to avoid compliance:

• Why is Iraq refusing to allow UNMOVIC to use a U2 plane to conduct aerial imagery and surveillance operations?
• When will Iraq account for 6,500 bombs which could carry up to 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent?
• How will Iraq justify having a prohibited chemical precursor for mustard gas?
• And how will Iraq explain the concealment of nuclear documents and the development of a missile programme in clear contravention of United Nations resolutions?

There is only one possible conclusion: Iraq is in further material breach as set out in UNSCR 1441. Security Council members will share my deep sense of frustration that Iraq is choosing to spurn this final opportunity to achieve a peaceful outcome.

Mr President, given what has to follow, and the difficult choice now facing us, it would be easy to turn a blind eye to the wording of Resolution 1441 and hope for a change of heart by Iraq. Easy but wrong. Because if we did so we would be repeating the mistakes of the past 12 years, and empowering a dictator who believes his diseases and poison gases are essential weapons to suppress his own people and to threaten his neighbours, and that by defiance of the UN he can indefinitely hoodwink the world.

Mr President, under the French Presidency two weeks ago we had a special session on the dangers of international terrorism, of the grave danger to the world of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction through the connivance of rogue states. Secretary Powell has today set out deeply worrying reports about the presence in Iraq of one of Osama bin Laden's lieutenants, Al Zarqawi, and other members of Al Qaida, and their efforts to develop poisons. It defies imagination that all of this could be going on without the knowledge of Saddam Hussein. The recent discovery of the poison Ricin in London has underlined again that this is a threat we all face.

Mr President, Saddam must be left in no doubt as to the serious consequences and serious situation he now faces. The United Kingdom does not want war. We want the UN system to be upheld. But the logic of Resolution 1441 is inescapable: time is now very short. This Council will have further reports from the inspectors on Friday week 14 February. If non-cooperation continues, this Council must meet its responsibilities.

Our world faces many threats, from poverty and disease to civil war and terrorism. Working through this great institution, we have the capacity to tackle these challenges together. But if we are to do so then the decisions we have to take must have a force beyond mere words.

This is a moment of choice for Saddam and for the Iraqi regime. But it is also a moment of choice for this institution, the United Nations. The UN's pre-war predecessor, the League of Nations, had the same fine ideals as the UN. But the League failed because it could not create actions from its words; it could not back diplomacy with the credible threat and where necessary the use of force; so small evils went unchecked, tyrants became emboldened, then greater evils were unleashed. At each stage good men said wait; the evil is not big enough to challenge: then before their eyes, the evil became too big to challenge. We had slipped slowly down a slope, never noticing how far we had gone until it was too late. We owe it to our history as well as to our future not to make the same mistake again.

Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Remarks to Press

Question: When are you going to Baghdad, Sir?

Secretary-General Annan: I was sure you would ask that question! Let me say that, we have had a very good discussion followed by a working lunch and I still believe that war is not inevitable but a lot depends on President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership. I think the message today has been clear - everyone wants Iraq to be proactive in cooperating with the inspectors and fulfil the demands of the international community. I think if they do that, we can avoid a war. The inspectors are going back over the weekend, carrying the message of the international community to the Iraqi authorities, and I urge them to listen and follow through on the demands, as I have said, for the sake of their own people, for the region and for the sake of world order. As far as my own visit to Baghdad is concerned - as you know the question was posed in the Council today and has been floating around for a while - let me say that the message that has been given to Iraq is very clear. That message has come from the united Security Council, it has come from the Arab League, it has come from its neighbours and the inspectors are going back in the next few days to give them the same message in the name of a united international community. And they should listen to them. If I were to go I would not carry a different message. I would be carrying the same message and they should listen to Drs. Blix and ElBaradei, and I hope they do so.

Question: Can you give us your reaction to the US presentation today?

Annan: I think the Council members all reacted and we followed up with discussions at lunch. It is expected that the inspectors will take up the new information that the Secretary of State has given. Some of it may be familiar with them. They will factor that into their work and when they are in Iraq they will pursue the leads that they have been given. ...

Question: The last time Mr. Blix and ElBaradei came to the Security Council each one of them presented his report, and each one of those two reports was received in a positive light and in a negative light at the same time, depending on who was looking at it. Is there a mechanism that the UN can set in place whereby it would not be interpreted according to who is interpreting it?

Annan: Obviously, the report the inspectors brought back to the Council was not black and white. If you wish, as somebody said, it was grey. And that was to be expected given the nature of their work. But as they keep presenting their reports to the Council, depending on what they come up with, the Council will have to make a judgement at some stage as to whether Iraq is performing, is cooperating, or is not and they should declare material breach. But the judgement has to come some day. It is not up to the inspectors to declare material breach. They will present the facts and it is up to the Council to make that judgement.

Question: How crucial will the Blix and ElBaradei reports on 14 February become in light of today?

Annan: I think, given the developments since their last report on 27 January, this would also be an important report. Members will be looking to see if there have been any further developments, any changes in the Iraqi attitude and mindset. ...

Question: You expressed the view before that was pretty much the majority of the Council, that the new information should be given to the inspectors to facilitate their work. Did you have a sense that the United States expected a different outcome, that this information actually should have led to force?

Annan: I think the United States officials have said all along that they do not believe that war is inevitable provided Iraq complies. So even at this stage, they are not saying peace is out.

Question: If that were the case, they could have given that information to Blix in private.

Annan: Well, I think it could have been done but they chose to do it this way and Blix and ElBaradei have been urged to factor into their work the information that has been given and the Americans have indicated that they will give them the information and any further information they have.

Question: Is there any talk of a UN role beyond a possible conflict? Is there any talk at all of that?

Annan: Well, I think it is, particularly for those of you in this house, it is clear that if it were to come to that, and I don't think we are there yet, when you look back, whether it is Kosovo or Afghanistan, or everywhere, if it comes to that the UN has always had a role to play. It has not been discussed. As you know, we are doing some contingency planning on the humanitarian side. This is also something that we have given some preliminary thought to, but we are not there at all.

Source: Secretary-General's press encounter following Security Council meeting and Luncheon on Iraq, New York, February 5, 2003, UN website, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=370.

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