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Disarmament Documentation

Weapons Inspectors' Briefing on Iraq, UN Security Council, February 14

I. Briefing by UNMOVIC Executive Chair Hans Blix
II. Briefing by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
III. Reaction: Statements in the Security Council

I. Briefing by UNMOVIC Executive Chair Hans Blix

'Disarming Iraq: Briefing of the Security Council, February 14, 2003'; remarks as delivered by Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chair of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), http://www.unmovic.org.

Mr. President [German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer],

Since I reported to the Security Council on 27 January, UNMOVIC has had two further weeks of operational and analytical work in New York and active inspections in Iraq. This brings the total period of UN inspections so far to 11 weeks. Since then, we have also listened on 5 February to the presentation to the Council by the US Secretary of State and the discussion that followed. Lastly, Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad with our counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan on 8 and 9 February.

Work in Iraq

Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the work being performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.

We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional office in Mosul is now fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are being developed. Our Hercules L-100 aircraft continues to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight helicopters are fully operational. With the resolution of the problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of minders into the no-fly zones, our mobility in these zones has improved. We expect to increase utilization of the helicopters. The number of Iraqi minders during inspections had often reached a ratio as high as five per inspector. During the talks in January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about one to one. The situation has improved.

Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were coming.

The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. At all sites which had been inspected before 1998, re-baselining activities were performed. This included the identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples and discussions with the site personnel regarding past and present activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground structures or buried equipment.

Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its missile capability but, as before, we do not know every cave and corner. Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002.

More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these have been screened using our own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad Centre (BOMVIC). The results to date have been consistent with Iraq's declarations.

We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50 litres of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept under UNMOVIC seal at the Muthanna site. One-third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which we found at another site, has also been destroyed.

The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This includes about 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 15 IAEA inspectors, 50 aircrew, and 65 support staff.

In my 27 January update to the Council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, most importantly prompt access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to Presidential sites and private residences.

In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on substance was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the disarmament task to completion and to set the monitoring system on a firm course. Such cooperation, as I have noted, requires more than the opening of doors. In the words of resolution 1441 (2002), it requires immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to resolve existing questions of disarmament - either by presenting remaining proscribed items and programmes for elimination or by presenting convincing evidence that they have been eliminated. In the current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply. While we were in Baghdad, we met a delegation from the Government of South Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence of the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons programme, by a wholehearted cooperation over two years with IAEA inspectors. I have just learned that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of experts for further talks.

How much, if any, is left of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and related proscribed items and programmes? So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number of empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed. Another matter - and one of great significance - is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted for. To take an example, a document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent were "unaccounted for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be presented.

We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations are convinced and assert that proscribed weapons, items and programmes continue to exist. The US Secretary of State presented material in support of this conclusion. Governments have many sources of information that are not available to inspectors. Inspectors, for their part, must base their reports only on evidence, which they can, themselves, examine and present publicly. Without evidence, confidence cannot arise.

In my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant outstanding issues of substance were listed in two Security Council documents from early 1999 (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) and should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles, and said that such issues "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside..." The declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December last year, despite its large volume, missed the opportunity to provide the fresh material and evidence needed to respond to the open questions. This is perhaps the most important problem we are facing. Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.

Work in New York

In my January update to the Council, I referred to the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting chambers, construction of a missile engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared to UNMOVIC by Iraq. I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah could very well represent prima facie cases of proscribed missile systems, as they had been tested to ranges exceeding the 150-kilometre limit set by the Security Council. I also noted that Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until UNMOVIC completed a technical review.

Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts from a number of Member States to discuss these items. The experts concluded unanimously that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the Al Samoud 2 missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the monitoring plan adopted by resolution 715 (1991).

As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile system could be fully assessed.

With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of the casting chambers, which had been intended for use in the production of the proscribed Badr-2000 missile system. Iraq has declared that it has reconstituted these chambers. The experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometres. Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed.

The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that is nearing completion and have assessed it to be capable of testing missile engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far, the test stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity.

On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the export/import mechanism and in contravention of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by Iraq during an official briefing that these engines were intended for use in the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which has now been assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured for use in this missile system would also be proscribed.

I intend to communicate these findings to the Government of Iraq.

Meeting in Baghdad

At the meeting in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February, the Iraqi side addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues and gave us a number of papers, e.g. regarding anthrax and growth material, the nerve agent VX and missile production. Experts who were present from our side studied the papers during the evening of 8 February and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9 February for further clarifications. Although no new evidence was provided in the papers and no open issues were closed through them or the expert discussions, the presentation of the papers could be indicative of a more active attitude focusing on important open issues.

The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities of anthrax and two VX-precursors, which had been declared unilaterally destroyed, might be tackled through certain technical and analytical methods. Although our experts are still assessing the suggestions, they are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to assess the quantities of material poured into the ground years ago. Documentary evidence and testimony by staff that dealt with the items still appears to be needed.

Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February from Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance. It presents a list of 83 names of participants "in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which took place in the summer of 1991". As the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains an important reason why quantities of chemicals have been deemed "unaccounted for", the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance. I trust that the Iraqi side will put together a similar list of names of persons who participated in the unilateral destruction of other proscribed items, notably in the biological field.

The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, had had its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed items. This was welcomed. A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed with the task of searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination of proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have very extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even private houses.

The two commissions could be useful tools to come up with proscribed items to be destroyed and with new documentary evidence. They evidently need to work fast and effectively to convince us, and the world, that it is a serious effort.

The matter of private interviews was discussed at length during our meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed the commitment, which it made to us on 20 January, to encourage persons asked to accept such interviews, whether in or out of Iraq. So far, we have only had interviews in Baghdad. A number of persons have declined to be interviewed, unless they were allowed to have an official present or were allowed to tape the interview. Three persons that had previously refused interviews on UNMOVIC's terms, subsequently accepted such interviews just prior to our talks in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February. These interviews proved informative. No further interviews have since been accepted on our terms. I hope this will change. We feel that interviews conducted without any third party present and without tape recording would provide the greatest credibility.

At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier occasions, my colleague Dr. ElBaradei and I have urged the Iraqi side to enact legislation implementing the UN prohibitions regarding weapons of mass destruction. This morning we had a message that a Presidential decree has now been issued containing prohibitions with regard to importation and production of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. We have not yet had time to study the details of the text of the decree.

Intelligence

Mr. President, I should like to make some comments on the role of intelligence in connection with inspections in Iraq.

A credible inspection regime requires that Iraq provide full cooperation on "process" - granting immediate access everywhere to inspectors - and on substance, providing full declarations supported by relevant information and material and evidence. However, with the closed society in Iraq of today and the history of inspections there, other sources of information, such as defectors and government intelligence agencies are required to aid the inspection process.

I remember myself how, in 1991, several inspections in Iraq, which were based on information received from a Government, helped to disclose important parts of the nuclear weapons programme. It was realized that an international organization authorized to perform inspections anywhere on the ground could make good use of information obtained from governments with eyes in the sky, ears in the ether, access to defectors, and both eyes and ears on the market for weapons-related material. It was understood that the information residing in the intelligence services of governments could come to very active use in the international effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This remains true and we have by now a good deal of experience in the matter.

International organizations need to analyse such information critically and especially benefit when it comes from more than one source. The intelligence agencies, for their part, must protect their sources and methods. Those who provide such information must know that it will be kept in strict confidence and be known to very few people. UNMOVIC has achieved good working relations with intelligence agencies and the amount of information provided has been gradually increasing. However, we must recognize that there are limitations and that misinterpretations can occur.

Intelligence information has been useful for UNMOVIC. In one case, it led us to a private home where documents mainly relating to laser enrichment of uranium were found. In other cases, intelligence has led to sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites were useful in proving the absence of such items and in some cases the presence of other items - conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to weapons of mass destruction.

The presentation of intelligence information by the US Secretary of State suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection. Our reservation on this point does not detract from our appreciation of the briefing.

Plans for the Immediate Future

Yesterday, UNMOVIC informed the Iraqi authorities of its intention to start using the U-2 surveillance aircraft early next week under arrangements similar to those UNSCOM had followed. We are also in the process of working out modalities for the use of the French Mirage aircraft starting late next week and for the drones supplied by the German Government. The offer from Russia of an Antonov aircraft, with night vision capabilities, is a welcome one and is next on our agenda for further improving UNMOVIC's and IAEA's technical capabilities. These developments are in line with suggestions made in a non-paper recently [February 11] circulated by France, suggesting a further strengthening of the inspection capabilities.

It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying ground movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent intelligence reports for instance about mobile biological weapons production units, such measures could well increase the effectiveness of inspections.

UNMOVIC is still expanding its capabilities, both in terms of numbers of staff and technical resources. On my way to the recent Baghdad meeting, I stopped in Vienna to meet 60 experts, who had just completed our general training course for inspectors. They came from 22 countries, including Arab countries.

Time Lines

Mr. President, UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked how much more time it needs to complete its task in Iraq. The answer depends upon which task one has in mind: the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and related items and programmes, which were prohibited in 1991 - the disarmament task - or the monitoring that no new proscribed activities occur. The latter task, though not often focused upon, is highly significant - and not controversial. It will require monitoring, which is "ongoing", that is, open-ended until the Council decides otherwise.

By contrast, the task of "disarmament" foreseen in resolution 687 (1991) and the progress on "key remaining disarmament tasks" foreseen in resolution 1284 (1999) as well as the "disarmament obligations", which Iraq was given a "final opportunity to comply with" under resolution 1441 (2002), were always required to be fulfilled in a shorter time span. Regrettably, the high degree of cooperation required of Iraq for disarmament through inspection was not forthcoming in 1991. Despite the elimination, under UNSCOM and IAEA supervision, of large amounts of weapons, weapons-related items and installations over the years, the task remained incomplete, when inspectors were withdrawn almost 8 years later at the end of 1998.

If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament - under resolution 687 (1991) - could have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided. Today, three months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short, if "immediate, active and unconditional cooperation" with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be forthcoming.

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II. Briefing by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei

'The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: 14 February 2003 Update', Statement by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei; IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org.

My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the IAEA's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions. Less than three weeks have passed since my last update to the Council, on 27 January - a relatively short period in the overall inspection process. However, I believe it is important for the Council to remain actively engaged and fully informed at this crucial time.

The focus of the IAEA's inspections has now moved from the "reconnaissance phase" into the "investigative phase". The "reconnaissance phase" was aimed at re-establishing rapidly our knowledge base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, ensuring that nuclear activities at known key facilities had not been resumed, verifying the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, and identifying the current workplaces of former key Iraqi personnel. The focus of the "investigative phase" is achieving an understanding of Iraq's activities over the last four years, in particular in areas identified by States as being of concern and those identified by the IAEA on the basis of its own analysis.

Inspections

Since our 27 January report, the IAEA has conducted an additional 38 inspections at 19 locations, for a total of 177 inspections at 125 locations. Iraq has continued to provide immediate access to all locations. In the course of the inspections, we have identified certain facilities at which we will be re-establishing containment and surveillance systems in order to monitor, on a continuous basis, activities associated with critical dual-use equipment. At this time, we are using recurrent inspections to ensure that this equipment is not being used for prohibited purposes.

Technical Methods

As I mentioned in my last report to the Council, we have a number of wide-area and location-specific measures for detecting indications of undeclared past or ongoing nuclear activities in Iraq, including environmental sampling and radiation detection surveys. In this regard, we have been collecting a broad variety of samples, including water, sediment and vegetation, at inspected facilities and at other locations across Iraq, and analysing them for signatures of nuclear activities.

We have also resumed air sampling at key locations in Iraq. Three of the four air samplers that were removed in December 2002 for refurbishing have been returned to Iraq. One of these has been installed at a fixed location, and the other two are being operated from mobile platforms. We are intending to increase their number to make optimum use of this technique.

We are also continuing to expand the use of hand-held and car-borne gamma surveys in Iraq. The gamma survey vehicle has been used en route to inspection sites and within sites, as well as in urban and industrial areas. We will start helicopter-borne gamma surveys as soon as the relevant equipment receives its final certification for use on the helicopter model provided to us for use in Iraq.

Conduct of Interviews

The IAEA has continued to interview key Iraqi personnel. We have recently been able to conduct four interviews in private - that is, without the presence of an Iraqi observer. The interviewees, however, have tape recorded their interviews. In addition, discussions have continued to be conducted with Iraqi technicians and officials as part of inspection activities and technical meetings. I should note that, during our recent meeting in Baghdad, Iraq reconfirmed its commitment to encourage its citizens to accept interviews in private, both inside and outside of Iraq.

In response to a request by the IAEA, Iraq has expanded the list of relevant Iraqi personnel to over 300, along with their current work locations. The list includes the higher-level key scientists known to the IAEA in the nuclear and nuclear related areas. We will continue, however, to ask for information about Iraqi personnel of lesser rank whose work may be of significance to our mandate.

Specific Issues

I would like now to provide an update on a number of specific issues that we are currently pursuing. I should mention that, shortly before our recent meeting in Baghdad, and based on out discussions with the Iraqi counterpart, Iraq provided documentation related to these issues: the reported attempt to import uranium, the attempted procurement of aluminium tubes, the procurement of magnets and magnet production capabilities, the use of HMX, and those questions and concerns that were outstanding in 1998. I will touch briefly on each of these issues.

Uranium Acquisition

Iraq continues to state that it has made no attempt to import uranium since the 1980s. The IAEA recently received some additional information relevant to this issue, which will be further pursued, hopefully with the assistance of the African country reported to have been involved.

Uranium Enrichment

The IAEA is continuing to follow up on acknowledged efforts by Iraq to import high strength aluminium tubes. As you will know, Iraq has declared these efforts to have been in connection with a programme to reverse engineer conventional rockets. The IAEA has verified that Iraq had indeed been manufacturing such rockets. However, we are still exploring whether the tubes were intended rather for the manufacture of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. In connection with this investigation, Iraq has been asked to explain the reasons for the tight tolerance specifications that it had requested from various suppliers. Iraq has provided documentation related to the project for reverse engineering and has committed itself to providing samples of tubes received from prospective suppliers. We will continue to investigate the matter further.

In response to IAEA inquiries about Iraq's attempts to procure a facility for the manufacture of magnets, and the possible link with the resumption of a nuclear programme, Iraq recently provided additional documentation, which we are presently examining.

In the course of an inspection conducted in connection with the aluminium tube investigation, IAEA inspectors found a number of documents relevant to transactions aimed at the procurement of carbon fibre, a dual-use material used by Iraq in its past clandestine uranium enrichment programme for the manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. Our review of these documents suggests that the carbon fibre sought by Iraq was not intended for enrichment purposes, as the specifications of the material appear not to be consistent with those needed for manufacturing rotor tubes. In addition, we have carried out follow-up inspections, during which we have been able to observe the use of such carbon fibre in non-nuclear-related applications and to take samples. The IAEA will nevertheless continue to pursue this matter.

Use of HMX

The IAEA has continued to investigate the relocation and consumption of the high explosive HMX. As I reported earlier, Iraq has declared that 32 tonnes of the HMX previously under IAEA seal had been transferred for use in the production of industrial explosives, primarily to cement plants as a booster for explosives used in quarrying.

Iraq has provided us with additional information, including documentation on the movement and use of this material, and inspections have been conducted at locations where the material is said to have been used. However, given the nature of the use of high explosives, it may well be that the IAEA will be unable to reach a final conclusion on the end use of this material. While we have no indication that this material was used for any application other than that declared by Iraq, we have no technical method of verifying, quantitatively, the declared use of the material in explosions. We will continue to follow this issue through a review of civilian mining practices in Iraq and through interviews of key Iraqi personnel involved in former relevant research and development activities.

Laser-Related Documents

The IAEA has completed a more detailed review of the 2,000 pages of documents found on 16 January at the private residence of an Iraqi scientist. The documents relate predominantly to lasers, including the use of laser technology to enrich uranium. They consist of technical reports; minutes of meetings (including those of the Standing Committee for Laser Applications); personal notes; copies of publications and student research project theses; and a number of administrative documents, some of which were marked as classified. While the documents have provided some additional details about Iraq's laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities or sites already known to the IAEA and appear to be the personal files of the scientist in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in the documents alters the conclusions previously drawn by the IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq's laser enrichment programme. We nevertheless continue to emphasize to Iraq that it should search for and provide all documents, personal or otherwise, that might be relevant to our mandate.

Remaining Questions and Concerns

Last week, Iraq also provided the IAEA with documentation related to questions and concerns that, since 1998, have been in need of further clarification, particularly as regards weapon and centrifuge design. However, no new information was contained in this documentation.

It is to be hoped that the new Iraqi commissions established by Iraq to look for any additional documents and hardware relevant to its programmes for weapons of mass destruction will be able to uncover documents and other evidence that could assist in clarifying these remaining questions and concerns as well as other areas of current concern.

Finally, I was informed this morning by the Director General of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate that national legislation prohibiting proscribed activities was adopted today. The resolution of this long-standing legal matter was a step in the right direction for Iraq to demonstrate its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Security Council's resolutions.

Looking Ahead

In the coming weeks, the IAEA will continue to expand its inspection capabilities in a number of ways, including its already extensive use of unannounced inspections at all relevant sites in Iraq. To strengthen and accelerate our ability to investigate matters of concern, and to reinstate and reinforce our ongoing monitoring and verification system that came to a halt in 1998, we intend to increase the number of inspectors and support staff. We will also be adding more analysts and translators to support analysis of documents and other inspection findings. We intend to augment the number of customs and procurement experts for the monitoring of imports by Iraq. We will also intensify and expand the range of technical meetings and private interviews with Iraqi personnel, in accordance with our preferred modalities and locations, both inside and outside Iraq.

In addition, we intend to expand our capabilities for near-real-time monitoring of dual-use equipment and related activities, and implement several additional components of wide area environmental monitoring aimed at identifying fingerprints left by nuclear material and nuclear related activities.

We hope to continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our mandate. Now that Iraq has accepted the use of all of the platforms for aerial surveillance proposed by supporting States to UNMOVIC and the IAEA, including U2s, Mirage IVs, Antonovs and drones, we plan to make use of them to support our inspection activities, in particular with a view to monitoring movements in and around sites to be inspected.

The Government of Iraq reiterated last week its commitment to comply with its Security Council obligations and to provide full and active co-operation with the inspecting organizations. Subject to Iraq making good on this commitment, the above measures will contribute to the effectiveness of the inspection process.

Conclusion

As I have reported on numerous occasions, the IAEA concluded, by December 1998, that it had neutralized Iraq's past nuclear programme and that, therefore, there were no unresolved disarmament issues left at that time. Hence, our focus since the resumption of our inspections in Iraq, two and a half months ago, has been verifying whether Iraq revived its nuclear programme in the intervening years.

We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear related activities in Iraq. However, as I have just indicated, a number of issues are still under investigation and we are not yet in a position to reach a conclusion about them, although we are moving forward with regard to some of them. To that end, we intend to make full use of the authority granted to us under all relevant Security Council resolutions to build as much capacity into the inspection process as necessary. In that context, I would underline the importance of information that States may be able to provide to help us in assessing the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by Iraq.

The IAEA's experience in nuclear verification shows that it is possible, particularly with an intrusive verification system, to assess the presence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in a State even without the full co-operation of the inspected state. However, prompt, full and active co-operation by Iraq, as required under resolution 1441, will speed up the process. More importantly, it will enable us to reach the high degree of assurance required by the Security Council. It is my hope that the commitments made recently in Baghdad will continue to translate into concrete and sustained action.

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III. Reaction: Statements in the Security Council

'At Stake Is Our Credibility': French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin

I would like to thank Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei for the information they have just given us on the continuing inspections in Iraq. I would like to express to them again France's confidence and complete support in their mission.

1. You know the value that France has placed on the unity of the Security Council from the outset of the Iraq crisis. This unity rests on two fundamental elements at this time:

We are pursuing together the objective of effectively disarming Iraq. We have an obligation to achieve results. Let us not cast doubt on our common commitment to this goal. We shoulder collectively this onerous responsibility which must leave no room for ulterior motives or assumptions. Let us be clear: Not one of us feels the least indulgence towards Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime.
In unanimously adopting resolution 1441, we collectively expressed our agreement with the two-stage approach proposed by France: the choice of disarmament through inspections and, should this strategy fail, consideration by the Security Council of all the options, including the recourse to force. It was clearly in the event the inspections failed and only in that scenario that a second resolution could be justified.

The question today is simple: Do we consider in good conscience that disarmament via inspections is now leading us to a dead-end? Or do we consider that the possibilities regarding inspections presented in resolution 1441 have still not been fully explored?

In response to this question, France has two convictions:

The first is that the option of inspections has not been taken to the end and that it can provide an effective response to the imperative of disarming Iraq;
The second is that the use of force would be so fraught with risks for people, for the region and for international stability that it should only be envisioned as a last resort.

2. So what have we just learned from the report by Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei? That the inspections are producing results. Of course, each of us wants more, and we will continue together to put pressure on Baghdad to obtain more. But the inspections are producing results.

In their previous reports to the Security Council on January 27, the executive chairman of UNMOVIC and the director-general of the IAEA had identified in detail areas in which progress was expected. Significant gains have been made on several of these points:

In the chemical and biological areas, the Iraqis have provided the inspectors with new documentation. They have also announced the establishment of commissions of inquiry led by former officials of weapons programs, in accordance with Mr. Blix's requests;
In the ballistic domain, the information provided by Iraq has enabled the inspectors to make progress. We know exactly the real capabilities of the Al-Samoud missile. The unauthorized programs must now be dismantled, in accordance with Mr. Blix's conclusions;
In the nuclear domain, useful information was given to the IAEA on the most important points discussed by Mr. ElBaradei on January 27: the acquisition of magnets that could be used for enriching uranium and the list of contacts between Iraq and the country likely to have provided it with uranium.

There we are at the heart of the logic of resolution 1441 which must ensure the effectiveness of the inspections through precise identification of banned programs then their elimination.

3. We all realize that the success of the inspections presupposes that we obtain Iraq's full and complete cooperation. France has consistently demanded this. Real progress is beginning to be apparent:

Iraq has agreed to aerial reconnaissance over its territory;
It has allowed Iraqi scientists to be questioned by the inspectors without witnesses;
A bill barring all activities linked to weapons of mass destruction programs is in the process of being adopted, in accordance with a long-standing request of the inspectors;
Iraq is to provide a detailed list of experts who witnessed the destruction of military programs in 1991.

France naturally expects these commitments to be durably verified as facts. Beyond that, we must maintain strong pressure on Iraq so that it goes further in its cooperation.

4. Progress like this strengthens us in our conviction that inspections can be effective. But we must not shut our eyes to the amount of work that still remains; questions still have to be cleared up, verifications made, and installations and equipment probably still have to be destroyed. To do this, we must give the inspections every chance of succeeding:

I submitted proposals to the Council on February 5. Since then we have detailed them in a working document addressed to Mr. Blix and M. ElBaradei and distributed to Council members.

What is the spirit of these proposals? They are practical, concrete proposals that can be implemented quickly and are designed to enhance the efficiency of inspection operations. They fall within the framework of resolution 1441 and consequently do not require a new resolution. They must support the efforts of Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei. The latter are naturally the best placed to tell us which ones they wish to adopt for the maximum effectiveness of their work.

In their report they have already made useful and operational comments. France has already announced that it had additional resources available to Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, beginning with its Mirage IV reconnaissance aircraft.

Now, yes, I do hear the critics:

There are those who think that the inspections, in their principle, cannot be the least effective. But I recall that this is the very foundation of resolution 1441 and that the inspections are producing results. One may judge them inadequate but they are there.
There are those who believe that continuing the inspection process is a sort of "delaying tactic" to prevent military intervention. That naturally raises the question of the time allowed Iraq. This brings us to the core of the debates. At stake is our credibility, and our sense of responsibility. Let us have the courage to see things as they are.

There are two options:

The option of war might seem a priori to be the swiftest. But let us not forget that having won the war, one has to build peace. Let us not delude ourselves; this will be long and difficult because it will be necessary to preserve Iraq's unity and restore stability in a lasting way in a country and region harshly affected by the intrusion of force.
Faced with such perspectives, there is an alternative in the inspections which allow us to move forward day by day with the effective and peaceful disarmament of Iraq. In the end is that choice not the most sure and most rapid?

No one can assert today that the path of war will be shorter than that of the inspections. No one can claim either that it might lead to a safer, more just and more stable world. For war is always the sanction of failure. Would this be our sole recourse in the face of the many challenges at this time?

So let us allow the United Nations inspectors the time they need for their mission to succeed. But let us together be vigilant and ask Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei to report regularly to the Council. France, for its part, proposes another meeting on March 14 at ministerial level to assess the situation. We will then be able to judge the progress that has been made and what remains to be done.

5. Given this context, the use of force is not justified at this time. There is an alternative to war: disarming Iraq via inspections. Furthermore, premature recourse to the military option would be fraught with risks:

The authority of our action is based today on the unity of the international community. Premature military intervention would bring this unity into question, and that would detract from its legitimacy and, in the long run, its effectiveness.
Such intervention could have incalculable consequences for the stability of this scarred and fragile region. It would compound the sense of injustice, increase tensions and risk paving the way to other conflicts.
We all share the same priority-that of fighting terrorism mercilessly. This fight requires total determination. Since the tragedy of September 11 this has been one of the highest priorities facing our peoples. And France, which was struck hard by this terrible scourge several times, is wholly mobilized in this fight which concerns us all and which we must pursue together. That was the sense of the Security Council meeting held on January 20, at France's initiative.

Ten days ago, the US Secretary of State, Mr. Powell, reported the alleged links between al-Qaeda and the regime in Baghdad. Given the present state of our research and intelligence, in liaison with our allies, nothing allows us to establish such links. On the other hand, we must assess the impact that disputed military action would have on this plan. Would not such intervention today be liable to exacerbate the divisions between societies, cultures and peoples, divisions that nurture terrorism?

France has said all along: We do not exclude the possibility that force may have to be used one day if the inspectors' reports concluded that it was impossible to continue the inspections. The Council would then have to take a decision, and its members would have to meet all their responsibilities. In such an eventuality, I want to recall here the questions I emphasized at our last debate on February 4 which we must answer:

To what extent do the nature and extent of the threat justify the immediate recourse to force?
How do we ensure that the considerable risks of such intervention can actually be kept under control?

In any case, in such an eventuality, it is indeed the unity of the international community that would guarantee its effectiveness. Similarly, it is the United Nations that will be tomorrow at the center of the peace to be built whatever happens.

To those who are wondering in anguish when and how we are going to cede to war, I would like to tell them that nothing, at any time, in this Security Council, will be done in haste, misunderstanding, suspicion or fear. In this temple of the United Nations, we are the guardians of an ideal, the guardians of a conscience. The onerous responsibility and immense honor we have must lead us to give priority to disarmament in peace.

This message comes to you today from an old country, France, from a continent like mine, Europe, that has known wars, occupation and barbarity. An old country that does not forget and knows everything it owes to the freedom-fighters who came from America and elsewhere - and yet has never ceased to stand upright in the face of history and before mankind. It wishes resolutely to act with all the members of the international community. Faithful to its values, it believes in our ability to build together a better world.

Source: French Mission to the UN, http://www.un.int/france.

'Why Should We Now Turn Away From This Path?: German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer

I would like to thank Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei for their update on the inspections in Iraq. They have briefed us on the substantial progress of their work but also on deficits in the Iraqi regime's cooperation with the inspectors. These deficits must be rectified by Baghdad without delay. Iraq must not be allowed to possess any weapons of mass destruction and must disarm completely. Baghdad must actively and fully cooperate with UNMOVIC and the IAEA and comply unconditionally with the requirements of the relevant resolutions.

The inspectors have reported on headway they have made: the first private interviews with Iraqi experts have taken place without official escorts. The problem of U2 aerial surveillance has been resolved. Helicopters, Drones, Mirage and Antonov aircraft are to be put at UNMOVIC's disposal to ensure comprehensive surveillance from the air.

The inspectors have thus been able to score some successes. Already today their presence on the ground has substantially diminished the danger emanating from Iraq. The need now is to gain experience with the new measures in place and evaluate them in the light of our common goal of ensuring Iraq's complete disarmament. Why should we now turn away from this path? Why should we now halt the inspections? On the contrary, the inspectors must be given the time they need to successfully complete their mission.

How we proceed from here is laid down by Resolutions 1441 and 1284. What is crucial are the resolutions' three core elements: cooperation, inspection and verification.

Firstly, Iraq must cooperate fully, unconditionally and actively with the inspectors if the looming tragedy is to be averted.

Secondly, the inspection regime must be made more efficient. France has made very concrete proposals on how this can be done. These envisage increasing the number of inspection teams and improving the technical resources at their disposal. In addition, the inspectors' capacities for coordination, surveillance and concrete action need to be spelt out precisely and strengthened. We strongly support these proposals, for they help ensure a response more appropriate to the size of the task.

Thirdly, and in parallel with the inspections, the verification and monitoring mechanisms called for in Resolution 1284 need to be developed and expanded. An ongoing long-term monitoring regime must prevent any future rearmament. We need structures that guarantee Iraq's disarmament and containment on a permanent basis. That is of immense importance for the whole region.

Such a reinforced inspection and verification regime could also be of service to the United Nations in other crises involving weapons of mass destruction.

All possible options for resolving the Iraq crisis by peaceful means must be thoroughly explored. Whatever decisions need to be made must be taken by the Security Council alone. It remains the only body internationally authorized to do so.

Military action against Iraq would - in addition to the terrible humanitarian consequences - above all endanger the stability of a tense and troubled region. The consequences for the Near and Middle East could be catastrophic.

There should be no automatism leading us to the use of military force. All possible alternatives need to be exhaustively explored. That was once again reaffirmed by the Governments of Russia, France and Germany in a Joint Declaration issued on Monday. Diplomacy has not yet reached the end of the road.

Source: German Embassy in Washington, http://www.germany-info.org.

'We Have A Unique Chance': Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov

Our present meeting is in its own way a unique occurrence in the history of the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council has again as a matter of urgency convened at Foreign Ministers' level for the search of a solution of an extremely acute problem, that of resolving the situation around Iraq. This fact once again evidences that it is in the United Nations that the world community perceives the most adequate mechanism for dealing with the most urgent issues of our time.

It is within the framework of the United Nations and its Security Council that all states have the opportunity on an equal and just basis to find a solution of problems affecting the interests of general security. That is why with each new Security Council statement the international community associates hopes for strengthening of the unity and solidarity of states in the face of common threats and challenges. Adopted a few days ago [February 10], the Joint Statement of Russia, France and Germany on Iraqi Settlement was dictated solely by this striving. And only thus should it be perceived.

From the reports presented today by Dr. Hans Blix and Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei it follows with the utmost obviousness that a unique potential has been established in Iraq with respect to inspections and monitoring. The checks being carried out by international inspectors every day have been proceeding without a hitch with Iraqi cooperation. Unhindered access to all sites is being provided, including to the most sensitive ones, as required by UNSC Resolution 1441.

In the course of the recent visit of Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei to Baghdad substantial progress was achieved. There are now practically no obstacles for the start of aerial surveillance over Iraqi territory with the employment of the US plane U-2, the French Mirage and the Russian AN-30B. Matters also stand better with the holding of interviews with Iraqi scientists. They have begun to be held without witnesses. The Iraqi side has placed at the disposal of UNMOVIC a whole series of new documents on its previous military programs, and has established two commission which will engage in the search of additional materials. Today a law has been passed in Iraq prohibiting any development of weapons of mass destruction.

We resolutely call upon Baghdad to build on cooperation with the inspectors. This is, above all, in its own interests.

It is absolutely clear that UNMOVIC and IAEA have the necessary conditions for the fulfillment of the tasks set for them. So far as we know, no one suggests altering the mandate of UNMOVIC and IAEA or making changes to the unanimously adopted Resolution 1441. But all or the overwhelming majority of states are in favor of the Security Council further rendering them all the necessary support.

At the same time the inspectors' work should bear a more systemic and purposeful character. It is necessary to set clearly defined goals and consistently work for their attainment. In this connection I want to recall the obligation of the inspectors to comply with the schedule, fixed in Resolution 1284, in accordance with which they must submit for approval by the Security Council a work program of UNMOVIC and IAEA, including the list of key disarmament tasks. With the adoption that program we will have an objective criterion not only for the evaluation of the degree of cooperation by Baghdad with the UN, but also - and most important - for answering the question whether Iraq presents a threat to peace and security and, if it does, what specifically has to be done for its removal. That program ought to be presented as soon as possible.

I think that it would be possible to put quite a few questions of a more specific nature to Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. But there is one question of principle which we all have to answer. Should the inspectors of UNMOVIC and IAEA continue their activity in Iraq in the interests of a political settlement? Have all the necessary conditions been created for that? To these questions Russia says "yes." "Yes" - the conditions are created, "yes" - the inspections should be continued. And this position is shared by the overwhelming majority of states of the world, including in the United Nations Security Council. And this clearly follows from the reports of Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei, which they presented today.

We have a unique chance to solve in a coordinated manner a most acute international problem by political means in strict accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. This chance is real, and it cannot be lost. Resort to force can be made, but only when all the other means have been exhausted. To this line, as today's discussion shows, we have not yet come up and we do hope we will never come up.

We are all equally aware of the exceptional importance which the international community has imposed on us in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore our energies should be directed today not to rivalry with each other, but to the unity of efforts.

It is symbolic that our present meeting is being held on St. Valentine's Day. With this day people associate their best hopes. I hope that we will succeed in justifying them.

Source: Statement by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov at the United Nations Security Council meeting, New York, February 14, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry.

'This Issue Is Not Just About Iraq': United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Jack Straw

I'd like, in opening, Mr President, to thank Dr Blix and Dr El Baradei for their reports and to express my very great appreciation to them and to their inspection teams for their great efforts in the face of what I think is still very clear, Iraq's failure, fully and actively, to comply with Resolution 1441.

Mr President, the issue before us could not be graver. It is about the authority of the United Nations and about the responsibility of the Security Council for international peace and security.

Just three months ago, on 8 November, we unanimously agreed Resolution 1441, tabled by the United States and ourselves. We said then that Iraq's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, of long-range missiles and its non-compliance with Council resolutions was a threat to international peace and security.

Now, we all know that they've had these weapons. That's why we said that Iraq had them, why all five permanent members, all 10 elected members, said the same thing. We knew that the issue was not whether Iraq had them, but whether Iraq was actively cooperating to get rid of them.

And we emphasized that Iraq had been found guilty 12 years ago by the world community. This was just reminding ourselves that Iraq is the only country in the world which has launched missile attacks on five of its neighbours, invaded two of its neighbours, both Muslim, and killed, without any justification, hundreds of thousands of innocent people in Iran, in Kuwait and in Iraq itself.

Dr Blix, in his report, refers to the decisions which were made in 1991, and he said regrettably the high degree of cooperation required by this Council of Iraq for disarmament through inspection was not forthcoming in 1991.

And it is worth reminding ourselves when we discuss this issue of time scales that on the 3rd of April 1991, this Council gave Iraq 90 days to disarm, by 2 July 1991. And in the 11 years, 7 months and 12 days, quite a long of time, since the Council's deadline to Iraq ran out, what is it that they've done? Well, they've lied, they've concealed, they've played games. A game of catcher's catch can, as Dr Blix told us on 27 January.

Saddam said for four years that he had no biological weapons program, no anthrax bacillus, no smallpox virus, no VX nerve agent. And indeed, the inspectors found absolutely nothing. It took the defection of Saddam's own son-in-law to uncover Saddam's biological weapons program, more terrible than anybody had thought.

And to bring us up to date, as Dr Blix and Dr El Baradei spelled out in their report on 27 January, Iraq has failed to account for thousands of tons of chemical weapons and precursor chemicals, of shells and bombs for anthrax, for mustard gas, for VX nerve agent. They have failed to make a full and complete disclosure as required of them on 7 December, failed to cooperate fully and actively on substance, as well as on process with the inspectors, and failed substantively to meet the obligations imposed on them.

Now, I've listened with very great care to the colleagues who've spoken so far. And we all agreed on the importance of 1441, and it was striking that nobody who's spoken so far - and I warrant that nobody who speaks after me - that nobody has spoken so far has suggested for a second that Iraq is fully and actively complying with the obligations that we imposed on him and on them on 8 November of last year. So Iraq's material breaches, which we spelled out on 8 November, are still there.

Now, in that regard, I'd be glad to put these questions to the inspectors. Why did Dr Blix think that Iraq has refurbished equipment, like the engine casting chambers at Al Mahmoun and the chemical processing equipment at Fallujah, both of which were destroyed by UNSCOM because they were prohibited?

Since the last report, how many interviews have taken place with the officials which the inspectors have asked to interview? How many in places which the two inspectors are sure have not subject to electronic interception and bugging by Iraq?

Has any of the outstanding material identified by UNSCOM in early 1999 - the missing 8,500 liters of anthrax, the one and a half tons of VX nerve agent, the 6,500 chemical bombs - been satisfactorily dealt with by Iraq? Do recent documents provided by Iraq give any serious evidence for this?

As for the nuclear dossier, how many of the IAEA's open issues has it been able to close through Iraq's cooperation?

Mr President, I thought that the most significant point made by Dr Blix in his report, which has subsequently been echoed by everyone who has spoken so far, was his closing remarks when he said, 'Three months after the adoption of Resolution 1441, the period of disarmament through inspection could still be short if the immediate, active and unconditional cooperation with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be forthcoming.' I take those words to mean that Iraq has yet to be forthcoming with that immediate, active and unconditional cooperation.

And I'd like to ask Dr Blix, picking up a phrase from his report of 27 January, whether he believes that Iraq has yet come to a genuine acceptance of the disarmament which has been demanded of it.

Mr President, the issue before us is of the authority of the U.N. and of the defiance of the United Nations resolutions. On the 8th of November, we said unanimously that Saddam was to have a final opportunity. Can anyone say, does anyone truly believe here that he has yet taken that final opportunity?

Like every other member of this Council and, I believe, of the international community, I hope and believe that a peaceful solution to this crisis may still be possible. But this will require a dramatic and immediate change by Saddam.

And this will only be achieved if we, the Security Council, hold our nerve in the face of this tyrant, give meaning to our words and to the decisions which we've already collectively taken, and make ourselves ready to ensure that Iraq will face the serious consequences which we all decided would have to happen if Iraq's defiance did not end.

And, Mr President, I want to close by saying this. This period of 12 years since 687 was passed on 3 April 1991 has frankly been a period of humiliation for this body, for this Security Council and for the United Nations, as games have been played with the Security Council's authority.

And the period after the inspectors were kicked out effectively by Iraq at the end of 1998 until 8 November will hardly be described as the best in the Security Council's history, because Iraq was in open defiance of the United Nations and nothing effectively was being done about its weapons of mass destruction.

I am proud that with the United States, the United Kingdom took the initiative on this issue and tabled what became 1441. And I'm glad to note the progress on process that has been made. I'm glad to note that, notwithstanding a clear statement by the government of Iraq on 10 September last year that the inspectors would never go back into Iraq, inspectors have now gone back into Iraq, and we note the progress on process that has been made.

But I also say this, that in securing a peaceful conclusion to this crisis, as all we must, I know and I think everybody else here knows that we have only got to this stage by doing what the United Nations charter requires of us, which is to back a diplomatic process with a credible threat of force and also, if necessary, to be ready to use that threat of force.

And if we back away from that, if we decide to give unlimited time for little or no cooperation on substance, then the disarmament of Iraq and the peace and security of the international community, for which we are responsible, will not get any easier, but very much harder.

And this issue is not just about Iraq, it's how we deal with proliferators elsewhere across the globe. And if we send out the message to proliferators the world over that the defiance of the United Nations pays, then it will not be peace that we will have secured.

Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk.

'More Inspectors? Sorry...': United States Secretary of State Colin Powell

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, Distinguished Members of the Council, it's a great pleasure to be here with you again to consider this very important matter. And I'm very pleased to be here as the Secretary of State of a relatively new country on the face of the earth, but I think I can take some credit sitting here as being a representative of the oldest democracy that is assembled here around this table.

I'm proud of that. A democracy that believes in peace, a nation that has tried in the course of its history to show how people can live in peace with one another, but a democracy that has not been afraid to meet its responsibilities on the world stage when it has been challenged; more importantly, when others in the world have been challenged or when the international order has been challenged or when the international institutions of which we are a part have been challenged.

That's why we have joined and been active members of institutions such as the United Nations and a number of other institutions that have come together for the purpose of peace and for the purpose of mutual security and for the purpose of letting other nations which pursue a path of destruction, which pursue paths of developing weapons of mass destruction which threaten their neighbors, to let them know that we will stand tall, we will stand together, to meet these kinds of challenges.

I want to express my appreciation to Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei for their presentation this morning. They took up a difficult challenge when they went back into Iraq last fall in pursuit of disarmament, as required by Resolution 1441. And I listened very attentively to all they said this morning and I am pleased that there have been improvements with respect to process. I'm pleased that there have been improvements with respect to not having five minders with each inspector, down to something less than five minders with each inspector. But I think they still are being minded, they are still being watched, they are still being bugged. They still do not have the freedom of access around Iraq that they need to do their job well.

I am pleased that a few people have come forward for interviews, but not all the people who should be coming forward for interviews, and with the freedom to interview them in a manner that their safety can be protected and the safety of their families can be protected, as required by UN Resolution 1441.

I am glad that access has been relatively good. But that is all process; it is not substance. I am pleased to hear that decrees have now been issued that should have been issued years and years ago. But does anybody really think a decree from Saddam Hussein, directed to whom, is going to fundamentally change the situation? And it comes out on a morning when we are moving forward down the path laid out by Resolution 1441.

These are all process issues. These are all tricks that are being played on us. And to say that new commissions are being formed that will go find materials that they claim are not there in the first place, can anybody honestly believe that either one of these two new commissions will actively seek out information that they have been actively trying to deny to the world community, to the inspectors, for the last eleven plus years?

I commend the inspectors. I thank them for what they are doing. But at the same time, I have to keep coming back to the point that the inspectors have repeatedly made, and they've made it again here this morning. They've been making it for the last eleven plus years: What we need is not more inspections, what we need is not more immediate access; what we need is immediate, active, unconditional, full cooperation on the part of Iraq.

What we need is for Iraq to disarm. Resolution 1441 was not about inspections. Let me say that again. Resolution 1441 was not about inspections. Resolution 1441 was about the disarmament of Iraq. We worked on that resolution for seven weeks, from the time of President Bush's powerful speech here at the United Nations General Assembly on the 12th of September until the resolution was passed on the 8th of November.

We had intense discussions. All of you are familiar with it. You participated in these discussions and it was about disarmament. And the resolution began with the clear statement that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations for the past eleven years and remains to that day, the day the resolution was passed, in material breach.

And the resolution said Iraq must now come into compliance. It must disarm. The resolution went on to say that we want to see a declaration from Iraq within 30 days of all of its activities. Put it all on the table. Let's see what you have been doing. Give us a declaration that we can believe in that is full, complete and accurate. That's what we said to Iraq on the 8th of November. And some 29 days later we got 12,000 pages. Nobody in this Council can say that that was a full, complete or accurate declaration.

And now it is several months after that declaration was submitted, and I have heard nothing to suggest that they have filled in the gaps that were in that declaration or they have added new evidence that should give us any comfort that we have a full, complete and accurate declaration.

You will recall, we put that declaration requirement into the resolution as an early test of Iraq's seriousness. Are they serious? Are they going to disarm? Are they going to comply? Are they going to cooperate? And the answer with that declaration was, "No. We're going to see what we can get away with. We can see how much we can slip under your nose," and everybody will clap and say, "Isn't that wonderful? They provided a declaration that was of not any particular use."

We then had some level of acceptance of the fact inspectors would be going back in. Recall that Iraq tried to use this gambit right after the President's speech in September to try to keep Resolution 1441 from ever coming down the pipe.

Suddenly, on the following Monday after the President's speech, "Oh, we'll let inspectors back in." Why? Because when the President spoke and when Iraq saw that that the international community was now coming together with seriousness and with determination, it knew it better do something. It didn't do it out of the goodness of its heart or it suddenly discovered that it's been in violation for all those years. They did it because of pressure. They did it because this Council stood firm. They did it because the international community said, Enough. We will not tolerate Iraq continuing to have weapons of mass destruction to be used against its own people, to be used against its neighbors."

Or worse, if we find a post-9/11 nexus between Iraq and terrorist organizations that are looking for just such weapons - and I would submit and will provide more evidence that such connections are now emerging and we can establish that they exist - we cannot wait for one of these terrible weapons to show up in one of our cities and wonder where it came from after it's been detonated by al-Qaida or somebody else. This is the time to go after this source of this kind of weaponry. And that's what 1441 was all about.

And to this day, we have not seen the level of cooperation that was expected, anticipated, hoped for - I hoped for. No one worked harder than the United States, and I submit to you no one worked harder, if I might humbly say, I did to try to put forward a resolution that would show the determination of the international community to the leadership in Iraq so that they would now meet their obligations and come clean and comply. And they did not.

Notwithstanding all of the discussion we've heard so far this morning about giving inspections more time, let's have more airplanes flying over, let's have more inspectors added to the inspection process, Dr. Blix noted earlier this week that it's not more inspectors that are needed; what's needed is what both Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei have said what's been needed since 1991: immediate, active, unconditional compliance and cooperation.

I'm pleased that Iraq is now discussing this matter with South Africa, but it isn't brain surgery. South Africa knows how to do it. Anybody knows how to do it.

If we were getting the kind of cooperation that we expected when 1441 was passed and we hoped for when 1441 was passed, these documents would be flooding out of homes, flooding out of factories. There would be no question about access. There would be no question about interviews. If Iraq was serious in this matter, interviewees would be standing up outside of UNMOVIC and IAEA offices in Baghdad and elsewhere, waiting to be interviewed, because they are determined to prove to the world, to give the world all the evidence needed that these weapons of mass destruction are gone.

But the questions, notwithstanding all of the lovely rhetoric, the questions remain, and some of my colleagues have talked about it. We haven't accounted for the anthrax. We haven't accounted for the botulinum, the VX, bulk biological agents, growth media, 30,000 chemical and biological munitions. These are not trivial matters one can just ignore and walk away from and say, well, maybe the inspectors will find them, maybe they won't. We have not had a complete, accurate declaration.

We have seen the reconstitution of casting chambers for missiles. Why? Because they are still trying to develop these weapons.

We have not seen the kind of cooperation that was anticipated, expected and demanded of this body. And we must continue to demand it. We must continue to put pressure on Iraq, put force upon Iraq, to make sure that the threat of force is not removed, because 1441 was all about compliance, not inspections. The inspections were put in as a way, of course, to assist Iraq in coming forward and complying, in order to verify, in order to monitor, as the Chief Inspector noted. But we've still got an incomplete answer from Iraq. We are facing a difficult situation.

More inspectors? Sorry, not the answer. What we need is immediate cooperation.

Time? How much time does it take to say, "I understand the will of the international community and I and my regime are laying it all out for you"? And not playing guess, not forming commissions, not issuing decrees, not getting laws that should have been passed years ago, suddenly passed on the day when we are meeting.

These are not responsible actions on the part of Iraq. These are continued efforts to deceive, to deny, to divert, to throw us off the trail, to throw us off the path.

The resolution anticipated this kind of response from Iraq, and that's why in all of our discussions about that resolution we said they're in material breach; if they come into new material breach with a false declaration or not a willingness to cooperate and comply, as OP 4 says, then the matter has to be referred to the Council for serious consequences.

I submit to you that notwithstanding the improvements in process that we have noted, and I welcome and I thank the inspectors for their hard work, these improvements in process do not move us away from the central problem that we continue to have; and more inspections and a longer inspection period will not move us away from the central issue, the central problem we are facing; and that central problem is that Iraq has failed to comply with 1441. The threat of force must remain.

Force should always be a last resort. I have preached this for most of my professional life, as a soldier and as a diplomat, but it must be a resort. We cannot allow this process to be endlessly strung out as Iraq is trying to do right now- string it out long enough and the world will start looking in other directions, the Security Council will move on, we'll get away with it again.

My friends, they cannot be allowed to get away with it again. We now are in a situation where Iraq's continued noncompliance and failure to cooperate, it seems to me, in the clearest terms, requires this Council to begin to think through the consequences of walking away from this problem with a reality that we have to face this problem; and that, in the very near future, we will have to consider whether or not we've reached that point where this Council, as distasteful as it may be, as reluctant as we may be, as many as - there are so many of you who would rather not have to face this issue, but it's an issue that must be faced. And that is whether or not it is time to consider serious consequences of the kind intended by 1441.

The reason we must not look away from it is because these are terrible weapons. We are talking about weapons that will kill not a few people, not a hundred people, not a thousand people, but that could kill tens of thousands of people if these weapons got into the wrong hands.

And the security of the region, the hopes for the people of Iraq, themselves, and our security rest upon us meeting our responsibilities. And, if it comes to it, invoking the serious consequences called for 1441 - in 1441. 1441 is about disarmament and compliance and not merely a process of inspections that goes on forever without ever resolving the basic problem.

Source: Transcript - Powell Says Iraq Must Not Be Allowed to "String Out" Inspection Process, US State Department (Washington File), February 14.

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