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IAEA Resolution on North Korea, February 12

• I. Text of Resolution
• II. Statement by IAEA Director General
• III. Reaction

I. Text of Resolution

'IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea', International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Media Advisory 2003/48, February 12.

Note: the resolution was adopted by 31 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions (Cuba and Russia). The 35 members of the Board for 2002/2003 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

The Board of Governors,

a. Recalling its resolutions GOV/2636, GOV/2639, GOV/2645, GOV/2692, GOV/2711 and GOV/2742, and General Conference resolutions GC(XXXVII)/RES/624, GC(XXXVIII)/RES/16, GC(39)/RES/3, GC(40)/RES/4, GC(41)/RES/22, GC(42)/RES/2, GC(43)/RES/3, GC(44)/RES/26, GC(45)/RES/16, and GC(46)/RES/14,

b. Also recalling its resolution GOV/2002/60 of 29 November 2002 and resolution GOV/2003/3 of 6 January 2003, and noting that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has rejected those resolutions and the efforts of the Director General to institute a dialogue pursuant to them,

c. Confirming that the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains binding and in force and that it is essential and urgent that the DPRK enable the Agency to take the necessary measures to ensure verification of compliance with that Agreement,

d. Having considered the report of the Director General (GOV/2003/4) and in particular paragraph 10 which states that the Secretariat remains unable to verify, in accordance with the DPRK's NPT Safeguards Agreement, that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK, and

e. Taking account of the rights and obligations under that Agreement,

1. Expresses deep concern that the DPRK has not undertaken to co-operate urgently and fully with the Agency, and has not taken the necessary steps called for in resolution GOV/2003/3, and calls upon it to do so urgently;

2. Expresses deep concern also that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

3. Declares, based on the report of the Director General, that the DPRK is in further non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency;

4. Calls upon the DPRK to remedy urgently its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency;

5. Decides to report, as provided for in Article XII.C. of the Statute, through the Director General, the DPRK's non-compliance and the Agency's inability to verify non-diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards, to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations; and in parallel stresses its desire for a peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue and its support for diplomatic means to that end;

6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement the Agency's comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK and to keep the Board informed of any significant developments; and

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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II. Statement by IAEA Director General

'Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, February 12, 2003' IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org.

Once again, the Board is meeting to consider recent events relevant to the compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. As I stated to the Board meeting on 6 January, the DPRK has been in chronic non-compliance with its safeguards agreement since 1993 when the Agency was unable to verify that the DPRK had declared to the Agency all nuclear material that is subject to safeguards. And since 1994 the DPRK has sought shelter behind the US-DPRK "Agreed Framework," claiming a legally untenable "unique status" under the NPT to circumvent compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. This status claimed by the DPRK has been rejected by the Board of Governors and the General Conference, which unequivocally declared the safeguards agreement to be binding and in force.

The events of December of last year further aggravated this situation. Not only did the DPRK fail to respond to the repeated requests of the Secretariat and the Board for clarification of reports concerning an alleged undeclared enrichment programme, but it displayed complete disregard for its obligations under the safeguards agreement by cutting all seals and impeding the functioning of all surveillance cameras that were in place in its nuclear facilities. These actions culminated in an order for the immediate departure of Agency inspectors at a time when the DPRK announced its intention to restart its nuclear facilities and when the presence of inspectors would have been critical.

These unilateral acts by the DPRK took place against a backdrop of repeated requests by the Secretariat to the Government of the DPRK to work with the Agency to maintain the required continuity of safeguards by ensuring an orderly transition from a situation where activities in the facilities were frozen to one in which the facilities became operational. In other words, while the Secretariat took note of the decision by the DPRK to restart the operation of the facilities, it also made it clear that this should only take place in full compliance with the DPRK's safeguards obligations to ensure that the facilities, and the nuclear material contained therein, are dedicated exclusively to peaceful purposes.

The result of this series of events, as I reported to the Board of Governors in GOV/2002/62, was that the Agency was rendered unable to exercise its responsibilities under the safeguards agreement, namely to verify that the DPRK is not diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and also unable to verify that the DPRK has declared to the Agency all the nuclear material that is subject to safeguards.

On 6 January, in the light of that report, the Board adopted a resolution that considered the DPRK's actions to be of great non-proliferation concern, and reiterated its call to the DPRK to comply promptly and fully with its safeguards agreement. The Board also stressed its desire for a peaceful resolution of the issue. The resolution affirmed, however, that unless the DPRK took all necessary steps to allow the Agency to implement all required safeguards measures, the DPRK would be in further non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Board in addition requested that I pursue urgently all efforts aimed at having the DPRK come into full compliance with its safeguards obligations, and to report again to the Board as a matter of urgency.

Regrettably, since the adoption of the Board resolution, my numerous and repeated efforts to engage the DPRK have been in vain. On 10 January, the DPRK declared the resolution to be "unjust," and announced that, as of 11 January, it was withdrawing from the NPT.

The Secretariat remains unable to verify, in accordance with the NPT safeguards agreement - which in our view remains binding and in force - that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK. Furthermore, the DPRK's actions and statements do not indicate readiness to enable the Agency to perform its safeguards responsibilities. In my view, as stated in the report, the DPRK's actions at this time constitute further non-compliance with the NPT safeguards agreement.

The current situation clearly sets a dangerous precedent. If we aim to maintain and preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, then it must be incumbent on all parties to that regime to fully meet their respective obligations, and all cases of non-compliance must be consistently addressed by the international community in a uniform fashion.

Needless to say, the Secretariat remains committed to continuing to work with the DPRK and all concerned parties, with a view to securing full compliance by the DPRK with its safeguards agreement through peaceful means. I am naturally aware of the security, humanitarian and other issues relevant to the DPRK that must be addressed in addition to the question of compliance by the DPRK with its safeguards obligations. However, in my view, the key to the resolution of all outstanding issues, both multilateral and bilateral, is a clear commitment by the DPRK to comply fully and promptly with its safeguards and non-proliferation obligations. This is a matter of grave concern and with broad international implications, and the resolution of this issue is a prerequisite to the resolution of other issues. Co-operation between the DPRK and the Agency is therefore an essential ingredient of any comprehensive solution.

I am encouraged by the increasing readiness of concerned parties to pursue a peaceful resolution of outstanding issues through multilateral and bilateral discussions, and I hope that your decision today will serve as an impetus to explore all available means for the resolution of these concerns while preserving the integrity of the non-proliferation regime.

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III. Reaction

Japanese Foreign Ministry Statement, February 12

Japan strongly hopes that North Korea will seriously take the message of the resolution, which includes the decision to report North Korea's non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, immediately resume dialogue with the IAEA and quickly take concrete action to dismantle in a verifiable manner its nuclear weapons programme. Japan will continue striving for the peaceful resolution of the issue by closely coordinating with the United States and the Republic of Korea, while maintaining cooperation with other countries concerned.

Source: Statement by the Press Secretary on the Resolution concerning North Korea at the February meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, February 12, 2003, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.go.jp.

Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, February 12

On February 12 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted by the majority a resolution which, among other things, envisages sending a report on non-compliance by the DPRK with its agreement with the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Russian delegation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution. In his statement the representative of Russia in the Council stressed that referring this issue to the UN Security Council right now was, in the Russian side's view, a premature and counterproductive step unhelpful towards a constructive and confidential dialogue of the parties concerned with a view to a peaceful resolution of the prevailing situation around the Korean Peninsula, including the DPRK "nuclear problem."

Russia proceeds from the necessity to ensure observance by the DPRK of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and stands up firmly for resolving the crisis around the DPRK nuclear program solely by politico-diplomatic means. We had been prepared to support the draft resolution in the case of the establishment of a direct dialogue between the United States and the DPRK in New York, it was noted.

Russia will be ready to work actively in the United Nations Security Council in favor of a diplomatic settlement of this problem and participation by the DPRK in the NPT and in favor of providing guarantees for its national security.

Source: In Relation to Adoption of IAEA Board of Governors Resolution on DPRK 'Nuclear Problem', Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 345-12-02-2003, February 12.

Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, interview with Izvestia, February 13

Question: Russia has said that it is against the consideration of the North Korean issue in the United Nations Security Council. Why?

Deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov: The Russian delegation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution condemning the DPRK adopted yesterday by the IAEA. We hold that a transfer of the discussion of this matter to the UN will not conduce to the fostering of a constructive and confidential dialogue between the interested sides. Moscow is prepared to support the draft resolution if there is a direct dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington. Russia presumes that it is necessary to secure the observance by North Korea of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and favors a way out of the crisis solely by politico-diplomatic means. In January I made a visit to Pyongyang. The talks were not simple. The Koreans reassured us that they had no nuclear weapons program and that they under certain conditions were even prepared to let international inspectors into their territory - in order to prove that all the suspicions of the Americans were groundless. In exchange they asked the United States to give them security guarantees. Whereupon we returned to Moscow, and informed Washington. The US refuses to settle the matter "amicably". It feels this problem has to be discussed in a broader international context, and demands creating a verification mechanism. And Pyongyang is convinced that this mechanism will be created in order to bring the Koreans to their knees. Neither Pyongyang nor Washington has enough wisdom. Such a state of affairs hinders them from getting out of the crisis. The DPRK has no nuclear program, and the United States in the final analysis is not going to attack North Korea. So there is no theme over which to clash. Pyongyang, it appears to me, has its own logic in such arrogant behavior. All comes up against the energy problem. North Korea supplies itself with electricity by 30 percent only. In its provinces lights are on only three hours per day.

Question: But what about the latest bellicose statements of DPRK officials?

Losyukov: Those statements are rather emotional. I am not going to shield Pyongyang. But I do believe: If North Korea wishes to prove that it has no nuclear weapons, why not give it that opportunity? Today certain countries want to bring the crisis to military conflict.

Question: What impression did Kim Jong-il produce on you during your personal communication? Is it possible to come to terms with him?

Losyukov: Kim Jong-il in this nuclear crisis has a sufficiently well-thought-out line of conduct. The North Korean leader is not threatening the world with a nuclear war. He warned, however, that should his people be driven into a corner and a blockade imposed, then the Koreans will respond decisively, using any of the means they have. The threat of an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula is quite real, and with very grave consequences at that.

Source: Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Losyukov Interview with the Newspaper Izvestia, Published under the Heading "Neither Pyongyang nor Washington Has Enough Wisdom," February 14, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript.

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© 2003 The Acronym Institute.