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US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Approves Moscow Treaty, February 5

'Foreign Relations Committee Approves Moscow Treaty; First Action of Lugar Chairmanship', Press Release from the Office of Republican Senator Richard Lugar (http://www.senate.gov/~lugar), Chair of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee today [February 5] unanimously approved the Moscow Treaty in which the United States and Russia pledge to continue cutting thousands of strategic nuclear weapons from respective forces. Committee Chairman Dick Lugar said he will seek full Senate ratification of the treaty in the next several weeks.

The unanimous first vote by Lugar's Foreign Relations Committee in the 108th Congress came with the approval of the White House to two conditions and six declarations added to the treaty. The conditions and declarations require the White House to annually report to Congress progress in the implementation of the treaty, and how the Nunn-Lugar program is being used to destroy weapons in Russia.

Since 1991, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program developed by Lugar and former [Democratic] Senator Sam Nunn has destroyed more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and thousands of missiles and launchers in the former Soviet Union. Funding for Nunn-Lugar was held up most of last year by the Bush Administration, which contended that Russia was not living up to past treaties. Congress in late 2002 granted the President the authority to waive Nunn-Lugar funding conditions the administration used to hold up the program.

The Moscow Treaty, negotiated by Presidents Bush and Putin in May 2002, reduces operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012.

"I remember well visiting the START I and START II treaty negotiations," Lugar said. "The US and the Soviet Union faced off against each other across conference tables for years. They produced multi-volume treaties and verification annexes that described in minute detail the requirements mandated by the treaties."

Lugar continued, "The Moscow Treaty recognizes that the US-Russian relationship has turned the corner. Our countries are no longer mortal enemies engaged in a worldwide Cold War. Our agreements need not be based on mutual suspicion or an adversarial relationship. We are partners in the war against terrorism and we continue to build a strong military and security partnership. The Moscow Treaty reflects the changing nature of our relationship."

The conditions and declarations follow:

Condition 1: Report on the Role of Cooperative Threat Reduction and Non-Proliferation Assistance.

This condition requires the President to submit to Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees an annual report on the amount of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance Russia will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty.

"Without US assistance Russia cannot meet the timetable of its obligations under this treaty," Lugar explained. "The primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing weapons levels set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the threat posed by warhead security will be the Nunn-Lugar program. Without Nunn-Lugar it is likely the benefits of this treaty will be postponed or never realized. It is my view that interruptions in the Nunn-Lugar program such as those we experienced this summer could threaten the viability of the Moscow Treaty."

Condition 2: Annual Implementation Report.

This condition requires the President to report to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on numerous items related to the Treaty, including: (1) Strategic force levels; (2) planned offensive reductions; (3) treaty implementation plans; (4) efforts to improve verification and transparency; (5) status of START I Treaty verification extension; (6) information regarding the ability of either side to fully implement the Treaty; and (7) any efforts proposed to improve the effectiveness of the Treaty. This language is intended to preserve the unique role the Senate plays in the treaty-making process and the needs of this committee to monitor treaty implementation closely.

Declaration 1: Treaty Interpretation.

This declaration or similar language has been in each resolution of ratification for an arms control treaty since the INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] Treaty's resolution of ratification in 1988. It is known in the arms control community as the Biden condition. The condition articulates the Constitutional principles on which the common understanding of the terms of a treaty will be based.

Declaration 2: Further Strategic Arms Reductions.

This declaration encourages the President to continue efforts to eliminate the threats posed by strategic offensive nuclear weapons to as low a level as possible while not jeopardizing our country's national security or alliance obligations.

Declaration 3: Bilateral Implementation Issues.

The treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission as a diplomatic consultative forum to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. This declaration calls on the Executive Branch to provide briefings before and after meetings of the Bilateral Implementation Commission concerning: (1) issues raised during meetings; (2) any issues the United States is pursuing through other channels; and (3) Presidential determinations with regard to these issues.

Declaration 4: Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons.

During the hearings on the Treaty both Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testified that non-strategic nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons remain an important issue and expressed a strong interest in working closely with Russia to reduce associated threats. This provision is meant to recognize the threat and difficulties associated with tactical nuclear weapons. It urges the President to work closely with and provide assistance to Russia on the full accounting, safety and security of the Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile.

Declaration 5: Achieving Reductions.

This declaration encourages the President to accelerate US reductions where feasible and consistent with US national security requirements so that reductions may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012.

Declaration 6: Consultations.

This declaration has been included in an attempt to address concerns put forward by some Senators regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause in Article IV. This text follows up on Secretary of State Powell's commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the withdrawal provision.

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