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Weapons Inspectors' Briefing on Iraq, UN Security Council, March 7

• I. 'There Has Been An Acceleration': Briefing by UNMOVIC Executive Chair Hans Blix
• II. 'The IAEA Has Made Important Progress': Briefing by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei
• III. Reaction: Statements in the Security Council
  • 'There Is No Reason To Shut The Door To Peace': Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan
  • 'Why Smash The Instruments That Have Just Proven Their Effectiveness?': French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin
  • 'What Is At Stake Now Is The Unity Of The International Community': German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
  • 'We Are Now Laying The Foundations Of Safeguarding Peace And Security': Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
  • 'I Wish We Lived In A Different World': UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
  • 'A Catalogue Of Non-Cooperation': US Secretary of State Colin Powell

I. 'There Has Been An Acceleration': Briefing by UNMOVIC Executive Chair Hans Blix

'Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC', Statement to the Security Council by Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chair of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), http://www.unmovic.org.

For nearly three years, I have been coming to the Security Council presenting the quarterly reports of UNMOVIC. They have described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The 12th quarterly report is the first that describes three months of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalized ten days ago and a number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today's statement will supplement the circulated report on these points to bring the Council up-to-date.

Inspection Process

Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.

Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks, Dr. ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome. This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.

American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries, which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.

Documents and Interviews

Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq's Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results. When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible accounts that is needed - or the proscribed items, if they exist.

Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons, who may have relevant knowledge and experience, may be another way of obtaining evidence. UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its records and they are among the people whom we seek to interview. In the last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of information, in particular, persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in 1991. The provision of names prompts two reflections:

The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.

The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations, which allow us to be confident that the testimony is given without outside influence. While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials (so-called minders) or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, 7 of these during the last week.

As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.

Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area.

There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of WMD. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.

I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.

Recent Developments

On 14 February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in the report before you.

As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament - indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed. However, I must add that no destruction has happened today. I hope it's a temporary break.

To date, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including 4 training missiles, 2 combat warheads, 1 launcher and 5 engines have been destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme.

Two 'reconstituted' casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.

The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile.

More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq had already declared, some will require further study and discussion.

There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results.

Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax, said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.

With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to WMD, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. This appears to be in response to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.

What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.

This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.

Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated "immediately, unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following:

The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.

It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now

taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.

Members of the Council may relate most of what I have said to resolution 1441 (2002), but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions of the Security Council. The quarterly report before you is submitted in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created UNMOVIC but also continues to guide much of our work. Under the time lines set by the resolution, the results of some of this work is to be reported to the Council before the end of this month. Let me be more specific.

Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to "address unresolved disarmament issues" and to identify "key remaining disarmament tasks" and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month as required.

UNSCOM and the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues, which were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points but analysed the data behind it and data and documents post 1998 up to the present time to compile its own list of "unresolved disarmament issues" or, rather, clustered issues. It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection activities.

It is from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify the "key remaining disarmament tasks". As noted in the report before you, this list of clustered issues is ready. UNMOVIC is only required to submit the work programme with the "key remaining disarmament tasks" to the Council. As I understand that several Council members are interested in the working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which members usually refer to. Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq's cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of issues.

I should note that the working document contains much information and discussion about the issues which existed at the end of 1998 - including information which has come to light after 1998. It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of paucity of information. Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programmes have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programmes and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document contains some suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled.

Let me conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement; it will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the programme, e.g. for aerial surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, etc.

How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.

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II. 'The IAEA Has Made Important Progress': Briefing by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei

'The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update', Statement to the Security Council by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei; IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org.

My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions. When I reported last to the Council, on 14 February, I explained that the Agency's inspection activities had moved well beyond the "reconnaissance phase" - that is, re-establishing our knowledge base regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities - into the "investigative phase", which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant to disarmament: whether Iraq has revived or attempted to revive its defunct nuclear weapons programme over the last four years.

At the outset, let me state one general observation: namely, that during the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi sites, industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially, due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late 1980s, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade, and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment. At only a few inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and manufacturing have the facilities been improved and new personnel been taken on. This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme.

Inspections

The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites, including 21 that had not been inspected before. In addition, IAEA experts have taken part in many joint UNMOVIC-IAEA inspections.

Technical Methods

Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The three operational air samplers have collected, from key locations in Iraq, weekly air particulate samples that are being sent to laboratories for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and material sample analyses have been received from the relevant laboratories.

Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2000 kilometres over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons factories, truck parks, manufacturing facilities and residential areas.

Interviews

Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel - at times with individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged meetings with key scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's past nuclear programme. The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews even when the conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA's preferred modalities, with a view to gaining as much information as possible - information that could be cross-checked for validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our assessment of areas under investigation.

As you may recall, when we first began to request private, unescorted interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews and keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, upon our insistence, individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without escort and without a taped record. The IAEA has conducted two such private interviews in the last 10 days, and hopes that its ability to conduct private interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside Iraq.

I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities for conducting interviews, to ensure that they are conducted freely, and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the best way to ensure that interviews are free. We intend therefore, to request such interviews shortly. We are also asking other States to enable us to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those States.

Specific Issues

In the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminium tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnet production capabilities, and its reported attempt to import uranium. I will touch briefly on the progress made on each of these issues.

Uranium Enrichment

Since my last update to the Council, the primary technical focus of IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of centrifuges. For that purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of international centrifuge manufacturing experts.

Aluminium tubes: The IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq's attempts to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminium tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that these aluminium tubes were sought for rocket production. Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets.

The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these rockets was well documented. Iraq has provided copies of design documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and supporting data and samples. A thorough analysis of this information, together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted purchases and intended usage of the 81mm aluminium tubes, as well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerances.

Drawing on this information, the IAEA has learned that the original tolerances for the 81mm tubes were set prior to 1987, and were based on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets in Iraq's possession. Initial attempts to reverse engineer the rockets met with little success. Tolerances were adjusted during the following years as part of ongoing efforts to revitalize the project and improve operational efficiency. The project languished for long periods during this time and became the subject of several committees, which resulted in specification and tolerance changes on each occasion.

Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme. However, this issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated.

Magnets: With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets - or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets - for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme, I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of twelve different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic bearing.

In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line, for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet occurred, and Iraqi documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel indicate that this contract will not be executed. However, the contract has been evaluated by the IAEA centrifuge enrichment experts. They have concluded the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of view. In addition, the training and experience acquired by Iraq in the pre-1991 period makes it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will continue therefore to monitor and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for enrichment centrifuges.

Flow forming capabilities: Iraq has used its relatively low-accuracy flow forming capability for the production of rocket parts in steel. Investigations in the field indicate that Iraq has recently started to flow form its own tubes in aluminium as well.

Based upon Iraqi documentation, experts' observations of Iraq's industrial capabilities and the IAEA's knowledge of Iraq's industrial assets - including the availability of raw materials - our assessment to date is that Iraq still possesses an abundance of high-strength aluminium materials procured during the 1980s, and has the expertise needed to produce pre-forms of high quality, but that it currently has low-quality flow forming equipment. In addition, Iraq's lack of experience and expertise in this field makes it highly unlikely that it is currently able to produce aluminium cylinders consistently to the tolerances required for centrifuge enrichment. Nevertheless, the IAEA will monitor all potentially capable machines and facilities using 24-hour camera surveillance, supported by a regime of unannounced inspections. The IAEA will also continue to assess the level of centrifuge-related expertise remaining in Iraq.

Uranium Acquisition

The IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was centred on documents provided by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001.

The IAEA has discussed these reports with the Governments of Iraq and Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took place. For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including Niger, in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was also able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of Niger, and to compare the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.

Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents - which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger - are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials.

Procurement Patterns

Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear programme have arisen from Iraqi procurement efforts reported by a number of States. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure commodities and products, including magnets and aluminium tubes, have been conducted in contravention of sanction controls specified under Security Council resolution 661 and other relevant resolutions.

The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation, and further verification will be forthcoming. An IAEA team of technical experts, customs investigators and computer forensic specialists is currently conducting a series of investigations, through inspections at trading companies and commercial organizations, aimed at understanding Iraq's patterns of procurement.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass destruction - inspections in Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since my last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated:

• There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.
• There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.
• There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question.
• Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.

As I stated above, the IAEA will continue further to scrutinize and investigate all of the above issues.

After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities, making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution 1441 and all additional tools that might be available to us, including reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope to continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our mandate. I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I do hope that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of its co-operation.

The detailed knowledge of Iraq's capabilities that IAEA experts have accumulated since 1991 - combined with the extended rights provided by resolution 1441, the active commitment by all States to help us fulfil our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi co-operation - should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related capabilities. However credible this assessment may be, we will endeavour - in view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification process, and, particularly in light of Iraq's past record of co-operation - to evaluate Iraq's capabilities on a continuous basis as part of our long-term monitoring and verification programme, in order to provide the international community with ongoing and real time assurances.

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III. Reaction: Statements in the Security Council

'There Is No Reason To Shut The Door To Peace': Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan

Let me begin by thanking Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei for their briefings and for the tremendous efforts they have made to fulfill the mandate given by the Security Council.

Four months ago right here, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 in the spirit of unity and cooperation. The adoption of the resolution fully manifested the determination of the Council to destroy the WMD possessed by Iraq and truly reflected the desire of the international community for a political settlement of the Iraqi issue. It is precisely due to this reason that the resolution has been widely welcomed and supported by all countries the world over.

Undoubtedly, it is a tough task for us to ensure the implementation of the relevant Council resolutions and the full and comprehensive destruction of Iraq's WMD. However, it is gratifying to note that much progress has been made in the weapon inspections, thanks to the unremitting efforts of UNMOVIC and IAEA. Judging from the reports of the two inspection bodies, Resolution 1441 has been implemented smoothly on the whole, with progress made and results achieved. As a matter of fact, there also exist problems and difficulties in the inspection process. This is exactly why it is highly necessary to continue the inspections. We believe that as long as we stick to the road of political settlement, the goal of destroying Iraq's WMD could still be obtained.

Resolution 1441 did not come by easily. Given the current situation, we need resolve and determination, and more importantly, patience and wisdom. For that purpose, the Council needs to maintain its unity and cooperation more than any time ever so as to preserve its authority. We believe that the Council should provide strong support and guidance to the two inspection bodies in their work, let them continue inspections and find out the truth until they complete the mandate of Resolution 1441. At the same time, we also urge the Iraqi Government to further effective measures to strengthen its cooperation on substance with inspectors in real earnest and create conditions necessary for the political settlement. Under the current circumstances, there is no reason to shut the door to peace. Therefore, we are not in favor of a new resolution, particularly one authorizing the use of force.

The Iraqi issue bears on peace and development in the Gulf Region and the world at large. With a view to finding a solution to that issue, we must take into full account the shared interests of all nations and the long-term interests of human and development. After entering the 21st century, peace and development still remain the major themes of our times. All countries in the world, faced with the common task of maintaining peace and achieving development and prosperity, desperately need a stable and peaceful international environment.

Among all things in universe, human beings are of paramount importance and peace is most precious. Over the past months right in this hall, we have heard for many times from many UN member states their strong appeal for resolving the Iraqi issue politically. Outside of this hall, we have also heard justified cries of "Peace, Not War" from peoples of many countries. The power of the Security Council derives from all the UN member states and from people of all nations. We have no reason to remain indifferent to those strong demands and outcries. In order to be responsible for history and safeguard the common interests of all peoples in the world, the Chinese Government strongly appeals to the Security Council to take up its responsibility and to do all it can to avoid war.

Source: Permanent Mission of China to the UN, http://www.china-un.org.

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'Why Smash The Instruments That Have Just Proven Their Effectiveness?': French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin

... I would like to thank Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei for the presentation they have just given us. Their reports testify to regular progress in the disarmament of Iraq.

What have the inspectors told us? That for a month, Iraq has been actively cooperating with them. That substantial progress has been made in the area of ballistics with the progressive destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles and their equipment. That new prospects are opening up with the recent questioning of several scientists. Significant evidence of real disarmament has now been observed. And that indeed is the key to resolution 1441.

With solemnity, therefore, before this body, I would like to ask a question - the very same question being asked by people all over the world: Why should we today engage in a war with Iraq? And I would also like to ask: Why smash the instruments that have just proven their effectiveness? Why choose division when our unity and our resolve are leading Iraq to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction? Why should we wish to proceed, at any price, by force when we can succeed peacefully?

War is always an acknowledgement of failure. Let us not resign ourselves to the irreparable. Before making our choice, let us weigh the consequences, let us measure the effects of our decision.

We all see it: In Iraq, we are resolutely moving toward completely eliminating programs of weapons of mass destruction. The method that we have chosen works: The information supplied by Baghdad has been verified by the inspectors, and is leading to the elimination of banned ballistic equipment. We are proceeding the same way with all the other programs: with information, verification, destruction.

We already have useful information in the biological and chemical domains. In response to questions by the inspectors, Iraq must give us further information in a timely fashion, so that we may obtain the most precise possible knowledge about any existing inventories or programs. On the basis of this information, we will destroy all the components that are discovered, as we are doing for the missiles, and will determine what the truth is.

With regard to nuclear weapons, Mr. ElBaradei's statements confirm that we are approaching the time when the IAEA will be able to certify the dismantlement of the Iraq program.

What conclusions can we draw? That Iraq, according to the very terms used by the inspectors, represents less of a danger to the world than it did in 1991. That we can achieve our objective of effectively disarming that country. Let us keep the pressure on Baghdad.

The adoption of resolution 1441, the assumption of converging positions by the vast majority of the world's nations, diplomatic actions by the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement - all of these common efforts are bearing fruit. The American and British military presence in the region lends support to our collective resolve. We all recognize the effectiveness of this pressure on the part of the international community. We must use it to go through with our objective of disarmament through inspections. As the European Union noted, these inspections cannot continue indefinitely. The pace must therefore be stepped up.

That is why France wants to make three proposals today:

• First, let us ask the inspectors to establish a hierarchy of tasks for disarmament and, on that basis, to present us as quickly as possible with the work program provided for by resolution 1284. We need to know immediately what the priority issues are that could constitute key disarmament tasks to be carried out by Iraq.
• Second, we propose that the inspectors give us a progress report every three weeks. That will make the Iraqi authorities understand that in no case may they interrupt their efforts.
• Finally, let us establish a schedule for assessing the implementation of the work program. Resolution 1284 provides for a time frame of 120 days. We are willing to shorten it, if the inspectors consider it feasible.

The military agenda must not dictate the calendar of inspections. We agree to timetables and to an accelerated calendar. But we cannot accept an ultimatum as long as the inspectors are reporting cooperation. That would mean war. It would lead the Security Council to relinquish its responsibilities. By imposing a deadline of a few days, would we be reduced to seeking a pretext for war? As a permanent member of the Security Council, I will say it again: France will not allow a resolution to pass that authorizes the automatic use of force.

Let us consider the anguish and the waiting of people all around the world, in all our countries, from Cairo to Rio, from Algiers to Pretoria, from Rome to Jakarta.

Indeed, the stakes transcend the case of Iraq alone. Let us look at things lucidly: We are defining a method to resolve crises. We are choosing to define the world we want our children to live in. That is true in the case of North Korea, in the case of Southern Asia, where we have not yet found the path toward a lasting resolution of disputes. It is true in the case of the Mideast: Can we continue to wait while acts of violence multiply?

These crises have many roots: They are political, religious, economic. Their origins lie in the tumult of centuries. There may be some who believe that these problems can be resolved by force, thereby creating a new order. That is not France's conviction. On the contrary, we believe that the use of force can arouse rancor and hatred, fuel a clash of identities, of cultures - something that our generation has, precisely, a prime responsibility to avoid.

To those who believe that war would be the quickest way to disarm Iraq, I say it will establish gulfs and create wounds that are long in healing. And how many victims will it bring, how many grieving families?

We do not subscribe to what may be the other objectives of a war.

Is it a matter of regime change in Baghdad? No one underestimates the cruelty of this dictatorship and the need to do everything possible to promote human rights. That is not the objective of resolution 1441. And force is certainly not the best way to bring about democracy. It would encourage dangerous instability, there and elsewhere.

Is it a matter of fighting terrorism? War would only increase it, and we could then be faced with a new wave of violence. Let us beware of playing into the hands of those who want a clash of civilizations, a clash of religions.

Or is it, finally, a matter of remolding the political landscape of the Middle East? In that case, we run the risk of exacerbating tensions in a region already marked by great instability. Not to mention that in Iraq itself, the large number of communities and religions already represents the danger of a potential break-up.

We all have the same demands: more security, more democracy. But there is another logic beside that of force, another path, other solutions.

We understand the profound sense of insecurity with which the American people have been living since the tragedy of September 11, 2001. The entire world shared the sorrow of New York and of America, struck in the heart. I say this in the name of our friendship for the American people, in the name of our common values: freedom, justice, tolerance. But there is nothing today that indicates a link between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda. And will the world be a safer place after a military intervention in Iraq? I want to tell you what my country's conviction is: No.

Four months ago, we unanimously adopted a system of inspections to eliminate the threat of potential weapons of mass destruction and guarantee our security. Today we cannot accept, without contradicting ourselves, a conflict that might well weaken it.

Yes, we too want more democracy in the world. But we will achieve this objective only within the framework of a true global democracy based on respect, sharing, the awareness of a true community of values and a common destiny. And its heart is the United Nations.

Let us make no mistake: In the face of multiple and complex threats there is no one response, but a single necessity: We must remain united.

Today we must invent, together, a new future for the Middle East. Let us not forget the immense hope created by the efforts of the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Agreement. Let us not forget that the Mideast crisis represents our greatest challenge in terms of security and justice. For us, the Mideast, like Iraq, represents a priority commitment.

This calls for great ambition and even greater boldness: We should envision a region transformed through peace; civilizations that, through the courage of the outstretched hand, rediscover their self-confidence and an international prestige equal to their long history and their aspirations.

In a few days, we must solemnly fulfill our responsibility through a vote. We will be facing an essential choice: Disarming Iraq through war or through peace. And this crucial choice implies others: It implies the international community's ability to resolve current or future crises. It implies a vision of the world, a concept of the role of the United Nations.

France believes that to make this choice, to make it in good conscience in this forum of international democracy, before their people and before the world, the heads of state and government must meet again here in New York, at the Security Council.

It is in everyone's interest. We must rediscover the fundamental vocation of the United Nations: to allow each of its members to assume its responsibilities in the face of the Iraqi crisis but also to seize, together, the destiny of a world in crisis and thus re-create the conditions for our future unity.

Source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.france.diplomatie.fr.

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'What Is At Stake Now Is The Unity Of The International Community': German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer

I would like to thank Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei for their briefing on the quarterly report. Both can count on Germany's full support. The aim of the international community remains the complete disarmament - and only the disarmament - of Iraq to finally eliminate the international threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. This is what all the relevant Security Council Resolutions say.

What is at stake now is the unity of the International Community. We have taken a forceful stance in our common fight against international terrorism. We fight together against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We stand united in our condemnation of the Iraqi regime. Where we have different views is our strategy on how to achieve effective and total disarmament of Iraq. The Security Council must not spare any effort to find a joint approach to attain our common goal.

The briefing by Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei has made clear once more: Iraq's cooperation with UNMOVIC and the IAEA does not yet fully meet UN demands. Baghdad could have taken many of the recent steps earlier and more willingly. In recent days, cooperation has nevertheless notably improved. This is a positive development which makes all the less comprehensible why this development should now be abandoned.

There is real progress to be noted on the implementation of the relevant Security Council Resolutions in all fields:

In the sphere of missile technology, there has been clear progress. Thus, Iraq informed the inspectors of its Al Samoud missiles. After examination by UNMOVIC, it was established that their range was too long. After Dr Blix had set the regime in Baghdad a deadline for their destruction, Iraq began to destroy the missiles within the prescribed timeframe. This is an important progress. It shows that peaceful disarmament is possible and that there is a real alternative to war. This positive development also shows that Hans Blix' approach of giving the regime in Baghdad concrete timeframes is successful. This method also ought to be used for other unresolved problems.

As far as Iraq's nuclear potential is concerned, we can note great progress. Dr ElBaradei has just confirmed this. The accounts presented by Iraq are plausible and verifiable. Cooperation on inspections is good. The IAEA is confident about reaching final conclusions soon.

Turning to biological weapons, there has also been progress in individual spheres. For example, in the excavation of many R400 aerial bombs which are now being assessed by UNMOVIC. Baghdad has announced the presentation of a comprehensive report on open questions in the field of biological and chemical weapons.

The interviews with Iraqi scientists are now taking place without monitoring or recording. Preparations are being made to conduct interviews abroad.

France, Russia and Germany presented a Memorandum to the Security Council on 24 February proposing a tough regime of intensive inspections. On the basis of these proposals, the inspections should be stepped up and accelerated. For this to happen, each remaining problem has to be specified and priorities have to be set. A timeframe should thereby be prescribed for every single problem. Therefore, Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei should present us with a detailed, comprehensive working programme that clarifies how they and their teams intend to tackle the complete disarmament of Iraq as called for by the UN.

It is of great importance that this working programme is presented to the Security Council without delay. We would like to hear today a statement by the inspectors on what are the remaining key disarmament issues in the Cluster report that has been drawn up.

The inspections can't go on for ever. The aim of disarming Iraq has to be pursued energetically and systematically. The Iraqi Government has to fully cooperate with the inspectors.

But given the current situation and the ongoing progress we see no need for a second Resolution. Why should we leave the path we have embarked on now that the inspections on the basis of Resolution 1441 are showing viable results?

The Security Council is now meeting for the third time within a month at ministerial level to discuss the Iraq crisis. This shows the urgency we attach to the disarmament of Iraq and to the threat of war. The crisis in Iraq troubles our governments, it troubles the people in our countries. It troubles the entire region of the Near and Middle East. Precisely because the situation is so dramatic we have to keep firmly reminding ourselves what a war would mean. What endless suffering it would bring to countless innocent people. What catastrophic humanitarian consequences it would entail. Are we really in a situation that absolutely necessitates the "ultima ratio", the very last resort? I think not, because the peaceful means are far from exhausted.

The Security Council - in fact, we all face an important decision, probably a historic turning point. The alternatives are clear: Disarmament of Iraq by war or disarmament by exhausting all peaceful means. The risks of a military option are evident to us all. There is good reason to believe that the region would not become more stable rather more unstable through a war - and, what is more, in the long term; that international terrorism would be strengthened not weakened; that our joint efforts to solve the Middle East Conflict would be hindered.

Then, there is the alternative. If we succeed in implementing the effective and complete disarmament of Iraq with peaceful means, we will improve the framework conditions for a regional process of stability, security and cooperation, based on the renunciation of the use of force, on arms control and on a cooperative system of confidence-building measures.

Resolutions 1441 and 1284 point a clear way forward for the Security Council. They have to remain the basis of our action. The progress of last few days have shown: We have efficient alternatives to war in Iraq. By taking this path we will strengthen the relevance of the United Nations and the Security Council.

Source: German Embassy in Washington, D.C., http://www.germany-info.org.

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'We Are Now Laying The Foundations Of Safeguarding Peace And Security': Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov

The Iraq problem bears a many-sided character. On the one hand, we concur that it is necessary to get Iraq fully and effectively disarmed in conformity with UN Security Council resolution 1441. On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that how we will deal with this problem will not only determine the future of Iraq. In essence, we are now laying the foundations of safeguarding peace and security in today's conditions.

Herein lies the special responsibility of this moment and of the choice which we have to make. If we manage by joint efforts to resolve the Iraq crisis in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, this will, of course, have a positive effect on our efforts in the settlement of other conflicts, and what matters most - become an important step towards a new just and secure world order. This is why Russia has consistently and persistently been working for a solution of the Iraq problem on the basis of international law and the UN Security Council resolutions. And today there are more grounds than ever before to say that this is not only a realistic, but also the surest way.

The report presented by Mr. Hans Blix shows that thanks to our common energetic work, thanks to the pressure that from all directions had been exerted on Baghdad, including through building up the military presence, it has been possible to achieve substantial progress in the implementation of resolution 1441.

Let us look at the facts. In Iraq there has been introduced and is operating an enhanced regime of inspections. The international inspectors are being given prompt, unimpeded, unconditional and unlimited access to any sites in Iraq. In the course of the inspections active use is being made of helicopters and planes, including for the purposes of aerial surveillance. On the whole the level of cooperation by Iraqi authorities with the inspectors profoundly differs from the practice that took place under the previous UN Special Commission.

Mr. Hans Blix and Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei have more than once pointed out, including in their latest reports, the problems with holding interviews with Iraqi specialists. We share the opinion that the Iraqi leadership should more energetically encourage its citizens to participate in interviews, including those without witnesses. Judging by the latest reports, such interviews are gradually becoming the normal practice.

In the course of the inspections there have appeared qualitative shifts in the tackling of concrete tasks. For the first time in many years the process of real disarmament is under way in Iraq. Weapons proscribed by the Security Council resolutions are being eliminated. It is the Al-Samoud-2 missiles, which were officially declared by the Iraqi side and are now being destroyed under UNMOVIC control. It is the discovered 122-mm shells capable of carrying chemical agents. The Iraqis handed over to the inspectors for analysis fragments of more than a hundred R-400 aviation bombs. Experts are studying the possibility of soil analysis at the sites of destruction of VX gas and anthrax pathogens. Baghdad has handed over to the inspectors several dozen new documents, which are now being analyzed.

In principle, we agree with the opinion of Dr. Blix that if the recent positive steps of Baghdad had been taken earlier, then the results would now be weightier. But it is important that the steps have been taken, and they, as the heads of UNMOVIC and IAEA note, are opening the way to the solution of the problems still outstanding. And this is of fundamental importance. Furthermore, I want to draw attention to one more important aspect, which Mr. Blix has stressed, notably the creation of long-term monitoring of the non-reproduction of WMD in Iraq. This is yet another important insurance mechanism.

In this connection the question arises whether it is wise now to wind down the inspections and thus cancel the momentum-gathering process of the disarmament of Iraq? Let us once again weigh up what meets the true interests of the world community: to continue the work of the inspectors, which, though not easy, is bringing tangible results, or to resort to force, which will unavoidably involve great human casualties and turn into grave and unpredictable consequences for regional and international stability.

In our firm conviction, the possibilities of disarming Iraq by political means are there - and they really exist. Therefore what's needed at present is not new UN resolutions, we have enough of them, but active support of the inspectors in the implementation of the existing decisions. Russia strongly favors the continuation and increase of inspection activity, the imparting to it of a more purposeful character. This aim would be served by the speediest possible - literally in the coming days - submission for approval by the UN Security Council of a work program of UNMOVIC with the inclusion in it of a list of key remaining tasks in the field of disarmament. Those tasks must be formulated with maximum clarity and be implementable. This will enable us to objectively evaluate the degree of Iraq's cooperation, and most importantly - give an exhaustive answer to all the questions left open about the proscribed Iraqi military programs.

Of course, we all face a not easy choice indeed. Hardly anyone of us can lay claim to the truth in the last instance. Therefore it is only natural that different points of view are being expressed in the course of our discussion. But those differences should not lead to a split among us. We all stand on the same side of the barricades. We share common values. And only by acting jointly shall we be able to counter new global threats and challenges effectively.

We are confident that from the Iraq crisis the UN Security Council must emerge not weakened and disunited, but united and strong. And for the sake of this goal Russia will continue to work.

Source: Russian Foreign Ministry Transcript (http://www.germany-info.org), Document 565-07-03-2003, March 7.

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'I Wish We Lived In A Different World': UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw

... I would...like to thank Dr ElBaradei and Dr Blix for their reports, and to place on record my Government's appreciation for their work and the work, in very difficult circumstances, of all the staff of the IAEA and of UNMOVIC.

I've listened with very great care to what my colleagues speaking before me have said. We are all agreed that Iraq must be fully disarmed of weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq's failure to co-operate immediately, unconditionally and actively with the Inspectors has to be dealt with. As we negotiated 1441 the evidence was there for all of us to see, that Iraq had been and remained in material breach and we all, fifteen members, voted to give the Iraqi regime a final opportunity to comply with its obligations. The first question therefore for this Council is, has Iraq taken this final opportunity to disarm? And I've been very struck, listening with care to all the speeches and of course people have different points of view. But nobody, not one Minister before this Council in my hearing, has said that Iraq is now fully, actively and immediately in compliance with 1441. They have not so far taken this final opportunity. If anybody in this chamber or outside has any doubt about that conclusion, I do commend to members this so called 'clusters' report, the outstanding issues, concerning Iraq's proscribed weapons programme, which as a member of the Commission behind UNMOVIC I've already had the privilege of reading. I have read, Dr Blix knows, all 167 pages of that report in every particular. It's a very painstaking piece of work. I thank Dr Blix for publishing it. But it's also a chilling read about the failure of Iraq to comply with successive resolutions of this Council over each day of the past 12 years. There's not been active co-operation in the matters that matter. UNMOVIC, because of that, have not been able to resolve the substantive issues outstanding from 1998. As we all know, a point to which I will return shortly, Iraq refused to admit Inspectors for three years after resolution 1284 was passed, only agreeing to them under the threat of enforcement action and in an attempt to frustrate 1441. Iraq has dragged its feet on as many elements of procedural and substantive co-operation as possible.

Could I draw attention to just one aspect which is often overlooked. Dr Blix referred to the fact that Iraq has recently informed us that, following the adoption of a Presidential decree prohibiting individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to weapons of mass destruction, further legislation on this subject is to be enacted. No-one should be taken in by this as a concession. Iraq was ordered, I have the instruction here from this Council, on 2 October 1991 to enact legislation, which in conformity with international law would do precisely what they are now saying they intend to do. What is more, what they have so far done does not cover the operations of the state, only private individuals and mixed companies. So 12 years on, 12 years, after the world saw that Iraq had developed, under the world's noses, weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, nuclear systems, biological systems, chemical systems, Iraq is still refusing to pass a law saying that such activity by members of state government authorities is illegal. This is not something on which they needed a search, it is not something of which they needed the assistance of Inspectors or ground penetrating radar, it's something they could, and should have, done back in October 1991. And notwithstanding all the pressure they are still refusing to do.

And then we come onto the issue of interviews. Dr Blix and Dr El Baradei have reported. Iraq has done everything possible to prevent unrestricted, unrecorded interviews. There have now been twelve private interviews between UNMOVIC and the IAEA, against an UNSCOM list of 3,500 people previously associated with weapons of mass destruction programmes. We know for a fact that all of these twelve and all prospective interviewees have been threatened and intimidated by the Iraqi regime beforehand and told that their exchanges were being recorded.

They weren't being recorded by bugs and tape-recorders the interviewees were told to take into the meetings. They were going to be recorded in any event by bugs placed in the walls of the recording halls, I understand that scientists most likely to have the most incriminating evidence have been locked away by the Iraqi Security Services. There have been no interviews in the safe havens outside Iraq, not one, and the restrictions placed on the interviews is itself the most incriminating evidence that Saddam has something to hide. The Al Samoud episode further confirms Iraq's familiar tactics. Iraq under-declared the number of missile engines it illegally imported. It declared 231 engines but imported 380. Iraq also falsely declared that the missile had a maximum range of 150kms when it was designed to fly, this is not an accident, it was designed to fly considerably in excess of that. And we know that Iraq's agreement to the destruction process, necessary as it is, is a calculation that it can satisfy the Council with a partial response in one only of the 29 categories of unresolved disarmament questions.

Now I have to say, Mr. President, and with all respect to good colleagues, that it defies experience that to continue inspections with no firm end-date, as I believe has been suggested in the French, German and Russian memorandum, will achieve complete disarmament, unless, as the memorandum acknowledges, Iraq's full and active co-operation is immediately forthcoming. The memorandum is not even a formula for containment, given Iraq's proven ability to exploit the existing sanctions regime to continue to develop weapons of mass destruction. We knew nothing about the missile engines, we knew nothing about the rest of this imported under our noses in breach of the sanctions regime until we passed 1441. And to find a peaceful solution to the current crisis the Council must not retreat from the demands that it set out clearly in 1441. What we need is an irreversible and strategic decision by Iraq to disarm, a strategic decision by Iraq to yield to the Inspectors all of its weapons of mass destruction and all relevant information which it could and should have provided at anytime in the last 12 years. A strategic decision like that taken by South Africa when it decided freely to abandon its secret nuclear programme.

I greatly welcome the progress which the Inspectors have today reported. My earnest wish and that of my government has all along been to achieve disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, if humanly possible, by peaceful means. But to achieve that we have to recognise that the progress that has been reported represents only the tip of a very large iceberg of huge, unfinished business required of Iraq. And just as I welcome the progress that we have heard about, I say to the Council that there are very serious lessons for us from what has been reported.

Let us consider what has changed. Why has there been this sudden bout of activity when there was no progress at all for weeks before that, when for months and for years before that Saddam Hussein was rearming under our noses? Now it isn't our policy that has changed, not international law that has changed. There has been from the beginning the clearest instructions for Saddam to disarm, no, what has changed is one thing and one thing only - the pressure on the regime. Dr Blix said in his opening remarks 'what's changed may well be due to strong outside pressure', that's absolutely right. In his remarks, Dominique de Villepin described a lot of diplomatic pressure by the Non-Aligned movement by the European Union, by the Arab League and by many others. I greatly welcome all of that diplomatic pressure. Dominique went on to say that the United States and United Kingdom forces lend support to that pressure. With respect to you my good friend, I think it's the other way around, I really do. What has happened, in Dr Blix's carefully chosen words 'the strong outside pressure', let us be blunt about this, is the presence of over 200,000 United States and United Kingdom young men and young women willing to put their lives on the line for the sake of this body, the United Nations. Dominique also said the choice before us was disarmament by peace or disarmament by war. Dominique, that is a false choice. I wish that it was that easy because we wouldn't be having to have this discussion, we could all put up our hands up for disarmament by peace and all go home. The paradox we face is that the only way we are going to achieve disarmament by peace of a rogue regime, that all of us know has been in defiance of this Council for the past 12 years, the only way we can achieve their disarmament of their weapons of mass destruction, which this Council has said poses a threat to international peace and security, is by backing our diplomacy with a credible threat of force. I wish we lived in a different world where this was not necessary, but sadly we live in this world and the choice, Dominique, is not ours as to how this disarmament takes place, the choice is Saddam Hussein's. It's his choice. Would that it were ours because it would be so easy, but sadly it is not.

There is only one sensible conclusion that we can draw - we have to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein, we have to put this man to the test. He's shown this week he doesn't need more time to comply. He can act with astonishing speed when he needs to. What's more he knows exactly what has to be done. He knows this because he's the originator or all this, of the information. The Iraqis do not need a Dr Hans Blix and all his staff to produce 167 pages of forensic questions. They have the answer book already. Look how fast they acted to produce 13,000 pages of a declaration albeit much of that was irrelevant.

It takes time to fabricate further falsehoods, but the truth takes only seconds to tell. And I just want to make this clear on this issue of automaticity, which again my good friend Dominique raised. There has never been anything automatic about the threat of force or the use of force. It has always been conditional. It would be utterly irresponsible and in defiance of our solemn duties to this Council, if we were in the business of using force automatically. The truth is that it's not being used automatically, should not be used automatically, it will not be used automatically, and nothing to which my Government has ever put its name ever suggests that that would be the case. What we seek is compliance by Saddam Hussein with 1441.

We are not suggesting that in a matter of days Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei would be able to complete all their work, they'd be able to verify the disarmament. No-one's suggesting that. But what we are suggesting is that it is perfectly possible, perfectly achievable and necessary for Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime to bring themselves into compliance. So that instead of all, either by our words or by our silence, as we have today, admitting that Saddam is not in full compliance, that he has not taken the further opportunity and the final opportunity, we can say the reverse and we can celebrate the achievement of the fine ideals of the United Nations and of one of the central points of the work programme of the UN - that we back if necessary our diplomacy by the credible threat of force.

We remain, as founding members of this United Nations and as Permanent Members of this Security Council, committed to exploring every reasonable option for a peaceful outcome and every prospect of a Council consensus. And in the light of that, and in the light of what I have said, I should tell the Council that I'm asking on behalf of the co-sponsors of our draft resolution - the Kingdom of Spain, the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom - I'm asking the Secretariat to circulate an amendment which we are tabling which will specify a further period beyond the adoption of a resolution for Iraq to take the final opportunity to disarm and to bring themselves into compliance. But, Mr President, the Council must send Iraq the clear message that we will resolve the crisis on the United Nations terms, the terms which the Council established four months ago when we unanimously adopted Resolution 1441.

Source: UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk.

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'A Catalogue Of Non-Cooperation': US Secretary of State Colin Powell

... We meet today, it seems to me, with one question, and one very, very important question before us: Has the Iraqi regime made the fundamental strategic and political decision to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions and to rid itself of all of its weapons of mass destruction, all of the infrastructure for the development of weapons of mass destruction? It's a question of intent on the part of the Iraqi leadership.

The answer to that question does not come from how many inspectors are present, or how much more time should be given, or how much more effort should be put into the inspection process. It's not a question of how many unanswered clusters of questions are there, or are there more benchmarks that are needed, or are they enough unresolved issues that have been put forward to be examined and analyzed and conclusions reached about. The answer depends entirely on whether Iraq has made the choice to actively cooperate in every possible way, in every possible manner, in the immediate and complete disarmament of itself of its prohibited weapons. That's what 1441 called for.

I would like to thank Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei for their reports this morning which shed more light on this difficult question. I listened to them very carefully. I listened to them very, very carefully to see if I was hearing that, finally, Iraq had reached that point where it understood that the will of the international community must now be obeyed. I was pleased to hear from both of these distinguished gentlemen that there has been some continuing progress on process and even some new activity with respect to substance. But I was sorry to learn that all of this still is coming in a grudging manner, that Iraq is still refusing to offer what was called for by 1441: immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation. Not later, immediate. Not passive, active. Not conditional, unconditional in every respect.

Unfortunately, in my judgment, despite some of the progress that has been mentioned, I still find what I have heard this morning, a catalog still of non-cooperation. If Iraq genuinely wanted to disarm, we would not have to be worrying about setting up means of looking for mobile biological units or any units of that kind. They would be presented to us. We would not need an extensive program to search for and look for underground facilities that we know exist. The very fact that we must make these requests seems to me to show that Iraq is still not cooperating.

The inspectors should not have to look under every rock, go to every crossroad, peer into every cave for evidence, for proof. And we must not allow Iraq to shift the burden of proof onto the inspectors. Nor can we return to the failed bargain of Resolution 1284, which offered partial relief for partial disclosure. 1441 requires full and immediate compliance and we must hold Iraq to its terms.

We also heard this morning of an acceleration of Iraqi initiatives. I don't know if we should call these things initiatives. Whatever they are, Iraq's small steps are certainly not initiatives. They are not something that came forward willingly, freely, from the Iraqis. They have been pulled out or have been pressed out by the possibility of military force by the political will of the Secretary Council. They have been taking these initiatives, if that's what some would choose to call them, only grudgingly, rarely unconditionally, and primarily under the threat of force.

We are told that these actions do not constitute immediate cooperation, but that's exactly what is demanded by 1441. And even then, progress is often more apparent than real. I am pleased, very pleased, that some al-Samoud II missiles are now being broken up, although perhaps the process of breaking them up has now paused for a moment. And I know these are not toothpicks, but real missiles. But the problem was we don't know how many missiles there are, how many toothpicks there are. We don't know whether or not the infrastructure to make more has been identified and broken up. And we have evidence that shows that the infrastructure to make more missiles continues to remain within Iraq and has not yet been identified and destroyed.

There is still much more to do, and, frankly, it will not be possible to do that which we need to do unless we get the full and immediate kind of cooperation that 1441 and all previous resolutions demanded.

The intent of the Iraqi regime to keep from turning over all of its weapons of mass destruction seems to me has not changed, and not to cooperate with the international community in the manner intended by 1441.

If Iraq had made that strategic decision to disarm, cooperation would be voluntary, even enthusiastic - not coerced, not pressured. And that is the lesson we learned from South Africa and the Ukraine, where officials did everything possible to ensure complete cooperation with inspectors.

I also listened to Dr. ElBaradei's report with great interest. As we all know, in 1991, the IAEA was just days away from determining that Iraq did not have a nuclear program. We soon found out otherwise. IAEA is now reaching a similar conclusion, but we have to be very cautious. We have to make sure that we do keep the books open, as Dr. ElBaradei said he would. There is dispute about some of these issues and about some of these specific items.

Dr. ElBaradei talked about the aluminum tubes that Iraq has tried to acquire over the years. But we also know that notwithstanding the report today, that there is new information that is available to us, and I believe available to the IAEA, about a European country where Iraq was found shopping for these kinds of tubes. And that country has provided information to us, to IAEA, that the material properties and manufacturing tolerances required by Iraq are more exact, by a factor of 50 percent or more, than those usually specified for rocket motor casings. Its experts concluded that the tolerances and specifications Iraq was seeking cannot be justified for unguided rockets. And I am very pleased that we will keep this issue open.

I also welcome the compilation of outstanding issues that Dr. Blix and his staff have provided to some of us and will make available to all of us. UNMOVIC put together a solid piece of research that adds up, when one reads the entire 167 pages, adds up fact by chilling fact, to a damning record of 12 years of lies, deception and failure to come clean on the part of Iraq.

This document is, in fact, a catalog of 12 years of abject failure, not by the inspectors, but by Iraq. We have looked carefully at the draft given to the UNMOVIC commissioners and which will be available more widely after this meeting, and we have found nearly 30 instances where Iraq refused to provide credible evidence substantiating its claims. We have counted 17 examples when the previous inspectors actually uncovered evidence contradicting Iraqi claims. We see instance after instance of Iraq lying to the previous inspectors and planting false evidence, activities which we believe are still ongoing.

As you read this document, you can see page after page of how Iraq has obstructed the inspectors at nearly every turn over the years. Just by way of example, we've talked about the R-400 bombs. The report says that during the period 1992, Iraq changed its declaration on the quantity of bombs it had produced, changed the declaration several times. In 1992, it declared it had produced a total of 1,200 of these bombs. With the admission, finally, after it was pulled out of them, of an offensive biological warfare program in 1995, this number was subsequently changed to a total of 1,550 such bombs. Given the lack of specific information from Iraq, UNSCOM could not calculate the total number of R-400 bombs that Iraq had produced for its programs. And so, this report says it has proved impossible to verify the production and destruction details of R-400 bombs. UNMOVIC cannot discount the possibility that some CW- and BW-filled R-400 bombs remain in Iraq. In this document, UNMOVIC says actions that Iraq could take to help resolve this question, present any remaining R-400 bombs and all relevant molds, provide more supporting documentation on production, inventory relating to the R-400 and R-400A bombs it manufactured, provide further documentation explaining the coding system that it had used with the R-400 type bombs, including coding assigned to specific CBW agents, provide credible evidence that the R-400 bomb production line stopped after September 1990.

This is just one example of the kinds of documentation we'll all be seeing. The question that leaps out at you is that these are issues, these actions that Iraq is being asked to take, they could have taken many times over the preceding 12 years. We're not talking about immediately. We're talking about why hasn't it been done over the last 12 years, and how can we rely on assurances now in the presence of this solid record of lying and deceit over the years?

These questions could easily have been cleared up in Iraq's December 7th declaration. There should not be these kinds of outstanding issues to work on, but there are, and we will all examine them carefully.

The point is that this document conclusively shows that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture these kinds of weapons, that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture not only chemical but biological weapons, and that Iraq had and still has literally tens of thousands of delivery systems, including increasingly capable and dangerous unmanned aerial vehicles.

These are not new questions being presented for our consideration. These are old questions that have not been resolved and could have been resolved in December with a declaration, or could have been fully resolved over the last four months if Iraq had come forward and do what 1441 wanted it to do.

In his report this morning, Dr. Blix remarked on the paucity of information on Iraq's programs since 1998. We've all been working hard to fill that gap. But Iraq is the one who could fill that gap, if it was truly complying with 1441. It would be inundating the inspectors with new information, not holding it back begrudgingly.

The draft we reviewed today in preparation for this meeting was 167 pages long. If Iraq were genuinely committed to disarmament, Dr. Blix's document would not be 167 pages of issues and questions; it would be thousands upon thousands of pages of answers about anthrax, about VX, about sarin, about unmanned aerial vehicles. It would set out in detail all of Iraq's prohibited programs. Then, and only then, could the inspectors really do the credible job they need to do of verification, destruction and monitoring.

We've been down this road before. In March 1998, Saddam Hussein was also faced with the threat of military action. He responded with promises. Promises to provide inspectors at that time with immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. The then-chief inspector reported to this Council a new spirit of cooperation, along with his hope that the inspectors could move very quickly to verify Iraq's disarmament. We know what happened to that hope . There was no progress on disarmament, and nine months later the inspectors found it necessary to withdraw.

I regret that not much has changed. Iraq's current behavior, like the behavior chronicled in Dr. Blix's document, reveals its strategic decision to continue to delay, to deceive, to try to throw us off the trail, to make it more difficult to hope that the will of the international community will be fractured, that we will go off in different directions, that we will get bored with the task, that we will remove the pressure, we will remove the force. And we know what has happened when that has been done in the past.

We know that the Iraqis still are not volunteering information and, when they do, what they are giving is often partial and misleading. We know that when confronted with facts, the Iraqis still are changing their story to explain those facts - but not enough to give us the truth.

So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the leadership in Baghdad? My judgment, I think our judgment, has to be clearly not. And this is now the reality we, the Council, must deal with.

Security Council membership carries heavy responsibility, responsibility of the community of nations to take the hard decisions on tough issues such as the one we are facing today. Last November, this Council stepped up to its responsibilities. We must not walk away. We must not find ourselves here this coming November with the pressure removed and with Iraq once again marching down the merry path to weapons of mass destruction, threatening the region, threatening the world.

If we fail to meet our responsibilities, the credibility of this Council and its ability to deal with all the critical challenges we face will suffer. As we sit here, let us not forget the horror still going on in Iraq, with a spare moment to remember the suffering Iraqi people whose treasure is spent on these kinds of programs and not for their own benefit; people who are being beaten, brutalized and robbed by Saddam and his regime.

Colleagues, now is the time for the Council to send a clear message to Saddam that we have not been taken in by his transparent tactics. Nobody wants war, but it is clear that the limited progress we have seen, the process changes we have seen, the slight, substantive changes we have seen, come from the presence of a large military force - nations who are willing to put their young men and women in harm's way in order to rid the world of these dangerous weapons.

It doesn't come simply from resolutions. It doesn't come simply from inspectors. It comes from the will of this Council, the unified political will of this Council and the willingness to use force, if it comes to that, to make sure that we achieve the disarmament of Iraq.

Now is the time for the Council to tell Saddam Hussein that the clock has not been stopped by his stratagems and his machinations. We believe that the resolution that has been put forward for action by this Council is appropriate and, in the very near future, we should bring it before this Council for a vote. The clock continues to tick and the consequences of Saddam Hussein's continued refusal to disarm will be very, very real.

Source: Transcript - Powell Says Clock Continues to Tick on Iraq, US Department of State (Washington File), March 7.

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Note: Iraqi WMD Decree

A number of statements made in the Council on March 7 refer to recent legislation passed by the government of Iraq related to the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction programmes in the country. The text of the legislation is reproduced below. It has been kindly provided to us by Douglas Scott, President of the Markland Group for the Integrity of Disarmament Treaties. Mr. Scott wishes to thank Ewen Buchanan, Public Information Officer of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, for making the text of the decree available to him.

Full Text

'Promulgation of a Republican Decree Forbidding the Import and Manufacture of Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons', Republican Decree No. 31, signed by President Saddam Hussein, Baghdad, February 14, 2003

On the basis of the provisions of paragraph (b) of article 58 of the Constitution,

We have decreed as follows:

Persons and companies in the private and mixed sectors are forbidden to import, produce and manufacture biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, whether as components or weapons.

The relevant ministries, each within its field of competence, shall be responsible for the implementation of this decree and for taking necessary action to impose penalties on those who are in violation of its provisions.

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© 2003 The Acronym Institute.