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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources, Vienna, March 10/13International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources, Vienna, Austria, March 10-13; organised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), co-sponsored by the governments of Russia and the United States, hosted by the government of Austria . Note: unless otherwise stated, the source for the following documentation is the website of the IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/RadSources.
I. Findings of the Conference, March 13'International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources: Findings of the President of the Conference', March 13. The Conference produced two major findings, as follows: (1) High-risk radioactive sources that re nit under secure and regulated control, including so-called "orphan" sources, raise serious security and safety concerns. Therefore, an international initiative to facilitate the location, recovery and securing of such radioactive sources throughout the world should be launched under the IAEA's aegis. ... (2) Effective national infrastructures for the safe and secure management of vulnerable and dangerous radioactive sources are essential for ensuring the long-term security and control of such sources. In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of such infrastructures, states should make a concerted effort to follow the principles contained in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that is currently being revised... In this context, the identification of roles and responsibilities of governments, licensees and international organizations is vital. Therefore, an international initiative to encourage and assist governments in their efforts to establish effective national infrastructures and to fulfil their responsibilities should be launched under the IAEA's aegis, and the IAEA should promote broad adherence to the Code of Conduct once its revised version has been approved. ... Additional findings of the Conference were as follows: Identifying, searching for, recovering and securing high-risk radioactive sources The Conference encourages:
Strengthening long-term control over radioactive sources... The Conference encourages:
Interdicting illicit trafficking... The Conference encourages:
Roles and responsibilities... The Conference encourages:
Planning the response to radiological emergencies arising from the malevolent use of radioactive sources... The Conference encourages:
Role of the media/public education, communication, outreach... The Conference encourages:
OutlookThe Conference recommends that the IAEA, taking account of these findings, revisit the revised Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources and adjust it as appropriate. The Conference concludes that the IAEA should organize a further conference in two years' time to assess progress regarding the worldwide security of high-risk radioactive sources; this includes progress in the implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of radioactive Sources currently being revised, in the further development of measures to protect high-risk radioactive sources, and in the development and implementation of national strategies for regaining control over "orphan" sources. The conference should also assess further development needs in key areas. ... II. Summary: IAEA Press Release, March 13'Stronger Controls Needed to Prevent Terrorist "Dirty Bombs"; Vienna Conference Urges Better Security, Surveillance and Regulation', IAEA Press Release, PR 2003/03, March 13. Over seven hundred delegates from more than 120 countries gathering in Vienna called today for stronger national and international security over radioactive sources, especially those that could be used to produce a terrorist "dirty bomb." "High-risk radioactive sources that are not under secure and regulated control, including so-called "orphan" sources, raise serious security and safety concerns," the International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources concluded today. "Effective national infrastructures for the safe and secure management of vulnerable and dangerous radioactive sources are essential for ensuring the long-term security and control of such sources." In some countries, regulatory control of radioactive sources - used extensively in medicine and industry - remains weak. Global concerns about the security and safety of radioactive sources escalated following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. There are fears that some radioactive sources could be used by terrorists as radiological dispersal devices, or so called "dirty bombs." "Source security has taken on a new urgency since 9/11," Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency said during the conference opening. "There are millions of radiological sources used throughout the world. Most are very weak. What we are focusing on is preventing the theft or loss of control of the powerful radiological sources," Dr. ElBaradei said. To effectively deal with the potential terrorist threat posed by so-called dirty bombs, the conference called for new international initiatives aimed at facilitating the location, recovery and securing of high risk radioactive sources throughout the world, under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Conference also called for a concerted worldwide effort under IAEA leadership to implement the principles in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, which is now being revised to account for security concerns, in order to promote adequate radiation safety and security control infrastructures. States should also adhere to the security-related principles contained in the international Basic Safety Standards. The Conference has offered numerous specific findings for addressing security concerns, identifying high-risk sources, and strengthening government actions to minimize radiological risks. Among the key recommendations:
"It is our critically important job to deny terrorists the radioactive sources they need to construct such RDD weapons," United States Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham told the Conference on Tuesday. "Our governments must act to identify all the high-risk radioactive sources that are being used and have been abandoned. We must educate our officials and the general populace, raising awareness of the existence of these dangerous radioactive sources and the consequences of their misuse." The International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources was held from 10 to 13 March 2003 at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna, Austria. US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham presided over the Conference, which was co-sponsored by the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America and hosted by the Government of Austria. It was organized by the IAEA in co-operation with the European Commission, the World Customs Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol) and the European Police Office (Europol). III. Statement by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, March 11OverviewI am pleased to welcome you all to this conference on a subject that continues to generate serious public concern: the security of radioactive sources. Around the world, radioactive sources have been used for decades to benefit humankind - to diagnose and treat illnesses, to monitor oil wells and water aquifers, to preserve food, as well as for many other uses. Millions of sources have been distributed worldwide over the past 50 years, with hundreds of thousands currently in use. Most of these sources, such as those in smoke detectors, are weakly radioactive and individually pose little radiological risk. However, about 12,000 industrial radiography sources are supplied annually; more than 10,000 medical radiotherapy units are in use. These types of sources - and others such as those contained in thermo-electric generators - are significant from a safety and security standpoint, because they contain potentially lethal quantities of radioactive material. To protect the public from the hazards of ionizing radiation, cradle-to-grave control is essential for these radioactive sources. For many years the IAEA has been helping States to strengthen their national regulatory infrastructures, to ensure that such radioactive sources are appropriately regulated at all times. Until recently, our emphasis has been on the safety of radioactive sources, with source security as one aspect of safety. However, in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and the stark awareness of the potential for radioactive sources to be used in malevolent acts, source security has taken on a new urgency. But while a number of countries are stepping up relevant security measures, many others lack the resources or the national structures to effectively control radioactive sources. Orphaned SourcesA widespread problem involves sources that, due to loss, theft, or abandonment, have fallen outside official regulatory control - the so-called "orphaned" sources. This problem has been especially present in the Newly Independent States, where transitions in governments have in some cases led to a loss of regulatory oversight of radioactive sources. In a large number of cases, even without malevolent intent, the loss of control of radioactive sources has resulted in death or serious injury. The well known incident in Goiânia, Brazil, in the eighties, is frequently cited as an example - a case in which the inadvertent dismantling of a radiotherapy source, and the dispersal of caesium-137, resulted in a number of fatalities and significant social and economic disruption. Many factors can lead to loss of control of radioactive sources, including: ineffective regulations and regulatory oversight; the lack of management commitment or worker training; poor source design; poor physical protection of sources during storage, transport and use; abandonment due to economic factors; as well as theft or other malicious acts. In view of this wide range of possible causes, addressing the problem is a difficult and complex challenge. Radiological TerrorismAs I just mentioned, after the events of September 2001, issues related to terrorist activities - including nuclear and radiological terrorism - were catapulted into the spotlight. Given the apparent readiness of terrorists to disregard their own safety, the personal danger from handling powerful radioactive sources can no longer be seen as an effective deterrent. This awareness prompted a thorough re-evaluation of the risks involved. In view of recent reports about terrorist plans to build and deploy radiological dispersion devices - and given the inadequacy of source controls I just mentioned - it is clear that additional security measures are urgently needed. This concern has been the focus of the international community in the past 18 months. I trust that this conference will help to identify what has been accomplished and to focus on additional measures that need to be taken to cope with the challenge. Clearly, the use of a radiological dispersion device - sometimes referred to as a "dirty bomb" - will, as with any explosion, kill or injure people through the blast. But, the most severe impacts of a dirty bomb would probably be the panic and social disruption associated with exposure to radiation, the very purpose of an act of "terror". IAEA ActivitiesThe IAEA and its Members have been hard at work to raise the levels of radiation safety and security associated with radioactive sources, focusing on countries with urgent needs. Nearly a decade ago, the IAEA established the "International Basic Safety Standards for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources", and recently the Agency has used a "Model Project on Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructure" to help Member States establish the infrastructure to improve their control of radioactive sources. Both the Basic Safety Standards and the Model Project have included specific aspects related to source security as well as safety - but in many countries these requirements have not been implemented, with the result that the regulatory control of radioactive sources remains weak, and the States' inventories of such sources not well maintained. The Agency has also developed a Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, a Categorization of Radioactive Sources and an international database on radiation events (RADEV). In addition, the Agency has sponsored a number of relevant international conferences, which made specific recommendations for creating national source registries, securing orphaned sources, and preventing criminal misuse involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. But the most direct impact of IAEA activities in this area has come in actual field work: that is, assistance to States to meet urgent needs or to provide the training, equipment and expert advice to raise the level of performance in the area of source security - including through the Agency's appraisal service for evaluating a State's radiation safety regulatory infrastructure. In a number of cases, the IAEA has lent its expertise to locate and secure orphaned sources. In Kabul, Afghanistan, last year, the Agency helped to secure an abandoned powerful cobalt source. In Uganda a week later, we helped the Government to secure a source that appeared to have been stolen for illicit resale. And a Georgian team supported by the IAEA successfully recovered two powerful radioactive sources that had been left unshielded and unsecured. Similar problems with orphaned sources exist in other countries. Recently, a tripartite initiative was established by the Agency, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) - in an effort led by Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev - to locate, recover, secure and recycle orphaned sources throughout the countries of the former Soviet Union. Two joint missions were carried out in Moldova and Tajikistan last year, and more are planned for this year; however, no similar arrangement is available yet to help countries outside the former Soviet Union. Another area of IAEA focus is on illicit trafficking and the potential malevolent use of sources. The Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database includes over 280 confirmed incidents since 1993 involving radioactive sources. The actual number of cases may well be significantly larger than the number reported to the Agency. Customs officials, border guards, and police forces continue to detect numerous attempts to smuggle and sell stolen sources. The IAEA has been actively assisting States to strengthen their border controls against illicit trafficking and to improve their physical protection of radioactive sources. Recent examples include: workshops on border monitoring and illicit trafficking held in Vladivostok and St. Petersburg for customs and law enforcement officials from the Newly Independent States; a workshop on border monitoring for law enforcement officials in the Philippines; a meeting in Ghana to plan assistance to African States on the full range of nuclear security issues; and incident related advisory missions to Bolivia, Nigeria, and the United Republic of Tanzania on issues related to illicit trafficking. Looking to the future, it is clear that much remains to be done to improve the security of radioactive sources worldwide. The IAEA will remain actively engaged in assisting States to search for, recover, and secure orphaned sources, and improve their own national measures for the control of radioactive sources. This ConferenceBefore closing, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the leadership shown by the US Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham - in continuing to highlight the urgency of addressing the security of radioactive sources worldwide. It was Secretary Abraham, during the September 2002 session of the IAEA General Conference, who suggested the need for our present conference. The Agency is grateful to the Government of Austria for hosting this conference, the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America for sponsoring the conference, and for the co-operation of the European Commission, the European Police Office, the International Criminal Police Organization, and the World Customs Organization. The control of radioactive sources is one among several areas of expanding Agency activity, and the Agency will need broad support from all its Member States, including financial support, to ensure that we deal effectively with this imminent danger. Naturally, the success of this conference will be measured by our success in agreeing and implementing the necessary measures to protect ourselves against any malicious use of radioactive sources. I wish you every success in your discussions. IV. Statement by US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, March 11... We are gathered here to deal with an important issue: the terrible threat posed by those who would turn beneficial radioactive sources into deadly weapons. The technical term for these weapons - Radiological Dispersal Devices or RDDs - has not come into general use. I seldom see it in a headline, or hear it in a newscast. But increasingly the public knows about these weapons, and they are deeply concerned. They call RDDs "dirty bombs." It is our critically important job to deny terrorists the radioactive sources they need to construct such weapons. The threat requires a determined and comprehensive international response. Our governments must act, individually and collectively, to identify all the high-risk radioactive sources that are being used and that have been abandoned. We must educate our officials and the general populace, raising awareness of the existence of these dangerous radioactive sources and the consequences of their misuse. And we must account for and tightly secure these sources wherever they may be. Radioactive sources can be found all over the world, and terrorists are seeking to acquire them. The threat they represent to people of every nation is very real. This threat has been a particular concern to the United States since the September 11 attacks. On that day, we learned that terrorists will strike anywhere, at any time. They will employ technology never intended for use as weapons, to murder thousands of innocent and unsuspecting people in the most shocking and ruthless way. We know now that there is no weapon they will not use, and no weapon they are not seeking to acquire. There is nothing they would like better than to cause the panic that the detonation of a radiological dispersal device would create. We know from experience with accidental releases of radiological sources that they can cause widespread panic, economic hardship, and significant health concerns. Remember Brazil, in 1987. Urban scavengers found a medical teletherapy machine left in an abandoned building. They removed the radioactive source from its shielding, ruptured it, and distributed the beautiful blue, glowing powder they found inside to their friends, neighbors and relatives. The powder was Cesium 137. Four people died. More than 110,000 people were monitored for radiation exposure at the city's sports stadium. Scores of buildings were evacuated and some were even demolished. Cleanup costs were enormous. The incident generated about 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive waste. Actual fatalities were relatively light in the Brazil incident, but panic was widespread. I can only imagine how much worse the situation would have been had terrorists dispersed the toxic material rather than innocent, uninformed people. That's why our work is so important. It is our responsibility to determine how to prevent such an attack in the first place, and how we should respond if, despite our best efforts, such an attack were to occur. All countries should act in their own self-interest by taking the steps needed to better secure high-risk radioactive sources. I came here to Vienna for the IAEA's 45th General Conference just six days after September 11. At that time, I called on IAEA's Member States to confront the new terrorist threat. The IAEA Secretariat proposed, and the Board of Governors approved, a new Nuclear Security Fund to help its member states to protect against nuclear terrorism. The action plan covers a broad range of activities to help states put in place the legal, regulatory, and technical elements needed to reduce the risk of misuse of nuclear and other radioactive material. Thus far, the United States has contributed $8.7 million to the IAEA program. I encourage all Member States to contribute to this fund. Last September, at the 46th IAEA General Conference, I discussed why Radiological Dispersal Devices presented a growing and disconcerting threat of a new kind. In my remarks then, I proposed that this conference be convened. My reason for suggesting the conference was in no small measure because RDDs are different from what we are accustomed to in our more traditional nuclear non-proliferation work. We are used to policing a defined number of nuclear facilities. Our job has been to focus on that small number of countries bent on violating the nuclear non-proliferation norm and acquiring fissile materials for nuclear weapons. But the radiological materials that could be used in an RDD exist in a variety of forms in virtually every country in the world. And they are often loosely monitored and secured, if at all. The use of radioactive sources is widespread. They have many beneficial industrial, agricultural, research and medical applications. In the medical field alone, roughly one hundred radioisotopes are used in various nuclear medical research, diagnosis, sterilization, and teletherapy applications. Millions of cancer patients have had their lives prolonged due to radiotherapy treatments, and patients of all kinds have benefited from bacteria-free, sterile medical equipment made possible by irradiation technology. Many more lives have been saved thanks to the smoke alarms and emergency exit signs that are now common in homes, schools and offices. Scientific research using radioactive materials takes place in laboratories all over the world. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, or RTGs, have been used for remote power application. Industrial gauges containing radioactive sources are commonplace. Radiation is used to increase the size and improve the health of crops, and remote beacons stand sentinel for years thanks to radiation's energy. Despite the wide use of radioactive sources, only a small portion of them poses a real threat as potential ingredients in a RDD. I called for this Conference last September in order to raise awareness of those radiological materials that have the greatest potential to result in exposure, contamination, and mass disruption. Your presence here - almost 600 participants from well over 100 countries - is reassuring proof of how seriously we all take the RDD threat. I have said on many occasions - before the IAEA and elsewhere - that taking measures to control dangerous and vulnerable radioactive sources is not just the responsibility of a few nations, but all nations. Each of us must act to create a seamless web of protection and control of high-risk radioactive sources to prevent their malicious use. Each of us must take on this significant responsibility. In the United States, we are evaluating potential vulnerabilities in our control of these materials in order to strengthen our regulatory infrastructure to better account for them, to track their use and disposition, and to ensure appropriate protection during import and export. We are also working to ensure that those using these radioactive sources are authorized to do so and are using them for legitimate purposes. In determining what additional protective measures might be needed, we are using a graded approach that takes into account potential hazards and protective measures already in place. These actions will ensure that the sources of greatest concern do not fall out of regulatory control and become orphaned in the future. In short, we are taking action to lessen the threat of radioactive sources being misused in a RDD. I would like to ask everyone gathered here today, the government representatives and officials in a position to take bold and decisive action, to do the same. Collectively, we can all make a difference. Collectively, we can all reduce the threat of RDDs worldwide. We can all work at home and through IAEA to get the job done. The United States believes that to solve the problems we will discuss today, we must attack them in all their dimensions. That's why I am pleased to announce today a new initiative that I hope will become international in scale. The Radiological Security Partnership is a three-pronged approach to addressing the potential threats from under-secured, high-risk radioactive sources. The first prong is helping countries accelerate and expand national initiatives to keep track of and better secure national inventories of high-risk radioactive sources. In this regard, our new partnership includes a new initiative to provide well over $1 million in technical assistance and equipment to IAEA Member States to facilitate effective tracking of high-risk sources. We are ready to assist other interested countries to speed the needed improvements, and we want to begin immediately. Second, countries need to draw on international resources that can give practical advice and assistance in bringing these sources under control. The United States is currently working with Russia and the IAEA to identify and secure high-risk radioactive sources in the former Soviet Union, and we believe the time has come to broaden that kind of cooperation. To do so, I am pleased to announce a new United States initiative to expand this "Tripartite" model to other countries in need of assistance. It is my hope that this model, which is working so well in the former Soviet Union, will become global in scale. The United States will focus our resources where the need is greatest. Our emphasis will be on developing countries. We are prepared to work with other countries to locate, consolidate, secure, and dispose of high-risk, orphan radiological sources by developing a system of national and regional repositories to consolidate and securely store these sources. The international efforts to choke off the illicit traffic in these sources must also be given highest priority. As I mentioned earlier, the United States is committed to establishing detection choke points at suspected smuggling routes, in order to better detect illicit traffic in radioactive sources. I recently initiated a new Department of Energy project to improve our ability to detect nuclear materials or weapons en route to the United States. As the third prong of our plan, I will now expand this project by focusing on other major transit and shipping hubs, which will improve our efforts to interdict and prevent illicit trafficking in high-risk radioactive sources globally. I am also pleased to announce that next week members of the United States Department of Energy will participate with the IAEA in important consultations that will set technical specifications for border monitoring equipment. This equipment - which in some cases can be as simple and small as the radiation pager I'm holding in my hand - can play a key role in the effectiveness of this critical initiative. By working together on all these dimensions of the threat, we have a chance to make rapid and significant progress toward our shared objective of reducing the potential threats from the highest risk sources. The Radiological Security Partnership is a United States priority. To demonstrate our commitment, the United States plans to contribute $3 million over the next year to support the Partnership. In particular, this money will support our efforts to work with developing countries to secure high-risk sources in their countries. ... Having outlined what my government has done and is willing to do, I want to applaud the work that has already been done by the IAEA and other member states. While this may be the largest conference held on the security of radioactive sources, it is not the first. I am thinking particularly of the 1998 conference in Dijon, which was one of the first to deal with the security aspects of radiological sources. The IAEA Member States are developing a revised Code of Conduct to guide their efforts to better account for under-secured radioactive sources. I understand the drafting work on the code is just about completed, and I applaud the member states for making the Herculean effort this task required. I urge all Member States to review the Code before it comes to the Board of Governors for approval. The United States strongly endorses this process. The IAEA is taking important steps to categorize radioactive sources so the international community better understands which sources pose the greatest security risks. It is also carrying out its model project to help member states improve their national infrastructures and regulatory systems of control. The Agency is taking concrete steps in Moldova and elsewhere to secure at-risk radiological sources, and helping countries establish effective systems for tracking and inventorying these sources. We have already demonstrated our ability to address these problems. For example, the Republic of Georgia, in cooperation with the IAEA, undertook the dangerous task of recovering RTGs that had been left unprotected in the countryside. Thanks to the commitment of the Georgians, the IAEA, and even my own agency, we secured the RTGs in record time. The Georgians, in cooperation with the United States Department of Energy, were also able to upgrade the security of the facility where the RTGs were stored. I have outlined a number of steps that the United States is taking, and I have noted steps that the IAEA has initiated that can truly benefit the international community's ability to get a handle on these problems. I know many of you have also taken important steps, and we will all benefit from your knowledge and experience as we each strive to establish "best practices and procedures" and come to grips with the challenges presented by radiological sources. That is why this Conference is important - it will help all of us to establish a framework for addressing these issues, and taking the critical next steps to protect our citizens and provide for our security. We have a great deal of work to do over the next three days, and a tremendous amount of information to share. We will be hearing from experts from around the world, and we will hear from those who have had to deal with radioactive source problems firsthand. It is my hope and expectation that, as a result of our intensive and wide ranging discussions, we will reach a consensus on steps that can be taken to ensure that the IAEA and other resources are made available to all nations. When we leave this Conference, we will have a few essential steps to take to begin to ensure the security of our nations' - and the world's - radioactive sources:
There is much work ahead for all of us. And this Conference is the place to start. I hope that historians will someday write that our deliberations signaled a turning point - that on March 11, 2003, we began to forge an international consensus on the need to deal urgently and decisively with the most dangerous and vulnerable radioactive source threats. Source: Transcript - Abraham Warns of 'Terrible Threat' from Radiological Weapons, US Department of State (Washington File), March 12. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |