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Withdrawal of Spain-UK-US Resolution on Iraq, March 17: Statements and Reaction

• I. Withdrawal Announcement by UK Ambassador
• II. Comment & Reaction

I. Withdrawal Announcement by UK Ambassador

'We will not pursue a vote on the UK/US/Spanish resolution', Statement by the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, New York, 17 March 2003; Un Mission to the UN, http://www.ukun.org.

I would like to make a statement on behalf of the three co-sponsors of the 7 March Draft Resolution. As you know, we have worked very hard in the last few days in a final effort to seek a Council consensus on Iraq. In an effort to reunite the Council, the United Kingdom proposed last week an ultimatum which would challenge Iraq to take a strategic decision to disarm. There were three key elements to the compromise we propose. First, tough be realisable tests, including an unequivocal commitment to disarmament by Saddam Hussein. Second, a realistic but tight timetable for completion of those tests given the urgent need for Iraq to comply after 12 years of prevarication. And third, an understanding that if Iraq failed the tests serious consequences would ensue as set out in resolution 1441. Having held further discussions with Council members over the weekend and in the last few hours, we have had to conclude that Council consensus will not be possible in line with resolution 1441. One country in particular has underlined its intention to veto any ultimatum 'no matter what the circumstances'. That country rejected our proposed compromise before even the Iraqi government itself and has put forward suggestions that would row back on the unanimous agreement of the Council in resolution 1441 and those suggestions would amount to no ultimatum, no pressure and no disarmament. Given this situation, the co-sponsors have agreed that we will not pursue a vote on the UK/US/Spanish resolution in blue. The communiqués and press statements that issued at the Azores Summit explain the position of our governments on the way forward. The co-sponsors reserve their right to take their own steps to secure the disarmament of Iraq.

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II. Comment & Reaction

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

'Press Encounter with the Secretary-General at the Security Council stakeout, March 17, 2003'; UN News Service, http://www.un.org/News.

Secretary-General Annan: I've just come out of a [Security] Council meeting where we discussed the situation in Iraq. Obviously the members of the Council who had hoped for a long time that it ought to be possible to disarm Iraq peacefully and had hoped to be able to come up with a common position, are today disappointed and frustrated and are worried that they were not able to muster the collective will to find a common basis to move ahead. And obviously, we seem to be at the end of the road here.

Yesterday UNMOVIC, the [International] Atomic [Energy] Agency and myself got information from the United States authorities that it would be prudent not to leave our staff in the region. I have just informed the Council that we will withdraw the UNMOVIC and Atomic Agency inspectors, we will withdraw the UN humanitarian workers, we will withdraw the UNIKOM troops on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border who are also not able to operate. The implication of these withdrawals will mean that the mandates will be suspended because it will be inoperable. We can not, for example, handle the Oil for Food when we do not have inspectors to monitor the imports, we do not have oil inspectors who will monitor exports of oil, and we don't have the humanitarian personnel who will monitor the distribution, receipt and distribution of the food supply. So, I have informed the Council of these suspensions. This does not mean that, should war come to Iraq, the UN will sit back and not do anything to help the Iraqi population. We will find a way of resuming our humanitarian activities to help the Iraqi people who have suffered for so long and do whatever we can to give them assistance and support. And as you know we have undertaken major contingency planning to be able to move forward as soon as we can.

Question: Did you get an authorization from the Security Council to withdraw these inspectors or did you use the measures you have available to you, temporary relocation of the inspectors?

Secretary-General Annan: It is relocation of the inspectors, and the Council has taken note of my decision.

Question: Should the United States go ahead and its allies and use military action against Iraq without UN Security Council authorization, would that be in violation of international law according to you?

Secretary-General Annan: I think my position on that is very clear. The Council will have to discuss that also.

Question: Do you believe part of 1441, is it legal or not legal?

Secretary-General Annan: I think I have made my position very clear on that and I have indicated to you that if ... Let's have a bit of order and calm here... I have made it very clear that in my judgement if the Council were to be able to manage this process successfully and most of the collective will to handle this operation, its own reputation and credibility would have been enhanced. And I have also said if the action is to take place without the support of the Council, its legitimacy will be questioned and the support for it will be diminished. ...

Question: Is today a very sad day for the UN and for the world?

Secretary-General Annan: I think almost every government and peoples around the world had hoped that this issue can be resolved peacefully. In the sense that we are not able to do it peacefully, obviously it is a disappointment and a sad day for everybody. War is always a catastrophe - it leads to major human tragedy, lots of people are going to be uprooted, displaced from their homes and nobody wanted that. And this is why we had hoped that the Iraqi leadership would have cooperated fully and would have been able to do this without resort to use of force. But the little window that we seem to have, seems to be closing very, very fast. I'm not sure at this stage the Council can do anything in the next couple of hours. ...

Question: If there is military action, then what happens?

Secretary-General Annan: Well if there is military action, the Council of course will have to meet to discuss what happens after that. I think I have made it clear that regardless of how this current issue is resolved, the Security Council is going to have a role to play. And I think that was also implied in the communiqué that came out of the Azores. That the UN has an important role to play in the post-conflict Iraq and the Council will have to discuss that. The Council will have to give me a mandate for some of the activities that we will need to undertake. And so this does not mean an end of involvement of the UN in the Iraqi situation.

France

UN Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sabliere

Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sabliere, remarks to the press, the UN Security Council, March 17.

"During the last days, members of the Council repeatedly stated that - and it is a majority in the Council - that it would not be legitimate to authorize the use of force now while the inspections set up by the resolution [1441] are producing results. ... This is the position of the huge majority on the Council. ... And now I understand that the co-sponsors made some bilateral consultations last night and this morning and the result is that the majority of the Council confirms that they do not want to authorize the use of force. The majority considers that it would not be legitimate."

Source: UK, US and Spain won't seek vote on draft resolution, may take 'own steps' to disarm Iraq, UN News Service, March 17.

Spain

UN Ambassador Inocencio Arias

Ambassador Inocencio Arias, remarks to the press, the UN Security Council, March 17.

"Resolution 1441 established in an unequivocal way that any false statement or omission or the sheer fact of not cooperating fully would constitute a further material breach. We believe that the government of Iraq was given a last opportunity and it has squandered it."

Source: UK, US and Spain won't seek vote on draft resolution, may take 'own steps' to disarm Iraq, UN News Service, March 17.

United States

US Secretary of State Colin Powell

'Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Briefing on Situation With Iraq, March 17, 2003', US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman.

Opening Statement

As you know, last fall, in an act of unanimity the Security Council came together following President Bush's historic speech to the United Nations on the 12th of September and on the 8th of November, after long negotiations, passed UN Resolution 1441 by unanimous vote, 15 to zero, not one member failing to raise a hand in support of that resolution. In the months after the passage of UN Resolution 1441, we watched as the inspectors began their work, and we were immediately concerned that Iraq was not going to understand the intention of 1441 when Iraq submitted 30 days later, a declaration that can only be said to be false, not complete, rather, incomplete, not truthful, untruthful and nowhere near meeting the spirit intended in 1441. We called that out to the international community at that time. We said we believed that that false declaration was a material breach. We continued to support the inspectors, we continued to watch, and although we have seen some process improvements and some grudging movement on the part of Saddam Hussein's regime to provide some information and provide some equipment to the inspectors, it certainly wasn't the kind of compliance and total cooperation that 1441 required and that we were hoping but had no illusions about Iraq being able to accept and respond to.

As a result of this and as a result of a number of briefings that we received from UNMOVIC and IAEA, a week and a half ago, the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain put forward a resolution that would once again give Saddam Hussein one last chance to act or face the serious consequences that were authorized and clearly intended in UN Resolution 1441. Unfortunately, over the last roughly two weeks or thereabouts, a little less than two weeks that we have been debating this particular draft resolution, and despite best efforts to see whether or not language could be adjusted to make it more acceptable to Council members, it is clear that there are some permanent members of the Council that would veto any such resolution or any resolution resembling the one that the British tabled Friday before last at the United Nations.

As a result of this, the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain decided to not call for a vote on this resolution. We spent a great deal of time overnight and early this morning talking to friends and colleagues around the world about the resolution and it was our judgment, reached by the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain that no further purpose would be served by pushing this resolution. So we are not going to ask for a vote on the resolution. The resolution will die anyway, because it had a built-in date of 17 March within the resolution, which has not been modified.

As you heard the President and the other leaders who assembled in the Azores yesterday for the Atlantic Summit say, the window on diplomacy is closing. The moment of truth is arriving. And you will hear a speech from the President of the United States this evening. President Bush will address the nation and the world on the situation as we now see it. In his speech, he clearly will issue an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein that the only way to avoid the serious consequences that were built into 1441 is for Saddam Hussein and his immediate cohort to leave the country and to allow this matter to be resolved through the peaceful entry of force and not a conflict. Nevertheless, the President's determination will be made clear tonight that this matter cannot continue indefinitely, that Saddam Hussein is guilty of the charges that have been brought against him previously through these many resolutions which acknowledged that he had weapons of mass destruction and he has failed to disarm himself as required by the various resolutions.

We believe and I think you've also heard an opinion from British legal authorities within the last 24 hours that there is sufficient authority in 1441, 678 and 687, earlier resolutions, for whatever military action might be required.

I'm very, very pleased that the Council did come together last November 8th for 1441, of course disappointed that we were unable to get a subsequent resolution, but we believe that our actions now are supported by international law, whatever actions we might take in the future, and the President will talk to this issue tonight. ... You will also notice that in their statements yesterday at the Atlantic Summit [in The Azores], all of the leaders spoke to a future for Iraq that will be brighter if it comes to the use of military force, where this dictator will no longer be able to oppress his own people, no longer able to threaten his neighbors, and no longer able to develop these horrible weapons which could be used against his neighbors as they have been used in the past, or, of greater concern to us, and spread and be acquired by terrorist organizations which might use them against us, our friends or our interests.

I think it was also important to note in the President's statement yesterday his commitment to the UN and the role that we believe the UN will play in the aftermath of any conflict should it come and our continued support for the UN. ...

Questions and Answers

Question: Mr. Secretary, on the allies... Back in November, when several of them tried to dilute the resolution, and they did accomplish some word changes, would it be fair to say that they understood at the end that force was possible? Because they seem to give the impression they had succeeded in sidetracking force. And could you say if you think there will be permanent damage to the alliance with what the French have done with support from Germany and Russia?

Secretary Powell: On your first question...there can be no confusion on this point. If you remember the debate that we were having before 1441 was passed, there were some nations who insisted that a second resolution would be required. And we insisted that a second resolution would not be required. And as we negotiated our way through that, we made it absolutely clear that we did not believe that the resolution as it finally passed would require a second resolution. And, in fact, the resolution that we are not taking to a vote today is not a resolution that we believe was necessary. It was a resolution we're supporting along with the United Kingdom, who tabled it, and Spain. It was a resolution that would help some of our friends to show to their publics and to the world that we had taken one last step, we had made one last effort to see if Saddam Hussein would come into compliance. The burden of this problem rests squarely on Saddam Hussein and his continuing efforts to deceive, to deny, to do everything to divide the Council, to take advantage of every meeting we have had over the last several months, to do something just before that meeting to suggest that he is complying when he really isn't. And the world should know that this crisis is before us because of this regime and its flagrant violation of obligations that it entered into over the last 12 years. That's where the burden lies.

Question: And is there permanent damage...to the alliance?

Secretary Powell: The UN is an important institution and it will survive, and the United States will continue to be an important member of the United Nations and its various organizations. But, clearly, this is a test, in my judgment, that the Security Council did not meet. We all knew what we were doing last fall. The very reason that we went into a prolonged negotiation on 1441 was so that it did not become the same kind of resolution that we had seen so many times in the past, that had a lot of words, a lot of rhetoric, and Saddam Hussein can simply ignore and thumb his nose at. This was a resolution that every person who voted for it, every permanent representative who was there on the 8th of November and voted for this resolution knew that it was different, that serious consequences would flow, and those serious consequences meant the use of force to disarm Saddam Hussein if he did not comply with that resolution and cooperate fully with the inspectors to disarm that regime. ...

Question: Mr. Secretary, can you give us some things like what has happened over the last 24 hours since the meeting in the Azores? Who were the problems, what kind of conversations did you have, who did you reach out to, and what were the responses?

Secretary Powell: The United Kingdom, obviously, reached out to a number of their colleagues and I can't speak for them; I'll let them cover their own calls and consultations. Similarly, Spain and others. [State Department spokesperson] Richard [Boucher] will give you the list of my calls for this morning, but it's about, oh, 12 or 15. I've spoken to the French. I just spoke to Foreign Minister de Villepin. I spoke to Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer of Germany. I've spoken to Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation. I've spoken to the new Chinese Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister Li. I've spoken to President Musharraf. I have spoken to Kofi Annan. I have spoken to Foreign Minister George Papandreou of Greece, who is also in the Greek Presidency for this period. I have spoken to Foreign Secretary Straw. I've spoken to Foreign Minister Palacios of Spain. And there is a very long list waiting when I get back upstairs. The response was, you know, this is where we are. Does anybody see any prospects for movement on this particular resolution? And, frankly, everybody pretty much accepted that this resolution was not going to be a successful one, because there was one nation, France, that had indicated that it would veto it under any set of circumstances, or any similar resolution as modified that would leave a path open to conflict. But we always knew, from the very beginning, that such a path had to be kept open. And this is what "serious consequences" meant. And without that path, Saddam Hussein would never comply. And what he was trying to do was just stretch it out, more inspections, more time, let's delay, let's give a little here, give a little there, let's see if we can break this consensus. And with the certainty of a French veto and possibly other vetoes, this was not the time to have further division within the Council by taking this to a vote.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you seemed to imply yesterday in one of the shows that you believe French commercial interests helped drive the position. I am wondering if you can elaborate on that. And how firm a guarantee do you have that Turkey won't send its troops well into northern Iraq and cause problems with the Kurds there?

Secretary Powell: I made the point that there - in response to a question, that of course there are commercial interests that everybody has to consider. And the French have for years had difficulties with the inspection regime. And I pointed out in one of the shows yesterday that when you go back to 1998 and early 1999, when the current inspection regime was being developed, when UNMOVIC was being created after the collapse of the previous inspection regime, France worked actively for a number of months, in our judgment, to try to weaken that inspection regime. And, at the end of the day, when compromises had been made and everybody thought we had a good outcome before our time, the previous administration, even then France abstained from voting for it. And so that is a concern to us. But, in 1441, France was solidly on board. And when you look at the statements that were made by French officials right after the passage of 1441, it was absolutely clear that they understood that Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime had weapons of mass destruction. It was not something just known to American intelligence; it's known to all the major intelligence agencies in the world. And France acknowledged that, everybody acknowledged that when they signed on to 1441, because that's what it says. It said, Iraq is in material breach, has been in material breach, and now has the opportunity to get out of the problem or get into further material breach. And what they did was get into further material breach. And that's our judgment and we believe that the test of the resolution has been met with respect to the appropriateness of the application of serious consequences.

Question: And the Turks and the Kurds?

Secretary Powell: ... On the Turks and the situation in northern Iraq, we are in the closest consultation with the Turks and let me say that we are very sensitive to Turkish concerns. We appreciate the fact that the Turkish Government did take our request for deployments into their Parliament at a difficult time for them, with a Prime Minister who was still coming in, so to speak. Mr. Erdogan was not the Prime Minister at that time. And we are in the closest touch with them now on a number of issues. One, the possibility of resubmission and he has committed to do that at a time that he believes is appropriate; and secondly, we don't think it would be useful right now to create any additional tension on the border between Turkey and northern Iraq and we are in discussions with them as to how to make sure that tensions can be kept at the lowest point and not to have difficulty in northern Iraq of a kind that concerns them. And we have also assured the Turks that in anything that the future might hold, we are committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq.

Question: I wanted to ask... just some personal reflections. After 1441 was passed, you were a very, very happy man and certainly it was quite a triumph. How have you been feeling the last few weeks? When did you realize that this was not going to happen? Do you wish you'd done anything differently? Do you wish you'd traveled more? Changed your tactics in any way?

Secretary Powell: Well, you know, this legend that is out there now that Colin Powell, one, he - the first variation of it was, he doesn't travel; and the next variation was, he hates to travel; and the third variation was, he will never travel and doesn't want to travel. You do your job by personal contacts, by contact, by travel and by the use of modern technology so that you can get more bang for the time. And so in the last six weeks, I have had four, personal, one-on-one meetings, direct meetings, with the French Foreign Minister, with the British Foreign Minister, with the Russian Foreign Minister, five such meetings with the Chinese Foreign Minister. I have gone to Davos in Switzerland, where I addressed an international setting and at that meeting I met with the Turkish Prime Minister for almost two hours and the incoming Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Erdogan. I have had the Turkish, a Turkish delegation here in the Department, a full delegation, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister; and they came to my home until midnight as we worked on the economic package. And so I believe that I have used my time properly. At the same time, I went to Asia a few weeks ago, so I travel when I believe travel is appropriate. I'd like to travel more, but you know, the Secretary of State has many responsibilities that he or she has to deal with and one has to balance it all. But I assure you that I do not shrink back from traveling and I will be traveling again soon.

Question: But any regrets? Anything you'd have done differently?

Secretary Powell: No. I mean you can always look and say you should have done this, should have done that, but the fact of the matter is, we came up with a good resolution and we got a solid vote for it, 15-0, and then for a period of four months after that we worked hard with the inspectors, we provided them intelligence. The focus, really, was at the UN in New York, not, you know, a lot of other places. That's where we had to concentrate our effort. And we did everything we could to try to persuade the Council that what they were seeing was not compliance. What they were seeing was passive cooperation that didn't get to the heart of the matter, which was a strategic decision by Saddam Hussein to comply. And that's what we weren't able to get and that's what we weren't able to convince some members of the Council is what was needed in order for us to believe that Saddam Hussein was a changed regime, was leading a changed regime that was willing now to cooperate with the international community and comply with its obligations. ...

Question: Mr. Secretary, you said that the ultimatum would be for Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq. Is there any form of disarmament or cooperation at this stage which could save his skin?

Secretary Powell: I think the time for diplomacy has passed. I think that's pretty clear. That's what the leaders were saying in the Azores yesterday. And we used last evening and this morning to consult broadly around the world. We did, the British did, the Spanish did. A lot of people have been talking to each other this morning and overnight, and it became clear that it would be best at this time to withdraw the resolution, and I can think of nothing that Saddam Hussein could do diplomatically. I think that time is now over. He had his chance. He's had many chances over the last 12 years, and he has blown every one of those chances.

UN Ambassador John Negroponte

'Ambassador Negroponte - Remarks to the Press on Iraq, March 17, 2003', US Mission to the UN, http://www.un.int/usa.

Ambassador Negroponte: It's been four months now since the passage of 1441, which called on the government of Iraq to immediately and unconditionally disarm. It's clear that after this four-month period, they have failed to comply. We sought a resolution that would have stated that Iraq had failed to take advantage of the final opportunity offered to it by Security Council Resolution 1441. In light of the threat of a veto by one of the countries, even though we think the vote would have been close, we decided under the circumstances not to put that resolution to a vote...

Question: How close was that vote?

Ambassador Negroponte: Well, I don't, I don't want to get into that. I think that as we said, we believe it was close and as Ambassador Greenstock said, we think that the atmosphere and the context of our entire discussion was affected by the fact that one permanent member explicitly stated that it was intent on frustrating the purposes of our draft resolution. ...

Question: As President Bush has presented it as a test for the Security Council, would you say the Security Council has failed that test?

Ambassador Negroponte: Well, it was a test, and it's most regrettable, as we said earlier, that in light of the explicit decision of one country to exercise its veto that it was not possible to move this resolution forward. ...

Question: Some of your allies in the Gulf or in the Middle East, they requested or they demanded a resolution from the United Nations for them to join any campaign. How are you going to explain that to them?

Ambassador Negroponte: Well, again, as we said, it's regrettable that a resolution has not been passed, but as Secretary Powell said this morning, we believe that at least as far as we're concerned there is ample authority under Resolutions 678, 687 and all the way through to 1441 for whatever future course of action might be contemplated, and I think that we might find that a number of countries agree with us on that point. ...

Question: ... [Isn't it] illegitimate to take military action without a general consensus? Because the majority of the Council is against, it would not only be the vote of France...

Ambassador Negroponte: In the first place, I do not agree with you that the majority of the Council is against. As I said before, we believe that if it were not for the threat of a veto, it would have been very possible to win passage of our resolution. But, in the second instance...we think that there is full authority in Resolution 1441, Resolution 687 and 678 with regard to the possible use of force. Therefore, we are not going to try to put this resolution to a vote.

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