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'The Nuclear Arms Control Regime Is Being Challenged': Statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, March 17

'Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, 17 March, 2003'; IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org.

Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources

An issue of continuing safety and security concern relates to the control of radioactive sources. Despite the increased level of attention given to this problem since September 2001, many countries still lack the programmes and the resources to properly respond to the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The Agency database of illicit trafficking, combined with reports of discoveries of plans for radiological dispersal devices, makes it clear that there is a market for obtaining and using radiological sources for malevolent purposes. Given the apparent readiness of terrorists to disregard their own personal safety, the personal danger from handling powerful radioactive sources can no longer be seen as an effective deterrent.

A radiological dispersal device, or "dirty bomb," would not necessarily result in widespread fatalities, but the panic and social disruption associated with radiological contamination and radiation exposure correspond exactly to the very purpose of an act of terror. And the fact that no such device has been used to date does not mean that this is not an imminent threat. In that regard, last week here in Vienna the Agency hosted an international conference on security of radioactive sources, co-sponsored by Russia and the USA, with active participation by more than 700 delegates from over 120 Member States. The conference emphasized the need for: assisting States with locating and securing orphaned radioactive sources; encouraging the development of strong national regulatory oversight bodies and national source registries; providing training and assistance on improving border controls and preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials; and promulgating guidance that will help to strengthen these national and international efforts. These actions are consistent with the Agency's existing efforts under the Nuclear Security Action Plan, and we will intensify these efforts based on the conference recommendations.

Nuclear Verification

The nuclear arms control regime is being challenged and is clearly under stress. The challenges include: our current effort to verify Iraq's nuclear capabilities; DPRK's blatant defiance of its NPT safeguards obligations; failure of countries to fulfil their legal obligations to conclude and bring into force safeguards agreements; slow progress on the conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols; and almost total stagnation on moving towards nuclear disarmament and towards universality. For the nuclear arms control regime to maintain its integrity, progress must occur on all these fronts.

Status of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

Despite intensified Agency efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, through regional seminars and visits to capitals, progress remains limited. As a result of the Johannesburg seminar last June, the Board has before it safeguards agreements with additional protocols for Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Seychelles, as well as an additional protocol with Gabon. And since the last meeting of the Board in November, Belgium has completed its statutory requirements for entry into force of its additional protocol, an additional protocol entered into force for Cyprus, and the United Arab Emirates signed a safeguards agreement with the Agency.

But despite this incremental progress, the number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols actually in force continues to be well below expectations. I regret to report again that 48 States have yet to fulfil their obligations under the NPT to bring safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, and that additional protocols have entered into force for only 29 States. As I have often stated, in States without safeguards agreements in force, the Agency cannot provide any non-proliferation assurances, and in States that do not have an additional protocol in force, similar to the situation prior to the Gulf War when we failed to uncover Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme, the assurance provided by the safeguards system remains limited with regard to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. I would reiterate my call on all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force their respective safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

Visit to Iran

Last month I visited the Islamic Republic of Iran, at the invitation of the Government, to discuss its plans for the use of nuclear power as well as information that came to our knowledge last September concerning the development of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Iran. My colleagues and I were able to visit a number of facilities - including a gas centrifuge enrichment pilot plant at Natanz that is nearly ready for operation, and a much larger enrichment facility still under construction at the same site.

During my visit, I emphasized to the Iranian authorities that it is important for all States, and particularly those with sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities, to be fully transparent in their use of nuclear technology. In this connection I stressed the value of bringing an additional protocol into force as an important tool for enabling the Agency to provide comprehensive assurances. During my meetings with President Khatami and other officials, Iran affirmed its obligations under the NPT to use all nuclear technology in the country exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to follow a policy of transparency. To this end it agreed to amend the Subsidiary Arrangements of its safeguards agreement, thereby committing Iran to provide design information on all new nuclear facilities at a much earlier date. And I was assured that the conclusion of an additional protocol will be actively considered. The Secretariat is currently discussing with the Iranian authorities a number of safeguards issues that need to be clarified, and actions that need to be taken.

Status of Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK

Since the last regular meeting of the Board of Governors in November, we have, as you know, held two special sessions related to the status of the Agency's NPT safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). On 12 February, the Board adopted a resolution which confirmed that the agreement remained binding and in force, and called upon the DPRK to urgently remedy its non-compliance with the agreement. The Board also decided to report the DPRK's further non-compliance, and the Agency's continuing inability to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material subject to safeguards in the DPRK, to all Agency Member States and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In parallel, the Board stressed its continuing desire for a peaceful resolution of this issue.

On the day the resolution was adopted, I transmitted the Board's resolution to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. I also sent letters to the Presidents of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly to inform both organs of the Board's resolution. Since that time, my letter to the DPRK has elicited no response, and no positive developments have been reported as a result of the various diplomatic initiatives that have taken place. Regrettably, recent reports indicate that the DPRK has restarted its 5 MW reactor at Nyongbyong. Clearly, the operation of this facility without the appropriate safeguards is in violation of the DPRK's safeguards agreement. At this stage, the Agency cannot provide any assurance about the DPRK's nuclear activities, and we are unable to verify that its nuclear material has not been diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I continue to urge all parties to the NPT and in particular the parties directly concerned to accelerate their efforts to bring the DPRK into full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations.

Inspections in Iraq

With regard to Iraq, I am able to report that, since the resumption of nuclear weapons inspections pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolutions a little over three months ago, the Agency has made progress in identifying what nuclear related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt. To date we have found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.

I should note that, in recent weeks, possibly as a result of increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been more forthcoming in its co-operation with the IAEA. I should also note that over the weekend, both Dr. Blix and I received an invitation from the Iraqi authorities to visit Iraq with a view to accelerating the implementation of our respective mandates.

Late last night, however, I was advised by the United States Government to pull out our inspectors from Baghdad. Similar advice has been given to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). I immediately informed the President of the Security Council and asked for guidance. I also informed the United Nations Secretary-General. I understand that the Security Council will take up the issue today. Naturally, the safety of our staff remains our primary consideration at this difficult time. I earnestly hope - even at this late hour - that a peaceful resolution of the issue can be achieved, and that the world can be spared a war. ...

Conclusion

The Agency's verification role is currently in the spotlight, but the state-of-the-art verification regime we are trying to build will be effective only if all Member States fulfil their respective legal obligations. We are continuing to press for a comprehensive and effective nuclear safety regime - but pockets of weakness remain, in both the nuclear and the radiation safety areas. In the nuclear security area, the Secretariat has made intensive efforts to prepare and implement an action plan - which is already making a positive impact - but much remains to be done, including better control of radioactive sources. Nuclear technologies provide significant opportunities for economic and social development - but we need to work together to maximize the benefits and minimize the risks of these technologies. In regard to all of our activities, I am reminded of the words of Adlai Stevenson in 1952, "There is no evil in the atom; only in men's souls".

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