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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation A Peaceful Path to Disarmament? Presentation of Draft UNMOVIC/IAEA Work Programmes, UN Security Council Meeting on Iraq, March 19
I. 'I Naturally Feel Sadness': Statement by UNMOVIC Executive Chair Hans Blix'Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix Introduction of draft UNMOVIC Work Programme, Security Council, 19 March, 2003'; United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), http://www.unmovic.org. UNMOVIC was established by the Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and was enabled to enter Iraq and carry out its inspection work almost three years later. It might seem strange that we are presenting a draft work programme only after having already performed inspections for three and a half months. However, there were good reasons why the Council wanted to give us some time after the start of inspections to prepare this programme. During the months of the build up of our resources in Iraq, Larnaca and New York and of inspections in Iraq we have - as was indeed the purpose - learnt a great deal that has been useful to know for the drafting of our work programme and for the selection of key remaining disarmament tasks. It would have been difficult to draft it without this knowledge and this practical experience. The time lines established in resolution 1284 (1999) have been understood to mean that the work programme was to be presented for the approval of the Council at the latest on 27 March. In order to meet the wishes of members of the Council we made the Draft Work Programme available already on Monday this week. I note that on the very same day we were constrained together with other UN units to order the withdrawal of all our inspectors and other international staff from Iraq. I naturally feel sadness that three and a half months of work carried out in Iraq have not brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items in Iraq, that no more time is available for our inspections and that armed action now seems imminent. At the same time I feel a sense of relief that it was possible to withdraw yesterday all UN international staff, including that of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. I note that the Iraqi authorities gave full cooperation to achieve this and that our withdrawal to Larnaca took place in a safe and orderly manner. Some sensitive equipment was also taken to Larnaca, while other equipment was left and our offices in Baghdad have been sealed. Some inspection staff will remain for a short time in Larnaca to prepare inspection reports. Others who have come from our roster of trained staff, will go home to their previous positions and could be available again, if the need arises. I would like further to make some specific comments that relate to the Draft Programme. I am aware of ideas which have been advanced that specific groups of disarmament issues could be tackled and solved within specific time lines. The programme does not propose such an approach, in which, say, we would aim at addressing and resolving the issues of anthrax and VX in March and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) in April. In the work we pursued until now we worked broadly and did not neglect any identified disarmament issues. However, it is evidently possible for the Council to single out a few issues for resolution within a specific time, just as the draft programme before you selects twelve key tasks progress on which could have an impact on the Council's assessment of cooperation of Iraq under resolution 1284 (1999). Whatever approach is followed, results will depend on Iraq's active cooperation on substance. May I add that in my last report I commented on information provided by Iraq on a number of unresolved issues. Since then, Iraq has sent several more letters on such issues. These efforts by Iraq should be acknowledged, but, as I noted in this Council on 7 March the value of the information thus provided must be soberly judged. Our experts have found so far that in substance only limited new information has been provided that will help to resolve remaining questions. Under resolution 1284 (1999) UNMOVIC's work programme is to be submitted to the Council for approval. I note, however, that what was drafted and prepared for implementation by a large staff of UNMOVIC inspectors and other resources deployed in Iraq, would seem to have only limited practical relevance in the current situation. UNMOVIC is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council. Until the Council takes a new decision regarding the role and functions of the Commission, the previous resolutions remain valid to the extent this is practicable. It is evidently for the Council to consider the next steps. In its further deliberations I hope the Council will be aware that it has in UNMOVIC staff a unique body of international experts who owe their allegiance to the United Nations, and who are trained as inspectors in the field of weapons of mass destruction. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a large department of skilled nuclear inspectors and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has a large staff of skilled chemical weapons inspectors, no other international organizations have trained inspectors in the field of biological weapons and missiles. There is also in the secretariat of UNMOVIC staff familiar with and trained in the analysis, both of discipline specific issues and in the broad questions of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. With increasing attention being devoted to the proliferation of these weapons this capability may be valuable to the Council. II. UNMOVIC Work Programme'Draft Work Programme', United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, March 17, presented to the United Nations Security Council, March 19; full 83-page text of Programme and Annexes available as a pdf file on the UNMOVIC website, http://www.unmovic.org. Draft Work Programme1. This document is being presented pursuant to operative paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), which requires the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to submit, for approval by the Security Council, a Work Programme for the discharge of its mandate. ... Unresolved Disarmament Issues9. The unresolved disarmament issues have recently been listed in the form of clusters and been described in the working document of 6 March 2003, which was presented informally to the Security Council. In the identification of these issues, a number of sources, such as the UNSCOM (S/1999/94) and Amorim reports (S/1999/356), UNSCOM inspection reports for the period from the end of 1998, and various declarations and documents of Iraq...were consulted. For the period from the establishment of UNMOVIC until the resumption of inspections in November 2002, reliance had to be placed on sources such as overhead imagery, published material, suppliers and intelligence. Account was taken of the information supplied by Iraq in its "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration" (CAFCD) of 7 December 2002 and other documents it had provided prior to, and since the resumption of, inspections. The results of those inspections and UNMOVIC's rebaselining activities constituted another important source of information. The working document of 6 March is an evolving one, and will be adjusted in the light of any new developments and the results of inspections and new information supplied from the Iraqi side. There has also been a good deal of destruction of missiles and missile related equipment, which will be taken into account. 10. In its CAFCD of 7 December 2002, Iraq stated that it had not pursued any proscribed activities in the period 1998 to the present day. However, this statement has been contradicted by reports from a variety of sources, and some further disarmament issues have now been identified as being unresolved for the period after 1998. Particular attention has been drawn to the possible existence of mobile CW and BW agent production facilities, of underground facilities involved with research and indigenous production of CW and BW agents, the movement of proscribed materials around Iraq to avoid detection, and to a surge of activity in the missile technology field. 11. It should also be noted that disarmament issues could exist, which neither the inspecting organizations nor any other authority outside Iraq is aware of. If and when such issues are identified as a result of inspections or intelligence information, they will be addressed, and it cannot be excluded that some such issues will be deemed to be of high priority. In such an event, additions to the list of key remaining disarmament tasks would, as appropriate, be made with the approval of the Security Council. Key Remaining Disarmament Tasks12. UNMOVIC has had extensive discussions in the past with the College of Commissioners on the question of criteria for the selection of key disarmament tasks. In selecting the key remaining disarmament tasks, primary importance has been given to the level of danger or threat the respective weapon or other item would pose, should it exist. In determining the level of danger of the different items, aspects such as shelf life and viability, readiness for deployment or use, lethality, quantities, indigenous capabilities have been taken into account. The distinction between disarmament issues requiring resolution and outstanding questions that may be dealt with through a refined system of monitoring and verification is not always easy to make. 13. The selection of key tasks is inevitably a matter of judgment. For this reason, it was particularly important that the initial selection made by UNMOVIC was submitted to the members of the College of Commissioners. Their advice has been taken into account in the selection made in this document. While the advice given by individual members naturally varied, the selection now advanced by UNMOVIC has substantial support. The three months of inspections and rebaselining have been of great value to give UNMOVIC a better sense of which issues it should pursue with priority. 14. The disarmament tasks identified as key have been selected from the cluster of issues presented in the document of 6 March... For each key issue, a statement of actions that Iraq can take to resolve the issue is indicated in as clear terms as possible. ... It should be noted that the suggested actions are sometimes alternative and may not be exhaustive. Other possible actions that could solve the issues are not excluded. The actions are not listed in any other order of priority than that the first solution, if at all applicable, is the presentation of any remaining proscribed item. While it is generally possible to define a disarmament issue that is to be resolved, a comprehensive definition of the ways in which this could be achieved is often difficult. 15. Following is a list of the issues which UNMOVIC has identified as key disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq. They are set out in detail in Annex 1. Annex 2 contains the background information relating to each task identified, under a heading relating to that task.
16. Iraq has the primary duty to help resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks: to present proscribed items, to provide documents and other evidence, to present witnesses for interviews, etc. At the same time, UNMOVIC will use all its resources to verify Iraq's declarations and evidence presented. It will thus contribute actively to the resolution of unresolved disarmament issues as well as the key remaining disarmament tasks of Iraq. ... Timelines23. The Security Council resolutions provide only limited guidance on timelines, and no timelines or phases have been included in this Work Programme for the completion of individual tasks. Clearly, Iraq's cooperation is decisive for the early resolution of issues. In resolution 1284 (1999), the Security Council has set a period of 120 days after UNMOVIC has become fully operational to measure the extent of Iraq's cooperation and progress achieved in the completion of key disarmament tasks, with a view to suspending economic restrictions. The most recent resolution, 1441 (2002), injects a greater sense of urgency and has provided Iraq with a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. 24. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, it will take some time to verify the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The same is true for the resolution of key disarmament tasks. UNMOVIC will pursue all key issues in the work programme simultaneously and with the same priority. Apart from the extent of Iraqi cooperation, the time needed will also depend on the nature of the verification required to resolve the respective issue. It is evident that the presentation and destruction of proscribed missiles can be done and verified in a very short time - even days or weeks. The same could be true of CBW agents if they exist and are presented. The resolution may be more difficult and time consuming in cases where verification relates to the absence of an item which may require the submission of documents, sample analyses or conducting interviews, etc. In both cases it is estimated - still assuming a proactive Iraqi cooperation - that the time necessary to complete the work programme is months rather than weeks or years. Verified disarmament, once achieved, would still need to be followed by a long-term inspection and monitoring effort that would give confidence and strike an alarm if signs were seen of a revival by Iraq of any proscribed weapons programme. 25. The Work Programme will become effective immediately upon its approval by the Security Council. Annex 1: Key Remaining Disarmament Tasks - Actions That Iraq Can Take to Resolve the Issues Identified BelowI. Scud Missiles and Associated Biological and Chemical Warheads
II. SA-2 Missile Technology
III. Research and Development (R&D) on Missiles Capable of Proscribed Ranges
IV. Munitions for Chemical and Biological Agent Fill (CBW)
V. Spray devices and Remote Piloted Vehicles (RPVs)/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
VI. VX and Its Precursors
VII. Mustard and Its Precursors
VIII. Sarin, Cyclosarin and Their Precursors
IX. Anthrax and Its Drying
X. Botulinum Toxin
XI. Undeclared Agents, Including Smallpox
XII. Any Proscribed Activities Post 1998
III. IAEA Work Programme'The Work Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999)', Presented to the United Nations Security Council, March 19; IAEA website, http://www.iaea.org. In paragraph 7 of resolution 1284 (1999), the Security Council decided that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), "not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will each draw up, for approval by the Council, a work programme for the discharge of their mandates, which will include both the implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance." The Security Council further decided "that what was required of Iraq for the implementation of each task should be clearly defined and precise." The IAEA considers that it started work as of 27 January 2003, the date the IAEA submitted the update required of it pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002). Accordingly, the IAEA hereby submits its work programme for the discharge of its mandate under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Objectives of IAEA Inspection, Verification and MonitoringThe objective of IAEA verification is to assess Iraq's nuclear activities with a view to providing assurances to the international community of Iraq's compliance with its disarmament obligations. The basic tool for achieving that objective is observation and analysis through on-site inspection and technical measures, including environmental and material sampling, surveillance and remote monitoring, and overall analysis and assessment combining data derived during inspections and from all other sources. In fulfilling its responsibilities under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and other related resolutions, the IAEA has two specific mandates:
While the implementation of these two mandates is intended to be sequential, inspections are, as they are for IAEA verification in general, essential for the achievement of both. In fact, many of the inspection techniques and procedures employed by the IAEA in its disarmament activities (i.e., those designed to detect and dismantle prohibited equipment, materials and activities) and its monitoring activities (those designed to provide assurance of the absence of prohibited equipment, materials and activities) are essentially the same. Among those measures are the continuous systematic analysis and assessment of all information available to the IAEA from its inspection activities, Iraqi declarations and clarifications, and information provided by other States. Status of Iraq's Nuclear-Related Capabilities as of December 1998At the time inspections were brought to a halt in December 1998, the IAEA had been able to draw a coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme, and to dismantle what was known of that programme. As reported to the Council in S/1997/779, S/1998/927 and S/1999/127, the IAEA had concluded with respect to Iraq's past nuclear programme that: a. There were no indications to suggest that Iraq had been successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons. b. All nuclear material of significance to Iraq's nuclear weapons programme was verified and fully accounted for, and all nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) was removed from Iraq. c. Iraq had successfully concentrated uranium from its own ore and produced industrial quantities of feed material (UCl4) for electromagnetic isotopic separation (EMIS). There were no indications that the production of feed material for centrifuge enrichment (UF6) went beyond laboratory level. d. Iraq had been at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of high enriched uranium through the EMIS process and the production and pilot cascading of single-cylinder sub-critical gas centrifuge machines. However, there were no indications to suggest that Iraq had produced more than a few grams of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material through its indigenous processes. e. Iraq had explored several other enrichment routes, including gaseous diffusion, chemical enrichment and laser enrichment without achieving any significant progress. f. Iraq had made major progress in the area of weaponisation, but still had significant hurdles to overcome before being able to complete the fabrication of a first nuclear implosion device. g. There were no indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of nuclear-weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance. h. There were no indications of significant discrepancies between the technically coherent picture which had evolved of Iraq's past programme and the information contained in the "Full, Final and Complete Declaration" (FFCD) submitted by Iraq to the IAEA, pursuant to resolution 707 (1991), in 1996, and supplemented in 1998. As of December 1998, there were no unresolved disarmament issues in the nuclear area, although there were a number of questions and concerns about Iraq's past nuclear programme the clarification of which by Iraq would have reduced the uncertainty in the completeness of the IAEA's knowledge and understanding, including, in particular, the uncertainty about the progress made in weapons design and centrifuge development due to the lack of relevant documentation. As stated in earlier reports, the questions and concerns remaining as of December 1998 are not an impediment to the full implementation of the IAEA's OMV Plan and their existence has already been factored into the Plan. Because of the suspension of the IAEA's Security Council mandated verification activities in Iraq between 16 December 1998 and 27 November 2002, the key - and only - current issue of disarmament relevance with respect to Iraq's nuclear activities is whether Iraq revived or attempted to revive its defunct nuclear weapons programme over that time. IAEA Activities Since the Resumption of InspectionsOn 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted to the IAEA its "Currently Accurate Full and Complete Declaration" (CAFCD) as requested by the Council in resolution 1441 (2002). In that document, Iraq declared that, "No activities of any substance related to the former Iraqi Nuclear Programme were carried out during and beyond April 1991. All nuclear program activities were practically terminated and abandoned during April 1991 and only reports of previous accomplishments and new missions (non-proscribed) were issued later." As reported in the IAEA's update report of 27 January 2003, and confirmed in the subsequent statements of the Director General before the Security Council on 14 February and 7 March 2003, the IAEA has found to date no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. As indicated above, there were no unresolved disarmament issues as of December 1998, although the absence of the inspectors from Iraq for the four following years gave rise to the need to re-establish knowledge about the possibility of nuclear-related activities in Iraq. To achieve that, the IAEA focused first on re-establishing rapidly its knowledge of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, ensuring that nuclear activities at known key facilities had not been resumed, verifying the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, and identifying the current workplaces of former key Iraqi personnel. The focus then shifted to identifying what, if any, activities of relevance had been conducted by Iraq over the last four years, in particular in areas identified by States as being of concern and those identified by the IAEA on the basis of its own analysis, such as changes in site infrastructures observed through satellite imagery and reported attempts by Iraq to import nuclear material and to revive centrifuge enrichment activities. The main areas where substantive progress has been made are:
However, there remain a number of actions to be completed before the IAEA is in a position to provide the international community with the assurance that Iraq has not resumed its nuclear weapons programme, and to move to implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification:
The IAEA's Work ProgrammeThe nature and content of the work programme are based on an understanding of Iraq's past achievements and of its current capabilities that could support nuclear or nuclear-related activities. The work programme nevertheless also anticipates actions that might need to be taken in the event of the discovery of new information giving rise to concerns about the resumption by Iraq of its nuclear programme. Key Remaining TasksFor the IAEA to resolve the key issue of whether Iraq had revived or attempted to revive its nuclear weapons programme between 1998 and 2002, there are a number of key tasks that need to be implemented by Iraq, as identified below. Although Iraq has initiated work on many of these tasks, Iraq should, within two to three months:
The IAEA's detailed knowledge of Iraqi capabilities - combined with the extended rights provided by resolution 1441 (2002), continued accelerated and expanded Iraqi cooperation and the commitment by all States to help us fulfil our mandate - should enable us, barring exceptional circumstances, within a few months, to provide the Security Council with an objective and through assessment of whether Iraq has revived or attempted to revive its nuclear weapons programme. It is important to emphasize that the verification process always has some degree of uncertainty, and cannot provide absolute guarantees regarding the absence of small-scale nuclear activities, such as simulations on personal computers or laboratory work by a few scientists. Iraq's direct acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material would also present a severe technical challenge to verification and great reliance must be placed on international controls. Nevertheless, an intrusive inspection system such as that which the IAEA implements in Iraq can minimize the risk of prohibited activities going undetected, and deter, through the risk of early detection, the revival of a nuclear weapons programme. Therefore, it is important, particularly in light of Iraq's past record of cooperation to continue to evaluate Iraq's capabilities as part of equally intrusive long term monitoring and verification in order to provide the international community with ongoing and timely assurances. Ongoing Monitoring and VerificationThe basis of the IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification system remains the plan approved by the Security Council through resolution 715 (1991). As foreseen in 1991, and as implemented through December 1998, ongoing monitoring and verification will entail: comprehensive and regular reporting by Iraq on its activities, as well as on its exports and imports; unconditional and immediate access for unannounced inspections at any site deemed necessary by the IAEA, regardless of whether the site has been previously inspected; the conduct of location-specific and wide-area environmental monitoring, including the collection of various types of samples; real time monitoring for the detection of radiation signatures; and the introduction of new technologies and methods of verification. Ongoing monitoring and verification will be reinforced taking into account resolution 1441 (2002), which grants the Agency additional authority that may be exercised in the context of the implementation of the OMV Plan, particularly in requiring broader information on personnel and non-weapons related nuclear programmes, and with respect to interviews, that would improve the efficiency of its monitoring activities, thereby enabling the IAEA to provide a higher level of assurance to the international community with regard to Iraq's compliance with its obligations. While often associated with the investigation process, technical meetings with and interviews of Iraqi personnel will remain a key tool for ongoing monitoring and verification. Drawing on the reinforced rights set out in resolution 1441 (2002), the IAEA intends to make continued use of such measures, in particular private interviews with Iraqi personnel in accordance with the IAEA's preferred modalities and locations. The IAEA is also expanding its capabilities to monitor imports by and exports to Iraq. In this regard, the IAEA intends to hire more customs and procurement experts to review, process and follow up the voluminous data acquired by the IAEA in the course of implementing its responsibilities under Security Council resolution 1409 (2002). The IAEA is also planning on expanding the number of inspectors and technicians in the field as well as analysts and support staff at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna. The expansion of the IAEA's capability to do near-real-time monitoring of dual-use equipment and related activities is scheduled to take place as soon as feasible. In addition, several other components of wide-area environmental monitoring aimed at identifying fingerprints left by nuclear material and nuclear related activities will be implemented. With a view to preparing for field activities and, when necessary, monitoring movements in and around sites to be inspected, the IAEA is planning to also make use of aerial surveillance from all available platforms, including U2s, Mirage IVs, Antonovs and drones. Should the IAEA be able to implement fully its reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification, and assuming full and active cooperation by Iraq, the IAEA would be able to provide the Security Council with continuous credible assurances of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. IV: Statements in the Security Council'This Is A Sad Day for the United Nations': UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan'The Secretary-General, Statement to the Security Council, New York, 19 March 2003'; UN website, http://www.un.org/News. Needless to say, I fully share the regrets expressed by many members of the Council at the fact that it has not been possible to reach a common position. Whatever our differing views on this complex issue, we must all feel that this is a sad day for the United Nations and the international community. I know that millions of people around the world share this sense of disappointment, and are deeply alarmed by the prospect of imminent war. Let me here pay tribute to the United Nations staff - both international and Iraqi - who have worked so hard in Iraq up to the last possible moment. That includes the inspectors, whose work has now sadly been suspended. I would like to pay special tribute to Dr. Blix, Dr. ElBaradei and Lopes da Silva, the Humanitarian Coordinator, under whose leadership the staff worked in Iraq. Mr. President, it is the plight of the Iraqi people which is now my most immediate concern, and I have been glad to hear that sentiment shared by all the speakers in this debate. In the past twenty years, Iraqis have been through two major wars, internal uprisings and conflict, and more than a decade of debilitating sanctions. The country's vital infrastructure has been devastated, so that it no longer meets the most basic needs for clean water, health or education. Already, Iraq's most vulnerable citizens - the elderly, women and children, and the disabled - are denied basic health care for lack of medicine and medical equipment. Already, nearly one million Iraqi children suffer from chronic malnutrition. Already, Iraqis are heavily dependent on the food ration which is handed out each month to every family in the country. For more than sixty per cent of the population, this ration is their main source of income. Yet many families have to sell part of it to buy clothes or other essentials for their children. All that is true as we speak. And in the short term, the conflict that is now clearly about to start can only make things worse - perhaps much worse. I am sure all members of this Council will agree that we must do everything we can to mitigate this imminent disaster, which could easily lead to epidemics and starvation. Under international law, the responsibility for protecting civilians in conflict falls on the belligerents; in any area under military occupation, responsibility for the welfare of the population falls on the occupying power. Without in any way assuming or diminishing that ultimate responsibility, we in the United Nations will do whatever we can to help. As you know, the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations have for some time been engaged in preparing for this contingency, even while we hoped it could still be averted. We have done our best to assess the possible effects of war, in terms of population displacement and human need, and to position our personnel and equipment accordingly. For these preparations we requested 123.5 million dollars from donors a month ago, but only 45 million have been pledged, and 34 million dollars received, to date. I'm afraid we shall very soon be coming back with an appeal for much larger sums, to finance actual relief operations - and I earnestly hope that Member States will respond with generosity and speed. We have also examined the situation caused by the suspension of the activities of the Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq, and ways that the Programme could be adjusted temporarily, to enable us to continue providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq during and after hostilities. Such adjustments would require decisions by this Council. I will therefore submit my specific proposals for the Council's consideration - as suggested in your note, Mr. President. In conclusion, Mr. President, let me express the hope that the effort to relieve the sufferings of the Iraqi people, and to rehabilitate their society after so much destruction, may yet prove to be the task around which the unity of this Council can be rebuilt. 'The Path We Mapped Out Together In The Context Of Resolution 1441 Still Exists': A Few Hours Before The Weapons Sound': French Foreign Minister Dominique de VillepinWe are meeting here today, a few hours before the weapons sound, to exchange our convictions again in observance of our respective commitments, but also to outline together the paths that must allow us to recover the spirit of unity. I wish to reiterate here that for France war can only be the exception, and collective responsibility the rule. Whatever our aversion for Saddam Hussein's cruel regime, that holds true for Iraq and for all the crises that we will have to confront together. 1. To Mr. Blix, who presented his work program to us, and Mr. ElBaradei, who was represented today, I want to say thank you for the sustained efforts and results achieved. Their program is a reminder that there is still a clear and credible prospect for disarming Iraq peacefully. It proposes and prioritizes the tasks for such disarmament and presents a realistic timetable for their implementation. In doing so the report confirms what we all know here: Yes, the inspections are producing tangible results. Yes, they offer the prospect of effective disarmament through peaceful means and in shorter time-frames. The path we mapped out together in the context of resolution 1441 still exists. In spite of the fact that it has been interrupted today, we know that it will have to resume as soon as possible. The Council took note two days ago of the Secretary-General's decision to withdraw the inspectors and all UN personnel from Iraq. The discharge of their mandates has consequently been suspended. It will be necessary when the time comes to complete our knowledge about Iraq's programs and finish disarming Iraq. The contribution of the inspectors will be decisive at that time. 2. Make no mistake about it: the choice is indeed between two visions of the world. To those who choose to use force and think they can resolve the world's complexity through swift and preventive action, we offer in contrast determined action over time. For today, to ensure our security, all the dimensions of the problem must be taken into account: both the manifold crises and their many facets, including cultural and religious. Nothing lasting in international relations can be built therefore without dialogue and respect for the other, without exigency and abiding by principles, especially for the democracies that must set the example. To ignore this is to run the risk of misunderstanding, radicalization and spiraling violence. This is even more true in the Middle East, an area of fractures and ancient conflicts where stability must be a major objective for us. To those who hope to eliminate the dangers of proliferation through armed intervention in Iraq, I wish to say that we regret that they are depriving themselves of a key tool for other crises of the same type. The Iraq crisis allowed us craft an instrument, through the inspections regime, which is unprecedented and can serve as an example. Why, on this basis not envision establishing an innovative, permanent structure, a disarmament body under the United Nations? To those who think that the scourge of terrorism will be eradicated through the case of Iraq, we say they run the risk of failing in their objectives. The outbreak of force in this area which is so unstable can only exacerbate the tensions and fractures on which the terrorists feed. 3. Over and above our division, we have a collective responsibility in the face of these threats, the responsibility to recover the unity of the international community. The United Nations must remain mobilized in Iraq to aid this objective. Together, we have duties to assume in this perspective:
4. Our mobilization must also extend to the other threats that we have to address together. Given the very nature of these threats, it is no longer possible today to address them in any old order. By way of example, terrorism is fueled by organized crime networks; it cleaves to the contours of lawless areas; it thrives on regional crises; it garners support from the divisions in the world; it utilizes all available resources, from the most rudimentary to the most sophisticated, from the knife to the weapons of mass destruction it is trying to acquire. To deal with this reality, we must act in a united way and on all fronts at the same time. 5. So we must remain constantly mobilized. In this spirit France renews its call for the heads of state and government to meet here in the Security Council to respond to the major challenges confronting us. Let us intensify our fight against terrorism. Let us fight mercilessly against its networks with all the economic, juridical and political weapons available to us. Let us give new impetus to the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. France has already proposed that our heads of state and government meet on the sidelines of the next General Assembly to define together the new priorities for our action. Let us recover the initiative in the regional conflicts that are destabilizing entire regions. I am thinking in particular of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. How much suffering must the peoples of the region still endure for us to force the doors to peace? Let us not resign ourselves to the irreparable. In a world where the threat is asymmetrical, where the weak defy the strong, the power of conviction, the capacity to convince, the ability to sway opinion count as much as the number of divisions. They do not replace them. But they are the indispensable aids of a state's influence. 6. Faced with this new world, it is imperative that the action of the international community should be guided by principles. First of all, respect for law. The keystone of international order, it must apply in all circumstances, but even more so when the gravest decision is to be made: to use force. Only on this condition can force be legitimate. Only on this condition can it restore order and peace. Next, the defense of freedom and justice. We must not compromise with what is central to our values. We will be listened to and heeded only if we are inspired by the very ideals of the United Nations. Lastly, the spirit of dialogue and tolerance. Never have the peoples of the world aspired so forcefully to its respect. We must listen to their appeal. As we see clearly, the United Nations has never been so necessary. It is up to this body to harness all the resolve to meet these challenges. Because the United Nations is the place where international rules and legitimacy are founded. Because it speaks in the name of peoples. In response to the clash of arms there must be a single upwelling of the spirit of responsibility, voice and gesture from the international community that is gathered here in New York, in the Security Council. This is in the interest of all: the countries engaged in the conflict, the states and peoples in the region, the international community as a whole. Confronted with a world in crisis, we have a moral and political obligation to restore the threads of hope and unity. The judgment of future generations will depend on our capacity to meet this great challenge - in furtherance of our values, our common destiny and peace. Source: Address by His Excellency Dominique de Villepin, French Minister of Foreign Affairs before the United Nations Security Council, March 19, 2003, French Mission to the UN, http://www.un.int/france. 'No One Can Seriously Believe That Disarmament Wars Are The Way Forward!': German Foreign Minister Joschka FischerThe Security Council is meeting here today in a dramatic situation. At this moment, the world is facing an imminent war in Iraq. The Security Council cannot remain silent in this situation. Today more than ever, our task must be to safeguard its function and to preserve its relevance. We have come together once more in New York today to emphasize that. The developments of the last few hours have radically changed the international situation and brought the work of the United Nations on the ground to a standstill. These developments are cause for the deepest concern. Nevertheless, I would like to thank Dr. Blix for his briefing on the work program. Germany fully supports his approach, even under the current circumstances. The work program with its realistic description of the unresolved disarmament issues now lies before us. It provides clear and convincing guidelines on how to disarm Iraq peacefully within a short space of time. I want to stress this fact, particularly today. It is possible to disarm Iraq peacefully by upholding these demands with tight deadlines. Peaceful means have therefore not been exhausted. Also for that reason, Germany emphatically rejects the impending war. We deeply regret that our considerable efforts to disarm Iraq using peaceful means in accordance with SC Resolution 1441 seem to have no chance of success. Time and again during the last few weeks, we have collaborated with France and Russia to put forward proposals for a more efficient inspections regime consisting of clear disarmament steps with deadlines - most recently on 15 March. Other members also submitted constructive proposals until the final hours of the negotiations. We are grateful to them for their efforts. During the last few days, we have moved significantly closer to our common objective: Namely, that of effectively countering the risk posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction with complete and comprehensive arms control. Especially in recent weeks, substantial progress was made in disarmament. The scrapping of the Al Samoud missiles made headway: 70 of them have now been destroyed. And - Dr. Blix pointed this out - the regime in Baghdad is beginning under pressure to clear up the unanswered questions on VX and anthrax. Iraq's readiness to cooperate was unsatisfactory. It was hesitant and slow. The Council agrees on that. But can this seriously be regarded as grounds for war with all its terrible consequences? There is no doubt that, particularly in recent weeks, Baghdad has begun to cooperate more. The information Iraq has provided to UNMOVIC and the IAEA are steps in the right direction. Baghdad is meeting more and more of the demands contained in the SC Resolutions. But why should we now - especially now - abandon our plan to disarm Iraq with peaceful means? The majority of the Security Council members believe that there are no grounds for breaking off the disarmament process carried out under the supervision of the United Nations now. In this connection, I would like to make the following three points:
Germany is convinced that the United Nations and the Security Council must continue to play the central role in the Iraq conflict. This is crucial to world order and must continue to be the case in future. The UN is the key institution for the preservation of peace and stability and for the peaceful reconciliation of interests in the world of today and of tomorrow. There is no substitute for its function as a guardian of peace. The Security Council bears the primary responsibility for world peace and international security. The negotiations on the Iraq crisis, which were followed by millions of people worldwide during the last few weeks and months, have shown how relevant and how indispensable the peacemaking role of the Security Council is. There is no alternative to this. We continue to need an effective international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. This can eliminate the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using the instruments developed in this process to make the world a safer place. The United Nations is the only appropriate framework for this. No-one can seriously believe that disarmament wars are the way forward! We are deeply concerned about the humanitarian consequences of a war in Iraq. Our task now is to do everything we possibly can to avert a humanitarian disaster. The UN Secretary-General is to present proposals on this. Yesterday, the Security Council declared its readiness to take up these proposals. With the Oil-for-Food program, the UN has provided sixty per cent of the Iraqi population with essential supplies. This experience must be used in future. A very large majority of people in Germany and Europe are greatly troubled by the impending war in Iraq. Our continent has experienced the horrors of war only too often. Those who know our European history understand that we do not live on Venus but, rather, that we are the survivors of Mars. War is terrible. It is a great tragedy for those affected and for us all. It can only be the very last resort when all peaceful alternatives really have been exhausted. Nevertheless, Germany has accepted the necessity of war on two occasions during the last few years because all peaceful alternatives had proved unsuccessful. Germany fought side by side with its allies in Kosovo to prevent the mass deportation of the Albanian population and to avert an impending genocide. It did likewise in Afghanistan to combat the brutal and dangerous terrorism of the Taliban and al Qaeda after the terrible attacks on the government and the people of the United States. And we will stick to our commitment in this war against terror. Today, however, we in Germany do not believe that there is no alternative to military force as the last resort. On the contrary, we feel that Iraq can be disarmed using peaceful means. We will therefore seize any opportunity, no matter how small, to bring about a peaceful solution. Source: German Embassy in Washington, http://www.germany-info.org. 'We Have No Doubt That UNMOVIC and IAEA...Are In A Position To Do Their Tasks': Russian Foreign Minister Igor IvanovThe UN Security Council, by unanimously voting in favor of resolution 1441, assumed serious responsibility - to complete the process of the disarmament of Iraq. Today we are in possession of the reports by the heads of UNMOVIC and IAEA on work done, and, most important, their proposals as to what it is necessary to do in order to finally close the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. We have no doubt that UNMOVIC and IAEA, which launched in Iraq an efficiently operating inspection mechanism, are in a position to do their tasks within a realistic time line. The reports made by Mr. Hans Blix and Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei demonstrate convincingly that the international inspectors succeeded in achieving tangible results. I shall not dwell on concrete examples - they are well known. It is of fundamental importance that thanks to unity of the world community and to joint pressure on the Iraqi authorities, including via the military presence in the region, Baghdad accepted practically all the conditions laid down by the inspectors and did not seriously impede their activity. So we have the right to assert that the international inspectors, if they are presented with a possibility to continue work, have everything necessary at their disposal to complete the process of disarming Baghdad by peaceful means. Thus, the Security Council as the body with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security fully coped with its duties by ensuring the sending to Iraq of the international inspectors and the creation of necessary conditions for their activity. It is no mere chance that even those who today cast doubt upon the Council's role in Iraqi settlement are forced to admit that we will have no alternative but to return this issue to the Security Council, which alone has the right to deal with its comprehensive solution. Taking into account all these considerations, we propose:
It can only arouse regret that just when the prospect of disarming Iraq via inspections had become more than real, issues were brought to the forefront that bear no direct relation to resolution 1441 or other UN decisions on Iraq. None of these decisions gives the right to use force against Iraq in circumvention of the United Nations Charter. None of them gives the right to a forcible change of the leadership of a sovereign state. Such actions - if they are undertaken - will not contribute to the strengthening of the unity of the international community at the moment when the world is in acute need of solidarity and the combining of efforts, primarily for rebuff to such a real and common threat for all as international terrorism. Russia is convinced of the need to do everything possible to overcome the prevailing crisis situation as soon as possible and to keep the Iraq problem in the channel of political settlement on the solid basis of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Only thus shall we be able to provide conditions for the continuation of effective multilateral cooperation in the struggle against global challenges and threats with the preservation of the central role of the UN Security Council. When on September 11, 2001, the monstrous tragedy befell the American people, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, was the first to phone US President George W. Bush and to offer him solidarity and support. Those were the sincere feelings of the entire Russian people. If today we indeed had irrefutable facts showing that a direct threat to the security of the United States of America emanates from the Iraq territory, then Russia without hesitation would be ready to use the whole arsenal of measures, envisaged by the UN Charter. However, the Security Council today has no such facts and that is why we give preference to a political settlement with reliance upon the activities of UNMOVIC and IAEA, which enjoy the world community's full confidence. Source: Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov at the Meeting of the United Nations Security Council, New York, March 19, 2003; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mid.ru. 'We Should Not Forget What Brought Us To This Point': UK Ambassador Sir Jeremy GreenstockI underline the United Kingdom's deep regret that it has not been possible for the Council to find an agreed way forward on Iraq. The UK tried as hard as any member of the Security Council to achieve that. In spite of that regret, which I know we all share, we should not forget what brought us to this point: the fundamental failure of Iraq to disarm in the face of 12 years of demands, pressure and pleas from the Security Council and from virtually the whole international community. If Iraq had made a genuine effort, that indispensable factor, a genuine effort to close outstanding issues of substance at any time in the last decade, and particularly after SCR 1441 afforded it the final opportunity to do so - if Iraq had respected the United Nations, we would not be where we are. I repeat what British Ministers have made clear, that any action which the United Kingdom has to take in this matter will be in accordance with international law and based on relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Whatever the present divisions and resentments, we - the Security Council, we the United Nations - have a central role to play on Iraq and on the wider issues associated with it. In that regard, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on 17 March expressed the interest of the United Kingdom in Security Council action affirming Iraq's territorial integrity; ensuring rapid delivery of humanitarian relief; allowing for the earliest possible lifting of UN sanctions; promoting an international reconstruction programme; and allocating the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the people of Iraq. These are issues where members of the Council have similar concerns. We will share our ideas on continuing the Oil for Food programme in the interests of the people of Iraq and on ensuring rapid humanitarian provision. I hope that - together and with the active contribution of the Secretary-General - we can make rapid progress on this crucial issue. The UK Secretary of State for International Development is visiting New York today, at the request of the Prime Minister, to discuss these issues with the Secretary-General. The British Government has already set aside around $110 million for immediate humanitarian provision if there is a conflict, and is likely to announce further funding. The United Kingdom continues to see an important role for UNMOVIC and the IAEA in verifying the disarmament of Iraq and in carrying out longer-term monitoring. We warmly commend the Inspectors for their professional work in Iraq since the passage of SCR 1441. They bear none of the responsibility for the evolution of events. We note the respective work programmes and the key tasks which Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei have put before us. Equally, we note that without a co-operating Iraqi government as resolutions 1284 and 1441 make abundantly clear, it would never be possible to be confident of the key tasks or of making progress against them. We should encourage UNMOVIC and IAEA to keep both documents under review. A more definitive work programme will be possible when there is an administration in Iraq which is prepared to co-operate fully, actively and unconditionally and when there is a secure situation on the ground. Source: UK Mission to the UN, http://www.ukun.org. 'Considering A Work Program At This Time Is Quite Simply Out Of Touch With The Reality That We Confront': US Ambassador John NegroponteMr. President, colleagues, at the outset of today's discussion, I would like to recognize and commend the UNMOVIC and the IAEA inspectors and Doctors Blix and El Baradei for their efforts to implement the inspection regime envisioned by this body under exceptionally difficult circumstances. We are relieved to know that all of the UNMOIVC and IAEA personnel have been safely evacuated from Iraq. Regrettably, discussion of the topic on today's agenda - the consideration of the Draft Programs of Work - is incompatible with Iraq's non-compliance with Resolution 1441 and the current reality on the ground. The UNMOVIC Work Program itself declares that, "The work program is predicated on the assumption that Iraq will provide immediate, unconditional and active cooperation." That is precisely what has been manifestly lacking. No realistic program of work or outline of key unresolved issues can be developed pursuant to Resolution 1284 while Iraq fails to cooperate fully, actively and unconditionally. Nor can it be developed absent sound information on Iraqi programs since 1998, and all other information, that is lacking. The fact of the matter is that the situation on the ground will change and so will the nature of the remaining disarmament tasks. Considering a work program at this time is quite simply out of touch with the reality that we confront. We acknowledge the effort that has gone into producing the Draft Programs of Work. While they cannot be definitive, they, and the paper on Key Remaining Disarmament Tasks, make it clear the multitude of important issues which Iraq has avoided addressing. These are the kind of documents that we would have been able to discuss if Iraq had met the requirements of Resolution 1441. But it cannot now lead us to the result this Council demanded - the immediate, peaceful disarmament of Iraq. Under current circumstances, we have no choice but to set this work aside for the time being. That said, we do not exclude the possibility that it may prove useful to return to these documents at some time in the future. In the meantime, this Council will face new challenges related to the future of Iraq. While I have the floor, I would like to touch briefly on an issue that was raised in our consultations yesterday: the concern my country shares with other members of the Council for meeting the humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq in this time. This is an issue to which my government has dedicated significant resources. We have been planning across all relevant US government agencies and in support of United Nations efforts to anticipate likely requirements and be prepared to administer necessary relief as quickly as possible. We have also consulted with interested governments, regional and international organizations, civil society and, of course, the United Nations. We are fielding the largest ever Disaster Assistance Response Team, known as DART, and composed of United States civilian humanitarian experts, to the region to assess needs, liaise with partners and provide in-field grant-making capacity. We have pre-positioned $16.5 million worth of food rations and relief supplies, including water and purification materials, blankets and shelter supplies in the region. In addition, we have contributed over $60 million to more than a dozen different United Nations agencies, including OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, the World Food Program and the World Health Organization, as well as a multitude of non-governmental organizations. As we increase United States contributions, we also urge other donors to contribute to these critical efforts. As President Bush has said, we recognize the critical importance of keeping the Oil-For-Food Program running to meet the humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq. Working with others in the Council, we are prepared to present soon a draft humanitarian resolution that would ensure the continuity of the Program. We have begun consulting with the United Nations and other Council members on adjustments to the current Oil-For-Food Program that will ensure continued delivery of key humanitarian supplies, particularly food and medicine, to Iraq. We trust that other members of the Council share our objective and the objective of the Secretary General of resuming the flow of humanitarian goods through the Oil-For-Food Program as soon as possible. We hope that progress on this resolution will be swift in order to minimize any interruption of the Program. Thank you, Mr. President. We look forward to working with you and our colleagues on issues related to the situation in Iraq in the days and weeks to come. Source: Transcript - US Ready With Aid for Iraq, Says Negroponte, US Department of State (Washington File), March 19. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |