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'We Need Our Coalition Partners To Do More To Prepare Themselves For WMD Threats': Speech by Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Defense Secretary, May 13

Speech by Paul Wolfowitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defense, National Defense University Conference on Counterproliferation, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., May 13.

[A]lthough it is still early, and we are only beginning to study the lessons learned in major combat operations in Iraq, let me share a few preliminary observations:

First, it seems to me clear that we must continue to evolve toward a capabilities-based approach in planning for chemical and biological defense. We are already doing that elsewhere in the Department. Doing that can help us prepare better for the unknown or the poorly known threats that we are likely to encounter. I guess I should say, that is, for those of you who aren't used to our recent twist in terminology, an approach that's based on capabilities rather than trying to be very specific in identifying the threat and designing your capability to a very specific threat. In general, we think that does not apply well to the world of the early 21st century. And in particular, I think it does not apply well to the area of biological defense. The earlier approach to prioritizing threat agents and targeting budgetary resources based on validated intelligence might have been adequate to meet the anthrax threat for which we had a relatively large body of - what I guess you could loosely call - "evidence" available. But that approach left us less prepared for other agents for which we have less intelligence.

One problem with threat-based approaches is that our intelligence about chemical and biological threats is inherently limited and uncertain - given the ease with which these capabilities can be concealed, especially when compared with nuclear or major conventional weaponry. Advances in biotechnology and in other areas of science also leave us vulnerable to the possibility that we will always be several steps behind a sophisticated adversary, who may vary his choice of threat agents faster than we can develop threat-specific responses.

Consequently we think it's important that DOD invest in research and development of a number of different promising technologies simultaneously - to counter both known and unknown chemical and biological threats and to get on the front side of the threat curve.

Greater emphasis also needs to be accorded to developing generic medical countermeasures - those that would be effective against the broad range of pathogens - so that an adversary's use of a novel agent does not suddenly render our targeted countermeasures ineffective.

A second emerging lesson is that we need to rebalance and reallocate our force structure - to ensure that we have enough of the right people and equipment. And I think people are the long pole in this particular tent, although equipment is important. The right people and equipment that we need to confront the biological and chemical threat at home and abroad and that they can be quickly deployed when needed Our first priority is to ensure the security of our homeland. At the same time - and it really is part of that same mission - we've got to be able to defend our interests overseas. The President should never be put in a situation where he has to choose between doing one or the other. We need to have enough capability to do both at the same time.

And yet today some of our chemical and biological defense capabilities - including those needed for biological detection, consequence management and WMD elimination - are stretched thin between meeting homeland defense and national security missions. For example, if a biological crisis had emerged here at home, while we were engaged in combat operations in Iraq, there would undoubtedly have been very strong pressure to redeploy key military bio-defense assets back from Iraq to the United States.

As short as this campaign was, I think it made abundantly clear what few fully understood before - that chemical and biological defenses are classic examples of what we came to call low-density/high-demand assets. Or as Secretary Rumsfeld said, "That's just another euphemism for something we didn't buy enough of." They are highly specialized capabilities that are called upon to meet many mission needs worldwide at the same time. As we look to the future, it is clear that the chem-bio defense mission is not going to go away. We must ensure sufficient forces to undertake the mission at home and abroad.

Another aspect of our current force structure concerns how we allocate our chemical and biological defense units between active duty and Reserve forces. About 70% of these units are currently in the Reserves. And while our Reserve forces are of very high quality - and they have been demonstrating that really over the last year-and-a-half - they can take longer to mobilize. Given the unpredictability of the WMD threat, we need to have sufficient defense capabilities to meet short-term emergencies. To ensure that we have the chem-bio defense forces early in crises when they may be needed most, we need to consider whether some forces in capability should be shifted from the Reserve to the active component.

Third, since WMD in the hands of rogue states and terrorists is the greatest security threat we face in this decade, we will continue to have a requirement for a robust WMD elimination capability even after the discovery and the destruction of Iraq's WMD capabilities.

The elimination capability that we put together in the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom will need to be retained, enhanced, and institutionalized. Accomplishing this will be an integral part of the effort to re-balance and re-allocate our force structure that I referenced earlier. In future conflicts we should not end up playing "pickup games" when we are trying to put together forces for eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction in the aftermath of a conflict. We must ensure that there are sufficient forces in peacetime, adequately trained, organized and equipped for that mission.

As with all other aspects of our WMD defense capabilities, the enduring elimination challenge will not be just a matter of ensuring a sufficient number of people outfitted with the appropriate equipment, but also ensuring that those well-equipped personnel have the proper concepts, doctrine, and training to use those capabilities effectively to accomplish their mission.

And finally, an emerging lesson from Iraq is that we need our coalition partners to do more to prepare themselves for WMD threats. And indeed I would say we can expect, I think, that this is an area where our coalition partners can contribute substantially. When key allies and coalition partners are unprepared for WMD threats our own ability to project power in defense of critical US interests is endangered. Because they fear becoming a potential target, unprepared allies may be reluctant to support coalition operations. Despite a decade of proselytizing by the United States about these risks, our coalition partners, with a few significant exceptions like the UK, remained poorly prepared for WMD use. Even some of Iraq's neighbors, who you might have thought would have been better prepared, were coming to us to draw on our relatively limited supplies of key items. Some coalition partners in Iraqi Freedom even lacked basic defensive equipment such as protective suits, masks, and atropine. They looked to us to make up their shortfalls. We were not always in a position to do so, but we did what we could. For example, we set aside anthrax and smallpox vaccine for tens of thousands of defense personnel for nearly 20 countries.

For the future, we need to consult with allies and coalition partners to achieve a common vision about threats and the level of chem-bio defense preparedness that will be required for future combat operations. Rhetoric must be matched with resources, and defense commitments must be honored. Our aim should be to lessen the dependency of potential partners on the United States for chem-bio protection. More than that, we should encourage our coalition to think of this as an area where they can contribute to the collective defense and indeed where they can help to meet what may unfortunately be an increased worldwide demand for these kinds of capabilities. But it is interesting, since this is an area that is people-intensive rather than equipment-intensive. I think it is an area where quite a few of our allies...have capabilities that could be quite substantial and quite important and can be thought of, not just as a complement to American forces, but the kinds of things that might be drawn on if there were a bio-terrorism catastrophe in whatever country.

Indeed there's at least one thing I think that's almost misleading about that term "homeland defense," and that's the word "homeland." In one respect, it's very important. It emphasizes that we, our own territory, our own cities and populations are at risk in ways that we really never had to think about, at least since the war of 1812, I guess, unless you count the Civil War. But at any rate, it's a new world for us in that respect. And the word "homeland" is useful in that respect. But if you stop and think about it, it would be a huge problem for us if, let's say, there were a catastrophic terrorist event in Japan. We just had one in Saudi Arabia. Imagine what it would be like if it were on the catastrophic scale. It was bad enough as it was. Being able to respond to this kind of problem worldwide is unfortunately something, I think, that the world as a whole has got to face up to. And these kinds of capabilities should come from more than just the United States.

To conclude, learning these lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom can help us to ensure that in future conflict we are even better prepared to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction....

Source: Excerpt - Wolfowitz Says Coalition Partners Must Be Ready for WMD Threats, US Department of State (Washington File), May 16.

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