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The US-Russia Nuclear Relationship: Interview with Georgy Mamedov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, May 15

'Transcript of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgy Mamedov, Remarks to Russian and Foreign Media, Moscow, May 15, 2003', Russian Foreign Ministry text, Document 1182-16-05-2003, May 16.

Remarks by Deputy Minister Mamedov

I would like to once again dwell briefly on the ratification of the Russian-US Strategic Offensive Reductions [SOR] Treaty by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia and on some outcomes of the talks held in Moscow with US Secretary of State Colin Powell. In essence, the discussion of the Treaty in the Russian parliament had developed into a kind of referendum on just what is to be the strategic basis on which to build relations with the US. The military-technical importance of this agreement on a radical reduction in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals is thoroughly set forth in the special Foreign Ministry statement of May 14, 2003, and here I'll only remind you of one more thing, namely, the Preamble to the Treaty, which reads that the sides have decided to embark upon the path of new relations for the 21st century, based on cooperation and friendship. We consider that as a result of a very frank discussion in the State Duma the Russian parliamentarians have passed a convincing vote of confidence in the policy being pursued by President Vladimir Putin towards an equal partnership with the US. 294 deputies voted for the ratification of the SOR Treaty, 134 against.

Now I'd like to touch upon the general results of the talks held with the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. The media variously comments on their individual fragments. In this regard, I would like to express the general view of the professionals who took part in the talks. In our opinion, they were successful and have once again borne out that Russian-American relations, despite the serious contradictions and difficulties, as in the assessment of the military actions in Iraq, are irrevocably developing along the road of cooperation on key issues. The reception of US Secretary of State Colin Powell by Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the frank and confidential talks with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov have borne this out. It can safely be said now that the upcoming meetings of Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush first in St. Petersburg and then [at the G-8 summit] in Evian will, in our view, impart an appreciable new impetus to the constructive development of relations between Russia and the US and also of international relations as a whole. Our cooperation will meet the interests of reducing tension in the world and restoring strategic stability and help to solve the crisis situations that have arisen by diplomatic means on the basis of the application of the rules of law, not of armed force.

Questions and Answers

Question: Georgy Enverovich, reports have appeared that Russia and the US may enter into a new agreement concerning strategic offensive potentials in development of the SOR Treaty. What is now the situation in Russian-American relations in the ABM field? Is the issue of concluding a new agreement on this problem conclusively closed or is the possibility still there?

Deputy Minister Mamedov: Regarding the first question, I would like to say that our task now is not to at once begin to work out a new agreement but to come to an understanding about the most effective implementation of the SOR Treaty already signed and ratified. There is a special body for its realization - the Bilateral Commission. As soon as the ratification is completed, and this still requires the approval of the Federation Council of Russia, the President's signature and the exchange of the instruments of ratification - we hope that at one of the nearest summit meetings this exchange will take place - the Treaty will enter into force. Whereupon, the Commission will begin to work, determining the procedure for the implementation of the Treaty. There are a number of questions with regard to the implementation procedure, which deputies asked yesterday. A number of aspects remain that demand clarification. That's what we shall be dealing with. I shall permit myself to cite another, no less important document, signed by Putin and Bush in Moscow in May 2002 - the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, which states that the conclusion of the SOR Treaty is a major step in the direction of carrying out strategic offensive reductions by the sides to the lowest possible levels. That is, one more, but not the last step. I shall also mention the US Senate resolution on the ratification of the SOR Treaty [on March 6] - it contains a direct call upon the American administration to continue to reduce strategic offensive arms to the lowest necessary level. Let us recall that the Russian side at the negotiations had suggested the figure of 1,500; now we have settled on the 1,700-2,200 bracket. Thus, in principle both we and the American side do not regard the SOR Treaty as the last agreement, we are ready to work on a new one, but at this stage it is more important for us to achieve the most effective implementation of a specific agreement - the SOR Treaty. On the matter of our ABM dialogue I can again refer to the need to implement the Joint Declaration. It has a whole section dedicated to Russian-American cooperation in the ABM field. The two sides have now, at last, got the wish to set out these agreed-upon measures in a separate document. An ad hoc Russian-US working group on missile defense has been created. It is meeting at regular intervals. The group has come up close to the elaboration of an accord which also provides for the protection of confidential information. It would have a great significance not only for Russia and the US, so we will do our best to carry this undertaking to its logical end. ...

Question: Was the question of the number of stockpiled and destroyed warheads discussed in the course of Colin Powell's visit?

Deputy Minister Mamedov: I would like to refer you to the text of the SOR Treaty. The very important Article II of the Treaty states that the START I Treaty remains in force. Upon unilateral withdrawal by the US from the ABM Treaty the question had also arisen of the fate of the START I Treaty, in which all the definitions and procedures for the reduction of strategic offensive arms are written down in detail. Now, as the SOR Treaty has confirmed, until December 2009 everything is in force that was written down in START I - including the counting rules and verification and reduction procedures for strategic offensive arms. What will be [the situation] if START I is not extended until 2012? This is what we shall now discuss with the US representatives - and, by the way, are already discussing [the issue]. There is already the working group for strategic offensive arms. Both sides did not want to wait until the Treaty was ratified and the implementation body began to operate. That was why the Russian-US group was created, which is meeting in parallel with the related working group on missile defense. The group incorporates the representatives of all the concerned agencies, and it is they who must discuss what number of warheads are to be stockpiled, and so on.

Furthermore, we treat the US military specialists with great respect. We understand perfectly well that, like our military, for simply political aims, for the aims of propaganda they will not take chances, will not squander the money necessary for storing an excess number of warheads. When we were entering into the Treaty, we had an absolutely clear idea (from independent sources as well) how the US strategic nuclear forces will evolve and be built up to the year 2012, both with and without the Treaty. We even received certain written materials from the American side that do not bear the character of an agreement but clearly show what will be with the American strategic arms subject to reduction, including warheads, missiles, submarines, heavy bombers, and so on. It is understandable that the American side has exactly the same perception about our plans as well. It was only on the basis of such exhaustive information, predictability and transparency that that Treaty became possible. No one has ever relied "on faith" in questions of nuclear containment. Perhaps, up until now we have insufficiently clearly shown this to our public. We shall do our best to remedy this omission. Both the Russian and the US side in the course of the development and reduction of their respective strategic nuclear forces will liquidate a part of them, and will stockpile another part. This was implied by the operative START I Treaty and the inoperative START II Treaty alike, and so will it be with the SOR Treaty. ...

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