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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation 'We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program', G8 Summit, Evian, June 1-3, 2003
I. Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, a G8 Declaration1. We recognise that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery poses a growing danger to us all. Together with the spread of international terrorism, it is the pre-eminent threat to international security. 2. This global challenge requires a multifaceted solution. We need to tackle it individually and collectively - working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system. 3. We have a range of tools available to tackle this threat : international treaty regimes; inspection mechanisms such as those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; initiatives to eliminate WMD stocks such as the G8 Global Partnership ; national and internationally-co-ordinated export controls; international co-operation and diplomatic efforts; and if necessary other measures in accordance with international law. 4. While all of these instruments are necessary, none is sufficient by itself. Not all proliferation challenges require the same remedies. We need to deploy the tools which are most effective in each case. We remain committed to work with and strengthen all these instruments and, where appropriate, to pursue the universalisation of relevant treaties and instruments. 5. Last year, at Kananaskis, we endorsed a set of Principles to prevent the spread of WMD and materials of mass destruction to terrorists and those that harbour them. Since then, events in the world have underscored the relevance of those Principles and the urgency of implementing them. 6. We reaffirm our commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and we urge all states which have not yet joined them to do so. We consider these three treaties to be essential instruments to maintain international peace and security and cornerstones of non-proliferation and disarmament. We reaffirm our support for the IAEA, which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks. 7. North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure to comply with its IAEA safeguards agreement undermine the non-proliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution. 8. We will not ignore the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program. We stress the importance of Iran's full compliance with its obligation under the NPT. We urge Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country's nuclear program. 9.We call on all States to establish effective procedures and machinery to control the transfer of materials, technology and expertise which may contribute to the development, production or use of WMD and their means of delivery. We likewise call on all States to establish and implement effective national standards for secure storage and handling of such materials with a view to effectively prevent proliferation and eliminate the risk that terrorists gain access to them. We agree, individually and collectively, to give support to this end where it is most needed. II. Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Securing Radioactive Sources, a G8 StatementAt Kananaskis, we, the Heads of State and Government of the eight major industrialised democracies and the Representatives of the European Union, endorsed six principles and launched the Global Partnership to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to weapons and materials of mass destruction. Today, at Evian, in another concrete demonstration of our commitment to theses principles, we have agreed to improve the security of radioactive materials. Radioactive sources are found in everyday life and have beneficial applications in medicine, agriculture, research, and industry. Certain poorly protected sources pose a real threat because they could be manipulated by terrorists to construct a radiological dispersion device or a " dirty bomb ". We commit ourselves to employing high standards that reduce the vulnerability of radioactive sources to acquisition by terrorists. We urge all countries to take measures to strengthen regulatory control of high-risk sources within their territories. In that context, we welcome the initiatives taken by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing an appropriate legal framework to this end. We welcome the findings of the 2003 Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources. We also recognise the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in combating radiological terrorism and endorse its efforts to establish international standards that ensure the long term security and control of high-risk radioactive sources. We have decided to undertake the following actions to reinforce and complement the IAEA's activities as well as to ensure the unavailability of radioactive sources to terrorists. The Group of Eight will: 1. Identify elements of the IAEA's Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources that are of the greatest relevance to preventing terrorists or those that harbour them from gaining access to high-risk radioactive sources. 2. Consider developing recommendations on how those elements could be applied at the national level. Those elements may include, as necessary: 2.1. National registers for tracking sources; 3. Work towards agreement on and implementation of these recommendations by the time of our next meeting in 2004. 4. Encourage all countries to strengthen controls on radioactive sources and observe the Code of Conduct when the revisions to it have been completed and approved. 5. Enhance international co-operation on locating, recovering, and securing high-risk radioactive sources. 6. Support and advance the IAEA's programs to improve the security of radioactive sources, including considering the provision of additional resources as necessary to the Nuclear Security Fund in order to promote the implementation of the Code of Conduct and the recommendations for its application. 7. In conjunction with the IAEA, convene an international conference in 2005, in France, to further discuss and raise awareness of the radioactive source problem, and to assess progress in implementing the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources. 8. Continue to work on this issue and will review the implementation of the plan of action, as set out in the technical annex to this Statement, at the 2004 G8 Summit. III. Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Securing Radioactive Sources, a G8 Action Plan1. Background In either case, this could have a major psychological impact on the population, going well beyond the actual radiological or chemical consequences produced-which would themselves be limited. Consequently, the international community must imperatively concern itself with the question of the security of these sources. 2. G8 approach The G8 welcomes the initiatives taken by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing a legal framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources. This work, performed in close co-operation with the IAEA, can provide a valuable input to wider international efforts in this area. The utilisation of radioactive sources yields important benefits in many peaceful applications (including medicine, agriculture, the environment, industry, and so forth). Conscious of the vulnerability of many States with regard to the control and monitoring of sources used in these applications, the G8 agreed on the following approach to strengthen the safety and security of radioactive sources: 2.1 Support of the IAEA work 2.2 Support for the most vulnerable States 2.3 Mechanisms for the control of radioactive sources 2.3.1 Political commitments by States producing, possessing, using, importing or exporting radioactive sources to uphold the "principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources", inspired by the relevant sections of the IAEA Code of Conduct (see Document 2-Political commitment by States producing, exporting and holding radioactive sources). 2.3.2 Identification of the elements of the completed Code of Conduct that are of the greatest relevance in preventing terrorism and encouragement to implement them world-wide. These may include national registers for radioactive sources, national measures to penalise thief or misuse of such sources and national physical protection and access control measures (see Document 3-Recommendations to States on the security of radioactive sources). 2.4 International conference on radioactive sources It supports the proposal by France to hold in France, in the first half of 2005, the fourth international conference on this topic and to include both the safety and the security aspects of radioactive sources, in order to review the actions undertaken and to map out perspectives for the future (see Document 4-International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources). This conference will also serve to support the actions already in progress (e.g. IAEA programmes, and bilateral and multilateral co-operation), encouraging all national and international players in their chosen course. Document 1 Support of the IAEA work The G8 reaffirms its support for the actions undertaken by the IAEA in favour of the safety and security of radioactive sources, and declares its readiness to co-operate with the Agency on this issue. More specifically, 1. The G8 contributes financially to the Agency's Nuclear Security Fund and is co-operating with the Agency through contributions in kind, within the framework of the programme for protection against nuclear and radiological terrorism, via inter alia the secondment of experts, training programmes, evaluation on request of national systems for the control of sources, participation in campaigns for the detection and securing of uncontrolled sources, and in technical co-operation projects for the supply of equipment for the detection of illegal movements of radioactive sources (as part of the fight against the illicit trafficking in radioactive materials). 2. The G8 members will promote - individually and collectively - the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources when the revisions to it have been completed and approved, and invite States to work through the Agency for its application. 3. The G8 will consider requests for assistance from the Agency in response to a radiological accident or malevolent act, to secure the incriminated source(s) and, where necessary, to treat persons who have been radiated by these sources. It will also consider requests for assistance, as needed, for preventive actions (e.g. the search for and securing of sources). 4. The G8 will consider supplying to the IAEA the information at its disposal concerning particular emergency situations involving a radioactive source, or information liable to assist the Agency in dealing with such emergency situations where so requested. It will also consider similar request from non IAEA members. Document 2 Political commitments by States producing, 1. Radioactive sources are used in a wide range of applications, including agriculture, the environment, industry, medicine, research and others. There are estimated to be several million radioactive sources of all kinds and sizes disseminated around the world. The great majority of these sources present no serious threat, even if they should be handled with the customary caution: this notably applies to smoke detectors or instrument calibration sources. Certain sources, on the other hand, call for strict safety and security measures owing to their highly radioactive nature. The main objectives are to prevent malevolent acts (theft, sabotage, or transformation into a radiological dispersion device) and avoid radiological accidents. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers that roughly a hundred countries lack the legislative and regulatory framework needed to control radioactive sources adequately. 2. The G8 Heads of State and Government appeal to the
international community of States, calling upon them to: This short and medium-term approach being conducted by States at the national level may be accompanied by international co-operation aimed at the most vulnerable States. The work performed by G8 countries and the European Union aimed at developing, in close co-operation with the IAEA, a legal framework for the registration, administration and control of radioactive sources can provide a valuable input to wider international efforts in this area. 3. International assistance is being intensified under the
auspices of the IAEA. This may take the following forms, and in
particular: 4. These assistance missions, which are liable to take place over an extended period of time, may be implemented with the aid of international financing (via the G8 Global Partnership, the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, European or national funding, etc). 5. The States that produce and distribute radioactive sources have a special responsibility with regard to the safety and security of these sources. The G8 initially, and subsequently the other producer and exporting States as well, will give consideration to the type and nature of commitment the radioactive source producer and/or exporting States might enter into. This commitment could take the form of an individual declaration by these States to the IAEA, in which they affirm their determination to uphold the "principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources". Document 3 Recommendations to States on the security of radioactive sources 1. The IAEA Code of Conduct contains points contributing to the safety or the security of radioactive sources, or both. In its findings, the International Conference in Vienna, in March 2003, also identified points that ought to help strengthen the security of radioactive sources and render terrorist access to these sources more difficult. The G8 proposes that these points be considered by States in implementing control and monitoring systems within their territory. 2. The G8 will direct a working group to identify those elements of the IAEA Code of Conduct that are of greatest relevance to prevent terrorists from gaining access to radioactive sources and to develop recommendations for national consideration on the implementation of those elements, in close consultation with the IAEA. These recommendations will take into account the findings of the 2003 International Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources and could consider addressing, in particular, the following: 2.1. Establishing a national register to track sources
throughout their life-cycle, Document 4 International Conference on the Safety and the Security of Radioactive Sources 1. The international Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources held in Vienna in March 2003, co-chaired by Russia and the United States, set in motion a process for reinforcing and accelerating international co-operation in the field of safety and security of radioactive sources, and more especially from the standpoint of security. But it also follows on from the previous international conferences on safety and security held in Dijon (France) in 1998 and in Buenos Aires (Argentina) in 2001. 2. Over the next two years, it would be desirable to consolidate the political impetus given to this issue in 2003 (through the Vienna Conference in March and the Evian Summit in June). A progress report should be drawn up on action taken to secure radioactive sources by: 2.1. The competent international organisations, e.g. the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Customs Organisation (WCO), Interpol, the European Commission, etc., 2.2. States, at both national as well as bilateral and multilateral levels: safety and/or security authorities, export control bodies, customs administration, public or private agencies or enterprises with expertise in the field of radioactive sources (management, detection, search and location, securing, etc). 3. Consultations should be conducted, after the Evian Summit, with the main States concerned in order to give substance to the initiatives launched. In particular, the proposals aimed at making sources more secure need to be refined: these could include inter alia recommendations made on the basis of measures contained in the IAEA Code of Conduct and of the findings of the March 2003 International Conference. Consideration will also be given to the need to launch campaigns to secure poorly-controlled radioactive sources, and to search for, locate and secure "orphan" radioactive sources, with international funding (mainly via the G8 Global Partnership and the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund). National expert groups could meet to discuss these themes at the IAEA in the second half of 2003 and in 2004. 4. France will organise a fourth conference in the first half of 2005, which will draw up a progress report on the process begun in 2003. This conference could work according to the following guidelines: 4.1. Consolidating the IAEA's international efforts with regard
to radioactive sources (via its Action Plan, Code of Conduct,
assistance in the detection of illicit trafficking in radioactive
materials, campaigns to locate orphan sources, and so on), and
States in their national initiatives, as well as supporting
bilateral and multilateral co-operative ventures, IV. Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, a G8 Action PlanThe Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which we launched last year at the Kananaskis Summit, has made significant progress over the past year toward realising the objective of preventing terrorists, or those who harbour them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and technology. With our determined commitment, significant progress has been made: "Substantial sums have already been pledged by Partners towards
their Kananaskis commitment to raise up to $20 billion over ten
years; We commit ourselves to an active programme to continue the
implementation of the initiative and to achieve substantial
progress by the next Summit. Our goals are: "To pursue the universal adoption of the non-proliferation
principles; V. Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, G8 Senior Officials Group Annual ReportOur Leaders decided at the Kananaskis Summit to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction. Their Statement set the scope of co-operation projects under this initiative to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among the priority concerns they identified the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapon scientists. It was agreed to review progress on the Global Partnership at the Evian Summit. The Global Partnership Senior Officials Group, established to review progress of the initiative and to co-ordinate projects, has undertaken an active work plan to implement this initiative, first under the Canadian Chair and then in 2003 under the French Chair. In the first year of Global Partnership activities, the Senior Officials Group can report substantial progress to translate the Global Partnership initiative into concrete projects. At the same time, much work remains to be done, and the Senior Officials Group has outlined a challenging action plan to be accomplished before the next Summit. The Senior Officials Group's activities over the past year have focused on four objectives: implementation and translation of the guidelines, as necessary, into concrete actions and agreements; initiation and development of concrete projects; financial contributions in conformity with the Kananaskis commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the next ten years; and outreach activities towards non-G8 countries to expand participation in the Partnership. For each, the objective was to ensure that the Kananaskis promises were being translated into practice. In order to do so, work has been pursued with determination on resolution of outstanding implementation problems, successful negotiation of implementing agreements, development and initiation of concrete projects based on allocated funds, national financial commitments to raise up to $20 billion over ten years, and inviting third countries to participate in the initiative and contribute to projects under the Partnership. 1. Implementation of Kananaskis guidelinesThe Kananaskis Statement defined a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements governing projects. Implementation of these guidelines has been a primary task of the Senior Officials, and was addressed at each Senior Officials Group meeting. In the course of their discussions, Senior Officials noted the difficulties and obstacles that were hindering the initiation of projects, and have conducted an in-depth review of the outstanding issues related to the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements required for projects falling under the scope of the Global Partnership. We welcome the important progress that has been made on the issue of tax exemption on the basis of high-level political decisions. Several bilateral and multilateral agreements include such provisions. Nonetheless, these agreements have yet to be tested in practice. Full exemption from taxes, duties, levies and other charges is essential for projects to succeed; progress registered in this field is positive and has to be pursued. Another essential issue for Partners is liability protection. The efficacious implementation of the guideline which states that "adequate liability protection from claims related to the co-operation project to be provided for donors countries, their personnel and contractors" has been discussed extensively by Senior Officials. All Partners agree that adequate liability protections are essential for project implementation, while recognising that the protections differ depending on respective national requirements. Partners reinforced the need to have adequate liability provisions in all bilateral and multilateral frameworks and welcomed progress in this regard. Partners agreed that there should be uniform treatment of donors in this respect. The guideline regarding "adequate access to work sites" has also been under consideration by Senior Officials. The new proposal to simplify access to sites by reducing prior notification delay from 45 to 30 days through a procedure of annual lists has been considered as an improvement on past practice though still judged insufficient by some Partners. It should be evaluated over the next year. Other guidelines such as monitoring, auditing and accountancy of funds, or the implementation of projects in an environmentally sound manner, and establishment of project milestones have not been raised as presenting problems. Some of these guidelines have been satisfactorily translated into bilateral agreements. However, the Senior Officials will duly address such issues as they may arise during the implementation of projects. The Senior Officials have also noted in their discussions the importance of the guidelines concerning the assurance that "the material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes" and "appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives". After one year, Senior Officials can report some progress regarding the implementation of the guidelines and welcome Russian efforts in that respect. They recognise that, given the importance of practical implementation of guidelines for engagement of new projects, sustained and broadened efforts in this field are necessary. 2. Partners report on the state of advancement of co-operation projects, and specific projects for new co-operationA number of specific co-operation projects are moving forward into their concrete phase. For example, in the chemical weapons field, the Gorny facility was completed and went into operation, and has already destroyed 400 tonnes of yperite. After the conclusion of an agreement, the construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility in Kambarka can start in the next months. Construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility for nerve agents at Schuchye was initiated as well as other related infrastructure projects. They are important milestones in the field of chemical weapons destruction. It is also to be reported that Italy and Russia have recently signed an Additional Protocol related to the Schuchye chemical destruction plant. A new stage in dismantling former nuclear submarines has been reached with the concrete and tangible results for implementation of new projects in Saïda Bay and at Zvezda Shipyard in the Far Eastern Region, as well as the funding of other projects for dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines. Agreement has also been reached on a programme to end Russian production of weapons-grade plutonium and on acceleration of efforts to secure Russian fissile material and nuclear warheads, while significant progress can be noted in the negotiations on international support for Russia's plutonium disposition programmes, including increased pledges and substantial agreement on concepts for effective programme management and oversight. We look forward to completion of these negotiations. The safety and security of biological research facilities is being improved. With respect to employment of former weapons scientists, in addition to the continued efforts in the multilateral International Science and Technology Centre framework, new bilateral engagements have been initiated with former non-conventional weapons production facilities to assist in their reconversion to develop and manufacture commercial products. The Senior Officials Group has followed closely the developments of bilateral contacts as well as multilateral consultations that preside over engagement of new projects. Additional efforts should be made to identify and start new projects. Partners have had an active programme of experts meeting and exchanges, including visits on the sites and seminars for dealing with concrete technical issues. This was the case for the seminar of experts on ecological problems in nuclear submarines decommissioning held in Vladivostok, and the meeting of submarine experts organised by Russia in Severodvinsk, followed by informal experts meeting on the same subject held by the presidency. Interested experts in the chemical fields also met in the margins of the Organisation for the Prohibition Chemical Weapons Executive Council sessions to discuss plans of countries to fund projects as well as outstanding needs. The Conference of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Co-operation Initiative hosted by the European Commission in Brussels under EU, US and Canadian Chairmanship also furthered the aims of the Global Partnership by facilitating information exchange, outreach to other countries and co-ordination of projects. All Partners have engaged in intensive bilateral consultations with Russia to identify fields of co-operation and select specific projects to be carried forward. The Russian side identified lists of specific projects that were presented to individual Partners. These lists were studied in depth by Partners who have responded, others are still in the process of discussion of projects. They have all, while keeping in mind the full scope of the Global Partnership, addressed those priorities identified among others by Leaders in Kananaskis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials and employment of former weapons scientists). They have also taken into account the two priorities on which Russia has put special emphasis (destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned submarines). Despite all these efforts and active endeavours, Senior Officials note that for practical implementation of projects to progress as fast and as effectively as expected, sustained and broadened efforts will be needed. 3. Financial CommitmentsLeaders in Kananaskis committed collectively to raise up to $20 billion to support Partnership projects over a ten year period. Over the past year, this collective commitment has been translated into firm national commitments of up to: United States - $10 billion; Germany - €1.5 billion; UK - $750 million; France - €750 million; Japan - $200 million; Italy - €1 billion; Canada - Can$1 billion. The EU has pledged €1 billion and Russia $2 billion. It is also to be noted that Partners have appropriated in their budgets of FY 2003 adequate funds for this year's projects. 4. Outreach strategy and modalitiesFollowing the Leaders' invitation to other countries prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents (statement, principles and guidelines) to enter discussions with Partners on participating in and contributing to this initiative, and their commitment to review this question at their next Summit, intense outreach activities have been developed. These activities were driven forward by the Canadian Chair, which sustained its efforts in this direction under the new French Chair. Contacts were made with countries that expressed an interest, and information was given on the content, aims and work of the Global Partnership. Meetings with interested countries were organised in Ottawa. Following bilateral additional consultations, an information meeting, co-chaired by Canada, France and the United States, was held in Paris on 8 April in order to encourage and facilitate potential donors to participate in the Global Partnership. Russia briefed potential donors about possible co-operation projects on the chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of decommissioned submarines. They were informed of the inclusive character of the Partnership and offered the possibility, having endorsed the Kananaskis documents, to make a formal announcement of their interest and their intention to pledge. The Chair indicated that the G8 would be ready to give due recognition to the new donors at the Evian Summit. Potential new donors were also informed of the possibility of having back-to-back meetings of the enlarged Partnership group with the G8 Senior Officials Group meetings until future structures are decided upon. A similar information meeting with interested countries was also organised by the United States in Washington on 25 April. Although the initial Global Partnership focus was on projects in Russia as stated by the Leaders, the Partnership may extend to other recipient countries, including in particular those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents. The Leaders stated the G8 willingness to enter in negotiations with such countries. In that respect, an official application was presented by the Ukraine. After discussion in the Senior Officials Group, it has answered positively, in principle, while recalling that the Partnership was still in its initial phase and thus focused on Russian projects. The Chair has expressed its readiness to enter into preliminary discussions with interested recipients willing to adhere to the Kananaskis documents in order to prepare for their future inclusion in the Partnership. Some partners are already pursuing relevant projects in former Soviet States outside Russia. While encouraging the importance of the universal adoption of non-proliferation principles, Senior Officials have been eager to underline the importance of Global Partnership and to publicise its objectives and activities to third countries as well as the United Nations, the European Union, the Non Proliferation Treaty Prepcom and others. In this respect, Senior Officials welcome the EU plan to organise an inter-parliamentary conference on Global Partnership in November 2003. This conference, to be held in Strasbourg on 21 November 2003, is fully supported by the G8 Partners and Chair, and the future EU Presidency, who view the event as an important step to provide information on the Global Partnership to parliamentarians whose support for funding the initiative will be essential over the ten-year period. Senior Officials reviewing their activities over the year since Kananaskis note the progress achieved in implementing guidelines, the advancement of new projects, financial commitments and outreach activities, while recognising that in all these fields, further work has to be done. All of the Kananaskis documents thus remain under Senior Officials Group consideration and review, as part of a global ongoing process in order to yield substantive results. Source: The G8 Evian Summit 2003 website at
http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/ © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |