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Disarmament Documentation

IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, June 16-20

Note: the 35 members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors for 2002-2003 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Arica, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. For full documentation from the meeting, see the IAEA website at www.iaea.org.

I. IAEA Statements & Documents
II. United States: Statement to the IAEA Board of Governors

I. IAEA Statements & Documents

Introductory Statement by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, June 16.

...

Nuclear Verification

The Safeguards Implementation Report and Safeguards Statement for 2002

In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2002, the Agency concludes that, in 145 States (and Taiwan, China) with safeguards agreements in force, the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful use or were otherwise adequately accounted for. In the case of 13 States having in force both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, the Secretariat, having found no indication of the existence of undeclared nuclear material or activities, was also able to conclude that all nuclear material in those States had been declared and remained under safeguards.

Status of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

Our goal continues to be the ability to provide credible, comprehensive assurances regarding all States that have made non-proliferation commitments, including conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This requires that States have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force. Since the last meeting of the Board in March, Burkina Faso and Georgia have brought into force both NPT safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Sultanate of Oman has brought its NPT safeguards agreement into force. Additional protocols have been brought into force by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jamaica, Kuwait and Mongolia. And Denmark and France have informed the Secretariat of the parliamentary approval of their respective additional protocols, leaving only two national ratifications outstanding, in addition to the notification required from EURATOM, before the collective entry into force of the European Union's additional protocols.

With the approval of additional protocols for Kazakhstan and Madagascar on the current Board agenda, the number of States for which an additional protocol has been approved by the Board will reach 80. But despite this incremental progress, it remains a source of concern that - more than six years after the Board's approval of the Model Additional Protocol - only 35 States have brought additional protocols into force, and 46 States party to the NPT still do not even have the required safeguards agreements with the Agency. I call on all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force the respective legal instruments without further delay. As I have stated many times, for the Agency to give credible assurances, we need the corresponding authority.

Integrated Safeguards

Work continues on the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards, as reported to the Board in March 2002, with the aim of having in place a more effective and efficient verification system. Our current focus is on a number of aspects of implementation. We are proceeding as fast as technically feasible - but of course we are limited, in this regard, to those States that have in force both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol. Currently, integrated safeguards is being implemented in Australia and Norway, and development is well underway for a number of States with significant nuclear activities - notably Canada, Hungary and Japan.

Verification in Iraq

As you are all aware, the Agency, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General, withdrew its inspectors from Iraq on the eve of the recent conflict, and before having been able to complete its Security Council mandated work to verify the presence or absence of prohibited nuclear activities in Iraq. The occupying powers have to date indicated that they are assuming that function themselves. Our Security Council mandate still stands. However, the Security Council, in resolution 1483, underlined the intention of the Council to revisit the mandate of the IAEA as set forth in previous resolutions. At this time, we are maintaining capacity in the Agency's Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO).

Following persistent media reports of looting of nuclear and radioactive material in Iraq, the occupying powers recently agreed to the Agency's request to send a team to undertake, pursuant to our mandate under Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement, an inventory of the nuclear material stored at the Tuwaitha complex south of Baghdad. The mission is limited to verification of nuclear material under safeguards. The occupying powers have informed the Agency that they are taking responsibility themselves for nuclear and radiation safety and security in Iraq.

Once the inspection is complete, and the exact results are known, I intend to report the findings to the occupying powers, as the authority in Iraq, and I will naturally keep the Board informed.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran

In March, I reported to the Board on discussions taking place with the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning a number of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified in relation to Iran's implementation of its NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency. Since my visit to Iran in February, the Agency has undertaken extensive verification activities in Iran. The report before you provides the results of these activities to date.

The report points out that Iran has failed to report certain nuclear material and activities, and that corrective actions are being taken in co-operation with the Iranian authorities. The report also explains that work is still ongoing with regard to the correctness and completeness of Iran's declaration to ensure that all nuclear material in Iran has been declared and is under safeguards. In this respect, we are continuing our efforts - through technical discussions, inspection and environmental sample analysis - to understand all aspects of Iran's nuclear programme, including: the research and development work relevant to its uranium conversion and enrichment programme; and its programme for the use of heavy water.

I continue to call on Iran, as with all States with significant nuclear programmes, to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol at an early date, in order to enhance the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. In the meantime, I also continue to call on Iran to permit us to take environmental samples at the particular location where allegations about enrichment activities exist. This is clearly in the interest of both the Agency and Iran. I will keep the Board informed of the results of our work.

Verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The Agency has not performed any safeguards functions in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the end of last December. We cannot, therefore, provide any assurances about the non-diversion of nuclear material for weapons or other explosive devices in the DPRK. We remain, however, ready to assist all concerned parties, through our verification role, in bringing the DPRK back to the non-proliferation regime, and redress a most serious challenge to that regime.

Nuclear Security - Measures To Protect Against Nuclear Terrorism

You have before you the report on the status of Agency activities related to nuclear security. Agency assistance to Member States, in helping to put in place measures to protect against nuclear terrorism, is continuing at an exceptionally fast pace. Since September 2001, a total of 35 advisory and evaluation missions have been conducted in Member States, and a total of 54 training courses, workshops and seminars have been convened.

These Agency activities are helping Member States in all regions to increase their nuclear security. Two major international conferences have been held: one, in Karlsruhe, Germany, focused on helping States to make use of advanced analytical methods for nuclear material seized in illicit trafficking incidents, and to improve co-ordination between the nuclear scientific community and the law enforcement community; and the second, here in Vienna, on the security of radioactive sources, about which I reported to the Board in March. Workshops on the self-assessment of security vulnerabilities at nuclear installations were held in Hungary, India and Turkey. International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions and follow-up missions were carried out in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine. Requests for seven additional IPPAS missions are currently being processed. Regional training courses in physical protection were held in Asia and Eastern Europe, and similar courses are being planned for Africa and Latin America.

Evaluation missions to assess Member States' capabilities to detect nuclear and other radioactive material at their borders have been held throughout Eastern Europe. Agency incident response missions have been sent to Bolivia, Ecuador, Nigeria and Tanzania to assist with the characterization of radioactive sources seized in illicit trafficking incidents. And the three-way initiative by the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the Agency, which seeks to secure vulnerable radioactive sources within the territories of the former Soviet Union, has so far resulted in missions to the Republic of Moldova and Tajikistan, with further missions scheduled for seven additional countries. Clearly, more work still needs to be done in this important area, and I encourage all of you to continue your support. ...

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Director General's Press Statement, IAEA Headquarters Vienna, June 19, 2003

.....The Board also made it very clear that Iran should continue to be transparent and co-operative with the Agency in completing the work ahead of us. We still have a lot of work to clarify safeguards and verification issues in Iran with regard to the enrichment programme, with regard to the heavy water programme we need to fully understand the depth and breadth of the programme and everything is declared to the Agency and under safeguards.

To that end we would like to continue to have a collection of environmental samples, we would like to see Iran, as early as practicable, concluding an additional protocol which gives us the required authority to sites and locations and the Board was supportive of my request to conclude a protocol to allow us to take environmental samples. The Board was very clear that safeguards have to be implemented in a very comprehensive very conspicuous manner, very rigid manner if you like. To build confidence we need to be completely transparent and that the issues before us should be resolved as early as possible.

We have a lot of work ahead of us in the next couple of months. We are, as I mentioned, collecting environmental samples. We are awaiting the results we need to discuss them with Iran. We are fielding a number of inspection missions to again help us understand the programme and report to the Board.

I intend to report to the Board in September, that would be the time, in my view, required for us to be able to complete our analysis, but obviously I could report to the Board earlier if required. So I very much hope and look forward to full active co-operation with Iran.

The more transparent Iran will become, the more confidence it will be able to build in the international community. And the more we can provide critical assurances that Iran's programme is dedicated fully to peaceful purposes. I would be happy to answer a couple of your questions.

Q: (inaudible).

A: Well that's what we are asking. I think again that they need to conclude an Additional Protocol to give us additional authority but, in the meantime, I am impressing on Iran to give us full access to all the locations - all the sites we would like to visit. As I mentioned, the more transparency Iran can provide, the more access we can get, the more confidence we can create.

Q: (inaudible).

A: Iran said they are positively considering that and I hope that a decision by Iran will be translated into an actual protocol sooner rather than later.

Q: (inaudible).

A: Yes, I think there is a statement by the Board which reflects the broad sense of the Board which will be circulated to you. But the Board made it clear that Iran should accept, without any condition, as early as possible, an additional protocol. But as I said, in the meantime, and before even that will take place, I expect Iran to be fully transparent; fully co-operative with the Agency, particularly with regard to collection of environmental samples and particularly with regard to access to sites and locations. So the jury is still out. I might end by saying, as I mentioned to the Board, that we still have a lot of work to do and we will be hopefully in a much better position to make a judgement by September or earlier if we can.

Q: (inaudible).

A: We hope so. The message coming from the Board is loud and clear. The Board issued a statement that reflects a broad sense of the Board that we should be able to take environmental samples; that we should be able to visit sites; and that we are interested in visiting. I think I come from that Board equipped with broad support of the measures we have so far taken and we would like to take in the next few weeks and months. There is, I would say, a very concrete support by the international community.

We need to bring that issue to a closure as soon as possible and we need to go to the bottom of that programme to assure ourselves that it is a comprehensive programme dedicated to peaceful purposes. I think, as you are all aware, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is becoming a number one national security issue. The international community has become very much sensitised to the need for full transparency and full co-operation on the part of an inspected country.

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Chairwoman's Summing-Up Statement Vienna, June 19, 2003

...The Board shared the concern expressed by the Director General in his report at the number of Iran's past failures to report material, facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations. Noting the Iranian actions taken thus far to correct these failures, the Board urged Iran promptly to rectify all safeguards problems identified in the report and resolve questions that remain open.

The Board welcomed Iran's reaffirmed commitment to full transparency and expected Iran to grant the Agency all access deemed necessary by the Agency in order to create the necessary confidence in the international community. Noting that the enrichment plant is under IAEA safeguards, the Board encouraged Iran, pending the resolution of related outstanding issues, not to introduce nuclear material at the pilot enrichment plant, as a confidence-building measure.

The Board called on Iran to co-operate fully with the Agency in its on-going work. Specifically, the Board took note of the Director General's 16 June Introductory Statement which called on Iran to permit the Agency to take environmental samples at the particular location where allegations about enrichment activities exists.

The Board welcomed Iran's readiness to look positively at signing and ratifying an additional protocol, and urged Iran to promptly and unconditionally conclude and implement an additional protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, in order to enhance the Agency's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities, particularly the absence of undeclared material and activities. The Board requested the Director General to provide a further report on the situation whenever appropriate.

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See also: Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General, available from the IAEA website at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf

II. United States

Statement of the United States to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] Board Of Governors Meeting, June 18, 2003

'Text: U.S. Urges IAEA to Expedite, Expand Iranian Nuclear Investigation', Washington File, June 23, 2003

Delivered by Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill, U.S. Representative, U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna (UNVIE) Vienna, Austria June 18, 2003

Agenda Item 6(B): Director General's Report On Iran

Madame Chairwoman, the United States takes note of and welcomes the Director General's June 6 report on the implementation of the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Although interim, the report clearly reflects the great thoroughness and professionalism with which the Secretariat is pursuing the very serious questions that have arisen about Iran's nuclear activities. My government expresses appreciation to the Director General and to Deputy Director General Goldschmidt and his staff for their continuing efforts to clarify the nature, history, dimensions, and purposes of the Iranian nuclear program. The United States strongly supports those efforts, which are essential for maintaining the security and other benefits that accrue to each country represented here today from a strong and credible nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Agency's efforts must continue until all the facts have been established and evaluated.

Madame Chairwoman, the United States finds the substance of the Director General's [DG's] report deeply troubling. Although the investigations are continuing, the report already confirms that Iran's nuclear program is cause for grave concern. Let me quote from the DG's report: "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material, and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed. ... The number of failures by Iran to report the nuclear material, facilities and activities in question in a timely manner as it is obliged to do pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement is a matter of concern." The U.S., and I am sure most other Board members, fully share the concerns the Director General expressed.

The report also notes that "the process of verifying the correctness and completeness of the Iranian declarations is still ongoing." In particular, the results of environmental sampling have not yet been reported to the Board. We call on the Secretariat to expedite the analysis of those samples and promptly report the results to the Board. Likewise, we look forward to a report on the Secretariat's continuing investigation of Iran's centrifuge and heavy water programs. Additional information from the Secretariat on Iran's experimentation in the production of uranium metal -- an activity without apparent justification in Iran's fuel cycle -- and on its isotope production experiments should also be presented to the Board as soon as possible.

The report that the Director General has put before us is one that no country can afford to ignore or dismiss. It is an impartial and wholly factual product of the international inspectorate entrusted by us all to verify the obligations of every country that has brought into force an NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)-required safeguards agreement. The inspectors were invited by Iran itself to test its stated policy of "full cooperation with the IAEA" and "complete transparency." Iran's "complete transparency" proved not to extend, however, to the import of nuclear material, or to the subsequent processing of that material, or to the facilities where the material was stored and processed. In fact, Iran's "complete transparency" has proven in crucial respects to be an empty promise, intended to distract attention from its reluctant confirmation of the existence of a whole series of clandestine activities and facilities.

In his statement this morning, the Ambassador of Iran characterized the quantity of nuclear material involved in the failures the DG's report noted as small. The DG's report itself noted "the quantities of nuclear material involved here have not been large." But the report immediately added that the amount involved was "not insignificant in terms of a State's ability to conduct nuclear research and development activities." The question the Agency will need to resolve is indeed whether Iran used that "not insignificant" quantity of nuclear material for undeclared research and development activities.

When revelations about Iran's nuclear program were made last summer, Iran did not demonstrate a willingness to move promptly to ensure the IAEA was fully informed about developments relevant to its responsibilities. The existence of undeclared nuclear facilities was made public -- not by Iran -- in August 2002. In a meeting with the IAEA the following month, Iran agreed to a visit to those facilities by the Director General in October 2002. That visit, however, was delayed by the Iranian side for months, and eventually took place only in February of this year -- half a year after the revelations were made.

We all need to reflect on the implications of the fact that the sequence of events leading to the Director General's report was the result not of reports by Iran to the IAEA, but largely of information that came to the Agency through open sources. The IAEA deserves full credit for following up on the press revelations and essentially confirming them. But we must pause to consider what would have happened if there had been no press disclosures? Would Iran have come forward on its own to inform the IAEA of its undeclared activities and its projects at Natanz, or Arak, or at the Kalaye Electric Company?

I believe the answer is clear. Without the outside revelations, Iran's extensive nuclear program would still be proceeding on a largely clandestine basis, with the existence of only the Bushehr power reactor and a few other facilities acknowledged by Iranian authorities. Can the IAEA or anyone else be confident under these circumstances that there are no other clandestine facilities that have yet to be revealed?

Madame Chairwoman, at the March Board the U.S. joined others in raising questions and expressing concerns about Iran's nuclear program. Those questions and concerns take on added weight in light of the Director General's interim report, which raises further questions about Iran's nuclear intentions. Such questions do not arise because of "U.S. propaganda," as Iran would like the world to believe, but instead flow from facts the Agency has revealed and confirmed.

The Director General's June 6 report indeed makes clear that Iran has yet to answer questions the Agency put to it in February, over three months ago. The breadth and depth of the unanswered questions, together with the confirmed pattern of safeguards failures, is the most compelling theme in the Director General's report.

I will mention here today only a few of the new questions to which the DG's report gives rise:

-- If Iran's intentions are peaceful, why did it engage in a long-term pattern of safeguards violations and evasions regarding a number of its nuclear fuel cycle research and development activities? Can anyone believe that all the different instances of "failure to comply" over many years, involving different quantities of nuclear materials at different locations, could reflect anything but a conscious effort by Iran to avoid monitoring of its fuel cycle research and development activities by the IAEA?

-- The DG reports that Iran obtained UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] from abroad but failed to report it as it was obliged to do, and that some of that UF6 is now missing. Iran says the missing material is due to a "leak" it just discovered. In light of the pattern of evasions the IAEA has now confirmed about Iran's use of undeclared imported uranium compounds, as well as Iran's practical need to test centrifuges with UF6 before committing to a huge facility like Natanz that must have cost hundreds of millions of dollars, is it not incumbent on Iranian authorities to cooperate fully with all IAEA efforts to establish what the real facts are?

-- While Iranian officials publicly claim full cooperation with the IAEA and say they are offering "complete transparency," the DG reported that Iran initially denied inspectors access to parts of the Kalaye Electric site, then only grudgingly granted some access, and still continues to prevent inspectors from taking environmental samples there. If Iran's claim that it never introduced nuclear material into centrifuges is true, why will it not permit sampling at the Kalaye Electric Company? Does it have something to hide there?

-- Why did Iran test its capability to make uranium metal -- using a secret stock of UF4 [uranium tetrafluoride] at an undeclared laboratory -- when neither Bushehr nor its planned heavy water research reactor requires uranium metal for fuel? The DG's report noted that "neither [Iran's] light water reactors nor its planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel." I don't need to remind the Board that uranium metal is required to make fissile components for HEU- [highly enriched uranium] type nuclear weapons.

Finally, Madame Chairwoman, in addition to those questions that Iran should answer, I would like to pose some questions to the Secretariat:

-- The U.S. recognizes the IAEA's work in Iran is not yet complete and that further analysis and evaluation will be needed before final conclusions are drawn. It will be important for the Board to be informed of the results of that work as soon as possible. But I would like to ask today whether the Secretariat believes it is presently in a position to provide the Board with assurances that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in Iran to non-peaceful purposes?

-- Secondly, can the Secretariat tell us any results of the June 7-11 visit to Iran by its enrichment experts that was mentioned in paragraphs 8 and 11 of the DG's June 6 report? Was the team able to take environmental samples at any sites, and if so, are there results that can be shared with the Board? Are there sites at which the team was not allowed to take environmental samples? If so, is there additional information about Iran's activities at those sites? And finally, has Iran now satisfactorily addressed the questions that the Agency forwarded on February 26 regarding its research and development program on centrifuges?

In light of the importance my government attaches to answering questions like the above in the most timely fashion possible, the U.S. requests the Director General to advise this Board immediately if he believes there are actions, pursuant to paragraph 18 of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, that the Secretariat views as "essential and urgent" for Iran to take in order for the IAEA to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material. If the DG believes a Special Inspection is in order, my government would fully support that and any other action the Director General believes is needed to answer the outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear program.

The United States also requests the DG to inform the Board immediately if the Secretariat detects in Iran actions that could be intended to "sanitize" Iranian facilities of evidence of past violations of its safeguards obligations.

The Board should in that regard urge Iran today to refrain from any actions that would make it more difficult for the Agency to determine the correctness and completeness of Iranian declarations. Specifically, the DG's June 6 report indicates that Iran intends to introduce nuclear material at the Natanz pilot centrifuge plant during the present month of June. We look to the IAEA Secretariat to work with Iran to ensure that no such step is taken while serious outstanding questions remain about whether Iran may already have used its centrifuges for undeclared operations -- evidence of which could be masked by the introduction of new, declared nuclear material.

The United States also joins other Board members in calling on Iran to sign, ratify, and implement the Strengthened Safeguards Additional Protocol without delay and without conditions. If Iran's nuclear program were limited only to peaceful purposes, Iran would see the Additional Protocol as a way to show its commitment to the non-proliferation regime and complete transparency. Instead, when Iranian officials speak about signing the Additional Protocol, they attach conditions no other country has sought or imposed. Like all other NPT signatories, Iran has an obligation to safeguards compliance that should be unqualified. Its adherence to the Additional Protocol should not be conditioned.

In conclusion, Madame Chairwoman, I want to reiterate the gravity of this issue. The Secretariat's work to date and the Director General's forthright reporting on it have rendered an important service to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to global security. My government now looks forward to further information from the DG as soon as possible on the Secretariat's progress in determining the correctness and completeness of Iranian declarations to date. The U.S. expects the Agency's accumulation of further information will point to only one conclusion: that Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

We propose that the Board be prepared to meet in special session to consider further information and analysis from the Secretariat whenever it becomes available, rather than waiting until the next scheduled Board meeting in September. In the interim, Iran should take all necessary steps to facilitate the work of the inspectors, so the world can be reliably informed of the full truth about its nuclear program.

Finally, Madame Chairwoman, the U.S. would like to join others in supporting the release of the DG's June 6 report to the public. A number of news media quickly acquired copies, and there have been selective quotations from its text. Our publics would be better served by the Board making the entire report available.

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