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'I take full responsibility for the decisions': Tony Blair evidence to the Hutton Inquiry, August 28

Full transcripts and documentation presented at the Hutton Inquiry are available at the Inquiry's official website, http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk. Extensive coverage, including the original BBC reports on the Government's Iraq dossier, is also available at http://news.bbc.co.uk.

MR ANTHONY CHARLES LYNTON BLAIR (called)

Examined by MR DINGEMANS

LORD HUTTON: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Good morning Prime Minister.

A. Good morning my Lord.

MR DINGEMANS: I do not think we need an introduction. May I start with the dossiers? We have heard that a dossier was being produced in February 2002 which related to four countries, one of which was Iraq. Could you explain the background to that?

A. After September 11th there was a renewed sense of urgency on the question of rogue states and weapons of mass destruction and the link with terrorism, and there was some thought given to trying to bring all that together, identifying the countries that were a particular source of concern to us, one of which was Iraq.

Q. We have heard that the dossier was then pursued against Iraq alone in about February/March time. Why was the decision made to concentrate on Iraq alone?

A. Again, as I say in my witness statement, I think given history Iraq was a special case. It was in breach of United Nations resolutions. It had a history of using weapons of mass destruction against its own people. So there was a sense that Iraq as it were fitted a special category.

Q. We know that the dossier got at least in its earlier stages to a final state in early March time but was not published.

A. Hmm.

Q. What was the reason for that?

A. We had a draft, but this thing was already beginning to build as a very major story. Frankly we were months away from deciding our strategy on this issue. I took the view in the end, and discussed it with the Foreign Secretary, and we both agreed that it would inflame the situation too much in order to publish it at this stage.

Q. We have also heard that on 3rd September you do announce that dossier is going to be published.

A. Yes.

Q. What changed?

A. What changed was really two things which came together. First of all, there was a tremendous amount of information and evidence coming across my desk as to the weapons of mass destruction and the programmes associated with it that Saddam had. There was also a renewed sense of urgency, again, in the way that this was being publicly debated. I recall throughout the August break last year literally every day there were stories appearing saying we were about to go and invade Iraq. Military action had been decided upon. President Bush and I had a telephone call towards the end of that break and we decided: look, we really had to confront this issue, devise our strategy and get on with it and I took the view, in the end, and said this at the press conference I gave in my constituency on 3rd September, that we really had to disclose what we knew or as much as we could of what we knew. That was because there was an enormous clamour. Here we were saying: this is a big problem, we have to deal with it. Why did we say it was a big problem? Because of the intelligence. And people were naturally saying: produce that intelligence then.

Q. What was the aim of the dossier?

A. The aim of the dossier was to disclose the reason for our concern and the reason why we believed this issue had to be confronted.

Q. We have heard evidence that after your announcement on 3rd September, there was a meeting in Downing Street chaired by Alastair Campbell on 5th September, where the presentational sides of the dossier were discussed, and after that meeting an e-mail was exchanged. Can I take you to that? That is CAB/11/17.

A. That is going to come up here, is it?

Q. I hope so. What you can see is about 13.50 -- we understand the meeting was about noon -- Mr Powell e-mailed Mr Campbell: "What did you decide on dossiers?" "Re dossier, substantial rewrite, with JS [John Scarlett] and Julian Miller in charge, which JS will take to US next Friday, and be in shape Monday thereafter. Structure as per TB's discussion. Agreement that there has to be real intelligence material in their presentation as such." Had you at this stage discussed the structure of the dossier with Mr Campbell?

A. I think I had discussed it in outline at least, that it was important that it dealt with Iraq and the question of weapons of mass destruction. We would obviously have to deal with the main elements of that because that after all was our case.

Q. And had you been aware of the proposed role that Mr Campbell was going to take in assisting with the presentation?

A. Well, I was in no doubt that he would assist with the presentation. I cannot recall exactly when but certainly around that time. However, I also knew that it had to be a document that was owned by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Chairman, John Scarlett. That was obviously important because we could not produce this as evidence that came from anything other than an objective source.

Q. We have heard that there was a draft of the dossier produced on 10th September, and we have seen that. I will not take you to that, if that is all right. What was the first draft of the dossier that you actually saw?

A. As I say in my statement I believe I saw the 10th September draft and I commented on drafts of the 16th and 19th and I made certain comments on that. But obviously in the end, of course, it all had to be produced and done through the process of the JIC.

Q. We have also seen some JIC assessments, redacted JIC assessments of 5th and 9th September which deal with the 45 minute issue. When did you see those?

A. I have seen the JIC assessment on 9th September but other than that, I do not think I made a comment on the 45 minutes in respect of the dossier.

Q. But you may have seen it as it went through in the draft of the 10th September?

A. Yes, I suppose that -- if it was in the 10th September draft I would have seen it.

Q. Can I take you to an e-mail dated 11th September which is CAB/23/15? This was an e-mail that Mr Scarlett produced. What this says is: "We have now received comments back from No. 10 on the first draft of the dossier. Unsurprisingly they have further questions and areas they would like expanded." Then the main comments are set out.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. They liked, for example, a specific personality. "Is there any intelligence that Iraq has actively sought to employ foreign experts ..." And , similar detailed comments. Then this is said at the bottom: "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around at least some of these buoys before, particularly item 4. But No.10 through the Chairman want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. This is therefore a last(!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included." Were you aware that this process was going on?

A. Yes, of course, and it was important that it made the best case that we could make subject, obviously, to it being owned by the Joint Intelligence Committee and that the items of intelligence should be those that the agencies thought could and should be included. So if you like it was a process in which they were in charge of this, correctly, because it was so important to make sure that no-one could question the intelligence that was in it as coming from the genuine intelligence agencies, but obviously I mean I had to present this to Parliament. I was going to make a statement. Parliament was going to be recalled. We were concerned to make sure that we could produce, within the bounds of what was right and proper, the best case.

LORD HUTTON: So you would agree, Prime Minister, that the wording that "No. 10 through the Chairman want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence" is a fair way of putting your view and the view of your staff in No. 10?

A. Provided that is clearly understood as meaning that it is only if the intelligence agencies thought both that the actual intelligence should be included and that there was not improper weight being given to any aspect of that intelligence. In other words, given that the process was that they had to decide what it was we could properly say, then obviously we wanted to -- we had to make this case because this was the case that we believed in and this was the evidence that we had, because all of this stuff was obviously stuff that had come across my desk.

LORD HUTTON: And that is conveyed by the words "as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence"?

A. Yes, and also the last sentence I draw attention to. I did not see this e-mail at the time, but you know any items --

LORD HUTTON: Quite. The last sentence: "This is therefore a last(!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included."

A. Yes, exactly.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

MR DINGEMANS: We have heard that the foreword was produced. We have looked at the dossiers, we have seen the dossiers, your signature appears with that. Can you help us on how the foreword was produced?

A. Again, as I say in my witness statement, the foreword would be -- the normal practice here is I would have told Alastair Campbell what are the items I think that are important, specific points that should be in it, on the basis of the drafts produced, and the foreword was expressed obviously to be my foreword. I should say at this point that probably my statement was the thing I was concentrating most upon.

Q. We will come to your statement, if I may. CAB/11/38 is the first document we see with the foreword. It is from Felicity Hatfield, who Mr Campbell told us worked for him, to Alison Blackshaw, with a draft of the dossier. That followed conversations. We can just see the Word document which says -- it is very small writing -- but "AC -- TB Foreword -- DO." If we go to CAB/11/39 you will probably recognise the dossier foreword by TB?

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. That appears to be the first draft we can see. That followed the discussions you had with Mr Campbell?

A. Yes.

Q. There is a slight variation on that at CAB/11/49. We can see another draft, a revised dossier foreword. I imagine there were various discussions about the dossier, is that right?

A. There were discussions going on about the dossier. I mean, as I say, it was more the facts in the dossier and the statement that were the key items. There could well have been discussions as drafts of the foreword were circulating around.

Q. Also on 17th September Mr Powell sends an e-mail, which is at CAB/11/53, to Alastair Campbell and David Manning. It does not appear as it were to get e-mailed to you.

A. Hmm.

Q. And he says he has three comments: "I think it is worth explicitly stating what the Prime Minister keeps saying, this is the advice to him from the JIC." Then: "We need to do more to back up the assertions ..." And: "In the penultimate para you need to make it clear Saddam could not attack us at the moment. The thesis is he would be a threat to the UK in the future if we do not check him."

A. Yes.

Q. Did those comments get reflected in the dossier?

A. I think so, yes; but I think the most important thing was I was very careful in my statement to make it clear what we were and were not saying. I think it is just important to emphasise this point. The purpose of the dossier was to respond to the call to disclose the intelligence that we knew but at that stage the strategy was not to use the dossier as the immediate reason for going to conflict, but as the reason why we had to return to the issue of Saddam and weapons of mass destruction preferably, as I said later, through the United Nations.

Q. On 17th September, there is also a memo that Mr Campbell sent to Mr Scarlett. It is CAB/11/66. You can see in the first paragraph he says: "Please find below a number of drafting points. As I was writing this, the Prime Minister had a read of the draft you gave me this morning, and he too made a number of points. He has also read my draft foreword, which I enclose (he will want another look at it before finally signing it off but I'd appreciate your views at this stage)."

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. Then a number of comments are made. Over the page, at 67, we can see if you scroll down: "'Vivid and horrifying', re human rights, doesn't fit ..." and effectively should go.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. Item 9: "... 'might' reads very weakly." Item 10: "... 'may' is weaker than in the summary."

A. Yes.

Q. Were you aware these type of comments were being passed by Mr Campbell to Mr Scarlett?

A. I cannot say I was aware of each and every specific comment but I was certainly aware of the fact, as I say, because this was going to be a publicly presented document, that he would be making comments upon it all subject, of course, to the fact that it had to be in the end the work of the JIC.

Q. And in fact, if we go to CAB/11/70, we can see Mr Scarlett's response, which is dated 18th September, and he thanks Mr Campbell for the minute. He talks about the reordering of chapter and he makes some specific comments. At paragraph 6 he turns to the detailed comments: "... we have been able to amend the text in most cases as you proposed. Taking your points in sequence: "1. We have strengthened language on current concerns and plans, including in the executive summary. The summary also brings out the point on sanctions and containment, as you proposed."

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. He says at the bottom: "... the intelligence supports only 'may have'" for item . If we go over the page to 71, you can see , he says: "'Vivid and horrifying' has been dropped."

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. he says he cannot improve on "might", but on he says that the language you queried on the old page has been tightened.

A. Yes.

Q. Were you aware of these type of responses from Mr Scarlett?

A. No, I was not aware of the absolute detail of it; but on the other hand, I mean, having read it, it seems to me a perfectly right way of proceeding. In other words, there are certain things that we are asking if they can improve on this or improve on that and they say: well, we can or we cannot. I think the important thing I would say is that once the decision had been taken that, as it were, John Scarlett and the JIC should actually own this document, it should be their document, then I think everything that was done was subject to that. Obviously it was vitally important when we got to Parliament and produced this document that I was able to stand up absolutely clearly and say: look, this is the work of the joint intelligence agencies, they stand behind the intelligence that is here.

Q. You said I think that your main preoccupation at this time was preparing your statement for Parliament?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Parliament, in fact, recalled to look at the dossier?

A. Yes. We recalled Parliament on 24th September.

Q. Is there anything from your statement to Parliament that you wanted to emphasise?

A. I think the only thing, as I do in my witness statement to you, is just to emphasise the fact that I make it clear what I perceived the threat to be. I said, if I could read this very briefly: "'Why now?' people ask. I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, that he will use his weapons. But I can say that if the international community having made the call for his disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion dictators faced with a weakening will always draw. That the international community will talk but not act ..." Then I go on to say: "If we take this course, he will carry on, his efforts will intensify, his confidence grow and at some point, in a future not too distant, the threat will turn into reality. The threat therefore is not imagined. The history of Sadaam and WMD is not American or British propaganda. The history and the present threat are real."

Q. And that was the process by which the dossier was produced, as far as you had any involvement in it?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Were you aware at the time about any unhappiness amongst members of the Intelligence Services with the process by which the dossier was being produced?

A. Absolutely not, no.

Q. We have now seen some e-mails that had been sent around. An example, just so that you can see it, is at MoD/4/11, which is a letter dated 8th July 2003, so after the event, but it relates to a complaint or a matter that was raised. He is writing to the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence. The name has been redacted. He says, in the second paragraph: "Your records will show that as an ADI NBC ST, and probably the most senior and experienced intelligence community official working on 'WMD', I was so concerned about the manner in which intelligence assessments for which I had some responsibility were being presented in the dossier of 24 September 2002, that I was moved to write formally to your predecessor, Tony Cragg, recording and explaining my reservations." Had any of those complaints as it were worked their way up as far as the JIC or to you?

A. No, they did not. I mean, I should say that this was a -- the question of whether we produced intelligence, though, was a very, very difficult question. I mean, on the one hand it is not normal for you to do this. I mean, intelligence, as I say in my witness statement, is intelligence and it has to be handled with care. On the other hand, the clamour for us to produce the reasons why -- here was I saying this is the situation with Saddam and weapons of mass destruction we have to deal with. The clamour for us to produce the evidence for this was obviously very, very strong. So, in a sense, the 24th September dossier was an unusual -- the whole business was unusual, but it was in response to an unusual set of circumstances. We were saying this issue had to be returned to by the international community and dealt with. Why were we saying this? Because of the intelligence. Not unnaturally, people said: well, give us the intelligence insofar as you can.

Q. There are various other e-mails but I will not take you to those. One other criticism that has been made, again after the event, is at FAC/3/34. This is in the report from the Foreign Affairs Committee. It is at paragraph 100. What they say is this: "We conclude that the language used in the September dossier was in places more assertive than that traditionally used in intelligence documents. We believe that there is much value in retaining the measured and even cautious tones which have been the hallmark of intelligence assessments and we recommend that this approach be retained." Do you agree with that comment?

A. I think that we described the intelligence in a way that was perfectly justified and I would simply make this point: although obviously people look back now on the September dossier in a quite different way, if I make these two points: the first is that the dossier, at the time, was not received as being particularly incautious in tone. On the contrary, a lot of people said that it was done in a fairly prosaic way. So the commentary at the time was not actually that it seemed to be, you know, advancing the case in an adventurous way, if I can put it like that, at all. The commentary was rather to the opposite effect. Secondly, the 45 minute claim, as I think I say in my witness statement, just a point to make, I mentioned it in the foreword, I mention it in my statement. I think after then I do not think I mention it again in Parliament. Indeed, on the 18th March debate, which was the crucial debate, where Parliament decided that it was going to opt for conflict, I do not think it came up at all, and I think there is a sense in which it is important to recognise that the September dossier was not making the case for war, it was making the case for the issue to be dealt with; and our preferred alternative was indeed to deal with it through the United Nations route.

Q. Now, one of the points that was made by some of the witnesses from the BBC was, in fact, that the Government had not relied on the 45 minutes claim after it had featured in the dossier.

A. Hmm.

Q. And they perceived that may be because the Government had doubts about whether or not it should have been put in there in the first place. Is that right?

A. No, that is absolutely wrong. There was absolutely no reason for us to doubt that intelligence at all. Can I just emphasise again, the whole purpose of having the JIC own this document was in order to provide the absolute clarity and certainty -- whatever discussions were going on as to how you presented it -- that in the end they were perfectly happy with this. And I think it was -- it was certainly part of our conversation in the early December period that for very, very obvious reasons it was essential that anything that we said in the course of my statement or in the dossier we could hand on heart say: this is the assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Q. If I can move away from the dossier now with one final question: were you aware at all of Dr Kelly's involvement in any historic or current drafting of the dossier?

A. No, I was not.

Q. We have seen correspondence between Mr Campbell and Mr Sambrook relating to complaints about BBC coverage. They go back, some of the documents we have seen, to the war in Afghanistan and then the war in Iraq.

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a feeling in Downing Street that the Government was not being properly represented by the BBC at this stage?

A. There was a feeling, but I do not doubt we are not the first Government to be in such a situation, that there were parts of the BBC that were not covering it in as objective a way as we thought, but that happens -- I think it happened throughout the business in Afghanistan too. I should imagine we are not the first Government and will not be the last Government to have such concerns.

Q. Were you aware of Mr Campbell's letters of complaint and the apparent absence of success, so far as getting any major corrections were concerned?

A. Yes, I was aware he had made complaints about certain of the stories. It was not from all parts of the BBC, incidentally, at all. But there were complaints about certain stories.

Q. We have seen the letters which are specific to certain programmes.

A. Yes.

Q. Can I turn, now, to the 29th May Today broadcast. Where were you at the time?

A. I was in Basra with the British troops when I was told about the claim, I think shortly after it was made.

Q. And what was your reaction to that?

A. Well, it was an extraordinary allegation to make and an extremely serious one.

Q. What did you do to --

LORD HUTTON: What were you told of the allegation Prime Minister? How was it reported to you?

A. It was reported to me -- I cannot actually recall whether I got an actual written transcript of what was said, but I think I even may have, but the things that absolutely stood out and were extraordinary, in my view, were (1) that this 45 minutes claim had been inserted into the dossier at the behest of No. 10 Downing Street; (2) that it was done by us I think the words were "probably knowing it was wrong"; and (3) that we had done it contrary to the wishes of the Intelligence Services. I think that then the report went on to say: and that this information had been supplied by someone who was in charge of the process of drawing up the dossier. So, obviously it was an extremely serious allegation. MR DINGEMANS: What steps were taken to correct the record?

A. Well, we issued a strong denial, which did not really go anywhere.

Q. Can I take you to some speeches that you made at the time? It is CAB/1/158. These are some extracts that have been prepared. I think after you were in Kuwait and in Iraq, you then went to Poland; is that right?

A. Yes, absolutely. Yes.

Q. And you can see what you say at the top: "... the idea that we authorised or made our intelligence agencies invent some piece of evidence is completely absurd ..."

A. Yes.

Q. Was that the main charge to which you were responding at the time?

A. Yes, I mean, look, this was an absolutely fundamental charge. It is one thing to say: we disagree with the Government, you should not have gone to war. People can have a disagreement about that. This was an allegation that we had behaved in a way that were it true -- as I say in my statement, tested in this way, had the allegation been true, it would have merited my resignation. It was not a small allegation, it was absolutely fundamental. The next day in Poland I thought we might have been able to deal with it on day one just by saying: look, this is completely untrue. Day two, when we were in Poland, I then asked -- I cannot remember exactly who and how it all came about, but I said: look, you have to check this out. What is more, you have to check it out with John Scarlett and the JIC people that we can say definitively and emphatically this is not the case. The dossier was the work of the JIC and they were entirely happy with it. I then made that emphasis at the press conference; and I hoped then that the strength of denial might put it to rest, but it did not. What really I think from that moment on made the thing extremely difficult was there was then a Mail on Sunday article by Mr Gilligan that then named Alastair Campbell as the person who had done this effectively. I cannot remember -- there was some huge great headline.

Q. We have seen the article.

A. Yes. What that then did was -- you already have this extraordinarily serious allegation which, if it were true, would mean we had behaved in the most disgraceful way and I would have to resign as Prime Minister. Then what you had was a very specific allegation, and putting Alastair Campbell into this. Now, if I can say this with all sort of due deference to the media and everyone, I mean the insertion of Alastair's name was -- once you then put that into the pot along with everything else, you have something that is no longer a small item. There is the person who is a BBC correspondent saying specifically that his source for this someone in charge of drawing up the dossier had named Alastair Campbell as the person who put it in. The combination of those things, both the original report and then the Sunday newspaper follow-up, to be frank, ever since then that has been the issue. I mean, we are three months on and it is still the issue.

Q. You considered, I think we have heard from Mr Campbell, putting this to the Intelligence and Security Committee, in a way of dealing with the issue; is that right?

A. Well, what happened then was we were then in a complete and full storm. I do not make any criticism at all of the opposition parties, everybody, but by the time we got to Monday in the Parliament, it was more or less a given that this is what had happened, that Alastair Campbell had actually produced the intelligence, not the Joint Intelligence Committee. Well, unsurprisingly that was a pretty big issue. There was a raging storm going on. And it was clear, because there were a lot of calls for inquiries, there was going to have to be some sort of inquiry into it. I thought that the Intelligence and Security Committee were the right people to deal with this. I thought they were the best people to deal with it. I thought they would deal with it in a sensible way, and I also thought this is within a fairly narrow compass of fact. We either did this thing or we did not do this thing. So, if they were able to look at it, and make a decision, then that would be the best way of dealing with it.

Q. Now, in fact while on CAB/1/158, if we scroll down to the bottom of that page, we can see comments that you made to Parliament on 4th June, extracts from Hansard, again denying in vigorous terms the story.

A. Hmm.

Q. Going over the page to 159, and I think it is the second paragraph, it says this: "Rather than having allegations made by anonymous sources that are completely untrue, is not it better that people with evidence should present it to the Intelligence and Security Committee and allow that Committee to make a judgment?"

A. Hmm.

Q. That is what you were hoping to do as at 4th June; is that right?

A. Yes, and I thought they were the best people -- I thought all the way through they were the best people to do this. I agreed I would publish their report, so there was no question of suppressing their judgment on it. They meet in private. They are pretty discreet. Contrary to what some people say, I appoint the people but after consultation with the opposition leaders in respect of their people serving on it. And they are senior Parliamentarians with a lot of experience. I thought they would be the best people to deal with it. I did not, I confess, right at the very beginning think that the FAC were the right people to deal with it.

Q. At about this time the FAC are announcing they are going to hold their inquiry. What was your attitude to that?

A. My attitude to it was that I did not think that was the best thing. I thought, for the reasons I have given, that the Intelligence and Security Committee -- however, it is not up to me to say what the FAC look into. You know, as I say in my witness statement, I worried right at the very beginning that when a Select Committee is looking at an issue that is such a huge and hot political issue in a sense, that the danger always is that it splits down party lines, that the whole thing becomes difficult. I thought that the best way of dealing with it, as I say, was through the ISC. I made that clear. But on the other hand, you know, the argument, to be fair to those people who were opposed to that, they said: look, the FAC is a Select Committee. The ISC reports to you as Prime Minister, so the FAC are the right people to look at this. Well, it is an argument.

Q. We can see what the FAC thought at FAC/3/10. This is in their report that is published on 7th July. And at paragraph they said that they were strongly of the view that they were entitled to a greater degree of cooperation from the Government on access to witnesses and intelligence materials, and they talk about the correspondence in relation to Mr Campbell and the fact that he then appeared and "we asked for direct access to the JIC assessments".

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. "That was refused, although some extracts were read to us in private session. We are confident that our inquiry would have been enhanced if our requests had been met." Then they do balance it at the bottom of the paragraph by saying: "Yet it is fair to state that within the Government's self-imposed restraints the Foreign Secretary sought to be forthcoming ... in private session ..." They note the differences between their inquiry and the ISC in paragraph 7, I think making the points that you have just made: "... the Prime Minister has repeatedly said in the House that he will cooperate fully with a parallel inquiry by the statutory Intelligence and Security Committee. This is hardly surprising, since the Committee was appointed by and reports to him, and it meets entirely in private. The Foreign Affairs Committee, on the other hand, was appointed by and reports to the House of Commons ... We believe that our inquiry is the more credible of the two ..."

A. Yes.

Q. Were those views you shared?

A. Well, I did, not unsurprisingly. I mean, what I thought was, yes, fine, the ISC it is true meets in private and reports to me, but I had agreed I would publish their report. So that point as it were was taken care of. And although they are appointed by me, as I say, the people on them who are from different political parties are appointed after consultation with me. They are senior Parliamentarians, they are experienced people, all of them, and they had shown quite clearly, for example over the report they did on the Bali bombing, they were perfectly prepared to be independent. I had no doubt at all they would get to the truth of this. In relation to the previous paragraph, in a sense that does accurately reflect the fact that I was not keen on the FAC doing this. I was worried about the precedent of No. officials appearing, which is why originally I said that I did not think Alastair should appear. I think there was concern as well from the intelligence people about how much we would say. But in the end I mean Alastair did appear and the Foreign Secretary actually read them out the JIC assessment of the 9th September about the 45 minute point.

Q. At this time, and this is all early June, when you were saying the ISC is going to report --

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. -- Mr Campbell is writing various private letters to the BBC and getting various private responses. Were you aware of those letters being exchanged?

A. I was aware he was in correspondence with the BBC. I was not aware of the details of it, but I was aware of the fact that he was still trying to get the story withdrawn.

Q. Then on 12th June we have heard that there was a lunch with the BBC.

A. Hmm.

Q. Do you recall that?

A. I do.

Q. And was anything said in relation to this criticism that had been made, as you perceived it, of the Government in relation to the intelligence assessments?

A. It was a lunch that really was about trying to make sure we all got back on terms with each other. So it was not done in an aggressive way, I may say. But obviously we discussed Iraq and the issues to do with Iraq. Curiously, we never got into the should they apologise, should we apologise part of it. It was somewhat overshadowed by the fact that that day we had a reshuffle, so it was necessarily somewhat truncated, I think.

Q. And so the issue of the report, Mr Gilligan's report, was it ever expressly raised?

A. No, I think the general issue to do with Iraq was raised, but this had obviously already been raised in correspondence; and I think my purpose in the lunch, in a sense, was more to do with a discussion with them that allowed us to be on terms with each other.

Q. In the hope that the dispute might go away or ...?

A. All the way through we hoped the dispute might go away. But the only way it was going to go away was if they said clearly and unequivocally that the original story was wrong and it was pretty obvious by then that they were not going to.

Q. That is 12th June. We can then go on to 19th June when Mr Gilligan gives evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Were you aware of the fact that he was giving evidence or had given evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee?

A. Yes, I mean I would have been aware that he was giving evidence.

Q. He was asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee at FAC/2/145 -- it is question 461, which is at the bottom of the page, if I can take you to that. Mr Pope asked this: "Just on the issue of the 45 minutes, I want to be very clear about what your source is alleging. Is your source alleging that the 45 minutes did not exist in the assessment that was inserted by Alastair Campbell?" Mr Gilligan says: "I will quote his words again. He said, 'It was real information. It was the information of a single source.' My source did not believe it was reliable. He believed that that single source had made a mistake, that he had confused the deployment time for a conventional missile with the deployment time for a CBW missile. He did not believe that any missiles had been armed with CBW that would therefore be able to be fireable at 45 minutes' notice. He believed that claim was unreliable."

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. And at FAC/2/148, towards the bottom, Mr Gilligan, in answer to Mr Illsley, said this: "It was not a claim that was in any way made up or fabricated by Downing Street. Another one of the reasons why this story took on the life that it did was that Downing Street denied a number of things which had never been alleged. They denied, among other things, that material had been fabricated. Nobody ever alleged that material had been fabricated."

A. Hmm.

Q. Was that your understanding of the dispute?

A. Well, it certainly is not my understanding that that is an accurate assessment of what was being alleged. Look, what was being alleged -- and this is the reason why the issue was such a big issue -- if what had been said was, well, somebody within the system doubts this 45 minute claim but nonetheless the 45 minute claim was put in there by the Joint Intelligence Committee and so on, I doubt it would have been a very big issue. But the original allegation, never really withdrawn in clear and unequivocal terms, was this had been put in by Downing Street against the wishes of the security people.

LORD HUTTON: Perhaps we should look at BBC/1/4 which contains the start of the Today Programme. MR DINGEMANS: This is the broadcast that was made, the early morning broadcast. If you look at the second paragraph --

A. Hmm.

Q. -- Mr Gilligan, it is about line 4, says this: "... and what we've been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that, actually the Government probably erm, knew that that 45 minute figure was wrong, even before it decided to put it in." Then towards the bottom: "... Downing Street, our source says, ordered a week before publication, ordered it to be sexed up, to be made more exciting and ordered more facts to be er, to be discovered."

A. Yes. Well, I mean, you know, look, any person listening to that would think that we had done something improper, not that we just got our facts mixed up. I mean in my submission, I think that anybody who listened to that -- this was the purpose of it. The whole thing since then has been not did the Government make the wrong decision, but did the Government dupe us, did the Government in a sense defraud people over it? That has been the central charge. My view, just to state it frankly, all the way through, has been that the only thing that was going to remove that was -- whatever agreement or disagreement you had over whether the story should ever have been run in the first place, the only thing that was going to remove that was a clear and unequivocal statement that the original story was wrong.

Q. Mr Campbell gave evidence on 25th June. I have taken you to Mr Gilligan's evidence, he is 19th June. Mr Campbell gives evidence on 25th June. At FAC/2/284, in answer to Mr Pope, Mr Campbell said this: "Well, it is true that when the BBC representative came to the Committee last week [which was 19th June] he claimed that all he had ever alleged was that we had 'given it undue prominence'. I am afraid that is not true. What he said last week was not true. It was a complete backtrack on what he had broadcast and written about in the Mail on Sunday, The Spectator and elsewhere. Now the reason why I feel so strongly that we, the Government, from the Prime Minister down deserve an apology about this story is it has been absolutely clear not just by me - you can put me to one side..." and he talks about himself, saying that: "'This story is not true' and if the BBC defence correspondent on the basis of a single anonymous source continues to say that is true, then I think something has gone very wrong with BBC journalism."

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. Mr Campbell has obviously picked up on the fact that Mr Gilligan, whatever he originally broadcast -- and you have been shown what he originally broadcast and you accurately set out what had been relayed to you in relation to that broadcast.

A. Yes.

Q. But by 19th June, when he was reading out what his source says, he is effectively putting a slightly lesser charge?

A. That is correct. There is no doubt that they, as it were, shifted to saying: look, we are not attacking your integrity, we just simply say this is what was told to us, and so on. But the real problem was that the original allegation had been made, it had then been, as I say, backed up and really had booster rockets put on it by the Mail on Sunday article and nothing -- so far as people were looking at this and taking it in, they were not taking in the intricacies of was this about your integrity or not. The fact is that the entire original allegation was an attack on our integrity. I want to make this point because it is important. I do not mean that in a sense I was being unduly sensitive about this. I think in my walk of life you get attacks the entire time. That is part of the business and you should not complain about it normally. Indeed, if you did, you would spend your entire time complaining. This was an attack that went to the heart of not just the office of Prime Minister but also the way our Intelligence Services operated. It went in a sense to the credibility, I felt, of the country, never mind the Prime Minister. It was a very, very serious charge. It is correct that in the weeks that followed that charge was somehow -- the ground was slightly shifted but nobody from the outside would have really understood that as happening. I think most of the reports normally said the BBC sticks by its story, is basically what was said.

Q. Another possible way perhaps of demonstrating what had actually happened would have been to show the dossiers, indeed or the draft dossiers. That is what the FAC asked for. Can I take you to FAC/2/287? It is question 1019 towards the bottom of the page. Mr Chidgey says: "You appreciate how important this issue is. The accusation has been made that this document was adjusted, altered, sexed up - whatever - for a particular political purpose" which you have identified as the thrust of the complaint.

A. Hmm.

Q. "You said, and it is on record elsewhere, that his process took many months to evolve. I think it would be helpful if, perhaps not today but shortly afterwards, you could let the Committee have information on the suggestions that were made by you and your team as this document evolved ... drafts were continuing ... It would be very helpful if it was possible for us to have copies of those earlier drafts so that we could satisfy ourselves that there were no attempts to change the essence of the document in order to pursue a particular political point." We have seen now the drafts of the dossiers and we have now seen the e-mails and the suggestions that were made so that everyone is able to make their own judgments in that respect.

A. Hmm.

Q. Was there any reason that the FAC were not shown the dossiers?

A. I think, from recollection, it was -- and I think someone indicated -- I had not seen this before actually, but what Alastair Campbell says in reply to this, I think it was the Joint Intelligence Committee and John Scarlett took the view that that was not a right thing to do. I think their worry all the way through was that, you know, there was a limit to what should be shown to the FAC.

Q. On 25th June, Mr Campbell also made allegations that the story from the BBC was a lie, I have taken you to part of the passage.

A. Excuse me, can I just say something? I think it is also important -- I mean, I cannot speculate and should not as to whether, had we given earlier drafts, it would have made a difference. I do just point out we obviously had said in the most plain and unequivocal terms that this was the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Jack Straw had actually read them out, the JIC assessment, in private on the 9th September. Once you have the JIC assessment read out on 9th September, it is pretty obvious that the claim is not our claim but their claim.

Q. I have taken you to those parts where the FAC said that they had those read out in private.

A. Hmm.

Q. Mr Campbell also made what the BBC perceived to be wider attacks on their journalism. He described the story as a lie and he described the BBC in less than flattering terms. Was this an escalation of the dispute between No. 10 and the BBC that you were aware of?

A. No, I do not think it was -- I mean, it was important, frankly, for reasons that I say in my witness statement, that we made it clear we were not attacking the BBC's independence. But in the end the essence of this, all the way through, was really an original story. But by the time you got to this point, I think it was largely self generating, this, because you see if it had been withdrawn quickly then I think the issue would have dampened down. But by the time you have got to this stage, you have the FAC doing its report and you had a huge row going on in Parliament. Virtually every Prime Minister's Question Time I was being asked about the issues to do with trust and the document and so on.

Q. What was your perception about how the dispute could end, as it were, at this stage?

A. I was of the view that the only thing that would really help in this situation was, as I say, whatever argument we had about whether the story should ever have been run, that there was something clear and unequivocal stated by the BBC that the story was wrong. I did not think it terribly likely we were going to get such a statement by that stage and also, to be blunt about it, I thought we had to move on.

Q. In fact before the FAC report there are two further items of correspondence. Mr Campbell wrote a letter of 26th June. That is at CAB/1/352. He publicised that letter. You have no doubt seen it, so if I may I will not take you through that.

A. Hmm.

Q. And that asked for an immediate response, and a response came back on 27th June which was at CAB/1/355, from Mr Sambrook, effectively reasserting all the allegations. If I can take you to CAB/1/360, this was in answer to specific questions that Mr Campbell had posed: "Does the BBC still stand by the allegation it made on 29th May that No. 10 added in the 45 minute claim to the dossier? "The allegation was not made by the BBC but by our source - a senior official involved in the compilation of the dossier - and the BBC stands by the reporting of it." There is a distinction drawn between the BBC and the source. Was that a distinction that you recognised?

A. Well, obviously when you say recognised -- I recognise those are two different things to say: this is what our source says; this is what we say. I go back to the original point that I made. Withstanding the force of the original allegation, the only thing that was going to diminish that force was a clear statement. What we got into was a distinction that you would pick up, if you were in the details of this, between what the source says and what the BBC say. But if you were simply observing this, you would still be struck by the force of the original allegation. That was really the point that I was trying to make then and throughout, that unless there was something very clear and unequivocal about the original story being wrong then frankly the force of the allegation remained, and it indeed did remain; actually in some ways it still does remain. LORD HUTTON: I think a possible indication from Mr Sambrook's statement is that there is a difference between the BBC directly making an allegation that someone or the Government has acted improperly and the BBC reporting someone else's view that a person or the Government has acted improperly. Do you have any comment on that, Prime Minister?

A. I think if you are to make that distinction then in your reporting of it on 29th May you make it a very clear thing. I think if one goes back to that and if one takes the newspaper article on the Sunday, I think you would be hard put to say: somebody said this thing but we stand back from it. It was not coming across like that. I honestly believe it was not meant to come across like that. MR DINGEMANS: Mr Campbell has told us that Mr Sambrook's reply was read to him I think while he was at Wimbledon and he was extremely irritated by it. He went to Channel 4. He was invited to Channel and made an appearance that day. Did you know that that was proposed?

A. Yes. He phoned me shortly before and asked for my permission to do it and I gave my permission for him to do it.

Q. Do you think that had any effect on the escalation of the dispute?

A. To be frank, I think it was pretty much there already, the dispute. One point I would just like to emphasise throughout is that for us the dispute was in a sense not what was important. What was important was the correction of the story.

Q. Now Mr Campbell also issued a statement, at CAB/1/367, that day where he makes plain his views about Mr Sambrook's reply --

A. Hmm.

Q. -- where he says, in paragraph 2, that: "It confirms our central charge that they do not have a shred of evidence to justify their lie, broadcast many times on many BBC outlets, that we deliberately exaggerated and abused British intelligence and so misled Parliament and public." So he goes on to describe in certain language Mr Sambrook's reply.

A. Hmm.

Q. It also appears at about this time that there is a letter being written, 29th June, to the effect that there is no point in corresponding any further, we will wait until the FAC report.

A. Hmm.

Q. Were you part of that decision-making process?

A. I cannot recall exactly but I think I was saying to Alastair at the time: look, they are not going to withdraw their story, you will just have to wait and see what the FAC say. And I think I was making the point too, I recall, that it was important to distinguish -- because I did understand this from the BBC's point of view -- it was important to distinguish between their independence and the story.

Q. Going on to the FAC report, if I can just complete with that before I turn to Dr Kelly's name coming to your attention. The FAC actually reported on the morning of 7th July. Did you have any further attempts to try to resolve the matter with the BBC?

A. As I say in my witness statement, on the morning of the 7th July I had an entirely private conversation with Gavyn Davies, the Chairman of the BBC, at my request, to see if there was some way we could find a way through this; and it was a perfectly amicable discussion but we were not able to come to an agreement. I mean essentially we were both agreed it was important to try to calm things down, and what I was saying to him -- I was not exactly clear what the FAC report was going to say but there were newspaper reports about what it might say. I said: look, is not the simple way through this, whatever we think about your original broadcast and the allegations, is not the best way through for you to say: well, we stand by our right to have broadcast the story but we accept the story was wrong, and we say we accept that as a retraction and we can debate about whether it was right or wrong that the story should ever have been run, but nonetheless the BBC have now clearly retracted the original story? He explained that he felt he could not do that, that he could not actually retract the original story, that would compromise the BBC's independence, although he said again very clearly: look, we made it clear in our statement -- they put out a statement the night before. He said: look, if you look at that statement, it makes it plain we are not attacking your integrity. I made the points about that that I have made, which are: you may not say it attacks my integrity but actually that is what the story is about, and therefore, unless the story is clearly withdrawn, then the attack on my integrity remains. We could not come to an agreement on that.

Q. Mr Davies, who is going to give evidence later, I have seen some notes he has made in relation to that. One thing he suggests is he said there was no basis on which he could apologise because the source had not been disproved. Do you recollect that in your conversation?

A. Well, I think what happened was that he made some comment of that nature and I then said to him, and said, you know, in confidence actually over the last few days, we do have reason to believe there may be -- we do not know at the moment -- someone who has come forward as a source. It looks like from what he is going to say that he does not back up Mr Gilligan's story, but we cannot be sure of that. I think Gavyn said something like: but this is corroborated by another report from Susan Watts on Newsnight. I had never heard of this report so I did not make any comment on that. Anyway, that was really very much at the end of the conversation. At the end of the conversation we tried to agree -- we said let us to try to deal with this the best we can but obviously it is a difficult situation.

Q. I think his perception -- he is likely to give evidence to the effect that he considered this as some first steps to return relationships to normal. Was that a fair analysis?

A. I think all the way through we were anxious to get things back on a normal footing and indeed the lunch on 12th June was a part of a desire to do that. After all, the BBC is the main broadcasting outlet. It is not really very sensible for the Government to be in a situation where we have a continuing dispute with the BBC. But the trouble was, again I just simply cannot emphasise this enough, that the whole of the political 45 debate was overshadowed by the story. So unless you managed to get that issue dealt with then, you know, you could do your very best to get back on a decent footing, I think it is important we do that in any event, but what we could not do was get round the fact that the story still stayed.

Q. The FAC report was published and they rejected the allegations that Mr Campbell had been responsible for inserting the 45 minutes claim. Was that sufficient for the Government's purposes?

A. No. The trouble with the FAC report, rather as I had anticipated at the outset, was that it split on party lines. Yes, it is true, you could say by a majority they had cleared the Government, but I think the next day the coverage frankly was in balance probably negative, it was at best a muddied picture, and certainly you would not have in any shape or form thought the next day: well, that is the Government in the clear.

Q. Mr Campbell has given evidence. He said that, I think on 7th July, and this is when the FAC report has been published, that he felt slightly dispirited. The BBC refused to accept they were wrong. That was obviously something he was very keen on and you have said you were very keen on as well. He said it was just going away as a media thing, or used words to that general effect. Was that right, that the story was now dying, as it were, or going to die?

A. It was obvious once the FAC had reported, it was important if possible that it started to go away as a story. One of the reasons -- I mean, I actually helped -- on 7th July after the FAC I think ourselves and the BBC both put out statements.

Q. Yes.

A. In Alastair's statement, which I actually looked over and helped draft a part of it, we made it clear that whatever argument we had about the source, the key thing was the original story. They had refused to accept that the story was wrong -- well, there it was. You know, maybe it would have been possible to move on at that point, I do not know.

Q. In fact, there were other developments. Can I take you, now, back to 3rd July?

A. Hmm.

Q. When was the first time you heard that a possible source for Mr Gilligan's story had come forward?

A. I was away on a visit in the North West on 3rd July and I was telephoned by Jonathan Powell, my Chief of Staff.

Q. What did he say to you?

A. We had a conversation about a whole series of things we were discussing but in the course of that conversation he said that the Secretary of State for Defence had informed him that an official in the Ministry had come forward to say that he had spoken to Mr Gilligan and that he might be the source.

Q. And what was your reaction to that?

A. Well, he said that the Ministry of Defence were still seeking further information and clarity. I said we had to proceed with caution. We needed proper information; and I said to keep the information to ourselves at that point.

Q. Right. Was there any reason that you said to keep the information to yourselves at that point?

A. I thought it was important, until we knew what was actually happening, that we did not enlarge the circle of information about it.

Q. Were you given a name, at that time?

A. No, I do not recall being given a name at that time. I cannot recall when I first heard the name. I mean, it may have been in these telephone conversations. It may not have been. I do not think it was on 3rd July, but at some point obviously in the next few days I was given the name.

Q. Then on 4th July, are you in London or not?

A. No, I was at Chequers on 4th July in the evening. It was a Friday evening.

Q. Which is a Friday night.

A. Yes.

Q. Had you had any discussions about the possible source during the day?

A. No, I had not; and I had a stack of other things that were preoccupying me at the time.

Q. Can you perhaps, just so that we can all put your evidence in context --

A. Well, there was the National Health Service. The Foundation Trust issue was obviously going to be a big question in the next week, and the vote was the next week. We had problems in the House of Lords over the Criminal Justice Bills, and also the situation in Iraq on the ground.

Q. So you were dealing with those issues?

A. All I had had was a statement in the course of a conversation on other things, that this might be a development.

Q. 4th July, in the evening is this?

A. Yes.

Q. You are at Chequers; and what happens?

A. Jonathan called me again and he said that Kevin Tebbit would be providing a letter, I think later that day, giving details of this possible source. He said that he had actually had a discussion with David Manning and David Omand and John Scarlett about the next steps and there had been a discussion about whether the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee should immediately be informed, since the report was about to be published on the Monday, and suddenly here we were on the Friday with this information. Of course, the Intelligence and Security Committee were about to start their hearings. I think they were due to take John Scarlett maybe on the Wednesday. I cannot recall that exactly. Anyway, they concluded there was not enough information to make a decision and I agreed and said we should await the details in the letter.

Q. Did you have any conversations with Mr Campbell on this day about the matter?

A. No, not on that Friday. No.

Q. Or with Mr Hoon, who I think also knew at this stage?

A. No.

LORD HUTTON: Prime Minister, I have asked other witnesses why these very senior officials were all concerned with this matter. There was a discussion, and Mr Powell discussed with Sir David Manning, Sir David Omand and Mr John Scarlett. Why were so many senior officials concerned with this?

A. I think it was really that this was -- I mean, this whole issue was still the dominant issue. You had the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report on the Monday into really the nature of the allegation. Then suddenly at the last minute comes forward somebody who might be the source. And I think there was a real concern on the part of everyone -- we were in a quandary, frankly, right from the very beginning. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee is about to report on the Monday, the report is going to deal precisely with the Andrew Gilligan allegations and here is somebody who suddenly emerges as the person who may be the source of those allegations.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. I think the reason why people were involved at a senior level in the Civil Service were first of all that it was very important. Secondly, certainly as the matter developed, I was very, very keen, indeed insistent, that we did have the senior people involved because I anticipated right from the very beginning that there were going to be a lot of questions asked afterwards about: when did you know? Why did you not tell the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee? How could you let them make their report on Monday when you were in possession of information plainly relevant to their report? That was I think the explanation as to why people at a senior level were involved.

LORD HUTTON: Again, I think having heard a considerable amount of evidence the reason may be obvious, but why was this a quandary? What was the quandary which you were concerned had arisen?

A. The quandary really was this: we had never really wanted the Foreign Affairs Committee to look into this; we thought the ISC should do it. But they had and that is their right to do so and they had conducted their investigation. Suddenly, as I say, at the last minute forward comes somebody who may be the source of the allegation that was at the centre of the FAC report. What did you do? Did you inform the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee immediately, which is one possibility and which I have no doubt afterwards people would have said to us we should have done. Did you try and get greater clarity of whether this was indeed the source or not? So how did you handle this? The reason why I thought it was very, very important to involve the senior officials is that the whole allegation around the Foreign Affairs Committee report and all the rest of it was about the propriety of the Government. Here is an issue that also seems to reflect on propriety and I am in receipt of that information. So I thought it was essential not in a sense to pass the responsibility to them -- in the end I have full responsibility for the decisions that are taken -- but in order to make absolutely sure that when at a later point, as I thought there would be, not obviously in the context which we are talking now, but people would say: when did you know? What did you know? Who did you tell? I would be able to say: we handled this by the book, in the sense of with the advice of senior civil servants. Not, as I say, in order to pass responsibility to them, but in order to make sure that this was not, as it were, the politicians driving the system but us taking a consensus view as to what the right way to proceed was. MR DINGEMANS: That is the evening of the 4th July when you were, as I think you were saying, dealing with other issues. Did you have any conclusion to your conversation that evening? Who was your conversation with; Mr Powell?

A. Yes. He told me about the meeting they had had earlier and that they said: look, there is not enough information to make a decision. I agreed and said we would await the details in the letter that was coming over from Kevin Tebbit.

Q. Did you get that letter that evening?

A. Yes. I got that letter that was faxed to me, I think, by David Omand and that then, you know, gave a certain amount of evidence obviously as to what Dr Kelly had said in the interview that he had had with the Ministry of Defence.

Q. We can see it at MoD/1/34. It is a letter dated 4th July 2003 from Sir Kevin Tebbit to Sir David Omand. This was the letter you got at Chequers?

A. (Pause). Yes. Absolutely.

Q. Having received the letter, did you feel able to make any other decisions?

A. No. I mean, I think it was simply obvious, as I discussed with Jonathan earlier, that they had to get further information about it.

Q. The 6th and 7th July, where are you physically? Are you in Downing Street? Which is the weekend.

A. On 5th and 6th July I think I am still at Chequers in the country; and I think that is when I get a second letter.

Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/41? What had happened on the morning of 5th July, if this helps, is that Mr Baldwin had written an article in The Times --

A. Yes.

Q. -- when some further information was given --

A. Yes.

Q. -- about the BBC's source.

A. Yes.

Q. Did you read that article in The Times?

A. I cannot honestly recall whether I saw the article or not.

Q. In fact, I think I have shown you the wrong letter. Can I take you to MoD/1/38? This is the letter, 5th July, which you can see refers to: "Today's Times carries an article by Tom Baldwin ...".

A. I do not think I actually saw the article before I got this but I think probably when I got this I went and had a look at the article. I cannot recall absolutely.

Q. Did you, having received this letter, decide to take any further action?

A. Well, I thought that what this letter indicated was effectively two things: (1) it was more probable that the particular individual was the source of the allegation by Mr Gilligan; and (2) the fact that the media were on to it. I think in that letter --

Q. If we scroll down the page you can see the terms of it.

A. Yes.

Q. Then, over the page, Sir Kevin Tebbit -- if it helps you, at the top of the next page he said: "There remain many discrepancies ... We still cannot exclude the possibility that the main source, or other sources, are elsewhere. But it may be possible to explain and reconcile at least some of the mismatches."

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. He says: "Records of the MoD's interview [that was one that took place on the Friday] ... are still being prepared... The Times story today, whether accurate or not, will increase the likelihood that over the weekend other journalists will indeed identify and name the BBC's source as our official. (He is ... well known in media/academic circles)."

A. Hmm.

Q. Sorry, does that help?

A. I mean, the two things that I took out of this were: (1) that it was more probable he was indeed the source; and (2), that this thing was already washing round the media

Q. Or may well be washing round other parts of the media, as it were?

A. It was in The Times and, you know, I think that they were -- I certainly took that as an indication that he thought this was -- you know, that this thing could come out at any point.

Q. Had you been told that the matter might come out at any point at this stage?

A. I cannot recall, but I mean I think -- I would use my own judgment about that, to be frank.

Q. Your own judgment was?

A. My own judgment was obviously there was a -- with an issue with so much political focus on it as this, when someone was being interviewed and reinterviewed and presumably people were talking about it within the system, then you have an article in The Times, I think I would have thought there was a fair possibility it would leak in any event.

Q. Who did you have your discussions with over that weekend? I appreciate it may not be possible to separate Saturday and Sunday.

A. Yes. I mean, my recollection is that on the Saturday Alastair called me, because he wanted to put to me his proposal that he write privately to the BBC Governors setting out the case in advance of the BBC Governors' adjudication, if you like. I agreed to that. But he then also raised the issue of the source because he had been told that by the Defence Secretary and his worry, he thought the information was plainly relevant and were we not going to be criticised for withholding it. I said to him what was my firm view throughout, as I was just saying to you a moment or two ago, that we had to proceed in a way that Sir Kevin and David Omand were entirely content with, that we had to make sure that the MoD's internal -- because there were obviously personnel procedures that had to be gone through. And again, just to say, and I am sure I said it to him in the course of this conversation: Look, this is a difficult situation. It is difficult to know exactly how to proceed and what the right thing to do is, so, you know, for goodness sake let us do it in a very careful way.

Q. Were you aware, at this stage, that Mr Hatfield, who was the personnel director of the Ministry of Defence, had effectively interviewed Dr Kelly on the Friday afternoon?

A. I cannot recall whether anyone mentioned that there had been an interview. I do not think I had -- I think I got more information actually once I had spoken on the Sunday morning to David Omand.

Q. Right.

A. I did that because I wanted to check his view out on this, because I mean I was worried about -- as I say, right at the very outset I was worried about this business with the FAC and should we tell them. I spoke to him about it and he said he thought we needed further information. That was his view. That was the Foreign Secretary's view. I said: fine, although I think we both agreed we had to be ready to move if this news leaked. I think at that point he gave me some more information about interviews that had taken place but I cannot recall the exact detail of that.

Q. Did you know that at this stage there was no question of the Official Secrets Act being invoked?

A. I cannot recall exactly when, but I think during the course of that weekend, and if not certainly pretty early on the Monday, I said: what is going to happen here? And it was explained to me that this was not an Official Secrets Act point.

Q. Not an Official Secrets Act point. As far as the disciplinary side of matters goes, the unauthorised contacts with the press, on Friday afternoon we can see from the minutes of the meeting Dr Kelly had been effectively told off and he was told he was going to get a letter recording Mr Hatfield's unhappiness with the situation, which would have brought the disciplinary side of matters to an end. Were you told about the disciplinary side of matters as well?

A. I think I was at some point. I just cannot remember exactly when. But I certainly knew by into the meeting of the 7th that their view was that it was not an Official Secrets Act matter, it was a disciplinary matter. There was going to be some disciplinary action taken but not of a fundamentally serious nature.

Q. At MoD/1/41 there is a letter that Sir David Omand starts to write on 5th July.

LORD HUTTON: I think at that point we will give the stenographers a break for five minutes. (11.45 am) (Short Break) (11.50 am) MR DINGEMANS: Prime Minister, we were on MoD/1/41 which is a letter that Sir David Omand starts on 5th July but actually sends on 6th July. If we can scroll down a wee bit, it relates to the receipt of the letter et cetera and in the second paragraph says this: "The Prime Minister asked for a deeper analysis of what the official has actually said, read against the account Gilligan himself ..." put in. Do you recall that discussion with Sir David Omand?

A. Yes, I think what I was saying throughout was: look, we need to get a -- we need to know, insofar as we can know. Therefore it is important we have as much information as possible. I think at some point, I am not again precisely sure of which conversation this was in, I was told that there was going to be a follow-up interview.

Q. Right, by Sir David Omand?

A. I think it was David that told me that, yes, but I cannot be absolutely sure. I suppose it could have been Jonathan but I think it was David.

Q. Can I take you to a document, CAB/11/6? To tell you what this is, this is part way through a document produced by Sir David Omand dated 21st July 2003.

A. 21st July.

Q. It is after the event and relates to the events at the time.

A. Yes.

Q. He is talking about the meeting on 7th July --

A. Yes.

Q. -- but referring also to what he had said over the weekend. If you look at the bottom of the first paragraph on that page, he says that: "He reiterated that Dr Kelly had come forward of his own volition, and that as far as MoD was concerned there was no question of any offence having been committed under the Official Secrets Act. Dr Kelly's continued cooperation was therefore essential. The Prime Minister made it clear that MoD should continue to handle the case properly, and should follow whatever internal procedures were normal in such cases." It is slightly difficult from the note to see whether that bit related to the weekend or the discussion on 7th July.

A. Yes.

Q. But does that assist in your recollection?

A. Yes. I mean that is very much consistent with what I was saying at the time.

Q. So you had understood, at this stage, that any public involvement of Dr Kelly was to be on the basis of his cooperation?

A. Yes. I mean, I think what was -- look, right at the very outset, as I say, part of this difficulty was he had come forward. We were in receipt of this information. You know, the question was: what do we now do with that information, in particular in relation to the FAC, which was a concern; and I cannot recall exactly when I was told this, but I think there was certainly -- it was said that he realised that he might end up having to give evidence.

Q. He realised he might end up giving evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall who said that to you?

A. I do not but certainly by the time we got to 7th July, I mean the basis of the meeting was that he had already realised his name would in all likelihood come out.

Q. You have mentioned your concerns that the Government might be accused of a cover-up in relation to the FAC. Were you, at this stage, keen that the FAC reopen their inquiry or did you have any view on that?

A. No, I mean -- look, if I had really wanted the FAC to do it, I think I could perfectly properly have put that information before the FAC actually on the Saturday or Sunday. I really was not sure what the right way to handle this issue was, but I knew that what we could not do was be in a situation where we were accused of misleading the FAC and that the reason why I thought it was so important to involve the senior officials, as I was saying to his Lordship just a moment or two ago, was in order to make it -- you know, to make sure that we were operating in a way that they were content with, and therefore if at a later time people say: why on earth did you not give this information immediately to the FAC over the weekend, I could say: there were discussions going on. It was being handled by the MoD. This was the advice given to us by officials. Not as I say to put off responsibility. Responsibility is mine in the end. I take the decisions as Prime Minister. But in order to be able to say we had played it by the book.

Q. On 7th July the FAC are going to report. I think you had various other matters going on. Again, if you want to give us the context of your day, is it possible just to give an outline of the various other matters you were considering?

A. Well, I refreshed my memory from my diary and in my statement. I had a breakfast with an information technology consultant. I had several meetings to deal with the issue of school funding. I then had quite a big speech on the criminal justice system in the QE2 Centre at 12.15. There was also a meeting with the head of the International Olympic Committee and then I had interviews with European newspapers and a meeting of Junior Ministers and a Government reception in the evening. It was a fairly busy time obviously. One of my preoccupations through this too was that I had the Liaison Committee on the Tuesday and Prime Minister's Questions on the Wednesday, both of which obviously were going to continue to be dominated by these allegations.

Q. You have a meeting, I think we have heard, to discuss really the FAC report and the reaction to that. Was Dr Kelly's name mentioned at all in that respect?

A. Yes, and at the end of it we agreed to discuss the issue of what to do in respect of Dr Kelly; and I asked David Omand and Kevin Tebbit to come over and, you know, we discussed the issue. As I understood it, he was going to be reinterviewed, then we would be in a better position to know exactly what to do, but the very clear view of all of us, right at the very outset, was that if it became clear that in all probability he was the source, the information could not remain undisclosed.

Q. Can I take you to CAB/1/46? This is a memo that John Scarlett dictates on 7th July. It is addressed to Sir David Omand, but it may reflect some of the views that Mr Scarlett was giving at the meeting, where he agrees with Sir Kevin Tebbit's second letter, that the finger points strongly at David Kelly as the source and he had been through the transcript, and he noted what Mr Gilligan had said about only having one source.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. He says: "If this is true, Kelly is not telling the whole story. "Gilligan must have got the 45 minute single intelligence report item from somewhere, presumably Kelly. Conclusion: Kelly needs a proper security-style interview ..." He has explained what he meant by that.

A. Hmm.

Q. Did you recall any discussion along these lines on 7th July?

A. I do not recall that. I mean obviously people were concerned as to what really had taken place, I mean, because you never can be sure. And one of the reasons why right at the very outset I was dubious, let us say, as to what would actually happen if Dr Kelly did give evidence is that you can never tell what is going to be said and what other views might be expressed and any of the rest of it.

Q. The outcome of that meeting was, I think, to conclude what had already been provisionally decided, that he should have a second interview. Do you recall that?

A. Yes. I mean, I think, as I recollect it, it was already the fact that he was going to be reinterviewed and I thought: well, that at least takes care of this for the moment. So, it is only after the reinterview you then reach the point where you really have to take a decision. But throughout Monday I should say that I mean the two things that seemed to us very, very clear, there was some surprise we expressed to each other on the Monday morning that it had not already leaked, and I think there was no doubt in anyone's mind that if on reinterview it was clear that he was in all probability the source then we were going to have to disclose that.

Q. Now, you then go off to the commitments I think you have told us about during the day.

A. Hmm.

Q. Did you have any other discussions about Dr Kelly on 7th July? Were you told about the interview, the result of the interview or was that not until the next morning?

A. No, I think that was the next morning. I think the only thing that happened later that day is that Alastair called me early in the Monday evening to say that the fact that someone had come forward should be disclosed ahead of my appearance at the Liaison Committee, because obviously one thing we were worried about, which is why we had the meeting the next morning, is I would go to the Liaison Committee and someone would know and then we would get into the most frightful business if people then started examining me on it.

Q. So I think we have been told a holding line was agreed; is that right?

A. Yes. The next day what I did was I asked them to ask Kevin Tebbit's office for a holding line on that. I said to Alastair on that Monday evening that I did not think we should proceed in that way; we should decide what to do the next day properly.

LORD HUTTON: What was it that he suggested to you, Prime Minister?

A. What he was suggesting, as I recall it, was that you had to get the information out in advance of my appearance in the Liaison Committee because otherwise it could take us by surprise, that a source had come forward. But I said to him: look, we have been dealing with this all the way through with Kevin and David and we will continue to deal with it in that way. LORD HUTTON: How did he suggest the information might be got out?

A. I do not think he gave particular details of that. MR DINGEMANS: He did not mention mentioning it to a newspaper or anything?

A. I honestly cannot recall. It was a very brief conversation. At that point, I mean I am trying to recall this the best I can but I think I was either en route to or on my way back from the reception that I had just attended; and I was, you know, frankly anxious to get down to the Liaison Committee the next day which again was going to go through all this stuff about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction.

LORD HUTTON: Presumably two alternatives were either to make a public statement or else to inform the press?

A. Those were two possible alternatives, yes. But I did not feel we were in a position to move forward at that stage. As I say, having agreed to reinterview him it was best to wait for the outcome of that reinterview. That is why it is the next day I think that we are then told the results of that reinterview. MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to the next day? First of all, you have a brief meeting in the morning where a holding line is agreed before you go to the Liaison Committee. You get back we are told about 11.30; is that about right?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you have a meeting at 11.45?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us, so far as you recollect, who was there?

A. Yes. I think the key person for me who was there was David Omand. Kevin Tebbit was away in Portsmouth but was going to return later. I had two other things that were a preoccupation. I had the foundation hospital vote either coming up I think on that night or certainly it was something I was having to deal with, and in addition I had an important Cabinet meeting on a separate, unrelated issue at lunchtime. But I wanted to know where this issue was.

Q. So Sir David Omand is there, you are there and there are some other people there?

A. Yes.

Q. But the critical person so far as you were concerned is Sir David Omand?

A. Yes.

Q. What was discussed in relation to Dr Kelly? What were you told about the second interview?

A. David, as I recollect it, said that it was now fairly clear that -- insofar as we could be clear, I mean -- the probability was Dr Kelly was the source and therefore we now had to decide what to do.

Q. Did he share with you Dr Kelly's own view that he was not the source at this stage?

A. I think all the way through what was said was that Dr Kelly was saying: I am not the source for this, in the sense that if Mr Gilligan says I said this, I did not say it, if you see what I mean. But I think certainly from the reinterview onwards, it seemed likely to -- as I understood, as I was informed, it was likely from the reinterview that he was indeed the single source that Mr Gilligan was referring to.

Q. We have certainly heard that Mr Howard thought that.

A. Hmm.

Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/54? This is just a letter of 8th July that is written by Mr Hatfield recording the fact that he has seen Dr Kelly again. He is saying this: "As I told you last night, there was no change in the essentials of his story and in particular he stoutly maintains that, as in his original letter, he did not make accusations about the dossier and, in particular, did not suggest that any material had been added by Downing Street. Some of his other replies suggested that he had become rather more concerned that some of his background comments might have been regarded by Gilligan as providing collateral for his thesis and may well have been incorporated with material from other sources. As Kelly himself put it, 'I am beginning to realise that I might have been led on!"

A. Yes.

Q. It was apparently made clear that it was likely the MoD would have to reveal that someone had come forward.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. "I said that I did not think that it would be necessary to reveal his name or to go into detail beyond indicating that the account given to us did not match Gilligan's PAC account, at least initially. It was, however, quite likely that his name would come out, not least because speculation about the nature of the source might lead in his direction."

A. Hmm.

Q. So I mean Mr Hatfield saw no change in the essentials. We have heard that Mr Howard had a different view, who sat in on the interview.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. What was your view about the situation with Dr Kelly now, in terms of disclosing the fact that someone had come forward?

A. I thought that it was likely on the basis of what we had been told that he was the source and in any event, in a sense, as important as anything else, he had been interviewed and reinterviewed and certainly, as it was relayed to me, it looked more likely than not that he was the source.

Q. So what was decided to be done about it?

A. Well, the first thing was the question was: do you simply conceal this information? And the view of the meeting -- it had been the view on the Monday and it was the view on the Tuesday -- was that we could not properly do that, for the reasons that I have given. I mean, this was information that was plainly material to the investigation the FAC had made, I was very concerned that we would be accused of misleading them or keeping information from them; and in addition, I think we were literally about to start the ISC hearings, and it was also relevant for them.

Q. So in the light of those considerations, who decided to do what?

A. Well, we decided that the -- how do we then proceed? We cannot conceal this information. What is the best way of proceeding? And I mean it was a discussion about it and I think the consensus was that the best thing was that David Omand should write to the Chairman of the ISC, copy it to the FAC for courtesy and then make public the fact that the source had come forward.

Q. Why was there a need to make public the fact that a source had come forward?

A. For two reasons really. I think, first of all, we were at any point concerned, as I said a moment or two ago -- I think we were quite surprised on the Monday it had not already come out, but we thought that it was likely to come out at any particular point. And, secondly, because once you had copied it to the FAC -- I mean, I thought there was a remote possibility the FAC might decide not to interview him, but I rather thought that they would.

Q. And that was the reason that it was decided to publicise the ISC letter?

A. Well, that you had to at least -- in respect of the fact that there was somebody who had come forward, my concern was to get that information not concealed but, as it were, out there so that no-one could say afterwards: look, this is something that you people were trying to cover up or conceal from a House of Commons Committee. And that was the view of the meeting. Again I say this in absolutely no sense to say this was the civil servants' decision rather than my decision. I take full responsibility for the decisions. I stand by them. I believe they were the right decisions. But the advice also of Sir David, in particular, who was, if you like, the key person for me, was that it would have been improper to have withheld this from the FAC.

Q. We know that correspondence normally with the ISC is in private; and we also know that by this time the Foreign Secretary has given evidence in private to the FAC because of the sensitive Joint Intelligence Committee material. Given the concerns, avoidance of a charge of cover-up, was any consideration given to disclosing this information on a private basis?

A. I think people felt that it was -- first of all it was very unlikely it would ever remain private. I cannot emphasise enough the fact that we thought literally at any moment this information was going to come out. That was one of the reasons I had the briefing session I did before the Liaison Committee. Secondly, because of the sensitivity of this it was better just to be open about it. Someone had come forward. Then it was up to them to do what they would do. But --

LORD HUTTON: Sorry, up to whom -- you say up to them.

A. Up to them as to whether they would interview the person or not.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. MR DINGEMANS: We know that the lead department in respect of these decisions was the Ministry of Defence. We also know that I think Mr Hoon was not there and Sir Kevin Tebbit was giving medals to members of HMS Nottingham in Portsmouth. What was done in relation to ensuring this was a Ministry of Defence decision, at this stage?

A. Well, what we did as -- I mean Kevin was not there as he was down in Portsmouth. As I say, I thought this issue -- we had to deal with it, but the decisions that we were taking at that meeting were very much obviously to be referred back to Kevin and he was going to join us as soon as he came back from Portsmouth. I think it was also agreed that whatever way we proceeded should be put to Dr Kelly for his agreement too, or any statement that was made should be put to Dr Kelly too.

Q. Was anything decided in relation to the BBC at this stage?

A. I think what we decided, at that stage, was that again at least the BBC had to be given the chance to say whether this was the source or not, because one of the complicating factors which made our position difficult is that we could not be 100 per cent sure. We all had an instinct or to a greater or lesser degree as to whether he was the source or not, but we did not know. The only people that knew were the BBC.

Q. And so what was decided to do in relation to them?

A. So I think it was decided that some way should be found of giving them an opportunity to state whether he was the source or not and that would lay it to rest. Obviously if they came forward and said he was not the source then the whole issue would go.

Q. The letter to the ISC, I think we have heard from Mrs Taylor that she was not particularly happy about that proposed approach, and said she would not welcome a letter that was made public. What was decided after that? Were you made aware of her reaction?

A. Yes, I think what then happened was when we reconvened, that the problem was that the ISC did not want to proceed in that way, and that is why in the end it was decided that the MoD should put out a press statement; that they should give the fact openly that someone had come forward but not give the name.

Q. But if the ISC had decided they do not need the name privately, your concern is avoidance of being accused of a cover-up. Why is there the need to make a press statement?

A. Because this information, as I say, was already within the system, it was going round the system. At any point in time it could come out; and I have to say we thought that giving this information to the FAC -- and we thought you cannot only give it to the ISC, you have to at least copy it to the FAC -- that was tantamount to it coming out. Therefore, I think that the feeling was: look, we are best simply to be open about this. We know this information. I have now had this information for several days. The whole issue that has revolved around the FAC has been: has the Government been open or not? We were already under criticism from the FAC for not having cooperated as fully as they would like and, you know, provided the personnel procedures were properly adhered to, provided as I say I think the idea was to refer this back to Dr Kelly for his agreement, it was thought that was the right thing to do. I would simply emphasise we were in an extremely difficult situation.

Q. We know that a press statement is issued by the Ministry of Defence. Yesterday I thought the final version was MoD/1/56. I have been told overnight others think it is MoD/1/67. It went through a number of drafts. You will have to forgive me if I have it wrong. Can we see that? Were you aware of any assistance with the drafting of this press statement being given by officials within No. 10?

A. I think certainly it came to Jonathan and I may have scanned my eye over it myself, but I cannot absolutely recall that.

Q. And I think we have heard that there was a drafting session in Mr Smith's room because this was on his computer.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. And that press statement was issued at about 5.45 on 8th July, and there has been evidence that it was read over to Dr Kelly.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. Also deployed was what was called defensive Q and A material.

A. Hmm.

Q. Were you aware of the existence of the defensive Q and A material?

A. I was not, but I, you know, would have thought it perfectly natural that the MoD had to prepare to field inquiries. I assume they had been doing that for several days.

Q. Can I take you to part of that defensive Q and A material? It begins at MoD/1/62. We have heard from journalists that they became aware that the Ministry of Defence were prepared to confirm the name if the right name was given. We have also heard that -- you can see, if you look at paragraph 2: "What is his name and current post?" "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name. "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it."

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. The journalists get to know that. Indeed, we have heard one journalist read out names and Dr Kelly's was the 21st name.

A. Hmm.

Q. We can also see that if you look at the fourth paragraph: "How long has he been in Ministry of Defence?" "He has been in his current position for 3 to 4 years. Before that he was a member of UNSCOM." Now, these questions and answers, it appears, assisted the journalists in identifying Dr Kelly. Do you know whether any view had been taken that that should happen?

A. No, I do not; but I have to say that I think that the basic view of this was -- you see, we were quite clear the name was going to come out in one way or another, and as far as I am aware, I think someone said this at the meetings, Dr Kelly was aware of that too. I think it was decided to do this by way of a public statement, not mentioning the name, (a) because we were not entirely clear, (b) I think to give at least a little bit of time to us; but the important thing was that at least the fact that someone had come forward saying I am the source was no longer something we possessed. We had actually been open and said: this is the case. As I say, I did not see the MoD Q and A, but I think the basic view would have been not to, as it were, offer the name but on the other hand not to mislead people. I think there was also some concern frankly if you ended up with a great scrabble as to who was the name, you know, other people might be thought of as the name who were not.

Q. Was there any discussion, as far as you were aware, that this was an approach that would be taken?

A. No, I do not think there was any specific discussion to that effect, but I mean I have to say that I think by then the MoD and all of us were in quite a difficult position. We did not want to keep this information quiet. On the other hand, we had taken the view: we do not put the name out straightaway, which is an alternative way of doing it. You know, in fairness to the MoD press people I think it was difficult for them. It was difficult for them.

LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, Prime Minister, it might appear a somewhat unusual procedure this, that the arrangement is that if reporters ask the MoD who is the source and they give names, the MoD, if the wrong name is given, will say: no, that is not the person, but if the correct name is given it is confirmed. And we have heard evidence of the very numerous requests which were made.

A. Hmm.

LORD HUTTON: Now, do you think, perhaps looking at it in retrospect, that it might have been a more appropriate procedure if the source had simply been named in the statement?

A. I have obviously thought very carefully about whether there were alternative ways of dealing with this. One alternative was certainly to make an open statement and name him upfront. I think the reason for the hesitation there was: well, we could not be absolutely sure about this. I seem to recollect, but I cannot be sure who said this and exactly when it was said, that there was some issue as to whether Dr Kelly himself did not want to be named in what I think was called the first wave of media focus on it. But I mean the only thing I would say, my Lord, is that if we had named him in the statement, I mean -- I do not think the outcome in terms of him appearing in front of the FAC or any of the rest of it would have been any different. MR DINGEMANS: We heard from Mr Hoon yesterday that he understood that after the ISC had said they did not want, as it were, to have the letter made public --

A. Hmm.

Q. -- there was a sort of different strategy deployed which was that there would be a press statement, for the reasons that you have given --

A. Hmm.

Q. -- but that Dr Kelly's name should not be made public until he had been confirmed by the BBC as the source, because he did not want to name him until he was sure that he was a person who had provided this information to Mr Gilligan. Were you aware of that?

A. I was not aware of that quite specifically like that. I think -- look, the trouble was it was fairly obvious the name was going to come out. The most that you were doing with the public statement was getting a short breathing space and obviously the BBC, in a sense, was a slightly separate track of this, because if the BBC were to confirm this was the source -- and we saw no reason why they should not because in a sense the confidentiality of the source had been waived in that way, so there was no particular reason why, if he was not the source, they would simply say no, and we obviously were not going to ask them for the name of the source if they said that. On the other hand, if he was the source, why not say so? That was the way of bringing certainty. The one thing throughout this was we all had our instinct as to what this might be but we did not know.

Q. If one looks at MoD/1/63 you can see the defensive Q and A material makes this statement: "It is unprecedented for a Government Department to make a statement of this sort. Why have you done it?" "There is no comparable situation that springs to mind. We have set out the facts as they have been put to us, on an issue of considerable public concern. The official involved volunteered the information to us."

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. Was that a fair statement, that it was unprecedented for a Government department to make a statement of this kind?

A. I quite honestly do not know, but I would certainly say it was an extremely difficult and unusual set of circumstances, and it was hugely complicated by the timing of the information about the source. I mean, this was one of the things that made me so concerned to deal with this in the way that we dealt with it, that this information literally had come to us as the FAC were about to provide the outcome of their deliberations. Now, without ascribing to them an over-suspicious mind, I was quite sure that they were going to be extremely concerned as to why suddenly on the weekend of the report we appear to know who the source may be and then we do not tell them until after their report is published. One of the things throughout I was very concerned about is that we had to have an absolutely copper bottomed reason for not having told them over the weekend.

Q. Was there any discussion about the pressure that Dr Kelly might be exposed to when you were having these meetings on 8th July?

A. Obviously one of the things that was part of the conversation that we were having was what Dr Kelly did, what sort of person was he, what experience did he have. I mean, all I can say is that there is nothing in the discussion that we had that would have alerted us to him being anything other than someone, you know, of a certain robustness who was used to dealing with the interchange between politics and the media. Having said that, incidentally, it is never, ever a pleasant thing; indeed, it is a deeply unpleasant thing for someone to come suddenly into the media spotlight. Certainly we were aware of that. It is one of the reasons why the press statement I think it was said at the meeting should be agreed with Dr Kelly. But there was in my view no way of avoiding the fact that you could not keep this information private.

Q. Can I turn, then, to the 9th --

LORD HUTTON: Could we perhaps just look at CAB/11/4, which is a note by Mr Scarlett of the meetings that took place on Monday 7th and Tuesday 8th July. If we look at the bottom.

A. Hmm.

LORD HUTTON: It is the penultimate sentence: "If Dr K name becomes public will Government be criticised for putting him under 'wider pressure'?"

A. Hmm.

LORD HUTTON: Do you have any recollection of that point being raised Prime Minister?

A. Yes, I think throughout -- as I say, there were several complicated factors of this, one of which was this was a personnel issue involving an individual. Therefore, one of the reasons why I was saying throughout, look, the MoD has to follow its internal procedures, is precisely in sensitivity to that. And again, as I say, therefore there was some discussion of how Dr Kelly was, how he would be; and obviously one looks back on this with a completely different perception.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. But I think that the best that I can say, my Lord, is that there was nothing that struck me as: well, there is a problem here.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. I think Sir Kevin Tebbit said in his evidence, and I am seeking just to give a paraphrase of it, but I think he did indicate that the view was taken, certainly by some, that Dr Kelly was a civil servant who in some part appeared to have contributed to this, as it was regarded in the Government, very serious and unfounded allegation against the Government and that therefore it was not unreasonable that he should play a part in resolving the problem. Now, do you remember any references to that or was there any feeling to that effect in the course of the discussions?

A. I do not recollect that specifically being said; but I think what there was was a sense that this was an unusual situation in which, you know, a civil servant had come forward and admitted he had had this unauthorised contact; that we could not simply because of him being a civil servant say: well, we are just going to keep this information to ourselves. Do you see what I mean? So that in a sense we were -- of course, which is the reason why I said that the MoD internal procedures should apply and there were personnel issues involved, but I think it is fair to say that certainly my concern all the way through was that we had to deal with this in a way consistent both with those employment procedures but also with our duty to the Parliamentary Select Committee. Again let me emphasise, I say this not in order to say that David Omand and Kevin Tebbit were the -- I take full responsibility, but the reason why I was so anxious that we dealt with this with the senior civil servants in a collective way was so that the decision that we took in a situation where I thought it was very difficult to work out exactly what the right thing to do was, was done as far as possible by consensus in a way that people were content with.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DINGEMANS: I am going to leave 8th July now if I may and turn to 9th July. Can I take you to an e-mail which is at CAB/1/86 which is sent in the morning of 9th July. The press statement has gone out at a quarter to 6. We know that some journalists have started ringing up. This is sent by Sandra Powell on behalf of Alastair Campbell to Clare Sumner. There are copies to Sir David Manning, Sally Morgan, John Scarlett, SEC A, as it were. What was being wondered was: "... whether in the light of yesterday's developments [that appears to be a reference to the Ministry of Defence's press statement], there is not a case for me doing more with the ISC than the half hour with a limited focus on intelligence handling. If the BBC source situation develops as it might, surely it is in our interest for the ISC to delve deeply into this, by interviewing the source, and Gilligan and myself, and for us all putting over our concerns about the damage this could do to the integrity of the Intelligence Services." Was, at this stage, a view being taken that having put the press statement out for the reasons you have given, Dr Kelly's arrival now might be used by the Government for their own advantages?

A. Well, look, there was obviously, in one sense -- Dr Kelly had come forward and said: I did not say the things Mr Gilligan says I said. On the other hand, you can never be sure of these situations; and actually what happened when the FAC did interview him was precisely that, the situation was not conclusive at all. Indeed, they made the wrong conclusion. They concluded he was not the source. In addition to that, quite frankly, you never know what someone will say on all the other issues that are put before them. So, I mean, I have to say I was always -- as I think I said to you earlier, I was doubtful about how much benefit Dr Kelly's evidence would ever be to the Government. The one thing I was absolutely sure of was that we could not say to the FAC: I am sorry, we decided you should not look at it.

Q. Can I take you to CAB/1/87, the next page? This is later in the day when Miss Sumner has confirmed Mr Campbell's appearance for Thursday 17th July. In paragraph 3: "The ISC Clerk told me that the Committee were not interested in interviewing Mr Gilligan ... "He said that on the source they were waiting for David Omand to write to them with the correspondence. He implied that he did not believe it was the source so could not see the point of the ISC seeing him and said they were not interested in the BBC/AC row."

A. Hmm.

Q. It is said that this point might be clarified in a letter.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. At the top: "I think one of us should speak to Ann on this." It appears Mrs Taylor was not contacted.

A. Was or was not?

Q. Was not, as far as we understand the situation to be.

A. Hmm.

Q. But again it appears to be indicating a desire to use Dr Kelly's appearance on the scene for the Government's purposes; is that fair?

A. Well, I mean, look, if the ISC or the FAC had said they did not want to interview him, that was absolutely fine. But if they did want to interview him then obviously it was potentially important for the Government but it could, as I say, equally in the end have turned out to be unhelpful.

Q. Just on that, if the ISC had said they did not want to interview him, that was fine. It does seem this was the Clerk before he had seen the full circumstances. But his provisional view is: we do not want to.

A. Yes.

Q. Yet it seems that a view being taken by Mr Campbell and Mr Powell, perhaps, is that there were advantages in Dr Kelly being interviewed. Were you aware of those views?

A. I was not particularly aware of those views. I have to say that I think that they -- look, all the way through it was possible, if Dr Kelly gave evidence, that it would be helpful. It was possible that it would not be helpful. But the one thing that was for sure was that it would not be for us to decide whether he was interviewed by the FAC or the ISC or not. That decision would be taken by them. And I only ever thought there was a very remote possibility of the FAC, because they had concluded their report and published it -- I thought there was a possibility they might say: we will not interview him, the ISC did that. If he was interviewed by anybody, I thought the ISC was the right body for the reasons I have given throughout. I do not read anything much more into that than that. I notice that the Clerk actually -- he seems to think he is not the source anyway, but ...

Q. That is the reason for his provisional view, as it were.

A. But in the end, we had got the information that I felt could not be suppressed. It was there in the public statement. What the Committees did was then up to them. The one thing you learn very quickly about these Committees is if the Government tells them to do something, they are less likely to do it than do it. Whether they interview him or not interview him, that would be a matter for them. You know, that decision would be taken by them. I was of the view, however -- I have to say this to you very clearly -- throughout, that the FAC would want to interview him and it would be difficult to resist him being interviewed by them.

Q. Can I take you to another document on 9th July which is CAB/25/4 and explain what this appears to be. This has been located after Mr Smith gave evidence. It was a document sent to Clare Sumner and not opened and therefore not actioned, but at least gives some indication of what Mr Smith was thinking at 2.31. If I go to the next page, CAB/25/5 --

A. Yes.

Q. -- it appears to suggest, albeit a draft statement: "In the light of the new evidence from the MoD last night and the BBC's own statement in response [because the BBC had said: we are not going to say anything] we believe we need to see AG, RS and source. "The allegations made by one source through the BBC have been at the centre of the issues we have been addressing." The BBC Governors defended their use of the single source and made comments on the BBC. "AG said in answer to John Maples that he had only discussed the WMD dossier with one source ... We now know from the MoD statement that, if this individual is not the source, that statement cannot be correct. This too would be material to our inquiry. "Either way there are important questions that need to be addressed in order for us to try and resolve this issue." That does not appear to have gone any further, but again it does appear to indicate that in the minds of people working in No. 10 there was a desire to use Dr Kelly's evidence before the Committees. Can you help us on that?

A. I have not seen that obviously --

LORD HUTTON: I think also Prime Minister, if we look at CAB/25/2, which is the covering letter -- if you would just like to read that. MR DINGEMANS: I think you should have been told about the letter, I hope, before.

A. (Pause). Hmm, hmm.

LORD HUTTON: It is really, I think, possibly the third paragraph that is relevant, beginning: "The purpose of the 'document' ..."

A. Hmm, hmm. (Pause). Yes, well that is -- I mean the trouble is I did not see this at the time, so I mean I would not know. But if I could say, my Lord, that I think that looking -- in the course of this, as I say, the assumption was that these Committees would want to interview Dr Kelly. I understand the Clerk of the ISC said: well, we do not want to interview him. I think that -- I do not think that -- MR DINGEMANS: That was only a provisional view.

A. I do not think that would have stood. There was no doubt in my mind really -- there was a remote prospect that the FAC may say no but I did not think they were likely to say no. I thought they were likely to say yes. Therefore it does not surprise me people were talking about whether this evidence was going to be difficult for us or unhelpful or helpful. I obviously asked at a very early stage: what is Dr Kelly likely to say if he appears in front of these Committees? But it was not -- I do stress this, it was not any part of our decision-making as to whether the FAC decided to call him or not.

Q. We know also on 9th July there is the Lobby briefing in the afternoon, and Mr Blitz has given evidence about this, where some further details were provided about the person who was the unnamed official, which he was able to use to assist in his identification of the person.

A. Hmm.

Q. Do you know why further details are being given out about the unnamed MoD official? I mean, it is surely likely to lead to his identification.

A. Well, I mean again I do not know for sure and I do not -- I was actually myself on the Wednesday morning obviously preparing for Prime Minister's Questions. As I say, I had a stack of other things on too. But I think that the view was: we could not give people wrong information or mislead them, on the other hand we had not volunteered the name. As I say, you could have -- I think you put this point to me a moment or two ago your Lordship -- you could have decided you put his name in the original statement and that would have been a different way of proceeding. For the reasons that I gave then, that was decided not to be the case.

Q. Or another way of proceeding may have been having disclosed that this person has come forward, not to say anything more either about his status or about his name?

A. Yes. The only difficulty there I think is that people would have felt that if you got a great swirl around, well, who is the person, you know, and a whole lot of people being named and identified, then before you know where you are, they have the wrong person. Remember this was still very much in the context this is somebody -- I think they somewhat shifted the way they described him but the original allegation was this was someone in charge of the process of drawing up the dossier. Not who had contributed to the dossier, in charge of it. So I think there was some anxiety within the MoD, I think I was not particularly aware of this but there was some anxiety in the MoD that in the difficult circumstances what you could not do is have a whole lot of speculation going on about a lot of other people being the source.

Q. It appears requests came from the ISC and FAC for interviews.

A. Hmm.

Q. If we turn to CAB/1/93, at the bottom Mr Powell reports to Miss Sumner that he: "Tried PM out on Kelly before FAC and ISC next Tuesday. He thought he probably had to do both..." I think Mr Hoon said that he had understood that from Mr Powell. Was that your view?

A. Yes, absolutely. I mean, I thought that -- and I think the way of putting it there is an indication of my view, as it were. Not: let us get him in front of these Committees, but I do not see how you resist the call. Even though, as I say, I wanted the ISC to deal with this throughout and would have preferred the ISC to deal with this particular issue, I could see, from the FAC's point of view, that having had an inquiry into this it was only reasonable for them to say: well, we want to interview the person who may be the original source.

Q. Continuing on: "... but needs to be properly prepared beforehand."

A. Hmm.

Q. Were you aware of what steps were going to be taken to assist Dr Kelly with his evidence?

A. No, but I mean it was, in a sense, again the statement of the obvious, that if he is going to go and do these Committees, he needs proper preparation for them.

Q. Were you aware of any uncomfortable views that Dr Kelly may have had at this time?

A. Yes. I think at some of these early meetings on the 7th or 8th, I think there was a description given to me of his overall perspective. His overall perspective was one that was generally supportive on the issue of Iraq weapons of mass destruction but there were certain views that he held that could be difficult or uncomfortable for the Government. That was one of the other factors in this. As I say, you never know what people may say when they are actually questioned in front of a Select Committee. So then I was also aware that probably if he did say anything remotely critical, even if it was 1 per cent of what he said, that that would be the thing that would arise.

Q. Above that there was a response, and you were not copied into that response --

A. No.

Q. -- where Mr Kelly said this: "This is now a game of chicken with the Beeb -- the only way they will shift is they see the screw tightening." Were you aware of any view amongst members of Downing Street civil servants and staff that this sort of view was being taken about the dispute with the BBC?

A. Obviously I did not see that e-mail. The thing had become difficult with the BBC for all the reasons that we have given and are obvious. I mean, I have to say in fairness to Tom Kelly, he was very much of the view that we should try to get back on terms with the BBC and I do not quite know what he means by what he is saying there. But you see I think the important thing is this, really: whatever people say and the way they express it, it was less to do with Government versus BBC than to do with this allegation. That was the thing that was troubling. In a sense, viz the BBC and the Government's relations, the best thing was to get back on terms with after all, as I say, what is the main broadcasting outlet. The problem was we literally from 29th May to this day have been in the position with this allegation hanging over us, with an entire campaign built around it, indicating fundamental issues to do with trust, and we have still not had the story retracted. I think it was more to do with the story than it was to do with the BBC. I see what is said there, but ...

Q. At this stage, Dr Kelly's appearance before the ISC and FAC was not going to assist anyone until the BBC had confirmed that he was the source and then everyone could see what Dr Kelly had done with the dossier, what experience he had, and whether or not he was in a position to make the claims that he had made. We also know that Mr Hoon is writing letters --

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. -- asking for the BBC to confirm their source. Does this in any sense relate to any strategy with the BBC to try and get them to confirm the source so that Dr Kelly's evidence could be used, as it were, as a trump card against them?

A. It was really that you had to try, insofar as could, to have certainty as to whether he was the source or not. The only people who could confirm it were the BBC. I did not greatly think that they would confirm it, but in the event, they did not. But I think it would have been -- it would have been somewhat odd if we had not given them an opportunity. After all, we were alleging this was the source for their journalist's story. We were saying: this is probable that this was the source.

Q. Did you have any further meetings yourself after 8th July relating to Dr Kelly and the evidence he was going to end up giving? I mean we have seen obviously the brief reference in the 10th July e-mail. Did you have any other discussions about the matter?

A. No. I mean, so far as I was concerned, the issue that I was really concerned about was dealt with. Whatever anyone said, and they could make their allegations and all the rest of it, but we had handled the issue, got the information. We had not concealed that information from the Foreign Affairs Committee. I mean, after that, in a sense, you know, I was content that it should then carry on being handled by the Ministry of Defence, which they did. And I think more so I was then immensely busy with other things that were coming up. I seem to remember in addition to what I say in my witness statement I had a very busy weekend coming up because we had a whole series of foreign leaders coming over here and I was busy with it. Then I had the speech to make in American Congress the next week. In a sense I felt this was dealt with as far as it could be dealt with and then I could move to other things.

Q. We know that Dr Kelly did give evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 15th July and because of some confusion and overruns he did not give evidence to the ISC that day but did on 16th July. We know that his body was found on 18th July. On 21st July, can I just take you to an extract from the Lobby briefing at CAB/1/235? It is at the bottom of the page, it is about eight lines up from the bottom: "Asked who had made the decision to confirm Dr Kelly's name, [your Official Spokesman] had said that the matter had been handled in accordance with MoD procedures and had been overseen by those at the top of the MoD in view of the fact that it had been the lead Department." When it said "MoD procedures", are there any procedures that exist for situations such as this?

A. No. Obviously, you know, this was, as I say, a very unusual set of circumstances. I think really what was meant throughout was that we were all conscious that this was a personnel as well as a political issue and that whatever procedures they had for dealing with personnel should be properly adhered to.

Q. Is there anything else relating to the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

A. No, I do not think there is.

Q. And is there anything else you would like to add?

A. No. Thank you.

LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much Prime Minister.

A. Thank you.

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