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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of CTBT, Vienna, September 3-5Note: for comprehensive coverage and documentation, see the website of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), http://www.ctbto.org. Unless otherwise stated, the CTBTO website served as the source for the following items.
I. Background Information & Preview of Meeting: CTBTO Press Release, August 29'Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, 3-5 September 2003', CTBTO press release, PI/2003/30, Vienna, August 29. The 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which will place in the Austria Centre in Vienna, Austria, from 3 to 5 September 2003, is convened under Article XIV of the CTBT for the purpose of examining ways and means to accelerate the Treaty's entry into force. The Conference is expected to renew global awareness of the Treaty and encourage States who have not already done so to sign or ratify it. Drafted at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, and opened for signature on 24 September 1996, the Treaty bans all nuclear-test explosions in any environment. To date, 168 States have signed the Treaty, 104 have ratified it. The Treaty will enter into force only when all 44 States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty have ratified it. These are the 44 States that participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament and possess nuclear research and power reactors according to data compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thirty-two of them have already ratified the Treaty. The Conference is convened by the United Nations Secretary-General at the request of the majority of the States that have ratified the CTBT. All States, both signatories and non-signatories, are invited to attend the Conference at a high level. The Conference is also open to specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, entities that have been granted observer status in the United Nations General Assembly, and non-governmental organizations. At the opening meeting, Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, is expected to be chosen as President of the Conference. Other officers will be elected as well. The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Wolfgang Hoffmann, will act as Secretary of the Conference. A progress report by Mexico on cooperation between States to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force is anticipated, as well as a general exchange of views by ratifiers and signatories. Statements by non-signatory States and a joint statement by non-governmental organizations are also expected. The discussion is due to conclude on Friday, 5 September, followed by consideration and adoption of a final document and report. The first Conference on facilitating the entry into force was held from 6 to 8 October 1999 in Vienna, Austria. The second Conference was held from 11 to 13 November 2001 at United Nations Headquarters in New York. A Final Declaration called upon all States that had signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those States whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, to accelerate their ratification processes. From the time of the convening of the 2001 Conference, 20 more States have ratified the Treaty, including one Annex 2 State, and seven more have signed it. Under the terms of the Treaty, a global verification regime to monitor compliance with the Treaty must be operational at the time of entry into force. This verification regime, based on an International Monitoring System (IMS) of 337 monitoring facilities around the world and the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, also provides for a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures. The data collected by the IMS and analysed in the IDC will be used by States, upon entry into force, to monitor Treaty adherence and, if necessary, to reach a decision as to whether or not the Treaty has been contravened. During a meeting of States Signatories of the CTBT in New York in November 1996, a Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO was established, as well as its Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) in Vienna. The Commission is to prepare for the effective implementation of the Treaty and has created three subsidiary bodies: Working Group A on administrative and budgetary matters; Working Group B on verification issues; and an Advisory Group on financial, budgetary and administrative matters. RatificationThe 104 States that have deposited their instruments of ratification of the CTBT are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Venezuela. SignatoriesThe 168 States that have signed the Treaty are: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia and Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Annex 2 StatesThe 32 Annex 2 countries that have ratified the Treaty are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. The following 12 States whose ratification is required for entry into force, but who have not yet ratified, are: China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, United States and Viet Nam. Of the Annex 2 States, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India and Pakistan have not signed the Treaty. II. Selected Statements to the ConferenceUN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, September 3I send my greetings to all who have gathered to examine ways and means to accelerate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. You meet at a time of heightened international concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is urgent. The CTBT creates an international norm prohibiting nuclear-test explosions, or any other nuclear explosions for military, civilian or any other purposes. It, thus, effectively constrains the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, and the development of new types of weapons. At two previous meetings of this kind - in Vienna in 1999, and in New York in 2001 - the ratifying and signatory States reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty's basic obligations. They agreed to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, pending its entry into force. And they affirmed the importance of universal adherence to the CTBT. It is encouraging that, following the 2001 Conference, there has been a significant increase in signatures and ratifications. The joint ministerial statement on the CTBT issued in September 2002 was a welcome restatement of the commitment of ministers from around the world to the vision of the Treaty. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization and the Provisional Technical Secretariat have continued to promote the goal of universal adherence. Progress has also been made in setting up the international monitoring system, the international data centre, and the global communication infrastructure. These efforts give confidence that the verification regime envisaged in the CTBT would be ready by the time the Treaty entered into force. But obstacles still remain to the entry into force of the Treaty. Indeed, seven years have already passed since the CTBT was opened for signature. Our world can ill afford to fail, or even to be unduly delayed, in achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Delay increases the risk that nuclear testing might resume. And it jeopardizes efforts to take further steps towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. I, therefore, call upon all States that have yet to sign or ratify the Treaty to do so without delay. Given the latest developments, I particularly direct this call to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as well as to the other 11 States whose ratification is needed for the Treaty to enter into force. It is essential that this important norm against nuclear proliferation and the further development of nuclear weapons becomes operational. Until it does so, it is crucial that all relevant States maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. No nuclear testing must be tolerated under any circumstances. The entry into force of the CTBT would be a victory for the cause of peace. It cannot come too soon. The United Nations remains firmly committed to helping the world community to achieve that goal. Source: Entry into force of Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty "cannot come too soon", says Secretary-General in message to Vienna Conference, statement by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, delivered by Antonio Maria Costa, Director General of the United Nations Office at Vienna, Vienna, September 3; UN Press Release SG/SM/8843, September 3. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, September 3The Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is being held at a time of major challenges to the nuclear arms control and disarmament regime. A verified, permanent, global ban on all types of nuclear explosive tests has been a key item on the international security agenda for nearly half a century. More than 2,000 nuclear explosive detonations have taken place since 1945, with the most recent ones in 1998. The CTBT has been characterized as "the longest sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control". The Treaty, when implemented, will prohibit all nuclear explosions, in all environments, for all time. It will curb the development and testing of new, more advanced and more dangerous nuclear weapons, and will limit the possibilities for further nuclear proliferation. The Treaty will lead to the establishment of a comprehensive International Monitoring System to provide independent, impartial verification of compliance. The CTBT, along with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and a future Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices (FMCT), forms an essential element of a network of negotiated, global treaties that will strengthen international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament - leading in time hopefully to a world without nuclear weapons. In the meantime, with the early entry into force of the CTBT, it would indeed be a significant achievement if this new century were to remain free of any nuclear test explosions. In this context, I encourage all signatory States to ratify the CTBT, and all those States that have yet to sign to do so and to ratify the Treaty, as soon as possible - so that another crucial pillar can be raised to support the edifice of global nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament norms. Source: Statement to the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Vienna, September 3, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) website, http://www.iaea.org. CTBTO Executive Secretary Dr. Wolfgang Hoffmann, September 32. ... When the CTBT was adopted by the General Assembly of the United nations on December 10, 1996, we were aware that the success of the Treaty would depend on two crucial factors: its universality and its verifiability. On both accounts we have made substantial progress. 3. As of today, 168 states have signed the CTBT and 104 have ratified. These impressive numbers demonstrate the ever-growing commitment of the international community to the Treaty. Of the 44 states whose ratifications are necessary for entry into force...32 have ratified, the latest one being Algeria which has deposited its instrument of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United nations only two months ago. The vote of confidence expressed in the large number of signatures and ratifications is a major source of motivation for all of us who are working on the verification system. 4. For almost seven years the Preparatory Commission has been working on ensuring that the verification system of the CTBT is credible, functional and cost-effective. As we speak, the working group on verification issues is meeting in a neighbouring building to discuss important technical questions ranging from station construction and data transmission to analysis of the data and modalities of on-site inspections. 5. So far, more than half of the 321 monitoring stations provided for in the Treaty have been installed and substantially meet the Commission's specifications. The building programme is continuing at a sustained pace. Data from the established stations are flowing the International Data Centre via our Global Communication Infrastructure to the International Data Centre in Vienna. In this nerve-centre of the verification system the incoming data re collected, processed, analysed and transmitted to states for final analysis. The Provisional Technical Secretariat is building up its capacity to support the verification responsibilities of states under the Treaty. In this context the continuously growing number of National Data Centres is playing a crucial role. 6. I would like to use this opportunity to underline that the build-up of the verification regime would be unthinkable without the political and financial commitment of states signatories, but also without the expertise, talent and dedication of the experts working as delegates or staff members in the Provisional Technical Secretariat or in National Data Centres. 7. The CTBTO Preparatory Commission is working closely with many states in order to provide assistance in the process of ratification and implementation of the CTBT. Training programmes and information visits help top familiarize experts and decision-makers with the work of the Commission. In order to facilitate this process, but also in order to exchange technical expertise, the Preparatory Commission has entered into relationship and cooperation agreements with the United Nations and other international and regional organisations and specialised agencies. 8. These activities are important accessories, but only accessories to the political will of the international community to bring entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty about. It is the purpose of this meeting to strengthen this political will and create a new dynamism in pursuing our common objective. The comprehensive ban of nuclear test explosions has been a dream for many decades. The political and strategic choices of states and the scientific and technological advances have brought us very close to a universal and verifiable regime. I hope that in the next few days we will get even closer. European Union (EU) & Acceding/Associated States: Statement by Senator Alfredo Mantica, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, September 3I would like to begin...by calling the attention of all participants to the historical result achieved in 1996 through the adoption [of the CTBT] by the General Assembly... The Treaty prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions" and represents an unequivocal response to aspirations which have been alive in our world for more than fifty years. The presence today of so nay representatives of governments, specialised agencies and non-governmental organisations bears witness to the determination of the international community to being to effect such [an] achievement. In that regard, the Agenda we have just adopted clearly defines our tasks. We are here to "decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty". We are going to focus our discussions on specific measures which, hopefully, will pave the way for the fulfillment of our expectations. We are going to consider the concrete steps which are to be undertaken in the framework of an overall strategy based on incentives: an intense dialogue aimed at ensuring that the force of goodwill prevails so that both regional and international security be strengthened; the full appreciation of the scientific and civil benefits of the CTBT International Monitoring System; assistance to countries in their ratification and implementation process. The Final declaration we will adopt at the end of our work enshrines our political commitment to the objective of providing the international community with a functioning Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban regime, which is an essential instrument to enhance international peace, confidence and security. We all know that the basic prerequisite for the viability of any multilateral agreement is the awareness of the common interests that it represents and safeguards. It is essential that we keep in mind this concept when we develop an overall strategy aimed at facilitating entry into force... The CTBT would safeguard the common interest of the international community and we must spare no effort in ensuring that the value of such intrinsic assets of the Treaty is fully assessed by those states which have not yet signed or ratified it. In that regard, all the European Union [and acceding and associated] states...have ratified the treaty, remain steadfast in their commitment to the CTBT, and are actively involved in promoting the understanding of the treaty, its entry into force and its universal adherence. The European Union considers these issues [to be] very important, and, in preparation for the Conference, adopted a decision to implement a Common Position as an instrument of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. On the basis, the EU carried out demarches all over the world and continues to advocate the merits of the treaty in all relevant international fora. ... While regretting the fact that the...[CTBT} has not entered into force 7 years after its opening to signature, the European Union believes that we should not neglect the progress made so far. 168 stares have signed the Treaty and 104 have deposited their instruments of ratification. The Provisional Technical Secretariat, the core of the future CTBT Organisation, has been established with 266 staff members from 70 countries. The legal, technical and administrative framework has been put in place so as to allow the steady build-up of the verification regime. ... We should build on this progress if we want to enhance the perspective for an early entry into force of the Treaty, and we shall do this through actions carried out at two different levels which are closely interlinked. On the one hand, we shall increase our individual and collective efforts aimed at giving the necessary support to the Treaty so as to accelerate the ratification process. In this regard, the European Union welcomes the adoption of a Final Declaration which contains a strong unequivocal signal and which contributes to maintaining the necessary political momentum. On the other hand, we shall enhance our activities within the Preparatory Commission, where the establishment of the verification regime in a timely and effective manner, and the demonstration of ist ability to be operated in accordance with the Treaty's provisions, is an important contribution for promoting the entry into force of the CTBT. ... Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) States Signatories & Ratifiers: Statement by Hussein Haniff, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the CTBTO... Today is indeed a historic day for NAM as this is the first time the Movement is participating in the Article XIV conference. ... In accordance with NAM's long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all forms of nuclear testing, we would like to reiterate our support for the objectives of the Treaty as we strongly believe that universal adherence to the Treaty, including by the five nuclear-weapon states, would contribute towards the process of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation... Since the opening for signature in New York of the CTBT...the Treaty has become an international standard to judge the level of acceptance among the international community of its aim to ban forever all forms of nuclear weapons test explosions as reflected by the signing of the Treaty by 168 states or more than 87% of the world's states, and the ratification by 104 states. Despite this...the entry into force of the Treaty is still uncertain. ... In this regard we call upon those [Annex II] states [yet to ratify the Treaty], especially the two nuclear-weapon states [China and the US], to ratify the Treaty... We believe that the five nuclear-weapons states have a special responsibility to see that the Treaty comes into force. They bear special responsibilities, not only because they are among the [Annex II] 44, but because they are expected to provide the leadership in making the ban...a reality... We are therefore concerned that one nuclear-weapon state [the US] has taken the position not to proceed with ratification... We hope that it would reconsider its position. ... We believe that early ratification by the two nuclear-weapon states would pave the way and encourage the remaining countries listed in Annex II, especially the three states with nuclear capabilities which have not even signed the Treaty [India, Israel and Pakistan], to eventually sign and ratify. ... We commend the five nuclear-weapon states for observing the [testing] moratorium...since the Treaty's opening for signature. ... However, the moratorium does not substitute the signing, ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. In addition, we recall the undertakings given by the nuclear-weapon states at the time of the negotiation of the CTBT to the fact that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear charges, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon states stated at that time that the only steps that would continue would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which wo0uld not involve nuclear explosions. In this regard, we call upon states to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear tests for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. We wish to re-emphasise the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the principles of the non-proliferation regime both vertically and horizontally. ... We express our serious concern about the Nuclear Posture Review as advocated by the United States which considers...the development of new types of nuclear weapons through resumption of nuclear testing. It is our view that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention with the assurances provided by the five nuclear-weapon states at the time of the conclusion of the negotiations of the CTBT... Ambassador Grigory V. Berdennikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organisations in Vienna, September 3... We are confident that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is an essential component of the international security system. ... We are glad to note that since the second Conference a number of states signed and ratified the CTBT. ... At the same time, we can't but feel concerned over the evolution of the situation around the prospects of entry into force of this most important treaty. ... Having ratified the CTBT...three years ago, Russia continues to take an active part in joint efforts aimed at ensuring the earliest entry into force... It is known that our country was a co-sponsor of the Joint Statement on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty adopted by Ministers of Foreign Affairs - by "CTBT friends" - at the 57th UNGA Session, as well as of the last UNGA First Committee's resolution on support for the Treaty. ... We wish to emphasise once again the need for all signatory states to fulfil their main obligations under the Treaty, not to violate the spirit and letter of the CTBT in a period preceding its entry into force, and to observe the moratorium on nuclear tests. This is the position our country intends to stick to on condition that other nuclear powers take the same approach to their commitments. In this connection, we cannot but express our serious concern with the plans of developing new types of nuclear warheads, all the more [so] that they are that they are accompanied by a decision to cut the timeframe needed to get ready for conducting nuclear tests. At the same time, I would like to specify once again that we consider voluntary support for the moratorium...as an important step which, however, can not replace attaining a more vital objective, that is the CTBT entering into force. Russia is satisfied with the progress and pace of activities aimed at establishing all the elements of [the] international mechanism to control compliance with the Treaty... We are confident that the technical level of such a verification mechanism within the framework of the Treaty, along with modern national means of monitoring, will make it impossible to conceal any attempts to violate the Treaty. Nevertheless, we can not accept arguments of those who delay the CTBT ratification referring to insufficient readiness of the verification regime and its low efficiency. We also wish to point out the necessity of timely and complete implementation by all states signatories of their obligations concerning participation in the work of the Commission [including] payment of contributions in its budget. Our delegation is ready to support the plan of action of the international community to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT that is contained in the draft final declaration of the Conference and to take an active part in its implementation. We would like to express the hope that our work would resulting a tangible intensification of versatile activities with a view to remedy the situation around the Treaty. We must all realise that the fate of the CTBT will remain in question until such activities get intensified and the nations on whom CTBT entry into force depends join it as a result. ... Joint Statement of Non-Governmental Organisations: delivered by Dr. Klaus Renolder, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), September 5.The CTBT is an integral part of our global efforts to achieve international security for all, free from the threat of weapons of mass destructions. All states should recognise that action on the CTBT is all the more important in light of rising hostilities across the globe. The CTBT was brought about largely through the hard work and determination of NGOs and millions of ordinary people around the world. In all these years, the NGO community has never faltered in its advocacy for a test-ban treaty. People throughout the world understood that ending nuclear testing was essential for three powerful reasons: to halt the spiralling arms race; to obstruct the emergence of new nuclear powers; and to prevent further devastation of human health and the global environment, already contaminated from decades of atmospheric and underground explosions. Since the middle of the 20th Century, more than 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted throughout the world, with direct, serious, and long-term adverse health and environmental effects. It is estimated that atmospheric testing directly produced 430,000 fatal human cancers by the year 2000. Eventually, that total will be 2.4 million. If the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to new rounds of testing, as we believe that ot will, deleterious impacts on public health and social well-being can only be expected. It is crucial to the stability and future of the non-proliferation regime that the CTBT enters into force, as was unanimously confirmed by all NPT states parties at the 2000 Review Conference. Among the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive disarmament identified in the Final Document of the Conference, the very first two are devoted to the CTBT and nuclear testing. ... A ban on testing is an essential step towards nuclear disarmament because it helps to block dangerous nuclear competition and new nuclear threats from emerging. However, it must be recognised that technological advances in nuclear weapons research and development mean that a ban on nuclear test explosions by itself cannot prevent qualitative improvements of nuclear arsenals. Efforts to improve nuclear arsenals and to make nuclear weapons more usable in warfare will jeopardise the test-ban and non-proliferation regimes. We call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to halt all qualitative improvements in their nuclear armaments, as well as to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing. In this context, we are alarmed by recent disclosures of proposals by the present US administration for the research and development of a new generation of earth-penetrating nuclear warheads and new types of 'low-yield' warheads, as well as proposals to reduce the time necessary to resume underground testing. We recognise that any new step in the field of security generally involves some risk, but the CTBT has been carefully designed so that its benefits greatly outweigh any possible risks. The CTBT establishes a far-reaching global monitoring, verification, and compliance system. A series of independent studies, most recently by the US National Academy of Sciences in 2002, have all concluded that the system is capable of detecting nuclear explosions in all environments with a high degree of confidence, thereby deterring potential treaty violators. We commend the Preparatory Commission...and the Provisional Technical Secretariat for their work in establishing the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre, which are already proving their capabilities beyond expectations. We support efforts to promote the civil and scientific applications of CTBT verification technology as a means of recouping costs and expanding the range of CTBT stakeholders. We oppose attempts by some states to delay full construction of the CTBT's verification system. Such behaviour harms efforts to increase the number of parties to the Treaty and prevents the system from demonstrating its full technical capabilities, thereby giving comfort to those who question the Treaty's verifiability. We deplore efforts by a small number of states to obstruct finalisation of the on-site inspection arrangements for the Treaty by not paying their dues, not participating in discussions on the on-site inspection manual, or by adopting unreasonable positions in those negotiations. We call on all signatories to provide the political, financial and technical support necessary for the earliest implementation pf all elements of the CTBT verification system. We believe that global security would be enhanced if all states with nuclear test sites engaged in confidence-building processes, including transparency measures at those sites, during the interim period prior to their complete elimination. In this regard, we note with interest the Russian proposal for mutual confidence-building measures with the United States following the CTBT's entry-into-force. We applaud Ambassador Hoffman's visit to the Novaya Zemyla test site earlier this year and encourage the United States and Russia, as well as India, Pakistan, and China to pursue initiatives to increase transparency at their test sites to dispel concerns about ongoing activities at those sites, including subcritical tests. Despite overwhelming international support for the CTBT, 12 key states have not yet signed and/or ratified. The Bush administration has declared that it is not even seeking Senate approval for ratification. Washington has also announced that it will not pay its share of, nor participate in, non-IMS activities...including preparations for on-site inspections. Although the US remains a signatory, it was the only country to oppose the retention of the CTBT on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in November 2001. Most importantly, this conference must train its attention and its future efforts on the signatures and ratification by those states that are required by the stipulations of Article XIV... The longer these states wait to join the Treaty, the greater the chance that some nation may begin testing and set off a dangerous international action-reaction cycle of military and nuclear confrontation. ... NGOs are ready to make greater contributions to the efforts for entry-into-force. In particular, they will be able to do so if the interaction between governments, parliaments, NGOS and the media is strengthened. Governments, for instance, should report to their parliaments on activities to implement the decisions of earlier Article XIV Conferences and their plans for future activities. The matter of entry-into-force should be discussed at regional intergovernmental meetings and parliamentary bodies linked to such organisations. The Provisional Technical Secretariat should be asked to assist the intersessional coordinator in compiling reports from states parties on their initiatives, and to make them available to all parties on a regular basis. NGOs, in the meanwhile, will increase their own efforts at monitoring and reporting these initiatives to the public and to the media. We will continue our advocacy efforts aimed at the CTBT hold-out states. Through a strengthened network of NGOs, governments, international bodies and the media, we can promote further initiatives, intensify public discussion, and exert broad pressure on the hold-out states. No single government should be allowed to stand in the way of the historic opportunity to permanently end the scourge of nuclear testing - an indispensable step towards eliminating nuclear weapon threats and preventing nuclear war. ... III. Summary of Meeting: UN Press Release, September 5'Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, 3-5 September 2003', CTBTO press release, PI/2003/30, Vienna, August 29. The 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) concluded today in Vienna with the adoption of a Final Declaration that stressed the importance of a universal and effectively verifiable comprehensive Treaty as a major instrument in all aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Conference, which took place from 3 to 5 September, reiterated that the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constituted an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and thus a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament. In the Final Declaration, the Conference reaffirmed "the importance of the Treaty and its entry into force for the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which were agreed to by the participating States at international forums dealing with nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation". The Declaration noted with concern, however, that despite the progress made and the international community's strong support for the CTBT, the Treaty had not entered into force seven years after its opening for signature. The Conference stressed the particular importance of prompt signature and ratification by those whose ratification was needed for its entry into force, but who had not yet ratified. Noting that international developments had occurred since the 2001 entry into force Conference which made the Treaty's entry into force as urgent today as when it was negotiated, the Conference reaffirmed that the CTBT had an essential role to play in strengthening global peace and security. The prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was one of the most important challenges facing the world. According to the Declaration, States parties considered it essential to maintain momentum in building a verification regime capable of meeting the Treaty's verification requirements at its entry into force. The verification system would be unprecedented in its global reach after entry into force and would thereby ensure that States were maintaining their Treaty commitments. The Declaration also contained 12 measures to promote the CTBT's entry into force. By one of those steps, States parties would encourage the organization of regional seminars to increase awareness of the Treaty's important role. They called upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to continue promoting understanding of the Treaty and demonstrating the benefits of the civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies in such areas as the environment, earth science and technology. By another measure, the Conference recommended that the CTBTO's Provisional Technical Secretariat continue to provide States with legal assistance with respect to the ratification process and implementation measures and to establish a contact point for better exchange and dissemination of relevant information. The Conference also encouraged cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other elements of civil society to raise awareness of and support for the Treaty and its objectives. ... In other consensus action today, the Conference adopted its report and that of its Credentials Committee. ... Key issues that dominated the three-day Conference included fears raised by most participants that further delay in the CTBT's entry into force could lead to a resumption of nuclear testing, resulting in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists. Delegates also emphasized the need for the universal and complementary application of all instruments dealing with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. ... Closure of ConferenceIn closing remarks, the President of the Conference, Tom Grönberg (Finland), thanked all delegates for their contributions. He hoped the Final Declaration would bring entry into force of the Treaty closer. He thanked all participants for their willingness to cooperate and compromise. During the last three days, encouraging statements had been heard, he said. However, before the Treaty would enter into force, much remained to be done. He counted on the participants' cooperation during the months and years to come. He then declared the Conference closed. IV. Final Declaration & Measures to Promote Entry into Force, September 5'Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into
Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty', adopted on
September 5; included as Annex I in the 'Report of the Conference',
CTBT - Art.XIV/2003/5, issued on September 11, full text available
at
http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xix/2003/ Final Declaration1. We, the ratifiers, together with the states signatories, met in Vienna from 3 to 5 September 2003 to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date. In accordance with the mandate given to us in Article XIV of the Treaty, we decided by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the treaty. 2. We reaffirmed our strong determination to enhance international peace and security throughout the world and stressed the importance of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. We reiterated that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects and thus a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament. We therefore renewed our commitment to work for universal ratification of the Treaty and its early entry into force. 3. We noted with appreciation the overwhelming support for the Treaty that has been expressed by the United Nations General Assembly and other multilateral and regional organs and initiatives, which have called for signature and ratification of the Treaty as soon as possible and have urged all states to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level. We reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty and its entry into force for the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation which were agreed to by the participating states at international forums dealing with nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. 4. Since the Treaty was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature almost seven years ago, progress has been made in the ratification process. We welcomed this as evidence of the strong determination of states not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or control. As of today, 168 stares have signed and 104 states have deposited their instruments of ratification. Of the 44 states listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty whose ratification is required for its entry into force, 41 have signed, and of these, 32 have also ratified the Treaty. A list of these States is provided in the Appendix. 5. However, despite the progress made and the strong support for the Treaty by the international community, we noted with concern that it has not entered into force seven years after its opening for signature. In this connection, we stress the particular importance of prompt signature and ratification by those whose ratification is needed for its entry into force but who have not yet done so. 6. The prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most important challenges facing the world. International developments have occurred since the 2001 Conference on facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT which make entry into force, within the broader framework of multilateral disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts, as urgent today as when the Treaty was negotiated. We therefore reaffirm that the CTBT has an essential role to play in strengthening global peace and security. 7. We call upon all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular those 12 whose ratification is needed for its entry into force. 8. We further call upon all states to continue a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. Voluntary adherence to such a moratorium is of the highest importance, but does not have the same effect as entry into force of the Treaty, which offers the global community the prospect of a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty's basic obligations and call on all states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. 9. We consider it essential to maintain momentum in building the verification regime, which shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at its entry into force. The verification system will be unprecedented in its global reach after entry into force of the Treaty and will thereby ensure confidence that states are maintaining their Treaty commitments. In this context, we will continue to provide the support required to enable the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to complete its tasks in the most efficient and cost-effective way. 10. We reaffirm our determination to continue to work towards an early entry into force of the Treaty and to this end adopt the following measures. Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyConvinced of the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, we (a) Will spare no efforts and use all avenues open to us in conformity with international law to encourage further signature and ratification of the Treaty, and urge all states to sustain the momentum generated by this Conference by continuing to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level; (b) Support and encourage bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives by interested countries and the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to promote the entry into force of the Treaty; (c) Agree that ratifying states will select one of their number as a coordinator to promote cooperation, through informal consultations with all interested countries, aimed at promoting further signatures and ratifications; (d) Will establish a contact list of countries among ratifiers which volunteer to assist the coordinator in various regions, as appropriate, in promoting activities enhancing the entry into force of the Treaty; (e) Agree that ratifying states will consider appointing a Special Representative to assist the coordinating state in the performance of its function in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty; (f) Recommend that ratifying states will consider establishing a trust fund, financed through voluntary contributions, to support an outreach programme for promoting the Treaty; (g) Encourage the organization of regional seminars in conjunction with other regional meetings in order to increase the awareness of the important role that the Treaty plays; (h) Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to continue its international cooperation activities and organizing seminars for experts in the legal and technical fields; (i) Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to continue promoting understanding of the Treaty and demonstrating the benefits of the civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies, inter alia, in such areas as environment and earth science and technology; (j) Recommend that the Provisional Technical Secretariat continue to provide states with legal assistance with respect to the ratification process and implementation measures and, in order to enhance these activities and their visibility, establish a contact point for a better exchange and dissemination of relevant information and documentation; (k) Request the Provisional Technical Secretariat to act as a 'focal point' where information about activities undertaken by ratifiers and signatories is collected in order to assist in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty; (l) Encourage cooperation with non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society to raise awareness of and support for the Treaty and its objectives, as well as the need for its early entry into force. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |