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US-China Statement of Intent on Nuclear Technology Exchange Safeguards, September 16

'Secretary Abraham and Chairman of China Atomic Energy Authority Affirm Understandings on Nuclear Technology Exchange', US Department of Energy (DOE) Press Release, R-03-209, September 16; DOE website, http://www.doe.gov.

Vienna, Austria [signing ceremony during the IAEA Annual General Conference] - Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and the Chairman of the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) affirmed their commitment today to recent understandings reached by the two countries on exchange of nonproliferation assurances required for exchanges of nuclear technology.

"These understandings open the way for greater participation by US nuclear industry in China's growing nuclear power program," Secretary Abraham said after he and CAEA Chairman Zhang Hua-zhu signed a Statement of Intent in a ceremony at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in Vienna, Austria.

The understandings, adopted formally in an exchange of diplomatic notes between the US Embassy in Beijing and China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, establish a process for determining what nuclear technologies require government-to-government nonproliferation assurances and set forth procedures for exchanging the assurances. In the Statement of Intent, Secretary Abraham and Chairman Zhang declare they will implement the understandings "effectively and efficiently, and with all necessary resources of our respective organizations."

The understandings enable US firms to use their authorizations under Department of Energy (DOE) regulations 10 CFR Part 810 to provide technology and services to the Chinese nuclear power program. Until now, lack of legally-required peaceful-uses and nonproliferation assurances from the Chinese Government to the US Government prevented some firms from using their authorizations. The understandings state that when nuclear technology proposed for transfer is determined to require nonproliferation assurances, the government of the recipient country will pledge that the technology will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and will not be retransferred to another country without the prior consent of the government of the supplier country.

The understandings also state that the term limits on DOE authorizations will be extended, when requested by CAEA for an individual contract. This addresses Chinese concern that a term-limited authorization might expire before contracted work is completed.

In addition, reciprocal nonproliferation assurances will be exchanged when required for joint US-Chinese projects. The first reciprocal assurances are to enable collaboration between Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Department of Nuclear Engineering and Tsinghua University's Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology on a Modular High Temperature Gas Pebble Bed Reactor (MPBR).

The understandings were reached in three years of discussions in Beijing, Washington, and Vienna between the US Departments of State and Energy and the Chinese foreign ministry and CAEA.

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