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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation Moscow International Non-Proliferation Conference, September 19-20: Statements by UN, Russian, US & Iranian OfficialsNote: for full coverage of the 2003 Moscow International Non-Proliferation Conference, co-hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Moscow Center) and the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Centre), see the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/respurces/moscow/2003/home.htm. Unless otherwise stated, this website address is the source of the statements in the following compilation.
I. Nobuyasu Abe, UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, September 19... Almost three years have passed since the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the PIR Center organized their first joint international non-proliferation conference in Moscow. The imminent threat of nuclear proliferation and the heightened concern about the use of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors surely justify a fresh look at the global non-proliferation regimes as an urgent matter. At the base of these regimes are indeed such treaties as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Concerns also include the delivery means of these weapons, such as ballistic and cruise missiles. The global WMD regime continues to enjoy strong support throughout the world community. But given the inherent dangers of WMD violations by even a few states can have profound effects on international peace and security. Hence the focus on the compliance and enforcement of global WMD norms is indeed justified. The BWC and the CWC banned biological and chemical weapons and aimed to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and certain precursors to non-adherents. But the NPT was coupled with a strong non-proliferation obligation, with an obligation to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith. For these reasons the world must work hard both on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This complicates the situation when nuclear weapons come into focus. As some countries persistently complain that emphasis is unfairly placed on nuclear non-proliferation while nuclear is progressing at a snail's pace. This is a legitimate argument but it should not be an excuse to a remake for non-compliance of non-proliferation obligations. In fact, we cannot afford to sit idle as a current environment threatens to unravel the NPT regime. This is a regime that seeks not merely to discourage the possession and use of nuclear weapons but also to devalue such weapons and set a course for their elimination. The treaty does not suggest that the non-proliferation alone, however diligently implemented, will suffice to guarantee against the use of such weapons. What then are our tools for non-proliferation? And what can be done to stop the proliferation to prevent the use of WMD by state or non-state actors? First, we have to look at the basic tools that currently exist. It is [an obvious priority] to strengthen the non-proliferation and disarmament norms regarding WMDs. Attaining the universal adherence to the existing treaties will greatly help strengthen the norms. As one example of such progress recently, although long overdue, Cuba recently acceded to the NPT. This leaves only India, Pakistan and Israel outside the NPT. When it comes to chemical weapons, there are still many countries yet to accede to the CWC, particularly in the Middle East. Steady progress in nuclear disarmament and in the elimination of the deadly legacies of the former CBW programs would also help strengthen these norms regarding WMD and respond to the complaints about the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. In this respect the United States and the Russian Federation bear a special responsibility as the world's two super powers. They have made a significant progress by signing the Moscow treaty to drastically reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons. But we want more. The comparative threat reduction program and the G-8 global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction are other examples of efforts being carried out. These efforts deserve the respect of the international community and need to be strengthened. Upon the strengthened norms, a firm monitoring and verification procedure has to be built. This is the area where progress is most urgently needed. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, IAEA safeguards provide a monitoring and verification role regarding the nuclear materials. The IAEA and the active diplomacy of concerned countries have succeeded in preventing ten to twenty countries that were originally suspected of going nuclear from acquiring nuclear weapons. By the way, it is noteworthy that most of these countries at the threshold of nuclear program at the time of the entry into force of the NPT, including Japan and Germany, are now successful industrialized countries, enjoying stable democracy and a high degree of prosperity. The IAEA, however, could not detect or stop the clandestine nuclear programs in Iraq and North Korea. It was for this reason that the IAEA model Additional Protocol was developed. The Additional Protocol will greatly enhance the IAEA's capability to uncover determined clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. This is why Mr. ElBaradei is urging the IAEA members to conclude Additional Protocol[s]. It is therefore extremely important that as many countries as possible urge those countries which are hesitating to conclude Additional Protocol, particularly those with significant nuclear activities to do so as soon as possible. Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are a case in point. There is an urgent need for Iran to accept the recent IAEA governing board resolution and conclude and implement an Additional Protocol; and for the DPRK - to return to the NPT. But unfortunately we are not certain that that would happen. The actions of these states and the responses of the world community will have a decisive impact upon the future of safeguards, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the fight against nuclear terrorism. In the field of chemical weapons, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is in the process of establishing itself as a viable monitoring and verification mechanism. However, it is well known that in the field of biological weapons an attempt to adopt the verification protocol has failed. There are many arguments about why this happened, but perhaps one basic reason may have been the difficulty of verifying biological weapons in comparison to the other kind of categories of WMD due to the high degree of dual use characteristics and the low traceability of bioorganisms. This leads to the argument for new and innovative means to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. One important supplementary tool that is gaining importance with the rising threat of non-state actors is physical protection for WMD and the material, for their production. The threat of dirty bombs has expanded the scope of nuclear material to be protected. The legal tools and the guidelines of the IAEA for the material cooperation carried out under the CTR [US-Russia Cooperative threat Reduction Programme] and the G-8 and other initiatives are notable efforts in this area. But there is still a lot more to be done. Next to come export controls. Export controls represent another traditional non-proliferation measure that can also help progress in disarmament. It seems highly unlikely, for example, that the world will ever achieve great progress in eliminating nuclear weapons, as technology, equipment, materials and special services needed to manufacture such weapons are freely available on the market with little monitoring or effective control. The recent concern about terrorism and clandestine efforts to acquire WMD seem to have reinforced awareness of many countries about the need to tighten export controls. Fortunately, efforts are under way to strengthen these export controls in many countries. The European Union, for example, has taken many steps towards strengthening the implementation of export controls. It adopts this year a set of general principles and an action plan that will make the EU a leader in strengthening export control regimes. The EU is also exploring common policies relating to the criminalization of illegal exports relating to WMD. Export controls are in effect like a cat and a mouse game against unscrupulous arms traders. When nuclear material and chemical precursors were controlled, they moved to dual use items or their production facilities. Now they are moving to smuggling of invisibles, that is to say, designs, know-how, scientists, and engineers. In this context, too, the CTR initiative or efforts as seen in the international science and technology centers are effective means to supplement export control efforts. Another supplementary yet still important tool is education to build in the minds of people, especially scientists and engineers, a strong norm of prohibition. In August of last year Secretary General Kofi Annan sent to the UN General Assembly a United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, prepared with the assistance of a distinguished group of governmental experts and contribution from civil society. The study addressed many relevant educational initiatives at the primary, secondary, but especially the university and post-graduate levels as well. In his foreword to this report, the Secretary General voiced his hope that disarmament and non-proliferation education becomes an integral and natural part of the education of the next generation. The Department of Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations is proceeding with its program on disarmament education. Beyond these traditional tools of non-proliferation, there are a number of additional tools being proposed to strengthen non-proliferation efforts. One idea favors the international criminalization of acts involving WMD. This may be worth pursuing not only to deter the individuals who may be engaged in the state-run WMD projects but also to deter and punish those who may be engaged in activities by non-state actors. In the case of biological weapons, efforts to build up a worldwide epidemic emergency action mechanism may be useful. Given that a sudden outbreak of an epidemic can provide evidence of the use of biological weapons or BW-related accidents. This may also help encourage countries with sufficient public health facilities to join the network of biological weapons vigilance. Most of all, we are now in a situation to confront the question of determined or suspected violations of non-proliferation norms. On January 31st, 1992, the Security Council met at the level of heads of state and government and issued a presidential statement declaring that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Nevertheless, many voices in recent years have questioned either the ability or the readiness of the members of the Security Council to perform its responsibility concerning a wide range of challenges related to WMD. To support such claims, many critics cited difficulties faced by the Security Council in coping with the years of Iraq's non-compliance with its obligations under the NPT and relevant Security Council resolutions. Critics also noted the Council's reluctance to act in the face of many proliferation challenges posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea throughout the last decade. The Council did adopt a unanimous resolution 1998 condemning the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan but has not followed up on the resolution. This crisis of multilateral enforcement mechanisms has led some commentators to label multilateral treaty regimes as an effective and unreliable. It has given rise to calls for unilateral enforcement action either by single states or by coalitions of the willing. It has helped to inspire calls for pre-emptive military action in the face of perceived threats. It has also given rise to calls for counter-proliferation actions and the buildup for them. In response to these crises, many observers have offered a wide area of measures to strengthen international enforcement of global non-proliferation norms. Some, including Canada and Germany in the NPT context, have called for greater transparency and the implementation of multilateral regimes through, for example, more detailed national reporting requirements for use in the treaty review conferences. Others, most recently France and the Russian Federation, have called for a new summit meeting of the Security Council focus on the WMD non-proliferation issues. Still others believe that only major reforms of the Security Council itself, including new limits on the use of veto and a more representative membership, will enable the Council to become more actively involved in addressing both non-proliferation and disarmament. In his recent publications, for example, Richard Butler, the former executive chairman of UNSCOM [UN Special Commission on Iraq], has proposed the establishment of a new council on weapons of mass destruction that would consist of a broader international membership and not be hampered by veto. Earlier this year others were suggesting that the Security Council should establish a counter-proliferation committee, building on the precedent established by the work of the counter terrorism committee. Not all of these reforms however have focused on the authority of the Security Council. The Proliferation Security Initiative, for example, represents an effort by a coalition of some states that share a common willingness to undertake various enforcement actions, possibly even on the high seas or in the international air space to advance non-proliferation goals. Many of the participants in this initiative stress the importance of the role of the UN Security Council, especially with respect to the legitimate use of force. Arguably, the stronger the enforcement system at the global level, the weaker would be the arguments for such ad hoc initiatives. Another argument points to the weakness in enforcement of non-proliferation norms. And the fact that of the three WMD treaty regime only the CWC has the benefit of a permanent secretariat. While the NPT has a permanent secretariat limited to its safeguard functions, suggestions are being made to preserve expertise of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). In one way or another the French proposal to establish an international verification court may be a variation of such thinking. These are but a few of the many proposals one is encountering today among those who are aware of the current crisis of enforcement. I hope that participants at this conference will give their close consideration to these and other such proposals as well as explore additional possibilities for progress through new initiatives that have not yet seen light of day. My concern grows from the fear that unless the crisis is resolved, the solemn global norms for both non-proliferation and disarmament will suffer and the world will move ever closer to a security system based exclusively on conservation of self-help and military means. If the world community fails to enforce its global norms, it will face another danger, the danger that the lack of political will to defend global norms will produce new wrongs. In all likelihood, the solution to this crisis will come through a combination of our approaches selecting various aspects from the more sensible and practical among them. The response will likely involve actions at the national, regional and global levels. The sooner the world community resolves the crisis it is facing, the sooner the world will achieve genuine progress in realizing all the goals and the promise that inspire the negotiation of fundamental universal goals of the UN Charter. We must take a results-based approach to these goals, one that is focused on concrete actions rather than rhetoric, ritual and empty routines. If the results fall short, we could all witness a collapse of the WMD non-proliferation and disarmament regimes that the world has worked so hard to create and preserve. Let us work together to avoid such a catastrophe. II. Marshal Igor Sergeev, Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation, September 19I would like to welcome you and congratulate you on the commencement of such a big and impressive forum on a most topical and very important issue that is very hard to solve in the 21st century. This issue is the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The modern world not only uses the results of major scientific and technological research but also remembers the death of tens of millions of people in the last world wars. The production and the possession of weapons of mass destruction is a hidden, until a certain point, global challenge to mankind. Weapons of mass destruction create in society an atmosphere of mistrust and fear. But some view them as a most cherished dream and goal. Like the previous conference...the current Moscow International Non-Proliferation Conference is taking place in a situation that differs dramatically from that of the first conference. The range of international security threats has increased. But most importantly, the probability of these threats has increased, too. Along with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, serious threats also include international terrorism, regional and territorial conflicts, the narcothreat. International non-proliferation regimes, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and related international legal documents, nuclear export control regimes, the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, the rocket technology control regime, the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, the convention prohibiting biological and toxic weapons of 1972 have undoubtedly played a fundamental role in limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. In order to understand their role, it would be enough to imagine, even for a second, that these documents and all the work that has been done in accordance with these documents are non-existent. It is just as hard to imagine this world without the Russian-US cooperation on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons that has been going on for decades. Three years have passed since the first International Non-Proliferation Conference. Unfortunately, many of the alarming tendencies that were cited at that conference have become a reality. First of all, it's the terrorist threat that has turned from a potential threat into a horrible reality. The nature of terrorist acts in the US, Russia, Indonesia and many other countries indicates that international terrorist organizations are using very sophisticated methods in trying to obtain weapons of mass destruction to achieve their goals in the most effective ways. The growing opportunities for that have been brought about by globalization, the proliferation and accessibility of dual-purpose technologies, the growing number of countries seeking to possess weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery, and finally the erosion of state control in a number of countries where the situation is considered to be relatively positive. I cannot but mention the largely artificial crisis of traditional international institutions that regulate multilateral activities of countries as confrontation in international relations continues to grow. This was clearly demonstrated by the military operation in Iraq that was accompanied by disagreements between UN Security Council permanent members. Therefore, in addition to the need to adapt the existing non-proliferation regime, including UN mechanisms, great hopes have been pinned on the new ideas and initiatives in this field. Previous speakers have raised the question of what is to be done in Russia. I must tell you that Russia has never experienced a lack of ideas as to what is to be done. This is not the most important problem. The most important problem is how to do it. ... I think an example of effective work to solve the non-proliferation problem is the Big Eight [G-8] that is assuming an ever-greater weight in global politics. The meetings in Kananaskis and Evian adopted decisions on the Program of Global Partnership that are designed to suppress the spread of weapons of mass destruction and that indicate considerable progress in moving from political declarations to concrete action. At the same time, non-proliferation just as the fight against the terrorism must not become a goal in itself or a vision of one country. The purpose of joint efforts is to ensure the security of all countries and each country separately. In this process we must take a balanced approach toward the use of military force and understand the importance of preventive measures, including those that are based on improved and effective use of international treaties. ... III. Mikhail Lysenko, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, September 19... We are discussing a problem which without exaggeration is the dominant problem and key challenge in world politics: the problem of nonproliferation. ... Unfortunately, the situation in this area is still complicated. On the one hand, we still rely on the positive experience and the solid international legal basis. Over the past decades an international legal base has emerged that imposes bans or restrictions on all types of mass destruction weapons. They are reinforced by multilateral and national export control regimes. According to specialists, if the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty did not exist, between 40 and 45 states could have acquired nuclear weapons by now; without the Chemical Weapons Convention, about 100 states would have been able to deploy industrial production of chemical weapons; if the Biological Weapons Convention did not exist, more than 80 states would have been capable of launching mass production of such weapons. I took part in the first Moscow conference. And let us look at what has been done in the last three years since then. Undoubtedly, there are positive things to report. The Russian-American Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions has been signed and ratified and has come into force. Work has begun to implement it. A large-scale program has been launched of global partnership in combating the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction. An agreement on a multilateral nuclear-ecological program in the Russian Federation has been signed. There is real progress of chemical disarmament. The first facility has been launched in Gorny in Russia, with foreign assistance, that has enabled us to fulfill the first stage in the destruction of these weapons according to the chemical weapons convention. The Hague Missile Nonproliferation Code has been signed. But on the other hand, one must recognize that no reliable barrier has yet been put in the way of proliferation. We are still reeling from the shock of September 11, 2001. The sway of terrorism all over the world continues and there is a continuing threat that terrorists may get hold of weapons or, more likely, materials of mass destruction. Terrorists, of course, are not bound by any norms of international law. The DPRK has withdrawn from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency has some specific questions regarding Iran's nuclear program. The Treaty on Nuclear Nonproliferation and other international conventions and agreements have yet to become universal. The deadlock at present as regards the coming into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty does not help the cause of nonproliferation. Attention to the problem of missile nonproliferation has flagged after the adoption of the Hague Code. We are convinced that this agreement needs to be developed and improved so as to work out not declarative, but legally binding norms of missile nonproliferation and create conditions for the accession to the Code of those states for whose sake it was conceived in the first place. Undoubtedly, bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the sphere of non-proliferation needs to be stimulated. There needs to be a stronger central coordinating role of the UN and the Security Council, a buildup of global efforts to deny access to mass destruction weapons or components thereof to terrorists, including the speeding up of the work on corresponding counterterrorist conventions. The complexity and diversity of the problems that have piled up in the sphere of non-proliferation means that the existing questions can hardly be resolved by the use of simple recipes including the use of military force or introduction of sanctions. This could merely drive the problem deeper, which is why hard and painstaking political and diplomatic work, often without a promise of quick dividends, is required. In such conditions one cannot separate one's own security from that of others. And indeed this is impossible in principle nowadays. What is needed is consolidation of the efforts of the international community working out a many-sided program to combat the proliferation of mass destruction weapons on a global, regional and national levels. It is necessary to get at the very roots of terrorism, the very roots of instability. Specifically, of prime importance are efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, support the NPT review process of 2005. It is necessary to render every support to the activities of the IAEA and its system of safeguards. Russia does everything to support the practice of concluding additional protocols to the agreement on IAEA safeguards. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is of course unacceptable for Russia and for all civilized states. It is necessary to do everything to ensure strict compliance with international agreements and verification activities. No one can produce convincing documents or arguments to explain why, for example, while strengthening the verification activities of the IAEA or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, we should not work to put in place the verification mechanism to enforce the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons. It would be noted that no international efforts would yield proper effect if there are no efforts to improve national legislation, [if there are inadequate] enforcement practices to stop illegal development and acquisition and use of mass destruction weapons [and] unless work is conducted to strengthen the national systems of accounting, monitoring, physical protection of weapons of mass destruction, their components and related materials and technologies. Naturally, nonproliferation activities require additional international initiatives. We believe that any initiative should be based on compliance with international law, supplement and strengthen existing nonproliferation and export control regimes. We are prepared for the most active work with all interested states, international, governmental and non-governmental organizations, with anyone who values peace and security. ... IV. Natalya Kalinina, Assistant to the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation [Mikhail Kasyanov], September 19[A]s has already been stated...the Russian President had - among the agreements on global partnership reached in Kananaskis last year - identified two of the most priority areas connected with the destruction of chemical weapons and disposal of atomic submarines taken off combat duty. ... [These priority areas are] the disposal of fissile materials and finding employment for scientists that dealt with defense programs. Why are these two problems of the greatest substance to Russia? Firstly, it is because Russia possesses the largest reserves of chemical weapons in the world - some 40,000 tons, and without international assistance, it is impossible to solve the problem within the deadlines envisaged in the convention. And the second problem, related to the disposal of atomic subs - and over 130 subs have to be destroyed before year 2010 - is now a serious problem of ecological character in all the boundaries and borders of the country, and in the first place the Western countries must be interested to see Russia getting rid of the burden, inherited from the Cold War, as soon as possible. For Russia the dealing with these two problems is of exceptional priority and this is indicated by facts, indeed under the chairman of the government a permanent interdepartmental meeting has been organized, which sits in session every month and when necessary, continues to be convened to examine the most complex and difficult issues and promotion of cooperation. In all ministries and in the Russian Foreign Ministry in the first place some specialized offices have been established and responsible officials have been appointed who are responsible for and in charge of this area of work. What have we been able to accomplish after Kananaskis and after summing up the results at the summit in Evian where Russia's actions in principle were assessed quite highly. Firstly, Russia took a decision on stable financing of projects related to the development of global partnership. Russia's contribution to the agreements amounts to 2 billion dollars. It is the second largest figure after the US input. In fact, in 2003 it was not 200 million but almost 205 million dollars was allocated. And this figure is kept in the draft budget for 2004 which is now being examined by the Duma. Secondly, in all these areas of cooperation concrete projects were developed in the immediate wake of Kananaskis and they were distributed among all the parties concerned for examination. After preliminary consultations, the areas of assistance were "transmuted", so to say, into working documents and they were given to all the partners back in January this year. One has to admit, regrettably, that on many proposals from Russia the partners have not yet taken their decision. Thirdly, Russia has, in the shortest possible time in the wake of Kananaskis made all the efforts to settle most of the issues that constituted points of concern for the partners. This includes matters of taxation, liability for damage, reduced deadlines for getting formal access to facilities, provision of privileges and immunities, monitoring, auditing, transparency and others. Most of the concerns were removed in the process of preparing and signing, on May 21 this year, the agreement on the multilateral nuclear-ecological program of the Russian Federation. The Russian abbreviation is MNEPR [Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme for the Russian Federation]. The agreement was signed on May 21, and on the same day the government took decisions to appoint the executive body under the agreement - the Atomic Ministry of Russia - and to appoint an authorized entity - the government - to work in the MNEPR committee. He is Deputy Minister of Atomic Industry...Antipov. One cannot say that considering the fact that the problem was connected with settling taxation issues and those I spoke about, the drafting of the MNEPR agreement proceeded with ease and simplicity. Everybody was perfectly aware, including our partners and Russia, that this will become a model agreement. It will become the basis and will be repeated in all the remaining agreements related to the development of global partnership. And although the agreement itself is not directly related to the tasks of global partnership, many partners took this as a signal and a possibility to further develop the cooperation. Cooperation in global partnership...is developing...regrettably at a much slower pace than we would like to see and hoped for. The basis for such a conclusion is provided by several circumstances but I will not list them all for lack of time. Firstly, the decision of the partner countries on the size of their financial contribution to the nonproliferation program took quite a long time to take after the summit in Kananaskis. It was only in late 2002 that the situation somehow cleared up. The figures of partnership - if not all of those present know them - I will repeat quickly: the USA - 10 billion, which is half of the amount declared; Canada - 650 million dollars; European Union - 1 billion euros; Great Britain - 750 million dollars, Germany - 1.5 billion euros; Italy - 1 billion euros; France - 750 million euros and Japan - 200 million dollars. ... [I have] already said that Russia's contribution is 2 billion. We get a total of 17.85 billion. It does not reach the figure of 20 billion. It is a matter of arithmetic. I think there emerges quite a different circumstance which, as we see it, is holding up the development of global partnership because many previous arrangements in various areas of cooperation are being transferred by the partners under the umbrella of global partnership. Hence, the differing approaches to arithmetics and a different attitude to figures one can hear when the talk is of global partnership. And another circumstance. The contribution of the Group of Eight to the Russian projects has yet to be decided as a total. We don't know yet what amount and what projects will be used for CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries that were previously parts of the Soviet Union. We do not know for what projects and within what deadlines that the resources will be used. Unfortunately, Russia has so far not received replies to many of its proposals related to the development of global partnership. I will tell you briefly about what we have as far as the destruction of chemical weapons is concerned. Chemical weapons and the destruction of submarines. First chemical weapons. Germany agreed to build facilities in Kambarka. Prior to that, starting in 1993, Germany had taken part in the construction of Russia's first chemical weapons disposal plant in Gorny, which is already operating. Aid for 2003 is 29.7 million euros. We have not had any problems with Germany throughout of cooperation either in terms of disbursement of funds or the implementation of agreements. Italy: we invited Italy to build a facility for detoxication of chemical weapons in the town of Pochep, Bryansk region. But Italy has so far not made up its mind. We and Italy are finishing the preparation of a general agreement that will cover the entire period of the global partnership. We have signed an additional agreement to an agreement on assistance in the destruction of chemical weapons to an amount of five million euros for two years, 2003 and 2004. Great Britain has been invited to build a detoxication facility in Maradykovsky, Kirov region. To the best of our knowledge, Britain has rejected the proposal. As part of the previous agreement signed in 2001, we have reached an understanding with Britain on an additional disbursement of $10 million for chemical disarmament in 2003-2004. But this agreement has so far not been formalized. We have offered a detoxication project in Leonidovka to Canada, but no decision has been made so far. Canada has given its consent to provide an additional $20 million within two years as part of the existing agreement. France: France is this year's president in the Group of Eight, but unfortunately, we have an uncertain relationship with France. It has been said preliminarily that France will provide $10 million, that is 10 million euros for two years. The European Union: The European Union has not decided on the areas of assistance either. So far two million euros for two years have been considered as part of the agreement with Britain on the facility in Shchuchye, Kurgan region. The US: we have had a long-term agreement with the US since 1992, and the US considers the global partnership a continuation of all previous agreements reached under the Nunn-Lugar program, but no substantive consultations or negotiations related to the global partnership are under way now. This year the US has resumed aid to chemical disarmament and started disbursing funds for the construction of a chemical weapons disposal plant in Shchuchye. However, a three-year break in the financing has had its toll on construction. Japan is not taking part and is not planning to take part in projects related to chemical weapons. So, if we sum it up, the total aid for 2003 will be only $90 million. If we take the sum of 20 billion for a period of 10 years, the contribution of partner countries to chemical disarmament is obvious. I hope the situation will improve in the future. Now about nuclear submarines. Projects to assist in the scrapping of nuclear submarines were handed over to the Atomic Energy Ministry in January this year. The total cost of the project for our American partners is $4 billion, for Germany, Italy, Britain and France, $2.2 billion each, and for Canada and Japan 1.7 billion each. Why do the sums differ? Because submarines are based in different parts of the country. The tasks to be fulfilled are identical, and the participation of any partner who decides to contribute to this process may be very broad. He may choose the region, the form of aid and the type of submarines. What do we have today? Germany first. We have reached an agreement in principle to finance a joint project to build a facility for scrapping submarines at the Nerpa plant in Saida Bay, Murmansk region, as part of the agreement of 1992. The total aid for 2003 will not exceed 30 million euros. And we also have an agreement with Germany to provide about seven million euros to upgrade physical protection. Italy: neither sums nor projects have so far been determined. Britain: Britain may provide up to 32 million pounds sterling this year. Canada: up to 30 million Canadian dollars. France: so far, the disbursement of a sum of 2.5 million dollars has been considered realistic. The European Union: zero. The US: everything is going in accordance with existing agreements. Like in the case of chemical disarmament, the total aid does not exceed $100 million. But even that is only in agreements. Three quarters of the year have already passed, but the financing of has so far not begun. Every person can draw his own conclusions from this information. And I will take one more minute of your attention. It was said in the beginning of the conference that we gathered here not just to talk and then leave, but to decide what is to be done. I am speaking as a private person here. And what do I think needs to be done? First of all, it is necessary to set up a standing consulting mechanism in Moscow that will further this global partnership because Russia is its principal donor. Second, so much was said in the first part of the conference about different understanding of non-proliferation, disarmament and so on. It is necessary to draw up an international glossary that will offer unified definitions of non-proliferation, disarmament and transparency that will be related to the spread of knowledge, technology or some other factors that allow us to suspect certain countries of developing prohibited and uncontrollable military programs. We must spread knowledge and create educational programs and use PR methods more actively in order to speak on the same wavelength with the rest of the world. And the last thing: ... implementation mechanisms of the global partnership...need to be improved. V. US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, September 19... Russia's Essential RoleI am pleased to share the keynoting responsibilities tonight with [Russian Atomic Energy] Minister [Alexander] Rumyantsev. For two years, I have worked closely with the Minister to implement bilateral nonproliferation programs. He share-s my deep commitment to reducing proliferation threats, and I believe he is as proud as I am of the progress that we have made. The United States and Russia are working together to address undersecured nuclear materials that could be vulnerable to theft or sabotage. We are taking steps to shut down reactors that are still producing plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons. We are helping displaced Russian nuclear scientists and engineers find gainful employment with commercial applications. And we remain committed to each reducing our surplus stores of plutonium by 34 tons, so that 68 tons will be reduced altogether. Yet, I know some ask, "Why can't more be done? Why can't Russia and the United States move faster?" Well, let me assure you that, like everyone in this room, we would like to do more, and do it faster, and we are finding ways to do so. It is in this spirit that Minister Rumyantsev and I have taken steps to accelerate the progress of our programs. When the administration took office in 2001, the Department of Energy's (DOE) budget for nuclear nonproliferation work was around $850 million. Two years later, the President's FY '04 request for DOE's overall nonproliferation programs is nearly $1.3 billion. Last year, we launched the G-8 Global Partnership. The members of that partnership have committed to spend up to $20 billion on cooperative programs in Russia and the FSU (Former Soviet Union) over the next 10 years - half of which will come from the United States.
With respect to the Nuclear Cities Initiative, I wish to announce that just this morning, Minister Rumyantsev and I on behalf of our agencies committed to continue projects under the provision of the NCI government-to-government agreement, including a new partnership we formed with the city Snezhinsk for the development of a Positron Emission Center. This $9 million project will provide state-of-the-art medical imaging capability to diagnose cancer, and will involve many Russian entities, the Bio Medical Research Foundation of Northwest Louisiana, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Minister Rumyantsev and I have also tasked our representatives to press ahead in forging a new agreement that meets the concerns of our governments. Our top legal experts will hold their first meeting next week. And I have one final announcement tonight. In a very short time, the US Department of Energy, in partnership with Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency, will return fresh HEU fuel from a research reactor in Romania to Russia for down-blending and use in reactors. This is a big victory for nonproliferation, and part of an even larger, global campaign to minimize commercial use of HEU.
In short, substantial progress is being made, on many fronts, and in many areas. Yes, there are legitimate issues, which arise on both sides, but Minister Rumyantsev and I - and our teams - are committed to working through them and keeping the programs on track. Contrary to the assertions of some, money is not an issue, as our budgets and as the Global Partnership initiative attest. Likewise inaccurate are the assertions of some who claim that one side or the other is providing inadequate commitment to or emphasis on these programs. Indeed, as too often happens in policy debates, it seems that every time we launch a new initiative or meet a milestone on time or early, the response from some critics is to identify a new initiative that allegedly hasn't been pursued sufficiently and bemoan our failure to do so. When it occurs, I'm reminded of a comment made by President Johnson many years ago. He said that "if one morning I walked on top of the water across the Potomac River, the headline that afternoon would read 'President Can't Swim.'" Now of course, it goes without saying that it is understandable and appropriate for others to call for greater progress, and we take great pains to look closely at such advice and to implement good ideas. But our ability to sustain and expand support for these programs in Congress requires not only that the Congress understand that more needs to be done, but also that they believe the money they are spending is being used effectively and efficiently to both meet and exceed the goals to which it is directed. ... Looking at the Bigger PictureWhile progress in the bilateral context is moving along smartly, there is a broader set of issues that merits serious and sustained attention. Nonproliferation efforts over the past 50 years have generally prevented nuclear threats from arising. But there are nonetheless a few states challenging the nonproliferation regime - and even one such state is too many. In Vienna at the IAEA's General Conference, I proposed three steps to address some potential challenges.
These initiatives are key to the sustained success of the nonproliferation regime. But the NPT is being challenged, and we must take strong measures, including those I have outlined, to impede the efforts of those determined to undermine it. We must deal immediately and effectively with any state seeking to exploit the Treaty to its own advantage by ignoring its treaty obligations. We have seen what happened when the DPRK (Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea) took this route. I am confident that progress will be made in dismantling the North Korean weapons program in the context of the six-party talks. But we need to look at why North Korea, while a member of the NPT, was able to make so much progress on its weapons programs in the first place. North Korea's activities send a message to other would-be proliferants. This worrisome message asserts that a state can be a member of the NPT, enjoy its benefits, and still put in place the assets it needs to break out of the Treaty quickly and pronounce itself a nuclear weapon state. This is the wrong message, and we must learn from this chain of events and not allow it to happen again. All states that support the nonproliferation regime, and the peaceful benefits that it provides, need to take a clear view of the problem posed by proliferant states that attempt to flout the NPT, and address that problem realistically and with determination. That is why the step taken last week at the IAEA Board of Governors, when the board adopted by consensus a resolution demanding greater transparency from Iran with respect to its nuclear programs, was so important. The resolution makes clear that member states are prepared to take firm and necessary action to withstand serious challenges to the nonproliferation regime. ConclusionThis evening I have raised some fundamental issues, and I am confident that you will give them serious thought. They speak to the very heart of our future safety and security, and they should be of paramount concern to all of us here this evening. In closing, let me quote from President Eisenhower who 50 years ago declared, "If a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all." These words were true fifty years ago and they are still true today. And to emphasize one thought: the issues I have raised will not be solved by any one nation, or by a few. Ultimately, it will take a collective commitment from all concerned nations, acting cooperatively and assuredly in the name of advancing the interests that are shared by all responsible nations. Source: US-Russian Nonproliferation Work Yields Results, Abraham Says, US Department of State (Washington File), http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/products/washfile.html, September 22. VI. US Ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, September 19... This conference is extremely topical, as there is a new sense of urgency to the struggle to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Many countries around the world are seeking to maintain their security amid a growing number of nuclear states. They also recognize the double threat we will face if weapons of mass destruction fall into the hands of terrorists. I would like to speak to you today about the challenges to existing non-proliferation regimes, how we might meet them, and the special role that the United States and Russia can play together in the global partnership to prevent proliferation. Non-proliferation challenges are not only multiple, but also multiplying. Large quantities of weapons-useable nuclear material, chemical agents, biological pathogens, high-risk radiological sources, and the means to turn these materials into deliverable weapons remain inadequately secure against theft or illegal transfer, despite the significant efforts of the past decade. Thousands of former weapons scientists and technicians are making the difficult transition to using their skills in civil, commercial, and research applications. With the greater mobility and lightning-fast communications that we have today, we face a greater threat than ever before from states and terrorists that seek to acquire WMD and have access to the technology and know-how required to make them. In addition, there is a growing threat from states and terrorist groups with access to chemical and biological weapons (CBW). We must even prepare for the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire materials to make radiological devices ("dirty bombs") or primitive nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968 remains the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. We can draw some satisfaction from the fact that, of the 188 parties to the NPT, most have decided to forego nuclear weapons. South Africa, Brazil and Argentina took the bold step of abandoning nuclear weapons programs entirely. Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus showed great foresight by relinquishing the nuclear weapons left on their territory after the Soviet Union collapsed. But not all countries have done the right thing, and the NPT regime is showing its weakness. Some countries have failed to abide by the central bargain implicit in the NPT: to renounce permanently any intention of developing nuclear weapons in return for access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. North Korea is the most egregious example: after having been caught cheating, it renounced the NPT and other agreements and has declared its intention to become a nuclear power. There are good reasons to ask whether Iran is moving down the same road. Iran's policy of deception and delay belies its claims of developing nuclear technology for purely peaceful purposes. In one instance, Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to take samples from a site only after denying them access for months - sufficient time to clean up the facility in question. Another example involves Iran's changing explanations of its enrichment efforts. Although Iran initially said its enrichment program was entirely indigenous, it changed its story when IAEA inspectors found traces of highly enriched uranium in a centrifuge. At that point Iran claimed that it had purchased the equipment abroad and asserted that it had been contaminated by its original owner. Nothing about Iran's behavior is consistent with what one would expect from a state that is fully honoring its NPT obligations. Without the full compliance of all parties, and without a strict verification regime, there is a growing risk that the international confidence that has underpinned the Treaty could be lost. Unless this is corrected, there is a risk it could lead to regional nuclear arms races and destroy the basis for the peaceful sharing of nuclear technology. In addition to NPT states that fail to fulfill their obligations, terrorist groups and their sponsors are also trying to undermine the regime. The tragic lesson of recent terrorist attacks, such as that in Jakarta last month, is that terrorists are looking for ever more lethal ways to kill increasingly large numbers of innocent civilians and to sow panic and economic chaos. Weapons of mass destruction offer terrorists a tempting means to those ends. It does not take a lot of imagination to picture the potential for destruction. As President Bush and European Union leaders recognized in a joint statement earlier this year, the acquisition of WMD by terrorists "would undermine the foundations of international order." In the face of these new challenges to the non-proliferation regime, the United States believes the international community cannot simply wring its hands and hope the situation will improve. The gaps in the existing regime that proliferators are exploiting need to be closed. At the same time, we need to face the fact that some countries may be determined to circumvent even the tightest regime, and we also must consider the nightmare scenario in which terrorists succeed in acquiring WMD. To counter these threats to our collective security, we need not only to strengthen existing non-proliferation regimes, but also simultaneously to seek new tools and creative approaches to halt the spread of these dangerous weapons. To strengthen the existing regime, we need to increase our political commitment to the NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and deal firmly with countries whose programs today pose serious threats to these treaties. More rigorous requirements, supplemented by more rigorous enforcement, offer the best hope for deterring any other party from seeking to acquire or transfer WMD or related technologies. Our experiences with Iran and North Korea show that we must be constantly mindful that an irresponsible party may use its declared peaceful nuclear program to mask the development of a WMD capability. Iran is a critical test case for the NPT and the international community's ability to give effective enforcement powers to the IAEA. One week ago, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution giving Iran until October 31 to prove that it does not have a covert nuclear weapons program. Iran's evasiveness in recent months compels us to ask what Iran is hiding. If its nuclear program were entirely peaceful, as Tehran claims, there would be no need to deceive the inspectors or to delay their inspections. It would be a devastating blow to international security and to the non-proliferation regime if Iran were to go nuclear, and the United States seeks to work with all of its partners in non-proliferation to ensure that Iran remains within the NPT. Another critical element of the existing non-proliferation regime is strong export controls. Governments should put in place comprehensive controls that meet international standards, enforce them vigorously, and punish severely those who violate national laws. Governments should also have the "catch all" authority to stop the transfer of items not on control lists, as well as to control transits, transshipments, brokering, and intangible technology. To this end, my government is encouraging national governments and supplier organizations, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, to adopt "catch-all" controls as has been done in the Australia Group. We need to acknowledge, however, that strengthening the treaties and tightening export controls can only be part of the answer. As some actors may attempt to circumvent any regime, we must find new tools to use against proliferators. One such tool is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by President Bush in Krakow in May. We will be seeking the support of all interested countries for the PSI, including Russia. It focuses on preventive interdiction - using existing national and international authorities to detain and search ships, aircraft or vehicles suspected of carrying WMD and missile-related materièl to or from countries of proliferation concern, and to seize any such cargo that might be found. This innovative, proactive approach is both an example of my government's multilateral approach to non-proliferation and a bold step toward stopping proliferators. In addressing non-proliferation challenges, the United States and Russia can and should play leading roles. It is clear that the excellent relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin has put the bilateral relationship on a new footing and enabled our countries to work cooperatively to meet new security threats. The United States and Russia have a shared interest in preventing the spread of WMD, their delivery vehicles, and related technologies and expertise. As founders of most of the key non-proliferation regimes, it is incumbent on us, acting with like-minded others, to combat this threat to everyone's security. The United States looks to Russia to help convince the North Koreans that there will be no business as usual in Russian-North Korean relations unless Pyongyang accepts complete, irreversible and verifiable elimination of its nuclear weapons program. We also hope that Russia will freeze construction at the Bushehr nuclear power plant and refuse to deliver fuel for it until Iran agrees to sign the Additional Protocol and cooperates fully with the IAEA in implementing it. The United States is counting on Russia to be a partner in non-proliferation and to use its influence to prevent the nuclearization of North Korea and Iran. The US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) are working with their Russian counterparts to eliminate strategic offensive arms and their associated infrastructure, to secure at-risk nuclear and radiological materials, and to destroy delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Other Department of Energy efforts in Russia include disposing of excess weapons-grade plutonium, stopping the production of additional quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, disposing of excess highly enriched uranium, and preventing adverse migration of WMD expertise from the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex. Just as important, DTRA is working jointly with Russian authorities to combat the proliferation of chemical weapons and weapons-applicable biotechnology. The means include securing and destroying chemical weapons stockpiles and production capabilities, securing biological research facilities and strains, employing scientists in non-military fields, and developing detection and treatment capabilities. I do not think anyone ever doubted the wisdom of longstanding efforts to reduce the threat we all face from WMD. But after the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and many other acts of terrorism worldwide, the United States and Russia have made cooperation on non-proliferation an even higher priority. To this end, Secretary of Energy Abraham and Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev, who will both address the conference this evening, agreed in November 2001 to accelerate and expand cooperation related to fissile material security, particularly under the Material Protection, Control and Accounting program. In closing, let me reiterate that the ever-changing security environment presents serious non-proliferation challenges - challenges that demand a strong response. We must advance our collective security by bolstering existing non-proliferation regimes and finding effective new ways to detect and prevent proliferation. I hope this conference provides a forum in which you will freely share ideas toward this end. I also hope your discussions here send the clear message that experts from around the world are united in the view that WMD proliferation is the single gravest threat to global security in our time, and that the international community must work tirelessly, and with great resolve, to find all possible measures to eliminate this threat. Source: US Counting on Russia as Non-proliferation Partner, US Department of State (Washington File), http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/products/washfile.html, September 22. VII. Gholamreza Shafei, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation, September 19Note: Ambassador Shafei's statement was delivered by an Iranian Embassy official, Mr. Khaseini ... There is no doubt that such events to exchange ideas and views make an important contribution to the resolution of problems that are facing the world community. I hope all of you will present your analyses of your problems. Creating WMD non-proliferation systems and mechanisms is one of the most important achievements in this area. ... The participation of some countries in this system and non-participation of others upsets the balance and triggers a kind of competition between some countries. It is necessary to adopt fair and discrimination-free international decisions regarding international non-proliferation mechanisms. Recent events that have affected international security require globalization of the agreement[s] prohibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Creating areas free of weapons of mass destruction is considered to be an effective means of ensuring global application of non-proliferation regimes, and it is necessary for the players in the international political arena to take this into account as a means of strengthening non-proliferation obligations. Another serious obstacle to WMD non-proliferation is the lack of flexibility in the countries that have nuclear weapons as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. And this [situation remains] despite numerous and daily appeals in different states of the world concerning one and the same question, and despite the existing valuable experience of the world community in the matter of giving up the use, proliferation and creation of reserves of...two types [of] weapons of mass destruction, chemical and biological. However, states possessing nuclear weapons still believe that the preservation of those dangerous weapons guarantees for them international plans for an exclusive status for all time. Such a situation, doubtless, increases the perils of nuclear weapons proliferation. In addition, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there will always be the threat of its accidental use or the temptation to take advantage of it if need be: the more so that in recent years we have seen how individual nuclear states threatened - for preventative, limited purposes - to use nuclear weapons against some other states. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, the Islamic Republic of Iran in line with its Islamic beliefs considers the weapons of mass destruction to be inhuman and illegal. And in its defense doctrine it does not leave place for weapons of this kind. On this basis, the Islamic Republic of Iran participates in the convention[s] on the non-proliferation of biological and nuclear and chemical weapons, being a country that suffered from weapons of mass destruction, from chemical weapons; and it actively cooperates with the appropriate international organizations and institutions. The Islamic Republic of Iran as a participant in the agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [NPT] believes itself to be bound to abide by all its provisions; and under Article 4 of the agreement pursue the intention and carries out activity in using the nuclear energy for generating electrical power, as well as uses it in agriculture, industry, medicine, biology and hydrology. Cooperation between Iran and Russia is pursued within the mainstream of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and has always been subject to control on the part of the IAEA. In addition, the recent several months the Islamic Republic of Iran has been cooperating with the IAEA over and above its commitments and will continue to pursue such cooperation within the framework of international norms. The official position of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as expressed by its president, his Excellency Mr. Khatami, is in the following. Our slogan says: "no" to atomic bombs and weapons of mass destruction; and "yes" to peaceful atomic technology and to peaceful atomic R&D. And nobody can turn us away from that road. I feel regret over the statement of the US Ambassador Mr. Vershbow, especially in the light of the fact that Iran's nuclear fuel is under the IAEA control and the Director General of the IAEA announced this. We are committed to international agreements. And thus the constructive atmosphere of this conference should not be affected by these accusations. ... VIII. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Deputy Director General, International Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, September 20... The issue of weapons of mass destruction is a global concern therefore it has to be dealt with a global approach. The most serious challenge to present global stability is the unilateralism. The superiority of military power should not give the legitimacy to violate the international laws and to under estimate the relevant international organizations. In accordance with the UN Charter, States must refrain in their international relation from the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. This kind of unilateral approach with justification of existence of WMD, though not proven yet, has already created tensions and un-stability in the strategic region of Middle East. The international legally binding instruments are the product of a long multilateral negotiation process. Such treaties are the reflections of the political will and determination of the international community for a collective and universal measures to fulfill the very spirits and objectives of such instruments. In order to implement the provisions of such treaties in a non-discriminatory and effective way, the organizations in charge have to perform in the most impartial and non-politicized manner. A critical review of the past four decades reveals that not only in the United Nation Security Council [has] the veto power has been mostly used by a single state in enforcing its political will, but in the other international organizations political pressures have been exerted to derail the policies and decisions and in one recent case changing the management. Attempts have been made in focusing on non-proliferation so much so that the vital issue, the disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is totally ignored. United States have adopted a unilateral approach towards the non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Withdrawal from the ABM, rejection of the CTBT, challenging the global collective efforts in strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention and stopping the negotiation on legally binding instrument, the protocol, are some few examples of such policies. The consequence of the withdrawal of US from the ABM [Treaty] is a new challenge to strategic stability and the prevention of arms race in outer-space, called upon by the UN GA resolution 56/23. Establishment of WMD Free Zones, Particularly in the Middle EastDuring last decades the main emphasis has been made on the NWFZ [nuclear-weapon-free zones] and not necessarily WMD Free Zone but during recent years [a] more comprehensive approach has been started. The concept of NFWZ was first developed in the late 1950s, but it was not until 1975 that the General Assembly agreed on a general definition, with three centrally important elements: zonal states must not possess nuclear weapons; outside states must not station nuclear weapons anywhere within the zone; and the zone must be free of targets which could be threatened with the use of nuclear weapons. In addition, NFWZ countries must renounce nuclear weapons voluntarily and as sovereign states, and must accept an international verification system. Each of the existing zones has features of its own, reflecting the peculiar concerns of the states which comprise it. Security Assurances and Nuclear-Weapon-Free ZoneSince the negotiation of the NPT, the non-nuclear-weapon states parties have sought assurances from nuclear weapon states to guarantee their security from nuclear attack because the former states have forgone their right to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. In accordance with the UN Charter, "States must refrain in their international relations from threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Article VII of the NPT reaffirms the ' right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories'. The NWSs [nuclear-weapon states] are expected to give legally binding assurances through protocols to NWFZs. At the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-1) in 1978 the five NWSs issued unilateral statements on negative security assurances. Only China issued an unconditional negative security assurance. The Third NPT Review Conference held in 1985, in its final declaration, urged all concerned parties to establish NWFZ in the Middle East. There was no Final Declaration in the Fourth NPT Review Conference held in 1990.There were, however, working papers proposed on NWFZ s by group of countries and [a] working paper on the prohibition of armed attacks against nuclear facilities proposed by Islamic Republic of Iran. At the Fifth NPT Review Conference held in 1995,a resolution sponsored by Russia, US, and UK on Middle East was adopted. In this resolution the states in the Middle East are called upon by the Conference "to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter-alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological." Adoption of the resolution making that call was one of the conditions for indefinitely extending the NPT The first nuclear-free-weapons zone, called Tlatelolco, was established in Latin America and the Caribbean. A second NFWZ was created by 13 countries in the South Pacific which signed the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga. The third, the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok, established the South-East Asian zone covering 10 states. A fourth zone, comprising 45 African nations, will come into existence when the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba receives the required number of ratifications. But there are fundamental obstacle to setting up such a zone [in the Middle East], among them Israel's failure even to sing, let alone ratify, the NPT, and its refusal to discuss details of its nuclear arsenal. The Non-Aligned Movement in its Ministerial Meeting in South Africa declared the following on the issue of zones free from WMD: "We reiterate the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. To this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear- weapons- free zone in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and 687 (1991) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment, we call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We express great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighboring and other States and we condemn Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. We are of the view that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons which allow one party to threaten its neighbors and the region. We stress that necessary steps should be taken in different international fora for the establishment of this zone. We also call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel. In this regard, we express our serious concern over the recent development whereby Israel scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one Nuclear Weapons State. This development will have potentially serious negative implication on the regional security as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime." Israeli WMD CapabilitiesThe Israeli nuclear program grew out of the conviction that the Holocaust justified any measures Israel took ensure its survival. Consequently, Israel has been actively investigating the nuclear option from its earliest days. The program took step forward with the creation of Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in 1952.Its chairman, Ernst David Bergmann, had long advocated an Israeli bomb as the best way to ensure " that we shall never again be led as lambs to the slaughter". For reactor design and construction, Israel sought the assistance of Europe. On 3 October 1957, Israel signed agreement with one of the European countries which prefer[red] not to [be] name[d], in order to build a 24 MWt reactor and the chemical reprocessing plant for the production of plutonium. This complex was constructed in secret and outside the IAEA inspection. After decades of combination of benign neglect, erroneous analysis, and successful Israeli deception, CIA [the US Central Intelligence Agency] issued a report in 1968 that Israel had successfully started the production of nuclear weapons. After the fall of the racist regime of South Africa, facts on its nuclear program as well as the past close military collaboration with Israel were revealed. Many observers speculated that a suspected nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was a joint South Africa-Israeli nuclear test. On Tuesday 2 September 2003, in Berlin, Mohammad ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, called for creation of a Middle East region, free of nuclear weapons. He said: "A cornerstone of the Middle East should be a nuclear weapons-free-zone. There are countries that believe that Israel should sign the NPT as a confidence-building measure pending the establishment of a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East" Israel has stubbornly refused to sign the NPT despite international pressure. Threat of WMD Capability of IsraelAccording to several reports, Israel has developed chemical and biological weapons and the ability to weaponize them. It has not publicly announced its possession of nuclear weapons and relies on an "undeclared" deterrents. Israel has an extensive nuclear stockpile, including boosted (fission devices with enhanced yield) and fusion weapons, and some low-yield targeting. It can deliver nuclear weapons with long-range ballistic missiles that can hit any target in the Middle East. It has most probably developed cruise missiles for submarine and possible surface delivery of nuclear weapons. It is evident that such achievement in weapons of mass destruction and missile technology has not been possible without the full technological and financial support particularly by US and its strategic allies in Europe. The statements made to the British press by Mordechai Vanunu, the technician who had worked at the Dimona center, about the size and sophistication of Israel's nuclear arsenal had attracted much less attention by western media. Moreover, no reference was made to the reports that Israel had made plutonium for military purposes through the use of heavy water imported from Norway. Armed Attacks against Nuclear Facilities in the Middle EastA taboo connected to the non-proliferation regime was broken during the Persian Gulf War. For the first time, nuclear facilities at Al Tuwaitha, in Iraq, containing irradiated material (reactor fuel), were purposefully attacked by Israel. Previous Israeli attack at Osiraq, Tammuz reactor, took place in 1981, when no fuel had been introduced in the reactor core, but the incident aroused fears of the consequences of armed attack on nuclear plants. Iraq itself had inflicted considerable damage in Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran in 1984, 1985 and again in 1987. The International organizations including the IAEA and the United Nation ignored the aggression. Following the military attack by Israel against Iraqi nuclear reactor, a resolution condemning the aggression was adopted in the IAEA in spite the objection and negative votes by US and European countries. As the result of the lack of effective universal measure, Saddam regime attacked Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant. During the IAEA General Conference in 1990, the Islamic Republic of Iran proposed a draft resolution on " Prohibition of all armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes whether under construction or in operation", which was adopted (GC/XXXIV) despite the objection by US and the lack of support by the European countries. In accordance with this resolution, any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency and it create[s] a situation in which the United Nations Security Council would have to act immediately in accordance with the provision of the United Nations Charter. Nuclear Activities of Islamic Republic of IranBefore the Islamic Revolution, Iran concluded an extendible ten-year nuclear fuel contract with US in 1974, with Germany in 1976,and with France in 1977. In 1975,he purchased a 10% share in a Eurodif uranium enrichment plant being built at Tricastin in France that was part of enrichment technology Eurodif developed, and agreed to buy a quota of enriched uranium from the new plant. [The] Shah also gave one billion dollars as financial assistance to the said company but Iran did not receive any uranium desperately needed for its reactor It is worth to recall that US was obliged to deliver new fuel this reactor according to the contract made just before the revolution, but it neither gave the fuel nor 2 million dollars receive for it. This 5 MW research reactor is under the IAEA full scope safeguards and is producing radioisotopes for hospitals. The primary priority of Iranian nuclear program is generation of nuclear electricity. The consumption of energy for electricity generation in fossil power plants has increased from 29.6 million barrels of crude oil in 1977 to 225.7 million barrels in 2001. The utilization of oil in processing industries such as petrochemicals will generate much greater added value. On the basis of the WASP energy planning model, Iran has chosen the medium scenario with the projected 7000 MWe by nuclear power plants by the year 2020. Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Non-proliferation and WMDIran believes that WMD will not augment its security, and would in fact increase its vulnerability. WMD, nuclear weapons in particular are not in the defense doctrine of Islamic Republic of Iran. On this basis after the Islamic Revolution, Iran decided to continue its membership in the NPT and IAEA. Iran believes that an arms race in the region, particularly in the area of WMD, is dangerous and must be addressed through universal non-proliferation. In 23 July 1974 at the 29th Session of General Assembly of the United Nation, Iran proposed an agenda item for establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Since then it has continuously reiterated its demand for the establishment of NWFZ in Middle East. Iran firmly pursue the goal of a region and world free from WMD through their total elimination. Iran signed the IAEA Statute in 1958,and signed comprehensive safeguard Agreement with the IAEA in 1973 to facilitate the inspection, it also accepted the Subsidiary Arrangements to the IAEA Safeguards in February 2003, following IAEA director General visit to Iran and meeting with the Iranian President. Our preliminary reaction is rejection to the recent resolution of the IAEA is in brief as follows:
The Position of the Non-aligned Movement regarding the IAEA resolution was: "With regard to operative paragraphs 3 an 4, NAM members of the NPT believe that it goes beyond the spirit of the NPT and the policy of the Agency, which is based on 'trust but verify' as it asks Iran to take actions beyond the NPT and the Additional Protocol provisions. On operative paragraph 4, NAM believes that by putting the deadline at the end of October 2003,we are tying the Agency's hand by this date. More importantly, it also gives the wrong impression that Iran's co-operation in no longer required after this date. On operative paragraph 4(ii), it is our view that a legal interpretation is required on the term 'unrestricted access' with regard to Iran's compliance with its current Safeguards Agreements. As we all know, the term 'unrestricted access' is not used in the Additional Protocol." Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran Towards Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)Iran ratified the Convention in 22 August 1973. In order to implement its provisions, the following national measures particularly on Security and Oversight of Pathogenic Micro-organism[s], have been made: 1. National Bio-Safety Committee (NBSC) The Committee has been established in August 2000 pursuant to decree of the President. The purposes of this Committee is to review the issues related to the Protocol on Biodiversity and preparation and compilation of draft national legislation on bio-safety. In this regard the related guidelines and regulations for working with human, animal and plants pathogens have been drafted by the NBSC. The draft of national legislation on bio-safety has also been submitted to the government. 2. The Comprehensive National Biological Defense Plan The Comprehensive National Biological Defense Plan was approved by the Supreme National Security Council in 1998. It coordinates nationwide actions to protect human, animal and plants against biological threats. 3. National Committee on Microbial and Toxin Diseases The National Committee on Microbial and Toxin Diseases was established in 1998. The Committee is composed of relevant ministers and is chaired by the first deputy President. The Ministry of Health is responsible for the cases of natural outbreaks of human diseases. The Ministry of Jihad-e-Agriculture is in charge of management of natural diseases in animals and Plants. Finally in case of use of biological weapons or bio-terrorism actions, the defense authorities will manage the crises. 4. Committee Against Bio-Terrorism (CABT) The Committee Against Bio-Terrorism was established in 2001 to function under the auspices of the Ministry of Health and Medical Education. The CABT has so far made following measures:
5. Laboratories regulations and guidelines Laboratories, institutes and organizations which work with biological materials in the Islamic Republic of Iran apply national, international regulations and guidelines such as: WHO, FAO, OIE. 6. Establishment of National Authority for implementation of BWC In order to implement the national obligations undertaken by States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, its article 4 in particular, the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran instructed the establishment of Interim National Authority (INA) of the BWTC in 1998. The INA comprises the representatives of relevant bodies and organizations and has expertise capability for preparation of necessary regulations and guidelines in the BTWC context. The National Authority was set out in manner when ever the additional protocol to the Convention has been finalized and enter into force it could function on broader basis in fulfilling national obligations. US Approach towards the BWCJust before US rejected the draft protocol of the BWC in July 2001, the chief negotiator for the US admitted under questioning before Congress that a number of US government agencies conduct biological activities that raise "ambiguities" regarding their purposes. The kinds of bio-defense activities that prompted his testimony and the hardline US opposition to a Protocol were illuminated by a New York Times article on September 4,2001 exposing three secret bio-defense project that push up against the permissible limits of the BWC. During the negotiation of the Protocol of the BWC, US was the main opponent to the Iranian proposal on the issue of prohibition of USE of biological weapons which is missing in the BWC. Reservations of some countries including US to the 1925 Protocol on the provision of use is a serious concern. During the BWC conferences Islamic Republic of Iran has proposed the amendment of the BWC in order to incorporate the prohibition of use in the BWC. The Non-aligned Movement expressed its deep disappointment at the inability that has been demonstrated in the endeavors of the States Parties of the BWC to successfully undertake initiatives to strengthen in implementation of the Convention Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran Towards the Chemical Weapons ConventionIran ratified the CWC on 3 November 1997. The Commitment of Islamic Republic of Iran to the Chemical Weapons Convention goes beyond that of a merely legal undertaking. Recalling the frightening bitter experience of Iraqi chemical attacks against soldiers and civilians, citizens of Serdasht just to name one, has created an ethic and moral commitment to ban such inhumane weapon in a collective international approach. Iran sustained 100,000 known victims,60,000 of them receive medical treatment.35,000 of them are considered serious. Ten percent of the victims whose case are serious will have a definite, gradual and agonizing death awaiting them. Unfortunately 25,000 victims who had been treated and released by 1993, thought to have fully recovered, have reported back to hospitals and medical centers with respiratory and other complaints US involvement in Saddam atrocity and its WMD activities and use of chemical weapons: According to the report by MSNBC News, in August 18,2002, the special envoy of the President Reagan, Mr. Rumsfeld, in his meeting with Saddam Hussein and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz stated that the Reagan administration was so concerned about an Iranian victory that it offered Saddam unspecified assistance. There is evidence in declassified State Department cables and court records which indicates that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iranian troops, it was ready to help Iraq in thwarting Iranian "human-wave" attacks. ... Continuous chemical bombardment particularly cities, and the ignorance and lack of effective preventive measure by international community, forced Iran to decide on a strictly limited scale, capacity should be developed to challenge the imminent threat particularly against the civilian populated centers. It was declared that Iran had chemical weapons capability, while maintaining the policy not to resort to these weapons and rely on diplomacy as the sole mechanism to stop their use by its adversary. The war ended soon after. Following the establishment of ceasefire, the decision to develop chemical weapons capabilities was reversed and the process was terminated. After the ratification of the CWC, Iran declared the passed activities to the OPCW and destroyed the chemical weapons production facilities (CWPF) with the presence of the OPCW inspectors and later received the certificate of destruction. The joining the CWC, declaring the chemical weapons facilities and their total destruction was a difficult historical decision, since Iran compromised its national security for the sake of global security due to the fact that Saddam was still in power and its potential threat still existed. The Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran towards the CTBTIslamic Republic of Iran signed the CTBT on 24 September1996.It has been one of the most active participants during the negotiation and has fully cooperated with the Preparatory Commission since it started its work Israeli Approach towards CTBT: In the Conference on facilitating entry into force of the CTBT, held in Vienna in September 2003, Israel announced three following conditions for ratification:
US Approach to the CTBT: ... Due to the requirement of 44 countries ratification for the Treaty to enter into force...US [opposition to the Treaty] has [the power to] stop the treaty to come into being. US officially announced in November 2000 that it withdraw from involvement in the activities regarding the On-site Inspection (OSI) and the preparation of the related manuals. It has also actively weakened the PrepCom's activities for the enhancement of activities for the EIF of the treaty Naming Names in WMD Conferences: A Dangerous GameDuring several conferences of the NPT, CWC, BWC, we have been face[d] with [a] serious threat to the collective united cooperation of states parties...by baseless allegations made by one state party against others, which has jeopardized the co-operative and constructive environment of the conferences and has threatened the successful conclusions. The Heads of States of the NAM, at the Summit Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, 20-25 February2003, regretted unsubstantiated allegations of non-compliance with relevant instruments on Weapons of Mass Destruction and called [on] States Parties to such instruments that make such allegations to follow the procedures set out in those instruments and provide the necessary substantiation for their allegations. Summary and ConclusionThe most serious challenges and obstacles to realization of non-proliferation are as follows : 1. Unilateralism 2. Lack of universality 3. Discrimination in application of the treaties (one has to also bear in mind the discrimination of the NPT in nature ) 4. Separation of two integral part of global security, that is non-proliferation and disarmament, in international deliberations 5. Lack of incentive for the parties to the treaties, particularly developing states parties, due to the lack of implementation of the promotional pillar of the treaties (for example articles IV of the NPT, 10 and 11 of the CWC, 10 of the BCW ) 6. Lack practical measure in encouraging the non-parties to join the treaties. Full cooperation of industrial countries with non-parties in supplying materials, equipment which are required to be under the international surveillance 7. Parallel export control regimes such as Australia Group, Zanggar Committee, NSG, etc. These regimes underestimate the credibility and comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the treaties. 8. Lack of success in implementation of the UN resolutions and call by other international relevant organizations for the establishment of zones free from weapon of mass destruction. 9. The Main obstacle for the establishment of WMD Free Zone in the Middle East is Israeli proliferation policies and non adherence to the disarmament treaties and rejection of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards. 10. The Israeli reluctance to fulfill the expectation of the international community, and non accession to the NPT, has given reasons for some countries in the region not to join the CWC and BWC and therefore the universality of those treaties can not be realized. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |