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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation 47th IAEA Annual General Conference, Vienna, September 15-19Forty-seventh Annual General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Agency Headquarters, Vienna, Austria, September 15-19. Note: for comprehensive coverage and documentation, see the website of the IAEA at http://www.iaea.org/worldatonm/About/Policy/GC/GC47/index.html. I. Statements
II. Resolutions, Developments & Decisions
I. StatementsUnited Nations: Message from Secretary-General Kofi Annan, September 15'Secretary-General voices support for efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards, encourages countries to conclude Safeguards Agreements', message by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, delivered to the Conference by Nobuyasu Abe, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, UN Press SG/SM/8873, September 15. I am pleased to send my greetings to the forty-seventh General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Some fifty years after the "Atoms for Peace" initiative, the IAEA's work in promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and verifying compliance with solemn safeguards obligations is more important than ever. The Director General, Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei, and the staff of the Agency have brought great professionalism and purpose to their work in what has been a challenging year, especially with respect to Iraq. I support the Agency's continuing efforts to strengthen international safeguards - in particular, to promote conclusion of Additional Protocols by Iran and other States, and to encourage other countries to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency. I call for the early resumption of the Agency's safeguards activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I share with many the hope that we will see new progress in achieving adherence to comprehensive safeguards by all States, including in the Middle East and South Asia. I also share the conviction of many that efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation must be complemented by progress in the field of nuclear disarmament - an issue in which the Agency has an abiding interest. Advances in these various areas would significantly reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, as would further progress in the Agency's efforts to ensure the safety and security of nuclear facilities and prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear material and radiation sources. While the international community is rightly concerned to prevent potentially dangerous uses of nuclear technology, that technology remains an important factor in economic development. The IAEA's efforts to promote public health and environmental protection, to increase food supplies, and to promote sustainable growth and development are vitally important. I look forward to continuing to work with the IAEA in advancing the causes of peace and sustainable development, and I wish you all the best for a successful conference. IAEA: Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, September 15Statement by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, September 15; IAEA website. The past year has been a time of significant challenges and achievements for the Agency. In the area of verification, the Agency has been at the centre of attention and has demonstrated again its ability to perform objective and credible safeguards - but we continue to face a number of difficult and unresolved situations. In the area of safety and security, we see overall improvement and our work is making a difference, but much remains to be done. ... International Co-operation on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle[B]oth the INPRO report [the Agency's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles] and other studies have stressed the fact that the area of fuel cycle design and operation may face a number of critical choices for the future, in part to address proliferation and waste management concerns. This is an important issue that has been discussed over the years, but in my view now merits serious consideration, as part of our effort to cope with the increasing non-proliferation, safety, security and technical challenges facing nuclear power. Such a consideration should include the merits of limiting the use of weapons usable material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes, by permitting it only under multilateral control. Similarly, we should also consider limiting the processing of such material - and the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment to international centres. These limitations would need to be accompanied by appropriate rules of transparency, control and above all assurance of supply. It is clear that strengthened control of weapons usable material is key to our efforts to strengthen non-proliferation and enhance security. Our consideration should also include the merits of multinational approaches to the management and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. Not all countries have the appropriate conditions for geologic disposal - and, for many countries with small nuclear programmes for electricity generation or for research, the financial and human resource investments required for research, construction and operation of a geologic disposal facility are daunting. Considerable economic, safety, security and non-proliferation advantages may therefore accrue from international co-operation on the construction and operation of international waste repositories. In my view, the merits and feasibility of these and other approaches to the design and management of the nuclear fuel cycle should be given in-depth consideration. The convening of an Agency group of experts could be a useful first step. ... De-MiningIn the area of humanitarian de-mining, the PELAN fast neutron mine detection system was field tested last year in Croatia, in co-operation with scientific staff from the Croatian Mine Action Centre. Testing showed that the device could reliably identify certain sizes of mines at various depths under the soil in dry conditions, but more work has to be done to enable reliable detection of the smaller anti-personnel mines and for detecting mines in wet soil conditions. ... Nuclear Safety and SecurityThe safety and security of nuclear activities around the globe remain a key factor for the future of nuclear technology. It is gratifying to note that nuclear safety continues to improve at power plants worldwide, that more and more countries are raising their standards of performance in radiation protection, and that significant steps have been taken in the past two years to improve nuclear security. However, more work needs to be done, particularly as public demands for greater transparency and accountability on safety issues are widely voiced in many countries. The need for a more effective and transparent global nuclear safety and security regime, therefore, continues to be a high priority. ... Status of International ConventionsThe development and adoption of legally binding international agreements has proven to be a powerful mechanism for enhancing safety worldwide. One area of current focus is the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, for which the first review meeting starts in Vienna on 3 November 2003. Thirty-two contracting parties have submitted their own national reports, and are now reviewing and commenting on those of the other contracting parties. At the review meeting, they will discuss these reports and compile a summary of their observations and conclusions. This summary will provide a first snapshot of the state of the safety of spent fuel management and radioactive waste management in States party to the Convention. I would note, however, that many States are not yet contracting parties, and in that sense this snapshot will be far from global. All States, including those with no nuclear power plants or research reactors, have radioactive waste that must be managed safely. I would urge all States to adhere to the Convention. Within the framework of co-operation established under the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions, the Agency completed missions to assist Bolivia, Ecuador, Nigeria and the United Republic of Tanzania with the recovery, characterization and securing of radioactive sources seized in illicit trafficking incidents. And in June, 55 Member States participated in the second meeting of representatives of competent authorities identified under these conventions - a step that I hope will begin the transformation of the emergency conventions from purely reactive to more proactive mechanisms for enhancing emergency preparedness and response. The Convention on Nuclear Safety is now approaching its third review cycle. Contracting parties will need to submit their national reports by next September, in advance of the review meeting in April 2005. To assist in this process, and at the request of last year's review meeting, the Agency is preparing a report for the contracting parties describing generic issues and trends in the safety of nuclear power reactors as identified by the Secretariat through our various services. In the past two years, 20 additional States have become party to the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), making a total of 89 States parties. This increase reflects the importance being given to the CPPNM as part of the international nuclear security regime. In September 2001, I convened an open-ended group of legal and technical experts to prepare a draft amendment to the CPPNM. Finally, this past March, the group was able to adopt a report, which I have distributed to all States parties. The possible amendments identified in the report would extend the scope of the CPPNM to cover, inter alia, the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, and the protection of nuclear material and facilities against sabotage. However, the prepared text still contains a number of bracketed clauses on which the group was not able to reach agreement. I would urge States parties to work rapidly towards consensus on these outstanding issues, in order to have a Diplomatic Conference to adopt the proposed amendments at an early date. ... Safety of Transport of Radioactive MaterialWhile the transport of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive material has been conducted for decades successfully and without serious accidents, many Member States continue to express concern over the risks involved in maritime transport. As part of the Secretariat's efforts to promote dialogue among Member States, a widely attended international conference was held here in Vienna in July. Most of the technical issues were successfully addressed during the conference; however, given the complexity of some topics - notably, nuclear liability and communications - not all areas of disagreement between Member States were resolved. The Agency will continue to promote constructive dialogue on these topics. ... Nuclear Security and Protection Against Nuclear TerrorismAgency efforts to help Member States increase their nuclear security are continuing at an exceptionally fast pace on multiple fronts. Measures to prevent the theft of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities remain a high Agency priority, and concerns about the threat of radiological terrorism have given increased emphasis to measures to improve the security of other radioactive material and to counter illicit trafficking. Since September 2001, working in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa, we have conducted a total of 40 advisory and evaluation missions, and convened a total of 60 training courses, workshops and seminars. A major international conference was held last October in Karlsruhe, Germany, focused on helping States to make use of advanced analytical methods for nuclear material seized in illicit trafficking incidents, and to improve co-ordination between the nuclear scientific community and the law enforcement community. International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions and follow-up missions were carried out in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Turkey and Ukraine. Requests for eight additional IPPAS missions in Latin America, Europe and Asia are currently being processed. Regional training courses in physical protection were held in Asia, Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, and similar courses are to be given in Africa and Latin America. One international course in the USA is taking place now, and another is planned for next month. The identification and protection of vulnerabilities in nuclear installations is one area in which safety and security aspects merge. Workshops on safety measures contributing to the security of nuclear installations were held in Hungary, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey. On a related note, at an Agency conference in Rabat, Morocco earlier this month, Member States acknowledged the positive impact of the Agency Model Projects to upgrade national radiation protection infrastructures - but, in addition to noting the continuing need for radiation safety enhancements, asked for Agency guidance on how to reconcile the need for transparency, in matters of radiation safety, with the need for confidentiality, from a security perspective. Evaluation missions have been held throughout Eastern Europe, Africa and Central America to assess Member State capabilities to detect nuclear and other radioactive material at their borders, and to help them respond to illicit trafficking. Significant progress has been made in developing and revising existing guidance to assist Member States in the development of emergency plans to respond to radiological emergencies resulting from malicious acts, and in the detection of and response to acts of illicit trafficking. The Agency is also strengthening its co-operation with other international organizations, including the UN and its specialized agencies, Interpol, Europol, the Universal Postal Union and the European Commission. Activities in this regard include international conferences, training and exchange of information, as well as collaboration through interagency co-operation committees. A total of nearly $23 million has been pledged to the Nuclear Security Fund in voluntary contributions from 21 countries and one donor organization, of which over $13 million has been received. Clearly, much more work remains to be done in this important area, and I encourage more and continued financial support. Safety and Security of Radioactive SourcesDespite the increased level of attention given to the security of radioactive sources since September 2001, many countries still lack the programmes and the resources to properly respond to the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Information in the Agency database of illicit trafficking, combined with reports of discoveries of plans for radiological dispersal devices, makes it clear that there is a market for obtaining and using radioactive sources for malevolent purposes. Given the apparent readiness of terrorists to disregard their own safety, the personal danger from handling powerful radioactive sources can no longer be seen as an effective deterrent. Although fortunately there have been no instances of the use of a radiological dispersal device, it is clear that the potential for such devices must be guarded against. These concerns were the focus of a major international conference held here in Vienna in March. The conference emphasized the need for the Agency to assist States with locating and securing orphaned radioactive sources, encourage the development of strong national regulatory oversight bodies and national source registries, provide training and assistance on improving border controls and preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, and promulgate guidance on how to strengthen these national and international efforts. Findings from the conference have been reflected in the revision of the action plan for the safety and security of radioactive sources and the revision of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Sources - both of which were approved last week by the Board of Governors. Implementation of the action plan and the Code of Conduct will greatly improve safety and security in this area. The three-way initiative by Russia, the USA and the Agency, which seeks to secure vulnerable radioactive sources within the countries of the former Soviet Union, has so far resulted in missions to the Republic of Moldova and Tajikistan, with further missions scheduled for seven additional countries. The Agency has also been working to assist developing countries in ensuring that sealed sources can be used and disposed of safely and securely. For example, we have assisted Angola, Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire in organizing the return of sealed sources to their manufacturers. Future Challenges in Nuclear Safety and SecurityWhile much has been achieved in the area of nuclear safety and security, I should conclude my review of this area by emphasizing the improvements still needed in remaining areas of apparent vulnerability - such as learning from recurring events, enhancing research reactor safety, continuing to enhance transport safety and tightening the control of radioactive sources. The strengthening of a global nuclear safety culture - characterized by broad adherence to existing safety conventions, the adoption of legally binding agreements for the remaining areas of nuclear activity, the universal application of the complete set of safety standards, and increased collaboration with relevant international organizations such as the OECD/NEA and WHO - will do much to address these vulnerabilities. And while the volume and scope of activities relevant to protection against nuclear terrorism demonstrate the Agency's ability to respond rapidly and with flexibility to emerging priorities, it is clear that we must be able to sustain the pace of this effort if we are to be successful - particularly in the combating of illicit trafficking; the protection of nuclear installations and nuclear and other radioactive material from sabotage; and the response to threats that could lead to radiological emergencies. Verification of Nuclear Non-ProliferationThe strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is becoming more important than ever. Events of the past year have placed the regime under stress on multiple fronts, and have made it clear that concrete steps to strengthen the regime are urgently required. The Agency's role as an independent, objective verification body remains central to the effectiveness of the regime. Safeguards Implementation Report for 2002In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2002, the Agency concludes that, in 145 States (and Taiwan, China) with safeguards agreements in force, with the exception of the nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful use or were otherwise adequately accounted for. Moreover, in the case of 13 States having in force both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, the Agency, having found no indication of the existence of undeclared nuclear material or activities, was also able to provide broader assurance, concluding that all nuclear material in those States had been declared and remained under safeguards. Status of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional ProtocolsIn response to last year's General Conference resolution, the Secretariat increased its efforts to promote the strengthened safeguards system through the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Regional seminars were held in Malaysia, Romania and Uzbekistan, with the financial support of Japan and the USA. These seminars were intended to deepen the understanding of participating State officials about the role of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in promoting global and regional non-proliferation and security objectives. Since my statement at last year's General Conference, safeguards agreements have entered into force for Burkina Faso and Georgia, and the validity of Albania's comprehensive safeguards agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was confirmed by an exchange of letters. Additional protocols entered into force for Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Georgia, Jamaica, Kuwait and Mongolia. At this time, additional protocols have been signed with 76 States and have entered into force for 36 of those. Clearly, the number of safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force remains well below expectations. Forty-seven States have yet to fulfil their legal obligations under the NPT to bring safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, and more than six years after the Board's approval of the Model Additional Protocol, over 150 countries still do not have an additional protocol in force. I strongly urge all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force the required safeguards agreements and additional protocols at an early date. As I have repeatedly stated, without the conclusion of the required safeguards agreements, the Agency cannot provide any assurance about compliance by States with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. And without the additional protocol, the Agency can provide little to no assurances about the absence of undeclared material or activities. For the Agency to provide the required assurances, it must have the required authority. Integrated SafeguardsLast year I reported to you that the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards was completed, meaning that the necessary safeguards concepts, approaches, guidelines and criteria were sufficiently developed to begin implementing integrated safeguards in States where the requisite safeguards conclusions had been drawn. As I have mentioned before, integrated safeguards aims to improve the effectiveness and cost efficiency of verification activities by integrating traditional nuclear material verification activities with new strengthening measures, particularly those of the additional protocol. We also continue to develop and improve our technological capability to detect undeclared nuclear materials and activities. At this point, integrated safeguards are being implemented in three States: Australia, Indonesia and Norway. The first States in which integrated safeguards have been implemented have relatively small nuclear programmes. In the near future, we expect to begin implementing integrated safeguards in States with much larger nuclear programmes, including Canada, Hungary and Japan. In this context, I should mention that I have recently initiated an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards strengthening measures we have been implementing. The evaluation will be undertaken by independent external evaluators, under the auspices of the Agency's Office of Internal Oversight Services. I have also asked the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) to undertake a focused technical review of the safeguards criteria. Implementation of Safeguards in the DPRKThe situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to pose a serious and immediate challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As I have reported repeatedly to the Board, since 1993 the Agency has been unable to implement fully its comprehensive NPT safeguards agreement with the DPRK. The Agency has never been allowed by the DPRK to verify the completeness and correctness of the DPRK's initial 1992 declaration - specifically, that the DPRK has declared all the nuclear material that is subject to Agency safeguards under its NPT safeguards agreement. From November 1994, the Agency was only allowed to monitor the "freeze" of the DPRK's graphite moderated reactor and related facilities, in connection with the "Agreed Framework" between the DPRK and the USA. This continued until the end of December 2002, when the Agency's inspectors were withdrawn at the request of the DPRK. Since that time, the Agency has not performed any verification activities in the DPRK and cannot therefore provide any level of assurance about the non-diversion of nuclear material. The six-party talks that recently took place in Beijing were clearly a step in the right direction towards a comprehensive resolution of the Korean crisis. I do hope that the dialogue will continue, and I trust that any future settlement will ensure the return of the DPRK to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and that the Agency will be given the necessary authority and resources, and be provided with all available information, to be able to fulfil its responsibilities under the NPT in a credible manner. I also hope that the Agency will be consulted at an early stage on verification requirements. Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to IraqAfter an interruption of nearly four years, last November the Agency resumed verification activities in Iraq under the mandate provided by UN Security Council Resolution 687 and related resolutions. In December 1998, we had reported to the Security Council that, based on our inspections over a period of more than seven years, there was no indication of Iraq having achieved its goal of producing a nuclear weapon, nor were there any indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons usable material of any practical significance. Between November 2002 and March 2003, Agency inspection teams carried out extensive inspection activities in Iraq. The Agency sought to determine what, if anything, had changed in Iraq over the previous four years relevant to Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities. At the time the Agency ceased its Security Council verification activities in Iraq - in consultation with the President of the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General, and out of concern for the safety of its staff - we had found no evidence of the revival of nuclear activities prohibited under relevant Security Council resolutions. However, considering the four-year absence of Agency inspectors from Iraq, the time available for the renewed inspections was not sufficient to permit the Agency to complete its overall review and assessment. The Agency's mandate in Iraq under various Security Council resolutions still stands. In May, the Security Council adopted resolution 1483 in which, inter alia, it expressed its intention to revisit the mandates of the IAEA and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). We are awaiting the results of that review and further guidance from the Council. In the meantime, I hope to be kept informed of the outcome of any current activities in Iraq that are relevant to our mandate. Nonetheless, I should emphasize that, irrespective of our mandate under Security Council resolutions, we have the continuing responsibility under Iraq's NPT safeguards agreement with the Agency to ensure that, in accordance with that agreement, Iraq does not have any proscribed nuclear material or activities, and that all nuclear activities in Iraq are for peaceful purposes. We will continue, obviously, to fulfil that responsibility. In July I reported to the Board and to the Security Council on our verification mission to Iraq in June. Our request for this mission was triggered by persistent media reports of looting. The mission was confined to verification of material subject to safeguards at 'Location C' Nuclear Storage Facility near Tuwaitha, where the looting had reportedly taken place. Our report noted that a small quantity of uranium compounds could have been dispersed. While fortunately neither the quantity nor the type of material involved would be sensitive from a proliferation point of view, I have called upon the Coalition Authority to ensure the physical protection of the entire nuclear inventory in Iraq. Application of Agency Safeguards in the Middle EastPursuant to the mandate given to me by the General Conference, I have continued to consult with the States of the Middle East region on the application of full scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East, on the development of model agreements, and on a forum on the experience of other regions that would contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Once again, I regret to report that due to the prevailing situation in the region I have not been in a position to make progress on the implementation of this important mandate, which is of direct relevance to non-proliferation and security in the Middle East. As before, I will continue to exert every effort within my authority. With the active co-operation of all concerned, I hope to move this mandate forward in the coming year. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of IranThe Board this year has given considerable attention to the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Last week the Board adopted a resolution urging Iran to show proactive and accelerated co-operation, and to demonstrate full transparency by providing the Agency with a complete and accurate declaration of all its nuclear activities. It is essential and urgent that all outstanding issues - particularly those involving high enriched uranium - be brought to closure as soon as possible, to enable the Agency to provide the required assurances. As I have often stated, the more transparency that is provided, the more assurance we can give. This is in the interests of both Iran and the international community. I look forward, therefore, to a period of enhanced co-operation with Iran. Agency Participation in Nuclear Disarmament ActivitiesFor many years, I have reported to you on progress made under the initiative by Russia and the USA to submit nuclear material released from their military programmes to Agency verification, with a focus on the associated technical, legal and financial issues. Last September, I agreed with Minister Rumyantsev and Secretary Abraham that the initial phase of the work could now be concluded. We agreed that the verification concepts explored under that initiative would allow the Agency to derive credible and independent verification conclusions, while the States concerned would be able to ensure that sensitive information relating to the design or manufacture of nuclear weapons would not be divulged. The legal framework developed is ready to be used as the basis for the negotiation of agreements between the Agency and either State. We have yet to receive a request by either of the two States. Future Challenges in Nuclear VerificationAgency verification continues to be a critical component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The effectiveness of Agency verification, however, is dependent on the Agency having the necessary authority and the required information and resources. An immediate priority of direct relevance to our work, therefore, is the conclusion of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all States that have made non-proliferation commitments. It is also essential that Member States provide the Agency with all the information relevant to its work. Our aim is to continue to implement safeguards in a manner that increases overall effectiveness and efficiency. On the broader front, it is essential that the international community continues to work towards the universal application of the Agency's safeguards system. This is key to the long term viability of the non-proliferation regime. ... Programme and BudgetI am pleased to say that - after many months of intensive consultations - the Board has recommended regular budget proposals for 2004 which, when coupled with the Board's plan to phase in further increases over the next few years, up to and including 2007, should go a long way towards easing the Agency's budgetary problems and enabling us to carry out our programme priorities. I am grateful for the hard work of the Board and of those Member States that participated in the discussions of the open-ended working group. ... Conclusion... On the safety and security front, we can take satisfaction in the degree of progress, but we must remain vigilant, and clearly much work is still urgently needed. In the verification area, we are working in an environment in which the non-proliferation regime is under growing stress. The Agency must therefore have all the required authority, information and resources to be able to provide the international community with credible assurances. The international community must also work on achieving the universality of the regime, addressing incentives for proliferation, achieving better control of weapons usable material, establishing a system of collective security that does not depend on nuclear weapons and making steady and accelerated progress towards nuclear disarmament. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the 'Atoms for Peace' speech by US President Eisenhower, in which he articulated a vision, shared by many world leaders, that would enable humanity to make full use of the benefit of nuclear energy while minimizing its risk. It was this vision that led to the establishment of the Agency. Much has changed since that time, and I believe it is appropriate for us to take stock of our successes and failures - and to resolve to take whatever actions are required, including new ways of thinking and unconventional approaches, to ensure that nuclear energy remains a source of hope and prosperity for humanity, and not a tool for self-destruction. Iran: Atomic Energy Organization Director Gholamreza Aqazedah, September 15Statement by Gholamreza Aqazedah, Director of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, September 16; IAEA website. ... Last week a resolution was adopted in the Board of Governors on the nuclear programme in my country. My delegation objects not only to the resolution but also to the manner in which it was developed and negotiated. The resolution goes beyond the words and spirit of the NPT and IAEA Statutes, even beyond the provisions of the Additional Protocol, which we are still in the process of negotiating... My delegation could not have associated itself with such a resolution, which was pushed to a decision through resorting to false attributions to the Secretariat, arm-twisting in many capitals, and stonewalling the views and amendments of not only 15 members of the NAM, but also those of others including some of the co-sponsors themselves. This is unilateralism at its worst, that is to say extreme unilateralism posed under a multilateralist cloak. We believe there is more to this resolution than meets the eye at first glance. There is an agenda behind it that is conceived in escalating tension and chaos to divert attention from serious issues that deal with partisan politics in the United States. In our view, such a heavy-handed approach to get a resolution casts considerable doubt on the validity, utility and, above all, the practicality of such a resolution. It seems that the resolution has been engineered in such a manner to guarantee its non- or half-implementation. We sincerely doubt whether this resolution intends, as it should, to promote the effectiveness of the safeguards and non-proliferation regime. We have serious problems with this resolution. From its inconsistency with the NPT to its deadline for cooperation and its venomous language are all problematic. These are our preliminary views on this resolution. We are studying the resolution carefully and will officially respond to it in a few days. In the meantime, I wish to underline the following points: 1. Iran is fully committed to its NPT responsibility, not only because of its contractual obligation, but also because of...religious and ethical considerations. 2. Iran's actions and policies are geared to strengthening the safeguards regime, because of strategic considerations. 3. Iran's planned nuclear development programme to generate 7,000 Mw [megawatts] electricity with secured fuel has factored in consideration of strengthening the Safeguards, through joining the Additional Protocol or otherwise, so as to encourage the international community to give a serious impetus to others in the Middle East to respond positively to Iran's initiative for establishing the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. 4. It is indeed unfortunate to note that despite all our attempts to resolve the outstanding issues, the ever-increasing cooperation with the Agency as noted in the [IAEA's August 26] report, we have witnessed an opposite trend by those who seek to disrupt the process. 5. Had the ongoing process continued, we would surely have achieved the desired results of full transparency and confidence. The resolution will certainly not help the process forward and is thus seen as counterproductive. 6. We are here with the message of willingness to find ways and means that would salvage the process and maintain the issue within the framework of the relevant international body, under the direction of the Director General, taking into account the interpretations put forth by the majority of Board members on the content of the resolution. 7. Being a signatory to the NPT, our right to peaceful nuclear technology is therefore an established and recognized fact. 8. Our cooperation with the Agency within the framework of the comprehensive safeguards shall continue as before. 9. As already declared by my government, we shall proceed with our negotiations, with the Agency, about the Additional Protocol. We, as a matter of principle, are strongly of the view that the only way to counter challenges that emanate from the existence of nuclear arsenals of the nuclear powers and the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to strengthen the relevant international instruments through multilateral, comprehensive and non-discriminatory efforts. We firmly believe that the NPT is the cornerstone of the international efforts to achieve complete nuclear disarmament and to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of this horrible weapon. Now the essential question is posed as to which country takes the responsibility and blame of providing Israel with nuclear weapons and thus overlooking its NPT obligations on non-proliferation. The NPT constitutes an integrated structure, whose effectiveness and realization of its noble goals lie in full compliance with all its obligations by all parties. The credibility of the NPT as the most encompassing disarmament treaty would be impaired through selective and discriminatory approaches towards its implementation. United States: Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, September 15'Nuclear Nonproliferation: New Challenges and New Solutions', statement by US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, September 15; US Department of Energy website, http://www.energy.gov. I am pleased to be with you today and to transmit a message from President Bush: "I send greetings to those gathered at the 47th conference on the International Atomic Energy Agency. Almost 50 years ago, President Eisenhower proposed the Atoms for Peace initiative, which established the principles that all nations must work to stem nuclear proliferation and that all responsible nations should enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear power and technology under sound nonproliferation conditions. Since 1957, the IAEA has been the center of international efforts to turn these principles into practice. Though the world has changed, and the roles of IAEA member states have changed with it, the ideas of nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear power remain unchanged. The work of preventing nuclear proliferation has taken on a sense of great urgency. Today, as some states are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, we must uphold our great responsibility to ensure full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With cooperation and strong leadership, we can combat the threat of nuclear proliferation and advance safety and security for people throughout the world. Best wishes for a successful conference." Fellow delegates, as President Bush has noted, 50 years ago, United States President Dwight Eisenhower announced an historic initiative called Atoms For Peace that led to the birth of this Agency, and laid the groundwork for steps that have been instrumental to controlling the spread of the atom, while making sure its peaceful benefits were available to all responsible nations. Over those 50 years, the world has enjoyed enormous benefits from an impressive array of peaceful nuclear applications. However, the benefits of nuclear energy and the obligation to use it responsibly are linked. Dramatic changes in the security environment may affect our ability to enjoy such benefits in the future. Two years ago, just after September 11, I spoke here of the need for member states to ramp up their efforts to address terrorist threats. We can be proud of our accomplishments so far. The Agency's establishment of a nuclear security plan of action and a nuclear security fund, and the accelerated efforts to secure nuclear facilities worldwide, are but three of the many examples. Nothing is more important. A failure to contain terrorist threats affects all of us - we are only as strong as the weakest link. Last year, I discussed the need to address threats from high-risk, under-secured radiological sources - material that could be used for so-called "dirty bombs." And the international community has responded well, as exemplified by the many initiatives that this Agency has undertaken since last March's conference on these high-risk materials. The United States and Russia continue to accelerate our bilateral cooperative nonproliferation efforts, and we are making good progress. Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev and I have overseen efforts to reduce potential threats from undersecured nuclear materials in that country, to shut down reactors in Russia that still produce plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons, and on many other fronts. Such efforts are making the world more secure. But the nonproliferation regime is now facing serious challenges from a few rogue states seeking the capability to attain weapons of mass destruction, and from those states that facilitate such activity or often appear indifferent to it. Sophisticated terrorist organizations are also pursuing WMD capabilities. Illicit efforts to acquire nuclear and radiological weapons technologies and materials continue to be reported. Together, we must build on the successes of the past and overcome the challenges of the present, so that our ability to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation can be expanded and sustained into the future. Let me focus on three areas where we can work together to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. First, we need to strengthen further the safeguarding and physical protection of nuclear materials. Member states took an important step forward when the Board of Governors agreed to recommend an increase in the Agency's budget, primarily to support the Agency's verification work. My government strongly supports this increase. President Bush has requested an increase of $10 million in the Department of Energy's budget to support international safeguards in the coming year. In the same vein, last year President Bush forwarded our Additional Protocol to the United States Senate for ratification. The United States Senate intends to hold hearings soon - a critical and essential step toward making strengthened safeguards a reality in the United States. Others need to act as well. Second, we need to prevent the trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials and technologies for weapons purposes. The Proliferation Security Initiative is an important step in this regard, and we welcome support for this initiative by all states that share our concerns about the proliferation of WMD. But we must do more. We need to strengthen our export control systems. The president has proposed an increase in the Department of Energy's export control budget by $6 million. This additional funding will help train and better equip customs guards and other border officials at home and abroad, develop new means of detection, and support many other steps. This week, I also will sign a "Statement of Intent" with my Chinese counterpart on an exchange of nonproliferation assurances for the transfer of nuclear technology. This will help both our countries better realize the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation - while ensuring that this takes place within the context of strong nonproliferation commitments. Finally, we need to stop nuclear smuggling at its source. Just over a month ago, the Netherlands decided formally to install equipment at the Rotterdam seaport to screen for shipments of radioactive and special nuclear materials. The United States will provide assistance for this effort. Others need to - and are - considering similar steps. Third, we need to improve the security of research reactors or other such facilities where nuclear and non-nuclear radiological material may be co-located. Such facilities often support medical and industrial research and other legitimate peaceful applications of nuclear technology. If not adequately protected, such facilities could be vulnerable to sabotage, theft, or attack. The United States is responding to this problem. In Romania, the United States will provide up to $4 million to support the purchase of low-enriched uranium, to convert the Pitesti research reactor from highly enriched uranium fuel. This will improve security, even as the reactor will continue to be used for peaceful purposes. This exemplifies what must be done to improve materials security at these sites, without sacrificing the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology. But more needs to be done and the United States strongly endorses IAEA efforts to address this problem. To begin or accelerate the initiatives I have described, the United States will contribute an additional $3 million to the IAEA's nuclear security fund and urges all member states to join us in making similar contributions, to the extent they are able, to ensure that these potential shortfalls in the regime are addressed. Today, I have discussed with you practical steps that we can take to address a number of serious proliferation concerns. But the problem also needs to be considered in a broader context. All responsible members of the international community should be concerned about the threats from a few states whose actions could undermine the regime. Atoms for Peace was an American initiative, and you can be assured that my country well recognizes the enormous benefits that have accrued from that regime over time. We support its objectives and remain strongly committed to working within its parameters. But the NPT is being challenged, and we must take strong measures, including those I have outlined, to impede the efforts of those determined to undermine it. We must deal immediately and effectively with any state seeking to exploit the Treaty to its own advantage, ignoring both the letter and/or the spirit of their treaty obligations. We have seen what happened when North Korea took this route. I am confident that progress will be made in dismantling the North Korean weapons program in the context of the six-party talks. But we need to look at why North Korea, while a member of the NPT, was able to make so much progress on its weapons programs in the first place. North Korea's activities send a worrisome message to other would-be proliferants. That message asserts that a state can be a member of the NPT, enjoy its benefits, and still put in place the assets it needs to break out of the Treaty, and pronounce itself a nuclear weapon state. This is the wrong message and we must learn from this chain of events, and not allow it to happen again. All states that support the nonproliferation regime, and the peaceful benefits that it provides, need to take a clear view of the problem posed by proliferant states that attempt to flout the NPT, and address that problem realistically and with determination. The United States is pleased with the resolution that was adopted by consensus at last week's Board of Governors meeting. I have earlier said, responsibility falls not only on the shoulders of states of concern, but on all nations vested in the viability and sustainability of the nonproliferation regime. That is why the step taken last week at the Board of Governors was so important. It made clear that the international community will not tolerate erosions of the nonproliferation regime. It made clear that, consistent with the Director General's June 6 report and subsequent findings, Iran has not responded to repeated calls for cooperation and transparency. Most importantly, it makes clear that the DPRK precedent is unacceptable, and if the nonproliferation regime is to withstand serious challenges, member states must be prepared to take firm and necessary action. Fifty years ago, President Eisenhower declared "if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all; and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all." These words were true 50 years ago; they are still true today, and they should guide us in the choices we make in our pursuit of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. II. Resolutions, Developments & DecisionsNote: at the time this compilation was finalised for posting on our website (September 26), the full texts of the resolutions adopted at the Annual General Conference had not yet been made available by the IAEA. Cuba Signs Safeguards, Additional Protocol Agreements, September 18'Cuba Signs NPT Safeguards Agreement, Additional Protocol with IAEA', IAEA media summary, September 18. Cuba, which acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons late last year, signed the related comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA 18 September. The country also signed an Additional Protocol to the agreement that grants the IAEA inspection rights beyond those in the safeguards agreement alone. Cuba is the 77th country to have signed an Additional Protocol. The move is being welcomed at the IAEA General Conference, where a pending committee resolution hails Cuba's action as "a substantial contribution" to strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, and to consolidating the world's first densely inhabited nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) in Latin America and the Caribbean. The NWFZ, chartered in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is administered by the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), which holds its next meeting in Havana in early November 2003. The official acknowledgement of the zone's now historical status is expected to be made there. Election of New IAEA Board of Governors, September 18'Member States Elected to IAEA Board for 2003-04', IAEA media summary, September 18. The IAEA General Conference today elected 11 Member States to the Agency's Board of Governors, the 35-member policymaking body. The elected States are Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Tunisia, and Vietnam. They join 24 other Member States previously elected or designated to serve on the Board. The newly constituted Board for 2003-04 now includes the following 35 States: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, and Vietnam. Resolution on North Korea Nuclear Programme, September 19'States Call Upon North Korea to Dismantle Nuclear Weapons Programme, Accept Safeguards', IAEA media summary, September 19. The General Conference adopted a resolution 19 September calling for North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) to promptly accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and cooperate with the Agency in their full and effective implementation. IAEA inspectors were forced to pull out of the DPRK in December 2002 and remain unable to verify North Korea's nuclear programme. The resolution was adopted by acclamation. In the resolution, States urged the DPRK to completely dismantle any nuclear weapons programme in a prompt, transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, maintaining the essential verification role of the IAEA. They stressed the desire for a peaceful resolution through dialogue to the DPRK nuclear issue that would lead to a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula, and contribute positively to regional and global peace and security. States particularly welcomed the six-party talks in Beijing in August 2003. The talks, and the consensus that emerged from them, are "a clear step in the right direction", the resolution said. Resolution on Application of Nuclear Safeguards in the Middle East, September 19'General Conference Resolution Calls Upon States to Take Steps Toward NWFZ', IAEA media summary, September 19. A resolution adopted 19 September by the IAEA General Conference calls upon States to take measures toward establishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. The resolution affirmed the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to accept the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear activities "as an important confidence-building measure". It further requested IAEA Director General ElBaradei to continue consultations with States in the region to facilitate the early application of full-scope safeguards, and called upon all other States, especially those with special responsibility for maintaining global peace and security, to render all assistance to him. The resolution took note of the importance of the Middle East peace talks and the activities of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Security in promoting mutual confidence and security in the Middle East. Resolution on IAEA Safeguards, September 19'States Support Measures to Strengthen IAEA Safeguards', IAEA media summary, September 19. In a resolution adopted 19 September, the IAEA General Conference emphasized the importance of the Agency's safeguards system and of continuing steps to reinforce it. Expressing the conviction that safeguards promote greater confidence among States, the resolution calls on all Member States to support the Agency's s system and urges all of them to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. It further stressed the importance of Additional Protocols, which enable more thorough inspections, and affirmed steps being taken to strengthen the system's capability for detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities. The resolution welcomed Cuba's signature of an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol earlier this week. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |