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Disarmament DocumentationBack to Disarmament Documentation 'I just can't respect anybody that would really let his people starve', President Bush on North Korea, October 22'Roundtable Interview of the President by the Press Pool', Aboard Air Force One, En Route Canberra, Australia, October 22, 2003. THE PRESIDENT: What I thought I would do is just -- Q On the record? THE PRESIDENT: Yes, on the record. I thought I would just give you some observations of this trip, and then answer some questions. Just first observation is that we have worked hard to build up good bilateral relations in the Far East. And the -- part of the purpose of the trip is to continue to foster those relations. It struck me as interesting that the United States now has got good enough relations with both -- with countries like Japan and South Korea and China -- to affect policy which helps our mutual security and our economy -- and economy. I think that's a very positive development. The most notable example of where that is taking -- where it is helping is in North Korea. When I visited with Hu Jintao, I spent a lot of time talking about North Korea, our mutual desire to affect change with Kim Jong-Il. And it was a very positive discussion. But I also had the very same discussion with Koizumi and President Roh. I mentioned it to Vladimir. I didn't have a bilateral with Vladimir Putin, but I did talk to him about it, in passing. My point is, is that by working hard to establish good relations on a lot of fronts, when a common problem arises, we can affect the solution in a positive way. I know you asked me, Steve, about the North Korean reaction. I didn't exactly see what official said it. But I -- what I hope my answer conveyed to you in public there was that this requires a degree of patience, because Kim Jong-Il is used to being able to deal bilaterally with the United States. But the change of policy now is, is that he must deal with other nations, most notably China. And I was pleased with my discussions with Hu Jintao, about his -- reaffirming his mutual desire -- or his desire, which is our mutual goal, that Kim Jong-Il disarm. He realizes that it's a problem. We discussed the security guarantees, what form they may come in. I made it very clear, obviously -- I said this during the pool spray there -- that a treaty is not going to happen, but there are other ways to affect, on paper, what I have said publicly -- we have no intention of invading. Obviously, any guarantee would be conditional on Kim Jong-Il doing what he hopefully will say he'll do, which is to get rid of his nuclear weapons programs... THE PRESIDENT: ... And the question on Hu was? Q Is there anything that he can -- any pressure that he can apply on North Korea? Did he say he would be able to do anything or -- THE PRESIDENT: He is a -- China is a major presence in the neighborhood. And the fact that they're willing to take the same message to the North Koreans that the United States is taking to the North Koreans, along with three other nations, is a powerful statement to Kim Jong-Il that it's in his national interest that he abandon his nuclear weapons ambitions, and that -- he has been saying -- as I said in the press conference, I think -- one of your questions -- he's been saying, I want a security guarantee. And what we have now said is that in return for dismantling the programs, we're all willing to sign some kind of document, not a treaty, but a peace of paper that says, we won't attack you. We'll see what happens. Q How does that -- a lot of people were saying, we can't make it look like we're giving in to blackmail from North Korea. THE PRESIDENT: What's changed is we've now got five countries involved. And the neighborhood is now speaking. What happened before was the bilateral relations with the United States. And now he's got his big neighbor to the -- right on his border, he's got a neighbor to the south, he's got Japan, he's got another neighbor, Russia, all saying the same thing. It's a different dynamic, is what I'm -- that's where the policy has changed. Q This security guarantee, what should it say? THE PRESIDENT: That's what we'll determine. We haven't worked out the words, but the point is, is that North Korea must hear that in return for the dismantling of their program -- in a verifiable way, by the way; I mean, we're going to want to know -- that now five nations are willing to say something about his security. Q Everybody is behind that? THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Q Can I ask you one on Iran? THE PRESIDENT: On Iran? Yes. Q It seems like last night there was some maybe cautious optimism that this is a good first step. If they comply with the three criteria that you've laid out, would they be then allowed to have a civilian nuclear energy program, or would that -- THE PRESIDENT: Well, it depends on -- first things first, and that is, let us have, in a verifiable way, their agreement that was made with the IAEA. The IAEA must be allowed in, and we'll discuss it then. Our relations with Iran -- that will help relations with Iran, obviously, if they do abandon a nuclear weapons program. It will also help if they -- we end up doing a -- reaching an agreement on the al Qaeda that they hold. Q What are the cross-strings there? THE PRESIDENT: You've got to have patience in foreign policy. Q Are you at all suspicious of the European motives? THE PRESIDENT: Am I suspicious? No, not in this case. No, I'm not -- I believe, in this case, they generally are concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon. They understand the consequences. I appreciate it very much. We spent a lot of time talking to the European -- our European counterparts, who are influential, more so than we are, in Iran. You know, we've got a sanctions policy with Iran, they don't. And there's influence. This is an effective approach. I've been saying all along that not every policy issue needs to be dealt with by force. There are ways to achieve common objectives, and this is a common objective. And the European Union -- and we're speaking directly to Silvio Berlusconi about it, who is the head of the EU. We've also obviously spoke to the three -- the leaders of the countries who went into Iran. And they made a decision collectively in Europe that it's not in their interest or the world interest that Iran have a nuclear weapon. And we came to that conclusion, they've come to that conclusion, and working together is an effective way. It's the same approach -- kind of approach we're taking in North Korea, as well, a collective voice trying to convince a leader to change behavior. Q -- Republicans in Congress didn't follow your wishes on the phone -- THE PRESIDENT: I thought they did in the House. There's two bodies. Q Do you regret saying that you loathe Kim Jong-Il? Some people think that it helped them sort of -- it made them sort of harden their position -- THE PRESIDENT: Any leader who starves his -- made him do what? Q It just made him -- THE PRESIDENT: Made Kim Jong-Il -- surely it didn't make Kim Jong-Il renege on the last agreement, did it? Because I wasn't there, you know what I'm saying? Q Right, but they've been much more vocal about their nuclear ambitions. THE PRESIDENT: No, they've been -- remember, they lobbed a rocket over -- Q Japan. THE PRESIDENT: Remember the rocket over Japan? Keep it in perspective. Anybody who starves his people is -- I just can't respect anybody that would really let his people starve, and shrink in size as a result of malnutrition. It's a sad, sad situation for the North Korean people. That's one people I've assured the -- our partners in this effort, that we deeply care about the plight of the North Korean people. It's just unconscionable that that many people are starving in the 21st century. We provide -- we're a generous nation. We provided food. We're not so sure the food is getting to the people, is one of the issues that we face. I feel strongly about failed leadership dashing the hopes of the people, in this case creating incredible starvation. © 2003 The Acronym Institute. |