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CIA Report to Congress on WMD and Advanced Conventional
Munitions' proliferation, November 10
'CIA Report Reviews Weapons Proliferation Trends', November
10, 2003.
Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions
1 January Through 30 June 2003
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this
report in response to a congressionally directed action in Section
721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, which
requires:
"(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6
months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development
or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced
conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such
countries."
At the DCI's request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence,
Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this
report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community. As
directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is
unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of
the Intelligence Community's assessments of weapons of mass
destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are
available in other classified reports and briefings for the
Congress.
ACQUISITION BY COUNTRY
As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence
Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of
acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and
deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January
through 30 June 2003. We have excluded countries that already have
established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated
little WMD acquisition activity of concern.
Iran
Iran continued to vigorously pursue indigenous programs to
produce WMD -- nuclear, chemical, and biological -- and their
delivery systems as well as ACW. To this end, Iran continued to
seek foreign materials, training, equipment, and know-how. During
the reporting period, Iran still focused particularly on entities
in Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe.
Nuclear
The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing
a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in violation of its
obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT). To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear
fuel-cycle capabilities, Iran sought technology that can support
fissile material production for a nuclear weapons program.
Iran tried to use its civilian nuclear energy program to justify
its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted
nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. In August 2002, an Iranian
opposition group disclosed that Iran was secretly building a heavy
water production plant and a "nuclear fuel" plant. Press reports
later in the year confirmed these two facilities using commercial
imagery and clarified that the "fuel" plant was most likely a large
uranium centrifuge enrichment facility located at Natanz.
Commercial imagery showed that Iran was burying the enrichment
facility presumably to hide it and harden it against military
attack. Following the press disclosures, Iran announced at the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) September 2002 General
Conference that it had "ambitious" nuclear fuel cycle plans and
intended to develop all aspects of the entire fuel cycle. By the
end of 2002, the IAEA had requested access to the enrichment
facility at Natanz, and the IAEA Director General (DG) for the
first time visited the facility in February 2003. The IAEA is
investigating the newly disclosed facilities, and previously
undisclosed nuclear material imports to determine whether Iran has
violated its NPT-required IAEA safeguards agreement in developing
these facilities and their related technologies. At the June 2003
Board of Governors meeting, the IAEA DG presented a report on the
Iranian program noting Tehran had failed to meet its safeguards
obligations in a number of areas. The DG's report described a
pattern of Iranian safeguards failures related to the undeclared
import and processing of uranium compounds in the early 1990s,
expressed concern over the lack of cooperation from Iran with IAEA
inspections, and identified a number of unresolved concerns in
Iran's program that the IAEA will continue to investigate. The IAEA
Board on 19 June welcomed the report and called on Iran to answer
all IAEA questions, cooperate fully with IAEA inspectors, and sign
and implement an Additional Protocol immediately and
unconditionally.
Although Iran claims that its nascent enrichment plant is to
produce fuel for the Russian-assisted construction projects at
Bushehr and other possible future power reactors, we remain
concerned that Iran is developing enrichment technology to produce
fissile material for nuclear weapons under the cover of legitimate
fuel cycle activities. Iran appears to be embarking on acquiring
nuclear weapons material via both acquisition paths -- highly
enriched uranium and low burn-up plutonium. Even with intrusive
IAEA safeguards inspections at Natanz, there is a serious risk that
Iran could use its enrichment technology in covert activities. Of
specific proliferation concern are the uranium centrifuges
discovered at Natanz, which are capable of enriching uranium for
use in nuclear weapons. Iran claims its heavy water plant is for
peaceful purposes. In June, Iran informed the IAEA that it is
pursuing a heavy water research reactor that we believe could
produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. We also suspect that Tehran
is interested in acquiring fissile material and technology from
foreign suppliers to support its overall nuclear weapons
program.
Ballistic Missile
Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities in the former
Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the years has helped Iran
move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production
of ballistic missiles. Such assistance during the first half of
2003 continued to include equipment, technology, and expertise.
Iran's ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the
Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab-3 medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs)-- including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud
C), and Tondar-69 (CSS-8) -- as well as a variety of large unguided
rockets. Already producing Scud SRBMs, Iran announced that it had
begun production of the Shahab-3 MRBM and a new solid-propellant
SRBM, the Fateh-110. In addition, Iran publicly acknowledged the
development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It originally
said that another version, the Shahab-4, was a more capable
ballistic missile than its predecessor but later characterized it
as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications.
Iran is also pursuing longer-range ballistic missiles.
Chemical
Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued to seek
production technology, training, and expertise from Chinese
entities that could further Tehran's efforts to achieve an
indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. Iran likely has
already stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve
agents -- and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them --
which it previously had manufactured.
Biological
Even though Iran is part of the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC), Tehran probably maintained an offensive BW program. Iran
continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and
expertise. While such materials had legitimate uses, Iran's
biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from
them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small
quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to weaponize
them.
Advanced Conventional Weapons
Iran continued to seek and acquire conventional weapons and
production technologies, primarily from Russia, China, and North
Korea. Tehran also sought high-quality products, particularly
weapons components and dual-use items, or products that proved
difficult to acquire through normal governmental channels.
Iraq
During the period covered by this report, coalition forces took
action under Operation Iraqi Freedom to remove the Saddam Hussein
regime from power in Iraq. A large-scale effort is currently
underway to find the answers to the many outstanding questions
about Iraq's WMD and delivery systems.
North Korea
Nuclear
In December 2002, North Korea announced its intention to resume
operation of nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, which had been frozen
under the terms of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. IAEA
seals and monitoring equipment were removed and disabled, and IAEA
inspectors expelled from the country. On 10 January 2003, North
Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT Treaty). In late
February 2003, North Korea restarted its 5 Mwe reactor, which could
produce spent fuel rods containing plutonium. In late April 2003,
North Korea told U.S. officials that it possessed nuclear weapons,
and signaled its intent to reprocess the 1994-canned spent fuel for
more nuclear weapons. On 9 June, North Korea openly threatened to
build a nuclear deterrent force. We continued to monitor and assess
North Korea's nuclear weapons efforts.
Ballistic Missile
North Korea also has continued procurement of raw materials and
components for its extensive ballistic missile programs from
various foreign sources. In the first half of 2003, North Korea
continued to abide by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests
adopted in 1998, but announced it may reconsider its September 2002
offer to extend the moratorium beyond 2003. The multiple-stage
Taepo Dong-2â€"capable of reaching parts of the United
States with a nuclear weapon-sized payload may be ready for
flight-testing. North Korea is nearly self-sufficient in developing
and producing ballistic missiles, and has demonstrated a
willingness to sell complete systems and components that have
enabled other states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier
than would otherwise have been possible and to acquire the basis
for domestic development efforts.
Chemical
North Korea is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). During the reporting period, Pyongyang continued to acquire
dual-use chemicals that could potentially be used to support
Pyongyang's long-standing chemical warfare program. North Korea's
chemical warfare capabilities included the ability to produce bulk
quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agent, using its
sizeable, although aging, chemical industry. North Korea possesses
a stockpile of unknown size of these agents and weapons, which it
could employ in a variety of delivery means.
Biological
North Korea has acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, but nonetheless has pursued biological warfare (BW)
capabilities since the 1960s. Pyongyang acquired dual-use
biotechnical equipment, supplies, and reagents that could be used
to support North Korea's BW efforts. As of the first half of 2003,
North Korea was believed to have possessed a munitions production
infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents,
and may have such weapons available for use.
Libya
Nuclear
An NPT party with full-scope IAEA safeguards, Libya continued to
develop its nuclear infrastructure. The suspension of UN sanctions
provided Libya the means to enhance its nuclear infrastructure
through foreign cooperation and procurement efforts. Tripoli and
Moscow continued talks on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear
Research Center and a potential power reactor deal. Such
civil-sector work could have presented Libya with opportunities to
pursue technologies also suitable for military purposes. In
addition, Libya participated in various technical exchanges through
which it could have tried to obtain dual-use equipment and
technology that could have enhanced its overall technical
capabilities in the nuclear area. Although Libya made political
overtures to the West in an attempt to strengthen relations,
Libya's assertion that Arabs have the right to nuclear weapons in
light of Israel and its nuclear program -- as Qadhafi stated in a
televised speech in March 2002, for example --and Tripoli's
continued interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure
upgrades raised concerns.
Ballistic Missile
The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 allowed Libya to expand its
efforts to obtain ballistic missile-related equipment, materials,
technology, and expertise from foreign sources. During the first
half of 2003, Libya continued to depend on foreign assistance --
particularly from Serbian, Indian, Iranian, North Korean, and
Chinese entities -- for its ballistic missile development programs.
Libya's capability therefore may not still be limited to its
Soviet-origin Scud-B missiles. With continued foreign assistance,
Libya will likely achieve an MRBM capability -- a long-desired goal
-- probably through direct purchase from North Korea or Iran.
Chemical and Biological
Libya also remained heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for CW
precursor chemicals and other key related equipment. Following the
suspension of UN sanctions, Tripoli reestablished contacts with
sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad,
primarily in Western Europe. Libya has indicated -- as evidenced by
its observer status at the April 2003 Chemical Weapons Convention
Review Conference and previous Convention Conferences of States
Parties -- a willingness to accede to the CWC. Such efforts are
consistent with steps that Tripoli is taking to improve its
international standing. Tripoli still appeared to be working toward
an offensive CW capability and eventual indigenous production.
Evidence suggested that Libya also sought dual-use capabilities
that could be used to develop and produce BW agents.
Advanced Conventional Weapons
Libya continued to seek new advanced conventional weapons and
received assistance from other countries in maintaining its
inventory of Soviet-era weapons.
Syria
Nuclear
Syria -- an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards -- has a
nuclear research center at Dayr Al Hajar. Russia and Syria have
continued their longstanding agreements on cooperation regarding
nuclear energy, although specific assistance has not yet
materialized. Broader access to foreign expertise provides
opportunities to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are
looking at Syrian nuclear intentions with growing concern.
Ballistic Missile
During the first half of 2003, Damascus continued to seek help
from abroad to establish a solid-propellant rocket motor
development and production capability. Syria's liquid-propellant
missile program continued to depend on essential foreign equipment
and assistanceâ€"primarily from North Korean entities.
Damascus also continued to manufacture liquid-propellant Scud
missiles. In addition, Syria was developing longer-range missile
programs such as a Scud D and possibly other variants with
assistance from North Korea and Iran.
Chemical and Biological
Syria continued to seek CW-related expertise from foreign sources
during the reporting period. Damascus already held a stockpile of
the nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic
and persistent nerve agents. Syria remained dependent on foreign
sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor
chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that
Syria also continued to develop an offensive BW capability.
Advanced Conventional Weapons
Syria continued to acquire limited quantities of ACW, mainly from
Russia. Damascus's Soviet-era debt to Moscow and inability to fund
large purchases continued to hamper efforts to purchase the large
quantity of equipment Syria requires to replace its aging weapons
inventory.
Sudan
Chemical and Biological
Although Sudan has aspired to a CW program, the United States is
working with Sudan to reconcile concerns about its past attempts to
seek capabilities from abroad.
Advanced Conventional Weapons
During the reporting period, Sudan sought a variety of military
equipment from various sources and received Mi-24 attack
helicopters from Russia. In the long-running civil war, as well as
for a general military modernization campaign, Khartoum has
generally sought older, less expensive ACW and conventional weapons
that nonetheless offered more advanced capabilities than the
weapons of its opponents and their supporters in neighboring
countries. We continued to remain concerned that Sudan might seek a
ballistic missile capability in the future.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism
The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials remained high. Many of
the 33 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other
nonstate actors worldwide have expressed interest in CBRN. Although
terrorist groups probably will continue to favor long-proven
conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings, the arrest of
ricin plotters in London in January 2003 indicated that
international mujahidin terrorists were actively plotting to
conduct chemical and biological attacks.
Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the
September 11 attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian
and government targets to CBRN attacks.
One of our highest concerns is al-Qa'ida's stated readiness to
attempt unconventional attacks against us. As early as 1998, Usama
Bin Ladin publicly declared that acquiring unconventional weapons
was "a religious duty."
Individuals from terrorist groups worldwide undertook poison
training at al-Qa'ida sponsored camps in Afghanistan and have ready
access to information on chemical, biological, radiological, and to
some extent, even nuclear weapons, via the Internet, publicly
available scientific literature, and scientific conferences, and we
know that al-Qa'ida was working to acquire some of the most
dangerous chemical agents and toxins. A senior Bin Ladin associate
on trial in Egypt in 1999 claimed his group had chemical and
biological weapons. Documents and equipment recovered from
al-Qa'ida facilities in Afghanistan show that Bin Ladin had a more
sophisticated unconventional weapons research program than was
previously known.
We also know that al-Qa'ida has ambitions to acquire or develop
nuclear weapons and was receptive to any outside nuclear assistance
that might become available. In February 2001, during the trial on
the al-Qa'ida bombings of the American Embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya, a government witness -- Jamal Ahmad Fadl --testified that
al-Qa'ida pursued the sale of a quantity of purported enriched
uranium (which in fact probably was scam material) in Sudan in the
early 1990s.
We assess that terrorist groups are capable of conducting
attacks using crude radiological dispersal devices -- i.e., ones
that would not cause large-scale casualties, even though they could
cause tremendous psychological effects, and possibly create
considerable economic disruption as well. This type of threat first
appeared in November 1995 when Chechen rebels placed a package
containing radioactive cesium on a bench in Moscow's Izmailovo
Park. In addition, we are alert to the very real possibility that
al-Qa'ida or other terrorist groups might also try to launch
conventional attacks against the chemical or nuclear industrial
infrastructure of the United States to cause panic and economic
disruption.
KEY SUPPLIERS
Russia
During the first half of 2003, Russia's cash-strapped defense,
biotechnology, chemical, aerospace, and nuclear industries
continued to be eager to raise funds via exports and transfers.
Some Russian universities and scientific institutes also showed a
willingness to earn much-needed funds by providing WMD or
missile-related teaching and training for foreign students. Given
the large potential proliferation impact of such exports,
transfers, and training, monitoring the activities of specific
entities as well as the overall effectiveness of the Russian
Government's nonproliferation regime remained an important element
of the U.S. bilateral dialogue with Russia on nonproliferation.
Nuclear
During the first half of 2003, Russia continued to play a key role
in constructing the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project in Iran.
However, President Putin has insisted that all Iranian programs in
the nuclear field be placed under IAEA control.
President Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on
nuclear exports to allow Russia in exceptional cases to export
nuclear materials, technology, and equipment to countries that do
not have full-scope IAEA safeguards. For example, Russia supplied
India with material for its civilian nuclear program in 2001.
Ballistic Missile
Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a
variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how
to countries such as Iran, India, and China. Iran's earlier success
in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities helped to
accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing
Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian
efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran's
self-sufficiency in missile production.
Chemical and Biological
During the first half of 2003, Russian entities remained a key
source of dual-use biotechnology equipment, chemicals and related
expertise for countries of concern with active CBW programs.
Russia's well-known biological and chemical expertise made it an
attractive target for countries seeking assistance in areas with
CBW applications.
Advanced Conventional Weapons
Russia continued to be a major supplier of conventional arms.
Following Moscow's abrogation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in
November 2000, Russian officials stated that they saw Iran as a
significant source of potential revenue from arms sales and
believed that Tehran could become Russia's third-largest
conventional arms customer after China and India. In 2001, Russia
was the primary source of ACW for China, Iran, Libya, and Sudan,
and one of the largest sources for India. As an example, Russia
actively marketed its thermobaric weapons at international arms
shows, which likely increases the availability of this type of
weapon in the open market.
Russia continued to be the main supplier of technology and
equipment to India's and China's naval nuclear propulsion programs.
In addition, Russia discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack
submarines to India.
Export Controls
The Duma enacted new export control legislation in 1999, and Putin
in 2000 and 2001 reorganized the export control bureaucracy to
establish an interdepartmental export control coordinating body,
the Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation. This
organization was to establish federal oversight over export
control, including compliance with international export control
standards. Further, in 2001, Putin signed into effect several of
the new law's implementing decrees, which updated export control
lists for biological pathogens, chemicals, missiles, and related
dual-use technologies and equipment. In May 2002, Russia amended
its criminal code to allow for stricter punishment for violations
involving the illegal export of material, equipment, and
scientific-technical information that may be used in creating WMD
or military equipment. The Code of Administrative Violations was
also updated and became law as of July 2002. This enactment
provided the Department for Export Control (under the Ministry of
Economic Development and Trade) with significant administrative
enforcement authority. In May 2003, President Putin signed the new
Customs Code of the Russian Federation that simplifies customs
rules and procedures with the ultimate goal of reducing red tape
and arbitrary actions of customs officers. The Code also brings
Russia in compliance with the Kyoto Convention on Simplification
and Harmonization of Customs Procedures.
Despite progress in creating a legal and bureaucratic framework
for Russia's export controls, lax enforcement remained a serious
concern. To reduce the outward flow of WMD and missile-related
materials, technology, and expertise, top officials must make a
sustained effort to convince exporting entities -- as well as the
bureaucracy whose job it is to oversee them -- that
nonproliferation is a top priority and that those who violate the
law will be prosecuted.
North Korea
Nuclear
In late April 2003 during the Beijing talks, North Korea privately
threatened to export nuclear weapons.
Ballistic Missile
Throughout the first half of 2003, North Korea continued to export
significant ballistic missile--related equipment, components,
materials, and technical expertise to the Middle East, South Asia,
and North Africa. Pyongyang attached high priority to the
development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related
technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology
were one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which
supported ongoing missile development and production.
China
Over the past several years, Beijing improved its
nonproliferation posture through commitments to multilateral arms
control regimes, promulgation of export controls, and strengthened
oversight mechanisms, but the proliferation behavior of Chinese
companies remains of great concern.
Nuclear
In October 1997, China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on
supplying a uranium conversion facility (UCF), not to enter into
any new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and to bring to conclusion
within a reasonable period of time the two existing projects. We
remained concerned that some interactions of concern between
Chinese and Iranian entities were continuing. China also made
bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT
commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or
development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May 1996, Beijing
pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities. We cannot rule out, however, some continued
contacts subsequent to the pledge between Chinese entities and
entities associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
Ballistic Missile
In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any
country in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used
to deliver nuclear weapons, and in August 2002, as part of its
commitment, promulgated a comprehensive missile-related export
control system, similar in scope to the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Annex. China is not a member of the MTCR, but on
several occasions has pledged not to sell MTCR Category I
systems.
Although Beijing has taken some steps to educate firms and
individuals on the new missile-related export regulations --
offering its first national training course on Chinese export
controls in February 2003 -- Chinese entities continued to work
with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during
the first half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped
Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant
SRBMs and supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant
MRBMs. Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped
Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the
production of ballistic missiles. In addition, firms in China
provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or
assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern --
such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
Chemical
Since 1997, the US imposed numerous sanctions against Chinese
entities for providing material support to the Iranian CW program.
Evidence during the current reporting period showed that Chinese
firms still provided dual-use CW-related production equipment and
technology to Iran. In October 2002, China promulgated new controls
on biological items and updated chemical-related regulations, and
now claims to control all major items on the Australia Group
lists.
Advanced Conventional Weapons
During the first half of 2003, China remained a primary supplier
of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan and Iran. Islamabad
also continued to negotiate with Beijing for China to build up to
four frigates for Pakistan's navy
and to develop the FC-1 fighter aircraft.
Other Countries
Countries of proliferation concern continued to approach
entities in Western Europe, South Asia, and the United States to
provide needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs.
Proliferators and associated networks continued to seek machine
tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available
materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals. Although
western European countries strove to tighten export control
regulations, Iran continued to successfully procure dual-use goods
and materials from Europe. In addition, several Western European
countries remained willing to negotiate ACW sales to Libya, India,
Pakistan, and other countries in order to preserve their domestic
defense industries. North Korea approached Western European
entities to obtain acquisitions for its uranium enrichment program.
A shipment of aluminum tubing -- enough for 4,000 centrifuge tubes
-- was halted by German authorities.
Western European countries were still an important source for
the proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and
training. The relatively advanced research of European institutes,
the availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, the
enthusiasm of scientists for sharing their research, and the
availability of dual-use training and education may have shortened
development time for some WMD and missile programs.
Emerging State and Non-State Suppliers
As nuclear, biological, chemical, and ballistic
missile-applicable technologies continued to be more available
around the world, new sources of supply emerged that made the
challenge of stemming WMD and missile proliferation even more
complex and difficult. Nuclear fuel-cycle and weapons-related
technologies have spread to the point that, from a technical view,
additional states may be able to produce sufficient fissile
material and to develop the capability to weaponize it. As
developing countries expanded their chemical industries into
pesticide production, they also advanced toward at least latent
chemical warfare capability. Likewise, additional non-state actors
became more interested in the potential of using biological warfare
as a relatively inexpensive way to inflict serious damage. The
proliferation of increasingly capable ballistic missile designs and
technology posed the threat of more countries of concern developing
longer-range missiles and imposing greater risks to regional
stability.
In this context, there was a growing concern that additional
states that have traditionally been recipients of WMD and
missile-related technology might have followed North Korea's
practice of supplying specific WMD-related technology and expertise
to other countries or by going one step further to supply such
expertise to non-state actors. Even in cases where states took
action to stem such transfers, there were growing numbers of
knowledgeable individuals or non-state purveyors of WMD- and
missile-related materials and technology, who were able to act
outside government constraints. Such non-state actors were
increasingly capable of providing technology and equipment that
previously could only be supplied directly by countries with
established capabilities.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, http://www.cia.gov.
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