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'[T]he project has faced intense political opposition in Congress and elsewhere', Senator Lugar on the Nunn-Lugar Program, November 19

'Lugar Wants Expanded Nunn-Lugar Program to Combat Proliferation', Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Tenth Anniversary Symposium, November 19, 2003.

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

It is a pleasure to be here with you today to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute. Over the last decade, the Institute has made important contributions to the policy debates surrounding arms control, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.

Mike Moodie and his talented staff have been allies in numerous ventures directed toward safeguarding and eliminating weapons of mass destruction. They played a vital role in our efforts to secure United States Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. They have made important contributions to the efforts of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program to construct a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye in Russia. In addition to Mike and his staff, I would like to recognize good friends such as Ron Lehman, Jim Woolsey, Brad Roberts, Richard Haas, John Hamre, and Joe Nye. Each has played an integral role in the debates that have defined U.S. policy in responding to the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction.

I urge all of you to fortify yourselves, because there will be many more policy battles in the future. Even in this age of terrorism, the magnitude of the threat posed by WMD [weapons of mass destruction] is not widely appreciated in this country or around the world. Even when the threat is understood, the political will to take action does not always materialize.

The War on Terrorism proceeds in a world awash with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials. Most of these weapons and materials are stored in the United States and Russia, but they also exist in India, Pakistan, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, Israel, Great Britain, France, China, and perhaps other nations.

Throughout much of the last decade, vulnerability to the use of weapons of mass destruction has been the Number One national security dilemma confronting the United States. The events of September 11 [2001] and the subsequent public discovery of al-Qaeda's methods, capabilities, and intentions finally brought our vulnerability to the forefront.

We must anticipate that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction if allowed the opportunity. I believe the minimum standard for victory in this war is the prevention of any terrorist cell from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction. We must make certain that all sources of WMD are identified and systematically guarded or destroyed.

To combat the WMD threat in the former Soviet Union, our country has implemented the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Nunn-Lugar has devoted American technical expertise and money for joint efforts to safeguard and destroy materials and weapons of mass destruction. During the first 10 years of Nunn-Lugar, 6,212 former Soviet nuclear warheads have been separated from missiles. Many of the warheads have been dismantled with their fissile material safely stored. In addition, the program has destroyed: 520 ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]; 451 ICBM silos; 122 strategic bombers; 624 nuclear air-launched cruise missiles; 445 SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]; 408 SLBM launchers; 27 strategic missile submarines; and 194 nuclear test tunnels. Perhaps most importantly, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are nuclear weapons-free as a result of cooperative efforts under the Nunn-Lugar program.

Nunn-Lugar also has worked to contain chemical and biological weapons in Russia. At least 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons have been stored in seven locations awaiting destruction. Although the status of biological weapons is less certain, Nunn-Lugar personnel are working at many bio-weapons sites to establish security controls and dismantle weapons infrastructure.

Despite these successes, some areas need improvement. Last year new Nunn-Lugar projects in Russia were halted for more than six months because of the administration's decision not to certify that Russia had satisfied six legislatively mandated conditions. Resumption of assistance was possible only after Congress granted, and the president exercised, limited authority to waive the certification requirements in the interest of national security. This authority will expire again at the end of fiscal year 2005. President Bush has rightly requested that Congress make permanent the waiver authority. Unfortunately, Congress has denied this request to date. This bureaucratic logjam must be corrected. I share the policy goals associated with the certification requirements, but the elimination of weapons of mass destruction must be our top priority.

Despite the tremendous progress realized by the Nunn-Lugar program in the former Soviet Union, the United States continues to lack even minimal international confidence about many foreign weapons programs. In most cases, there is little or no information regarding the number of weapons or amounts of materials a country may have produced, the storage procedures they employ to safeguard their weapons, or plans regarding further production or destruction programs.

As the United States and our allies have sought to address the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the aftermath of September 11, we have come to the realization that, in many cases, we lack the appropriate tools to address these threats. Traditional avenues of approach such as arms control treaties and various multilateral sanction regimes have met with some success, but there is still much work to do. In some cases, it is unlikely that the existing multilateral frameworks and nonproliferation tools retain much utility. In fact, several nations have announced their intention to continue to flout international norms such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This must change. The problem we face today is not just terrorism; it is the nexus between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. I have no doubt that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda will use weapons of mass destruction if they are able to steal, buy, or build them. It is equally clear that they have attempted to obtain them.

Congress took important steps in the fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization Conference Report to respond to these threats. I commend Chairman John Warner [Republican senator of Virginia] and Ranking Member Carl Levin [Democratic senator of Michigan] for a bill that expands the president's authority to confront the threat posed by proliferation.

The outcome was far from certain when the Senate and House passed divergent bills with respect to the Nunn-Lugar Program. The Senate bill included a provision that I had authored, known as "The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act." This provision gives the president the authority to use the Nunn-Lugar program beyond the former Soviet Union to address proliferation emergencies. The Senate bill also authorized continuation of chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye. Unfortunately, the House took a different approach, denying the administration the ability to use Nunn-Lugar worldwide and placing additional restrictions on chemical weapons destruction. In addition, the House bill restricted efforts to address biological weapon threats.

In the end, however, the House and Senate conferees arrived at a compromise that will permit Nunn-Lugar to continue its important work and, where needed, to expand the winning strategy beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.

As many of you know, I have been working with colleagues in the Senate to ensure that the United States continues its assistance in the area of chemical weapons destruction in Russia. In August, I saw first-hand the progress we have made toward building the unique technologies that will be used to neutralize the chemical munitions at Shchuchye. If current projections are met, the Shchuchye project will begin to destroy live agent in 2007 and the entire complex will be transferred to Russia in 2008. Assuming a destruction rate of 1,700 metric tons of nerve agent per year, it will take six-and-a-half years to destroy the nerve agent Russia stores at Shchuchye. When that task is complete, chemical weapons will be brought from other locations for elimination at Shchuchye.

Despite the obvious national security benefits associated with destroying chemical weapons stockpiles in Russia, the project has faced intense political opposition in Congress and elsewhere. Opposition is all the more perplexing when one considers President Bush's strong commitment to the Nunn-Lugar program and our efforts at Shchuchye. I have spoken to the president about this issue on several occasions, and each time he has expressed his support and directed his national security team to assist in resolving bureaucratic and legislative obstacles.

Despite the president's strong backing, Congress placed six conditions on U.S. assistance for chemical weapons destruction. Current law requires that the president certify that Russia is meeting each of the six conditions. Absent such a certification, funds cannot be obligated or expended for chemical weapons destruction. Last year, the administration did not certify that Russia was meeting its arms control obligations in this area. As a result, funding for this project was stopped until a waiver was passed. President Bush signed a waiver for that condition in January 2003. We would have faced a similar prospect this year, had the Defense Authorization bill not extended this authority through September 2005. To date, the Russians have worked to satisfy five of the six conditions, leaving one remaining barrier to U.S. assistance.

The remaining condition requires the full and accurate disclosure of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile. As many of you know, there is disagreement over whether the Russian declaration under the CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] is complete. It is very important to reach an acceptable conclusion to this matter this year. It cannot be set aside, as some Russians have proposed.

Under the Global Partnership, known as "10 Plus 10 Over 10," G-8 leaders have pledged $20 billion over the next10 years for nonproliferation projects. Of this amount, a significant portion has been identified for chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye. Specifically, Canada has committed to fund road construction and facility security; the United Kingdom will contribute funds for critical engineering infrastructure projects; Italy will fund a gas pipeline and facility security; and France will provide secure containers for the shipment of chemical weapons to elimination. I am pleased that the international community is committed to success at Shchuchye. I will continue to work to provide the president with waiver authority so that the project at Shchuchye may continue.

U.S. and Russian experts also must overcome the remaining obstacles to biological weapons proliferation cooperation. I have visited numerous facilities involved in the Soviet biological weapons program, including Obolensk and Vector. Cooperation is ongoing between the U.S. government and most of the facilities involved in the BIOPREPARAT network. American officials, scientists, and contractors are at these sites every day working closely with Russian colleagues to improve security, to take accurate inventories, and to engage former weapons scientists in peaceful projects.

Unfortunately, four former military facilities continue to refuse cooperation with the Nunn-Lugar program. Some Russian leaders have maintained the audacious line that concern is unnecessary because a biological weapons program never existed in the Soviet Union. Our Russian partners must get over this denial and obfuscation. We are anxious to assist Russia in transforming these facilities to peaceful purposes. But success depends on honesty and transparency.

As I mentioned earlier, the Defense Authorization Conference Report also contained "The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act," which permits President Bush to use up to $50 million of unobligated Nunn-Lugar funds for proliferation emergencies outside the former Soviet Union. I worked closely with the administration on this important issue and received the strong support of Dr. Rice and Secretary Powell.

The continuing experience of Nunn-Lugar has created a tremendous nonproliferation asset for the United States. We have an impressive cadre of talented scientists, technicians, negotiators, and managers working for the Defense Department and for associated defense contractors who understand how to implement nonproliferation programs and how to respond to proliferation emergencies. The new authority will permit and facilitate the use of Nunn-Lugar expertise and resources when proliferation threats around the world are identified.

Proliferation threats sometimes require an instantaneous response. We must not allow a proliferation or WMD threat to "go critical" because we lacked the foresight to empower the U.S. to respond. Under Nunn-Lugar the U.S. has undertaken time-sensitive missions like Project Sapphire in Kazakhstan and Operation Auburn Endeavor in Georgia that have kept highly vulnerable weapons and materials of mass destruction from being proliferated.

The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be possible everywhere. Clearly, many states will continue to avoid accountability for programs related to weapons of mass destruction. When nations resist such accountability, other options must be explored. When governments continue to contribute to the WMD threat facing the United States, we must be prepared to apply diplomatic and economic power, as well as military force.

Yet we should not assume that we cannot forge cooperative nonproliferation programs with some critical nations. The experience of the Nunn-Lugar program in Russia has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted in the 1980s that American contractors and DOD officials would be on the ground in Russia destroying thousands of strategic systems. If we are to protect ourselves during this incredibly dangerous period, we must create new nonproliferation partners and aggressively pursue any nonproliferation opportunities that appear. Nunn-Lugar expansion authority is the first step down that road. Ultimately, a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and safety must be established in every nation with a WMD program.

There are always risks when expanding a successful venture into new areas, but I don't believe we have a choice. We must give the administration the ability to interdict and neutralize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This new venture, like its predecessor, will take time to organize and to establish operating procedures, but I am hopeful that a decade from now, we will look back on this effort and marvel at the successes we have enjoyed.

For 10 years the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute has been on the leading edge of new strategies to combat weapons of mass destruction. I am heartened by your commitment to this important work and your enthusiasm to enter a second decade of close cooperation with us to address the threats facing the American people and the international community. I look forward to continuing my close association with the Institute and being here to celebrate many more anniversaries.

Source: US State Department, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov.

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