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'Decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed this Parliament but are likely to be required in the next one', UK Defence White Paper, December 11

• 'Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defence White Paper,' Cm 6041-I, December 2003, excerpt on The Strategic Deterrent & Missile Defence
• 'Expeditionary operations on that scale can be conducted effectively only if United States forces are engaged,' UK Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon MP, December 11

'Delivering Security in a Changing World, Defence White Paper,' Cm 6041-I, December 2003, excerpt on The Strategic Deterrent & Missile Defence

Editor's Note: Unlike previous UK Defence White Papers, which presented the strategic deterrent policy alongside UK policy on arms control and disarmament, Delivering Security in a Changing World makes no mention of the UK's non-proliferation or disarmament commitments.

The Strategic Deterrent & Missile Defence

3.11 The Government's policy on nuclear weapons remains as set out in the SDR. We are committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons and continue to play a full role in international efforts to strengthen arms control and prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. However, the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, mean that our minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, is likely to remain a necessary element of our security. The SDR noted the need to ensure that Trident could remain an effective deterrent for up to 30 years, and the New Chapter noted the continuing role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of the UK's national security. Decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed this Parliament but are likely to be required in the next one. We will therefore continue to take appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability is kept open until that decision point.

3.12 Missile defence technology is a growing area of interest following the ending of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. Although the technologies are developing rapidly, missile interceptors and other means of destroying missiles will only be able to deal with a limited ballistic missile threat. They are not a substitute for nuclear or other forms of deterrence. However, the addition of active missile defences may complicate the thinking of an adversary. We have agreed with the US to allow the Fylingdales radar to be used for this role, but will continue to examine, with our NATO Allies, the complex web of strategic issues to inform future political and policy decisions. Active missile defences could provide an option for meeting the threat from WMD and its means of delivery. But we will need to consider the right balance of investment between it, forces for nuclear deterrence, and other deterrent, defensive and preventive strategies.

3.13 The UK continues to monitor developments in the potential ballistic missile threat to deployed forces. In parallel, studies looking across the four pillars of Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) - Deterrence, Counterforce, Active Defence and Passive Defence - have scoped the extent of the capability gap in this area and identified potential solutions. The UK also retains a strong interest in international fora considering how the capability may be met by an alliance. Of particular interest has been the NATO feasibility study that has examined an Active Layered Ballistic Missile Defence capability. The report from this study is in production, and we will assess its implications once it is available.

Source: UK Ministry of Defence, http://www.mod.uk/publications/whitepaper2003/.

'Expeditionary operations on that scale can be conducted effectively only if United States forces are engaged,' UK Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon MP, December 11

'Defence White Paper/Operations in Iraq', Statement to the House of Commons by Secretary of State for Defence Geoffrey Hoon MP, Hansard, December 11, Column 1207.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about the defence White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World", and a report entitled Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future".

It has been five years since the strategic defence review was published by my predecessor, Lord Robertson, who steps down at the end of this year as NATO Secretary-General. I am sure that the House will join me in paying tribute to his determined contribution to modernising the alliance at a time of unprecedented challenges.

The strategic defence review concluded that we needed to move our armed forces into an expeditionary era and build greater flexibility to face increasingly diverse threats in both war-fighting and peace-support operations. Its conclusions have served us well in those five years, although it could not have anticipated the appalling events of 11 September 2001, or their strategic impact. That is why we published the new chapter last year.

The ability of our armed forces to conduct the full spectrum of operations has been well demonstrated since 1998. We have conducted operations, often concurrently, across three continents: in Kosovo, Macedonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Our armed forces have been successfully engaged in combat operations in Iraq this year and are still heavily engaged in large-scale post-conflict activities.

The Ministry of Defence is today publishing its full report on operations in Iraq: Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future". Hon. Members will recall that an initial report was published in July, which provided an authoritative account of the campaign and reflected on the early conclusions that we could draw from the combat operations. Since then, a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the operation has been undertaken within the Ministry of Defence. Evidence has been taken from those involved in the operation at all levels, assessing the effectiveness of the equipment that we used and identifying from that work the lessons that we can draw from the campaign.

The operation was a significant military success, achieving almost all of its military objectives within only four weeks."

If we want to maintain the battle-winning capabilities of our armed forces, however, we must learn from the difficulties as well as the successes. There is no benefit in

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It is important to emphasise, however, that we have been successful in recent military operations because we have always looked ahead at the capabilities that we need for future challenges. It is therefore appropriate that the detailed analysis of the Iraq operation is published on the same day as the White Paper, whose title captures what it is about: Delivering Security in a Changing World". It sets out how we expect to adapt to keep ahead of the challenges. It sets out a policy baseline against which we will make decisions to provide the armed forces with the structures and capabilities that they require to carry out the operations that they can expect to undertake in the future.

The shadow of the cold war, which has shaped our armed forces for two generations, may have receded, and the threat of a large-scale conventional military attack on Europe may seem remote as a result. New threats are emerging, however. We must respond to today's strategic environment and prepare for tomorrow's. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by international terrorism, coupled with the consequences of failed or failing states, present us with a real and immediate challenge. Our experience of the recent pattern of military operations demonstrates the increasing frequency of the United Kingdom's involvement in small and medium-scale operations. The need for multiple, concurrent small to medium-sized operations will therefore be the most significant factor in force planning. Counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation operations in particular will require rapidly deployable forces that are able to respond swiftly to intelligence and achieve precise effects in a range of environments across the world.

Regional tensions and potential conflicts are likely to create a sustained high demand for enduring peace support commitments, such as the extended deployments that we have seen in the Balkans, but we must also retain the capacity to reconfigure our forces at longer notice to undertake the less frequent but more demanding large-scale operations of the type that we saw in Iraq earlier this year.

Expeditionary operations on that scale can be conducted effectively only if United States forces are engaged. When the United Kingdom chooses to be involved, we would want to be in a position to influence their political and military decision making. That will involve sharing the military risk, and will require an ability for our armed forces to play an effective role alongside those of the United States. We were able to do that in Iraq, for example, by procuring additional communications equipment for our aircraft. More generally, the key to retaining interoperability with the United States, for our European allies as well as for the United Kingdom, is likely to rest in the successful operation of NATO's new Allied Command Transformation.

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Whatever the strategic planning and equipment, it is ultimately people who deliver success. Our people will need to possess exceptional skills to deal with the complexity of modern operations. We must continue to invest in their recruitment and training and reward them properly for the difficult tasks that we ask them to undertake. The excellent contribution of our reserve forces in Iraq shows that they are an essential part of our defence capability and will remain so.

Resources must be directed at those capabilities that are best able to deliver the range of military effects required, while dispensing with those elements that are less flexible. It has historically been the fashion to measure military capability in terms of the weight of numbers of units or platforms-of ships, tanks and aircraft. That might have been appropriate for the attritional warfare of the past, but in today's environment success will be achieved through an ability to act quickly, accurately and decisively, so as to deliver military effect at the right time.

What are the critical elements, however, in delivering this military effect? The answer is threefold: sensors to gather information; an effective network to consolidate, communicate and exploit that information; and strike assets to deliver the decisive action. Technology will be a key driver for change and will present us with new opportunities: for example, the means by which to link sensor to shooter" through network-enabled capabilities. By thinking about capability jointly rather than as a collection of separate platforms, the effects that can be delivered can far exceed the sum of the individual parts. That will provide significant opportunities when we consider the requirements for future force structures and will place a premium on flexible and adaptable network-enabled capabilities.

It follows that we no longer need to retain a redundancy of capability against the re-emergence of a direct, conventional strategic threat to the United Kingdom. Our priority must now be to provide the capabilities to meet a much wider range of expeditionary tasks, at a greater distance from the UK, and at an ever increasing tempo. The heaviest burden in those circumstances will fall on those key enablers and force multipliers that deliver more rapid deployment, better intelligence and target acquisition, with ever greater accuracy.

The structure of each of the services will also need to evolve to optimise joint operations and provide greater flexibility and capability to project power to counter the threats that we face. In the maritime environment, our emphasis is increasingly on delivering effect from sea on to land, supporting forces ashore and securing access to the theatre of operation. The new amphibious ships coming into service over the next two years, together with our existing aircraft carriers, offer a versatile capability for projecting land and air power ashore. The introduction of the two new aircraft carriers and the joint strike fighter early in the next decade will offer a step change in our ability to project air power from the sea, while the Type 45 destroyer will enhance protection of joint and maritime forces and assist force projection. Some of the older ships can contribute less well to the

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In the case of the Army, experience shows that the current mix of heavy and light capabilities was relevant to the battles of the past rather than the battles of the future. We need to move to a more appropriately balanced structure of light, medium and heavy forces, and place a greater emphasis on enabling capabilities such as logistics, engineers and intelligence. The future rapid effects system family of vehicles that we are currently developing will help meet the much-needed requirement for medium-weight forces. Over time, that will inevitably reduce our requirement for heavy armoured fighting vehicles and heavy artillery.

The work in this area is continuing, but we judge that we can start this rebalancing by reducing the size of our heavy armoured forces. We therefore intend to establish a new light brigade, reducing the number of armoured brigades from three to two. This will be achieved by re-roling 4 Armoured Brigade in Germany as a mechanised brigade, and 19 Mechanised Brigade in Catterick as a light brigade. We will announce further plans for future Army force structures next year.

We want to be able to project more air power from both land and sea, offering enhanced capabilities across the range of air operations. Storm Shadow missiles will provide a long-range precision-strike capability, and the increasing availability of smart" bombs, such as Paveway IV, will ensure a higher degree of accuracy in our offensive capability than ever before. Around 85 per cent. of RAF munitions used in Iraq in 2003 were precision-guided, compared with only 25 per cent. in Kosovo as recently as 1999. Additionally, Typhoon and the joint strike fighter will offer much greater flexibility and balance in the air component of the future, reducing the need for single-role fast jets. Multi-role capability will also allow us to deploy fewer aircraft than previously thought necessary. We are therefore considering what those developments mean for the number of combat aircraft that we require.

The rapid deployment of land and air combat power is, of course, dependent on having a sufficient strategic lift capability. The core of the airlift capability will continue to centre on the C130 fleet, and the A400M when it replaces older C130s from 2011. We are considering the options for retaining a small force of C-17s after A400M enters service, to carry the largest air deployable items. We now also have a fleet of six roll-on/roll-off vessels that proved their worth in moving our forces to the Gulf and are crucial in achieving a rapid build-up for medium-scale operations.

When military action is required, it will be most effective when it comes in the form of partnerships, alliances and coalitions. For the United Kingdom, the key organisations through which we act will be NATO and the European Union.

NATO remains the basis for the collective defence of its members, and continues to play a vital role in crisis management. It is the transatlantic organisation through which the US engages with its allies in planning and conducting military operations. The European Union's European security and defence policy is complementary and provides a means to act where

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The security and stability of Europe and the maintenance of the transatlantic relationship are fundamental to our defence. More widely, our security and national prosperity depend on global stability, freedom and economic development. Our armed forces will continue to act as a force for good in the international community. We know that, ultimately, security cannot be delivered by military might alone. It is a matter of changing attitudes and bringing security to those regions where there is a risk of instability. That is a challenge for not only those of us in Defence but all of us in Government. The White Paper should therefore be read in conjunction with the White Paper on UK international priorities that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary published last week.

Everything that I have set out involves change. The White Paper, by dealing with the policy context, will ultimately determine the shape of our armed forces. Within that overall shape, we will need to develop the details of individual systems and structures. However, before we can do that, we need to be certain that we have the right procurement and development projects, which is why the Ministry of Defence is undertaking a significant examination of our capabilities and overheads. This is not a new defence review, nor does it need to be, but it is a final check on our planning, to ensure that we have the right capabilities that are needed for the challenges ahead and that we are spending our finite funds in the most effective way. I shall make further announcements on the results of that work next year.

This is a changing world, and we must adapt if our armed forces are to stay ahead of potential adversaries. We must exploit new and emerging technologies and be prepared to make tough decisions to ensure that our armed forces are able to carry out the difficult tasks that we ask of them. It is only through the process of continuous change and improvement that we can ensure that our armed forces are equipped and structured to meet the challenges of the future.

Source: UK Parliament, Hansard, http://www.parliament.uk.

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