Disarmament Documentation
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'[N]othing that we saw at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific
Research Center that would allow me to assess whether or not the
DPRK possessed a nuclear deterrent...', Testimony of Siegfried S.
Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratory, following an
unofficial visit to North Korea, January 21
'An Update on North Korean Nuclear Developments', Hearing
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
January 21, 2004.
Senator Lugar's Opening Statement
Hearing on North Korea
Opening Statement
January 21, 2004
Senator Richard G. Lugar
Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is meeting to
receive testimony on the observations of Dr. Siegfried Hecker,
Senior Fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory, following his
January 8th tour of the Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Korea.
This facility has been closed to outsiders since December 2002.
Yesterday, Dr. Hecker briefed this Committee on his observations in
closed session. He has briefed members of some executive branch
agencies already, and he is scheduled to brief additional
administration officials at the State Department later today.
The crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear program has been
the subject of six-way talks between the United States, Russia,
Japan, China, South Korea and North Korea. The Administration and
our allies understand the importance of these talks for regional
stability and global security. The United States has consulted
closely with other countries in the region in an effort to make
these talks productive. China has emerged as the pivotal country
because of its links to the North Korean regime. The continued
cooperation of China as an intermediary in the six-way talks is
essential, and the Administration is working hard to solidify
Chinese support for mutual objectives. In December, the Committee
requested Administration testimony on the sixway talks and was
assured that either Secretary Powell or Assistant Secretary James
Kelly would oblige the request when Congress returned to session.
Therefore, at an early date, our Committee intends to hold another
hearing at which we will examine the progress of the six-way talks
and the Administration's policies toward North Korea.
Even as we attempt to achieve our objectives through the six-way
talks, the United States must continue to refine its analysis and
options related to North Korea. As this analysis occurs, we should
keep in mind several factors. First, the central, overriding
interest of the North Korean regime is its own survival. Second,
given their lack of friends and their dysfunctional economy, North
Korean leaders increasingly perceive that their backs are to the
wall. Third, recent events, including the ousters of Saddam Hussein
and the Taliban, and even the voluntary opening of Libya's nuclear
program, have pressurized the geopolitical environment for North
Korea. Fourth, although there is still ambiguity surrounding the
precise configuration of North Korea's nuclear program, the North
Korean regime sees this program as the primary means through which
it can protect and perpetuate itself. These realities combine to
create a dangerous situation that requires focused attention by the
United States and our allies.
North Korea's nuclear program is at odds with American national
security. Our goal must be to stop and ultimately dismantle the
North Korean nuclear weapons program - as well as its biological
and chemical weapons programs -- while preventing the transfer of
weapons or dangerous materials and technology to other groups or
nations. To achieve this objective, we should not rule out any
options, including - as a last resort - the use of force.
Last year, President Bush announced his willingness to pursue a
non-aggression pact with North Korea in the context of the
elimination of North Korea's nuclear program. On January 9th, in an
interview with a Japanese television station, Secretary Powell
underscored the Administration's efforts to achieve a peaceful
solution in North Korea. He stated, "President Bush has made it
clear that he wants to find a political, diplomatic solution to
this challenge, and I think we can. If we were interested in the
military option, we wouldn't have gotten the six party talks
organized. The United States does not seek war. We are not looking
for enemies. We are seeking to solve problems - problems of the
kind presented by North Korea's nuclear weapons programs."
As one of the authors of the Nunn-Lugar program, which has
succeeded in safeguarding and destroying thousands of nuclear
weapons and their delivery vehicles in the former Soviet Union, I
am more optimistic than some about disarmament initiatives focused
on implacable enemies. Late last year, Congress passed the
Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which broadens the Defense Department's
authority to provide cooperative disarmament assistance outside the
former Soviet Union. If we maintain alliance cohesion and American
resolve and apply creative diplomacy and disarmament tools to the
situation on the Korean Peninsula, we can achieve our goals.
In this context, we welcome Dr. Hecker's testimony. As a former
director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Dr. Hecker
possesses extraordinary expertise related to the construction and
operation of nuclear programs and facilities. Two of the central
issues related to North Korea's nuclear activity are whether 8,000
spent fuel rods stored in the Yongbyon facility have been
reprocessed -- with plutonium extracted from them - and whether
North Korea has a highly-enriched uranium program.
Before we turn to these questions, however, I would like to
underscore the work done by our Committee in relation to human
rights and humanitarian issues in North Korea. This has been a
particular interest of Senator Biden and myself, as well as other
members of the Committee, including the East Asian subcommittee
chairman, Senator Brownback. The visit of Dr. Hecker and the
Stanford delegation to the Yongbyon site, understandably has gained
international attention. Keith Luse and Frank Jannuzi, Professional
Staff of the Committee, were in North Korea and accompanied Dr.
Hecker and the Stanford delegation to the Yongbyon facility.
However, Mr. Luse and Mr. Jannuzi traveled to North Korea with
additional agenda items. They met with high North Korea officials
to discuss the deplorable conditions of the North Korean prison
system, the harsh treatment of North Korean refugees, food scarcity
in North Korea, and the matter of Japanese citizens abducted by
North Korean agents since the mid 1950's. Mr. Luse and Mr. Januzzi
have briefed Senator Biden and me on these issues and they will be
issuing a comprehensive report on their findings in the near
future. In addition, they briefed Executive Branch officials in
both Beijing and Washington.
At this time, I would like to highlight a couple of the most
urgent human rights issues. North Korean refugees seeking food and
shelter continue to cross the border into China. Unfortunately
China has not yet allowed the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) to establish assistance centers.
In September 2003, I wrote to United Nations Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, asking for a written response outlining steps taken by
the UNHCR to gain access to China and to assist North Koreans.
Based upon the UNHCR response and after consultation with experts
familiar with the refugee situation, I am hopeful that the Bush
Administration is actively encouraging the Chinese to meet their
international obligations so that North Koreans in need of
protection in China may be assisted by the UNHCR.
A 2003 report by the U.S. Committee on Human Rights in North
Korea has documented the existence of two distinct prison systems
in North Korea. That country maintains a gulag of forced-labor
camps and prisons where, according to the report: "scores of
thousands of prisoners -- some political, some convicted felons -
are worked, many to their deaths, in mining, logging, farming, and
industrial enterprises..." The report documents a second penal
system composed of detention camps near the border with China that
are used to mete out punishment to North Koreans who are caught
attempting to flee to China or who are forcibly returned to North
Korea by the Chinese authorities.
This dual-system of repression must be eliminated. The United
States should press the North Koreans and the Chinese continuously
on this point. We also should insist that a survey of food needs
within the two prison systems be conducted by the U.N. or a
non-governmental organization familiar with North Korea.
The points that I have outlined related to North Korea represent
a sizable agenda for the oversight activities of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. We are pleased to continue our inquiries today
with the benefit of insights from Dr. Hecker.
Source: US Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/LugarStatement040121.pdf.
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Siegfried S. Hecker Written
Testimony
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on "Visit to the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea"
Siegfried S. Hecker Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National
Laboratory
University of California
January 21, 2004
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
Committee, I am honored to share with you my report of a rather
unexpected and extraordinary visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear
Scientific Research Center in North Korea (the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea). I will submit a written statement for the
record and summarize my observations this morning.
Background
I visited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK) and the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center as part
of an unofficial U.S. delegation led by Professor John W. Lewis of
Stanford University. Professor Lewis is an Asian scholar at
Stanford, specializing in China and North Korea. Professor Lewis'
visit was part of his ongoing dialog with officials of the DPRK
concerning the North's nuclear program. He has visited the DPRK ten
times since he began this dialog in 1987. He last visited the DPRK
just before the official six-party talks in Beijing last August.
DPRK officials invited him to return. When they indicated that they
may allow him to visit the nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon
Nuclear Scientific Research Center, he contacted me to accompany
him to provide scientific expertise. Since I work for the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, which is operated by the University of
California for the Department of Energy, I requested and received
the necessary U.S. Government approvals for travel to China and the
DPRK. I have known Prof. Lewis for approximately 15 years. We have
collaborated on other global security issues.
Joining our delegation at Prof. Lewis' invitation
was Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard, Visiting Scholar at the Brookings
Institute and formerly the U.S. special envoy for DPRK
negotiations. In addition, two Senate Foreign Relations Committee
experts on Asian affairs, Mr. W. Keith Luse and Mr. Frank S.
Januzzi, had separately planned a trip to the DPRK. They joined our
delegation in the DPRK and participated in our visit to the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.
The host organization for our visit was the DPRK
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Li Gun accompanied us
during the entire visit. Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan met with us on
three separate occasions. In addition to the visit to the Nuclear
Scientific Research Center, Prof. Lewis had arranged other meetings
with DPRK officials to cover economic, military, and science
issues. Mr. Luse and Mr. Jannuzi arranged some additional meetings
on their own. I will restrict my written statement to the areas of
my expertise, namely the nuclear issues. More specifically, I will
focus on what we learned during the visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear
Scientific Research Center.
DPRK statements and motivation to set the
context for the visit
Vice Minister Kim [Gye Gwan] indicated that they
were very interested in resuming the six-party talks. The DPRK made
a proposal on Dec. 9, 2003 to freeze its nuclear activities and
received no response from the United States. Vice Minister Kim
indicated that they have just repeated this proposal and this time
Secretary Powell responded positively. [The following quote from
Secretary Powell appeared in AFP, January 7, 2004: "This is an
interesting step on their part, a positive step, and we hope that
it will allow us to move more rapidly to six-party framework talks.
I am encouraged, I am encouraged by the statement the North Koreans
made."]
Vice Minister Kim stated, "The most reasonable way
[to proceed] is to have simultaneous action steps. …The U.S.
says it will give us a security assurance if we dismantle our
nuclear program. We say it differently. The first step would be a
freeze of the present [DPRK] nuclear activities. You will see how
important a freeze will be when you are at Yongbyon. This means
there will be no manufacturing, no testing, and no transferring of
nuclear weapons."
Vice Minister Kim stated, "We view the delegation's
visit to Yongbyon as a way to help contribute to breaking the
stalemate and opening up a bright future. We will not play games
with you. We have invited you to go to Yongbyon. The primary reason
for this is to ensure transparency. This will reduce the
assumptions and errors. …This visit can have great symbolic
significance."
"We want you to take an objective look, and we will
leave the conclusions to your side. This is why the inclusion of
Dr. Sig Hecker is so significant." Mr. Pritchard stated that we are
unofficial and that we are not an inspection team. Kim continued,
"Hecker's presence will allow us to tell you everything. This is an
extraordinary approval by us. …We, too, emphasize that you
are not making an inspection. But, because we are allowing this
visit, we will provide you enough access to have good
knowledge."
Vice Minister Kim indicated that based on the U.S.
actions in November 2002, the DPRK decided that the Agreed
Framework was no longer in its interest, so it terminated the IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections and withdrew from
the NPT. The DPRK decided to operate the 5MWe reactor and resume
reprocessing of plutonium for peaceful nuclear activities. He
stated, "It is the only way to keep the spent fuel rods safe." He
added, "At the same time, the hostile U.S. policy had been
intensified. So, we changed our purpose and informed the U.S. that
the plutonium that was to have been used for peaceful purposes
would now be used for weapons. Originally, we had wanted to keep
the reprocessed plutonium in a way we could store it safely. Then,
we changed the purpose in order to strengthen our deterrent."
Vice Minister Kim added that the DPRK wants a
peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis. They want a
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He emphasized that the
DPRK has been very flexible and very patient, adding, "I should
note that the time that has been lost [in dealing with us] has not
been beneficial to the U.S. side. With an additional lapse in time,
our nuclear arsenal could grow in quality and quantity. The outcome
has not been a success for the U.S."
I provide this political background to set the
context for potential motivations for the DPRK decision to invite
us to visit the Nuclear Scientific Research Center. They have
publicly stated that they have reprocessed the fuel rods to extract
plutonium and strengthen their "deterrent." It appears they were
concerned that the United States (and perhaps others) did not
believe them. So, they may have invited us to provide independent
confirmation of their claims.
However, Vice Minister Kim also expressed a concern
about their decision to invite us to Yongbyon. He stated: "If you
go back to the United States and say that the North already has
nuclear weapons, this may cause the U.S. to act against us." At a
later meeting, he returned to this concern by stating, "We are
concerned that the U.S. Government will use what you conclude [as a
pretext] to attack us. The U.S. might claim that this visit proves
that the DPRK has crossed a red line when it restarted the reactor.
Can we be sure that the U.S. will refrain from action if it
declares that we have gone beyond its red line - such as finishing
of the reprocessing and the change in the purpose of the
reprocessing [from peaceful safety-related reasons to making
weapons]?"
So, I believe the DPRK wanted to show us the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center to verify that they had
taken significant actions since December 2002 and to impress us
with their nuclear capabilities. The Center leadership and its
specialists were very cooperative within the boundaries of what
they were authorized to show us. Nevertheless, DPRK officials had
reservations about our visit and they recognized the risks
involved. They obviously decided the potential benefits of our
visit justified taking the risks.
My motivations for going to the DPRK
I explained to our DPRK hosts my decision to accept
Prof. Lewis' invitation to join him on this trip. I have been
concerned about the ambiguities associated with the DPRK nuclear
program. I realize that some of the ambiguities may be deliberate.
However, ambiguities often lead to miscalculations, and in the case
of nuclear weaponsrelated matters, such miscalculations could be
disastrous. So, I had hoped that as a scientist I could help to
bring some clarity to the DPRK nuclear situation by visiting the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.
I also stated that I believe the role of scientists
(and I should add engineers) is very important to the diplomatic
process. I see three important roles. First, to bring clarity to
the issues so as to facilitate a diplomatic solution to the nuclear
crisis. Second, if a diplomatic solution is found, scientists must
help to implement any solution such as a freeze or eventual
denuclearization. Third, scientists will be crucial to help verify
any such solution. So, it is my hope that my visit might be a small
step in this direction.
Logistics of the visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific
Research Center
On Thursday, January 8, 2004, all five members of our delegation
visited the Center, which is near the town of Yongbyon, roughly 100
km north of the DPRK capital of Pyongyang. We were accompanied by
Ambassador Li Gun, an official from the General Bureau of Atomic
Energy and a security escort. We were greeted by Professor Dr. Ri
Hong Sop, Director of the Nuclear Scientific Research Center. The
Center reports to the General Bureau of Atomic Energy. Also present
at our introductory briefing were Choi Kil Man, Assistant Director
of the Center, Li Yong ho, Safeguards Section Head, Kim Haik Soon,
Senior Center Researcher, Pak Chang Su, Center Researcher.
At the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, Director Ri
[Hong Sop] toured us through the following facilities:
- The Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (the DPRK name for what we
call the 5 MWe [5 megawatt electric] reactor). We were toured
through the control room and the observation area for the reactor
hall. This facility is inside the first security area of the
Yongbyon facility. Our guide was Chief Engineer of the facility, Li
Song Hwan.
- The spent fuel storage pool building next to the 5 MWe reactor,
also guided by Chief Engineer Li Song Hwan.
- Drive by (twice) of the 50 MWe reactor site. Inside the second
high-security area of the Yongbyon facility.
- Radiochemical Laboratory - 3rd floor corridor that allowed for
viewing of the hot cell operations through shielded glass windows
and a conference room. (This facility is also inside the second
high-security area). Our guide was Chief Engineer of the
Radiochemical Laboratory, Li Yong Song.
- Guest House for introductory and wrap-up discussions with
Center facility leadership.
Our hosts drove us from Pyongyang to the Yongbyon facility. We
left the hotel at 8:30 a.m. and returned shortly before 7:00 p.m.
We spent from 10:30 am to 5:15 p.m. at the facility.
Observations from the visit: What we were told and what we
saw
I will present my observations for each facility. I will first
summarize what we were told by the Center leadership (shown in
Italics) and then summarize my observations (in regular font). The
director and the two chief engineers each stated that it was U.S.
actions that forced the DPRK to take steps to resume nuclear
operations.
The 5 MWe reactor: They stated that they have
restarted only the Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (the 5 MWe
reactor). The plant was restarted in February 2003. It now is
operating smoothly at 100 % of its rated thermal power. They are
producing electricity and heat from the reactor now for their town.
The reactor is the main source of heat for the town now that the
10,000 metric tons (tonnes) of heavy fuel oil supplied annually to
their region (as part of the 500,000 tonnes agreed to in the Agreed
Framework) has been cut off.
We confirmed that the 5 MWe reactor is operating now. We were
shown the control room and the reactor hall. All indications from
the display in the control room are that the reactor is operating
smoothly now. The steam plume emanating from the cooling tower
[visible both in the morning and afternoon] confirmed operation.
However, we have no way of assessing independently how well the
reactor has operated during the past year.
The length of time the reactor is expected to operate with
the current load of fuel depends on how the situation with the
United States develops. They do not have safety concerns about
running the reactor for a long time [implying years]. They stated
that some of the operational problems experienced previously have
been corrected. However, they are prepared to reprocess the current
fuel at any time.
We commented to our hosts that in addition to producing
electricity and heat the reactor is also producing new plutonium.
Best estimates are that under current reactor operations
approximately 6 kg of plutonium is produced annually in the spent
fuel.1 The reactor may currently contain approximately 6 kg of
plutonium in the spent fuel rods, and it will continue to produce
an additional 6 kg each year assuming the reactor operates
efficiently.
They stated that have one more charge of fuel for the reactor
fabricated now. The fuel fabrication facility is partially
operational and partially under maintenance. They are in no hurry
to fabricate more fuel since the two bigger reactors under
construction are not close to operation.
We did not have the opportunity to visit the fuel fabrication
facility. However, these comments are consistent with previous U.S.
estimates. In previous years, the fuel fabrication complex was
reported to be making fuel elements containing about 100 tonnes per
year of uranium. The complex is believed to have produced enough
fuel for the initial loading of the core for the 50 MWe reactor
under construction. Moreover, the nominal capacity was appreciably
larger.1
50 MWe reactor. They told us that construction stopped
in 1994. They stated that at that time it was within one year of
completion. Nothing has been done since. They are currently
evaluating what to do with the reactor.
We drove past the 50 MWe reactor site twice. We confirmed that
there is no construction activity at this site. There were no
construction cranes on site. The reactor building looks in a
terrible state of repair. The concrete building structure showed
cracks. The steel exhaust tower was heavily corroded, as was other
steel equipment on the site. The building was not closed up and
resembled a deserted structure. The NSC director expressed his
great dismay about the deterioration of the facility because of the
eight-year freeze. This reactor is much more than one year from
completion now. It is not clear how much of the current structure
can be salvaged.
200 MWe reactor at Tacheon (this reactor site is 20 km
from Yongbyon). They stated that construction also stopped in
1994. They are also evaluating what to do with the reactor.
This reactor location is at a different site. We were not able
to assess the current situation.
Spent fuel storage building. They stated that they
removed all 8000 fuel rods from the spent fuel storage pool and
shipped them to the Radiochemical Laboratory (plutonium
reprocessing facility) and reprocessed them [to extract the
plutonium]. The fuel rods were taken out of the pool in Korean
containers (metal baskets) and placed in specially shielded
shipping casks. During the removal of the fuel rods they found that
about half of the U.S. canisters had leaked during storage. But
they claimed not to have experienced major problems getting the
spent fuel rods out of the pool and transporting them in special
casks by truck daily to the Radiochemical Laboratory for
reprocessing.
These are the spent fuel rods that the DPRK had removed from the
5 MWe reactor after it ceased operation in 1994 as part of the
Agreed Framework. In 1995, a few months after the Agreed Framework
was signed, preparations for the canning began. The process turned
out to be quite involved and was not finished until June 2000.
During this time, the United States Department of State and
Department of Energy (supported by the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory and the Nuclear Assurance Corporation) worked jointly
with the DPRK to package these rods in 400 U.S. supplied stainless
steel canisters to store safely (with dry inert gas inside the
canisters) in a deep pool of water (for radiation shielding) to
allow the radioactivity level of the rods to decrease with time.
This facility was fitted with various devices and seals by IAEA
inspectors to ensure that the fuel rods would not be tampered with.
However, the IAEA inspectors were dismissed by the DPRK in December
2002. Only DPRK personnel have had access to the Nuclear Scientific
Research Center since that time.
Our initial look into the spent fuel pool showed that the
locking plates and associated structures that the U.S. Spent Fuel
Team had put in place after the canisters (loaded with the 8000
fuel rods) were inserted into the pool were gone. We immediately
confirmed the fact that all fuel rods were no longer in the pool
because many of the canisters were missing and many were open. The
building was not heated and we found a thin sheet of ice on the
pool surface. When I expressed concern that some of the canisters
were still closed, they took the extraordinary step of allowing me
to pick one at random and open it [all done under water in the
pool] to demonstrate that there are no fuel rods remaining, even in
the closed canisters. The randomly selected canister did not
contain any fuel rods (it initially contained 20). This and other
observations convinced me that the spent fuel pool is empty; the
fuel rods are gone. It is possible that they moved the 8000 fuel
rods to a different storage location. However, such storage would
represent a serious health and safety hazard. [During the tour of
the Radiochemical Laboratory, I asked if we could visit the Dry
Storage Building, which serves as the port of entry for the fuel
rods into that laboratory, they said that it was not available for
a tour because their was no activity and there were no workers in
the building.]
Radiochemical Laboratory. They stated that they
reprocessed all 8000 spent fuel rods in the Radiochemical
Laboratory in one continuous campaign, starting in mid-January 2003
and finishing by the end of June 2003. They stated that their
capacity in the Radiochemical Laboratory is 375 kg uranium per day
(they said they worked four 6-hr shifts around the clock). They
later added that the reprocessing capacity of the facility under
normal operating conditions is 110 tonnes of spent uranium fuel per
year. Therefore, they were able to finish the current campaign of
50 tonnes of spent fuel rods in less than six months. They told us
that we would tour the corridor next to the hot cells in which the
reprocessing occurs. The campaign is complete; the facility is not
operating now. Everything has been cleaned up and there is no
radiation hazard in the corridor.
At the Radiochemical Laboratory we confirmed that they possessed
an industrialscale reprocessing facility. The facility appeared in
good repair. They demonstrated the requisite facilities, equipment,
and technical expertise required for reprocessing plutonium at the
scale in question. They use the standard PUREX (plutonium uranium
extraction) process for separating plutonium from the fission
products and uranium fuel. They answered all our technical
questions about the reprocessing chemistry very competently. We
were not able to see the glove boxes used for the final plutonium
purification and production. They indicated that these were
downstairs and not part of today's tour. In his book, Albright
stated that five glove boxes were used during this process to
produce plutonium dioxide product. He also reported that one or two
glove boxes may have been removed before inspectors were permitted
on site.2 These boxes could presumably have been used to
process plutonium dioxide [the typical plutonium product from the
reprocessing operation] into metal and to cast or shape plutonium
metal. Based on our tour we are not able to confirm or deny that
the facility operated during the first half of 2003.
They stated that the Radiochemical Laboratory was built
through their own efforts. They began construction in 1986 and the
main parts were completed by 1990. At that time they ran a "hot
test" of the facility with 80 fuel rods and natural uranium rods to
extract 60 grams of plutonium.
Albright reported that the hot test involved 86 fuel rods
irradiated in the 5 MWe reactor combined with 172 fresh fuel rods.
He also reported that in 1992 the DPRK presented plutonium oxide
containing about 62 grams of plutonium to the IAEA inspectors.
However, the total amount of plutonium actually processed by the
DPRK before IAEA inspections began in 1992 is still strongly
disputed.2
When asked about the disposition of the waste stream, they
stated that the waste from the most recent reprocessing campaign
was mixed in with the waste from the "hot test" of the 80 fuel rods
processed in spring of 1990.
We were not able to visit the waste facilities and, hence,
cannot confirm this statement. Even if we had toured the facility,
we could not make a judgment without sophisticated sampling and
measurements of the nuclear wastes. However, this type of
information is important for tracing the reprocessing history of
the facility.
They stated that they initially intended to run the fuel
cycle for civilian purposes (which means they would have stored the
plutonium product as plutonium dioxide) but because of the hostile
U.S. actions, they reprocessed the entire campaign to plutonium
metal. They stated that this processing was done in the
Radiochemical Laboratory by installing some glove boxes that were
not present during IAEA inspections. It took them three months to
install the equipment and prepare it for the plutonium metal
processing step.
We were not able to see the glove boxes for the final plutonium
operations. However, their comments indicated that they had glove
boxes for plutonium metal production ready to go. This indicates
that they had experience making plutonium metal before the IAEA
inspections began in 1992. Albright3 estimated that the
8000 spent fuel rods in question could yield between 25 and 30 kg
of plutonium metal.
Although we could not see the plutonium glove box operations,
they took the extraordinary step of showing us the "product" from
what they claimed to be their most recent reprocessing campaign. In
a conference room following the tour, they brought a metal case
that contained a wooden box with a glass jar they said contained
150 grams of plutonium oxalate powder and a glass jar they said
contained 200 grams of plutonium metal for us to inspect.
The glass jars were fitted with a screw-on metal lid and were
tightly taped with transparent tape. (The plutonium?fs
alpha-radiation is easily stopped by the glass jar). The green
color of the plutonium oxalate powder is consistent with plutonium
oxalate that has been stored in air for some time. The plutonium
metal was a thin-walled (approximately 1/8-inch thick) funnel
(approximately 2-inch diameter at the base and 1-inch diameter at
the top, approximately 1 inches high) that they claimed to have
been scrap from a casting from this reprocessing campaign. When
asked about its density, they responded, ?gbetween 15 and 16
g/cubic centimeter and that it was alloyed [a practice common in
plutonium metallurgy to retain the ƒÂ-phase of plutonium
which makes it easier to cast and shape]. The metal surface and
color were consistent with moderately oxidized plutonium metal from
a casting (I believe it could not have been in the jar for a period
of many weeks because it did not show any loose oxide powder). I
tried to get a feel for the density and heat content of the alleged
plutonium metal by holding the glass jar in a gloved hand. The
glass jar (very thick walled) was reasonably heavy and slightly
warm (importantly, however, it was definitely not cold as was
everything else in this building). The bottom line is that with the
rather primitive tools at hand I was not able to definitively
identify the purported metal and the powder as plutonium. It was
radioactive, however, because a radiation probe (which appeared to
be a Geiger counter [Geiger- Muller detector]) registered a count
when turned on near the wooden box containing the glass jars. With
a few relatively simple tests, we would be able to positively
identify the product as plutonium metal, but that was not possible
to do during this visit.
Furthermore, even if we could confirm that the product we were
shown is plutonium, we would not have been able to confirm that it
came from the most recent campaign without additional, more
sophisticated isotopic measurements that would let us identify the
age of the plutonium. The director of the NSC confirmed this by
stating, "you would have to measure the americium to
plutonium-241 ratio to determine its age." He was correct.
When asked about the isotopic content of the plutonium,
specifically its Pu-240 content, they stated, "the plutonium-240
content from this campaign is low, but we are not authorized to
tell you. The IAEA knows, you can ask them." We were in no
position to assess the isotopic content of the plutonium produced
or that shown to us.
They also stated that the plutonium metal was alloyed, but
they were not authorized to tell us what alloying element was used
[they did add, you know what it is, and we do it the same]. We
were in no position to tell whether or not the plutonium metal
shown to us was alloyed. However, the fact that it was not cracked
and that their specialists claimed that the plutonium had a density
between 15 and 16 grams/cubic centimeter is consistent with
plutonium alloyed with approximately 1 weight percent of gallium or
aluminum. A calculation of the rough dimensions and weight is also
consistent with these values. However, the uncertainty in my
observations is very large.
Mr. Luse asked about a concern of yours Mr. Chairman; that is,
the security of their nuclear materials. Director Ri responded,
"Be at ease with this problem. I am not authorized to give you
an explanation on this, but we feel certain that the protection and
safety - the security - are good."
We were also told that the effects of another freeze or
decision to denuclearize would have devastating effects on the work
force. Director Ri indicated that all of his people, including he,
would have to look for new jobs.
Other observations and comments related to the nuclear
issues
The DPRK "deterrent." During follow-up discussions with
Ambassador Li and Vice Minister Kim in Pyongyang, they stressed
that the DPRK now has a nuclear deterrent and that U.S. actions
have caused them to strengthen their deterrent - both in quality
and in quantity. Ambassador Li inquired if what I had seen at
Yongbyon convinced me that they had this deterrent.
I explained to both of them that there is nothing that we saw at
the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center that would allow me
to assess whether or not the DPRK possessed a nuclear deterrent if
that meant a nuclear device or nuclear weapon. We found that both
in our visit and in previous declarations by the government of the
DPRK that the term "deterrent" was used in a very ambiguous
manner.
I explained that I view a "deterrent" to have at least three
components: 1) The ability to make plutonium metal, 2) the ability
to design and build a nuclear device, and 3) the ability to
integrate the nuclear device into a delivery system. What we saw at
Yongbyon was that they apparently have the capability to do the
first. However, I saw nothing and talked to no one that allowed me
to assess whether or not they have the ability to design a nuclear
device. And, of course, we were not able to assess the integration
into a delivery vehicle. Moreover, during additional discussions I
cautioned that "deterrence" might have worked between the United
States and the Soviet Union, two equally armed nuclear superpowers
under rather predictable circumstances. The concept of nuclear
deterrence may have little meaning for the U.S. - DPRK situation. I
asked Ambassador Li in the late morning of the last day of our
visit if I could meet individuals who could talk to me in some
detail about their "deterrent" in the spirit that I had just
described. He said he would try, but that evening told me that the
time was insufficient to make such arrangements.
Highly-enriched uranium issue. In the Foreign Ministry,
we discussed the contentious issue of DPRK's supposed admission on
October 4, 2002, to having a clandestine highly enriched uranium
(HEU) program in violation of the letter and spirit of the 1994
Agreed Framework. There is a controversy about whether the DPRK
admitted to having such a program at a meeting with U.S. officials.
The disagreement concerns a difference between what DPRK officials
believe they said and what U.S. officials believe they heard. DPRK
officials provided us with a copy of the Korean text of what Vice
Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju said at the meeting. Regardless of how
this issue is eventually clarified, one will still have to deal
with the facts.
During our meeting, Mr. Pritchard stated, "The key issue is the
intelligence that makes the United States believe that the DPRK has
an HEU program. In the U.S., there is the widespread view that the
complete, verifiable resolution of this HEU issue is now mandatory.
This is a practical issue, and there must be a multilateral
discussion to resolve it." In response, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan
stated that the DPRK had no HEU program. Upon further questioning
he stated that the DRPK had chosen the plutonium path to a
deterrent. It had no facilities, equipment or scientists dedicated
to an HEU program, adding, "We can be very serious when we talk
about this. We are fully open to technical talks."
Concluding remarks
Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize my observations based on
our visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and
discussions in Pyongyang.
- The 5 MWe reactor has been restarted. It appears to be
operating smoothly providing heat and electricity, while also
accumulating approximately 6 kg of plutonium per year in its spent
fuel rods.
- The 50 MWe reactor construction site appears to have seen no
activity since the IAEA inspectors were instructed to leave in
2002. The reactor and the construction site look in a bad state of
repair. It would require a major construction program to finish the
reactor.
- The spent fuel pond is empty; the approximately 8000 fuel rods
have been moved.
- The DPRK claimed to have reprocessed all 8000 fuel rods to
extract plutonium metal during one continuous campaign between
mid-January 2003 and end of June 2003. The 8000 fuel rods are
estimated to contain up to 25 to 30 kg of plutonium metal. We could
not definitively substantiate that claim. However, the
Radiochemical Laboratory staff demonstrated that they had the
requisite facility, equipment and technical expertise, and they
appear to have the capacity to do so.
- It is possible that they moved the 8000 fuel rods to a
different storage location. However, such storage would represent a
serious health and safety hazard.
- We were shown what was claimed to be a sample of plutonium
metal product. I was not able to definitively confirm that what we
saw was actually plutonium metal, but all observations I was able
to make are consistent with the sample being plutonium metal.
However, even if the sample were plutonium metal, I would not have
been able to substantiate that it was plutonium from the most
recent reprocessing campaign. Such a determination requires more
sophisticated measurements.
- In the foreseeable future, the DPRK can produce 6 kg of
plutonium per year in its 5 MWe reactor. It easily has the capacity
to reprocess the spent fuel at any time to extract the plutonium.
It also has the capacity to reload the reactor with fresh fuel for
a second and subsequent reloading. It is not, however, in a
position to increase the rate of plutonium production much beyond 6
kg per year without a major construction project at the 50 MWe or
200 MWe reactor sites, something that would be difficult to do
clandestinely.
- Officials of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that
the DPRK had weapons of mass destruction. They believe that they
provided us with evidence of their "deterrent." At Yongbyon, they
demonstrated that they most likely had the capability to make
plutonium metal. However, I saw nothing and spoke to no one who
could convince me that they could build a nuclear device with that
metal, and that they could weaponize such a device into a delivery
vehicle. We were not able to arrange meetings with DPRK staff who
may have such expertise or visit related facilities.
- Officials of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated
categorically that the DPRK has no program for enriching uranium.
Moreover, they claim to have no equipment and no scientific
expertise to do so. We were not able to substantiate these
claims.
Let me close by stating that I shared these conclusions with our
DPRK hosts before my departure. I told them that my observations
still have uncertainties. I may be able to reduce some of the
uncertainties through discussions with other U.S. specialists, with
additional analysis, and through peer review. I intend to do so and
write a more comprehensive technical report in the future. The
response of the DRPK officials was quite positive although they had
hoped that my conclusions would be more definitive. They asked me
to report my observations as I presented them.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I found the trip to be remarkable. Our
DPRK hosts were most courteous and cooperative. I would like to
acknowledge the Albright/O'Neill book on the Korean Nuclear Puzzle,
the Report from the Department of State/Department of Energy Spent
Fuel Canning Team, and discussions with several of my colleagues at
Los Alamos, all of which helped me to prepare for this visit. I
hope that our findings will contribute at least in some small way
to a resolution of the current nuclear crisis and the eventual
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Thank you for giving me
the opportunity to share our findings with you.
Footnotes
1. David Albright, Kevin O'Neill, editors. "Solving the North
Korean Nuclear Puzzle," ISIS Reports, The Institute for Science and
International Security, Washington, D.C., 2000.
2. See D. Albright and K. O'Neill, Reference 1.
3. See D. Albright and K. O'Neill, Reference 1.
Source: US Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/LugarStatement040121.pdf.
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