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Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 6 - 8

Selected Speeches

• Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Vice Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, February 7
• 'Transatlantic Relations', Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State of Defense, United Kingdom
• Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands, February 7
• 'International Security in the Context of the Russia-NATO Relationship', Sergey B. Ivanov, Minister of Defense, Russian Federation, February 7
• 'NATO and the Greater Middle East', Senator Richard G. Lugar (Republican - Indiana), Chairman, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 7
• Senator John McCain, (Republican - Arizona), Chairman, US Senate Commerce Committee, February 7
• Solomon Passy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Bulgaria; Chairman-in-Office, OSCE, February 7
• Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, United States of America, February 7
• 'Future of NATO', Dr Peter Struck, Member of the German Bundestag, Federal Minster of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany, February 7

Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Vice Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, February 7

One year ago this Conference was the venue for a frank debate on the question of a war against Iraq.

Our opinions differed on whether the threat was analysed as sufficient to j justify terminating the work of the UN inspectors,

the consequences that a war would have on the fight agamst international terronsm, the effects of a war in Iraq on regional stability, whether the long-term consequences of the war would be controllable, and whether the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the war would dangerously reduce the sustainability so essential in the post-conflict phase.

The Federal Government feels that events have proven the position it took at the time to be right. It was our political decision not to join the coalition because we were not, and are still not, convinced of the validity of the reasons for war.

Nevertheless, two things were clear once the coalition had decided to go to war. Firstly, the coalition must bring the war to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible, and secondly, the peace must be won.

For a failure would have had equally damaging consequences for us all, for Europe as for America, for pro-war and anti-war countries. This conviction informed Germany's position during and after the war on Iraq.

We are appalled by the horrific terrorist attacks, not least the most recent bombings in Erbil, which have claimed so many victims, both among the civilian population and from the armed forces of our allies and friends. Our heartfelt sympathy goes to all their families.

When we say that, regardless of our opinion of the war, we have to win the peace together because otherwise we will lose together, we have to look forward:
We are in agreement that the coalition's efforts must be successful. The forces of violence and terror in Iraq must not win the upper hand.

We are therefore convinced that it is now vital to restore the sovereignty of the country with broad legitimacy and to transfer it to an Iraqi government, preferably one legitimised at the ballot box. The United Nations must take on the key role in transferring sovereignty and supporting democratic reconstruction, for only it can guarantee the necessary legitimacy of the process.

From the very beginning we have said that reconstruction in Iraq should build on experience in Afghanistan. This stance is also reflected by our humanitarian commitment and our police training project for Iraq.

Permit me to refer openly to a discussion that began some time ago. l believe that the decision on the direct involvement of NATO in Iraq needs to be considered and weighed up with the utmost care. The Federal Government will not stand in the way of a consensus, even if it will not deploy any German troops in Iraq. But the risk of failure and the potentially very serious, possibly fatal consequences for the Alliance absolutely must be taken into consideration.

Honesty demands of me that l do not conceal my deep scepticism on this account.

It is becoming more and more apparent that the crisis in Iraq will not be solved without a sustainable long-term reform process in the region as a whole.

Notwithstanding the controversy about the war in Iraq, we have long shared the view that following 11 September 2001, neither the US nor Europe and the Middle East itself can tolerate the Status quo in the Middle East any longer.

For the Middle East is at the epicentre of the greatest threat to our regional and global security at the dawn of this Century: destructive jihadist terrorism with its totalitarian ideology. This brand of terrorism does not only pose a threat to the societies of the West, but also and above all to the Islamic and Arab world.

We cannot counter the threat of this new totalitarism by military means alone. Our response needs to be as all-encompassing as the threat. And this response cannot be issued by the West alone.

If we were to adopt a paternalistic attitude, we would only inflict the first defeat upon ourselves. Instead we must formulate a serious offer based on genuine co-operation, an offer to work together with the states and societies of the region.

This jihadist terrorism is not strong enough to achieve its political aims. i.e. the destabilisation of the Middle East, by a direct route. It is therefore attempting to embroil the West and above all the United States, in a clash of civilisations - the West versus Islam - and to provoke it into overreacting or making the wrong decisions, thereby bringing about the destabilisation of the entire Middle East. To this end, terrorism and asymmetric warfare are pursued with two aims: firstly, to wear down the forces deployed in the region, not to mention the general public in the West, and secondly to drag the region down into chaos.

Precisely for these reasons we must consider every step in the fight against terrorism very carefully and we must develop a common strategy with which to prevail over the jihad terrorists.

11 September and AI Qaida's homicidal terrorism are the reason why NATO is today in Afghanistan to secure the reconstruction and stabilisation of the country on the basis of the ISAF mandate issued by the UN. Germany presently has some 2,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, of whom 1,800 are in Kabul and 200 in our reconstruction team in Kunduz. We have also taken a lead role in re-establishing civilian police structures. In addition, Germany is one of the largest donors of reconstruction aid in Afghanistan: by the middle of the year we will have made available some 280 billion Euro, thereby exceeding our pledges.

Nevertheless, if we are to win the fight against jihadist terrorism, we will have to take a much broader and further-reaching approach on the Middle East. For behind the new terrorism lies a profound modernisation crisis in many parts of the Islamic Arab world.

Our concerted efforts to foster peace and security are doomed to failure if we believe that only security issues matter. They certainly do, but security is a much broader concept in this fight against terrorism: social and cultural modernisation issues , as well as democracy, the rule of law, women's rights and good governance, are of almost even greater importance. '

The European Security Strategy adopted by the EU m December 2003 ,s based on this realisation.

It has been barely possible hitherto in the countries of the Middle East to shape globalisation in a way which is even remotely positive. The region has not yet found any answers to the pressing challenges of the 21st Century. 1t is largely unable to meet the expectations of a predominantly young population - more than half of those living in the region are under eighteen. The latest figures show that Investments are falling in the Middle East.

We should also be alarmed by the current Arab Human Development Report issued by the United Nations Development Programme. In response to the shortcomings in this region, the report puts forward the Strategic Vision of a knowledge society in the Arab world. Its cornerstones are democracy and the rule of law, equal rights for women and their Integration into public life, the development of strong civil societies, as well as of modern education Systems and of the economy.

This is a generational task. And the initiative cannot only come from the outside. 1t must, first and foremost, come from within. The key to successful reforms lies in the region.

Anyone who now thinks that all of this is nice to know but has little or nothing to do with security policy is very much mistaken. The question of whether NATO engages in Iraq or not is of less importance to our security (even though l certainly do not underestimate the importance of this question) than whether finally we, America, Europe and the countries affected in the region strategically tackle this challenge of modernisation and stabilisation in the Middle East.

In order to succeed, the European Union and the US should, in view of this major challenge to our common security, pool their capabilities, assets and projects to form a new transatlantic initiative for the Middle East.

Such an initiative could open up a completely new perspective to the countries of the Middle East: enhanced co-operation and closer partnership in the fields of security, politics, the economy, law, culture and civil society.

Of course, such a joint transatlantic initiative depends on the fulfilment of two conditions: first of all, this initiative needs sustainability and must be based on a long-term perspective. Secondly, the key regional conflict, namely the Middle East conflict, should neither be set aside nor allowed to block this initiative from the outset.

The common threat presented by jihadist terrorism and the possible destabilisation of a region crucial to our security in Strategic terms; our common interests; the proliferation of our options through close co-operation - all of this would indicate that America and Europe should now draw the night conclusions from their differences of opinion concerning the Iraq war and develop a perspective and strategy for the wider Middle East together with our partners in the region. Mark you, I am talking about a common strategy here, not a "toolbox" approach.

An initiative in two stages would seem appropriate. Both NATO and the EU already have cooperation arrangements in the Mediterranean. A first step would therefore be a joint EU/NATO Mediterranean process.

A second step could then be a "declaration on a common future", which addresses the entire Middle East region.

Allow me to first of all explain our views on the EU/NATO Mediterranean process.

Whether the Mediterranean becomes an area of cooperation or confrontation in the 21st Century will be of Strategic importance to our common security.

The dialogue which NATO is conducting with the Mediterranean countries and the European Union's Barcelona Process could strengthen and complement each other by closely coordinating their work and thinking it up to form a new EU/NATO Mediterranean process.

The EU's Barcelona Process and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue should not be amalgamated in this process. Rather, they should complement each other through their specific strengths.

The new EU/NATO Mediterranean process should include all participants in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue: in addition to NATO and EU member states, the Maghreb states Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania, as well as Egypt, Jordan and Israel. They would be joined by all participants in the Barcelona Process, i.e. the countries already mentioned as well as the Palestinian territories, Syria and Lebanon.

The cooperation should focus on four main priorities: security and politics; the economy; law and culture; civil society.

The first priority would be to develop close political cooperation and a security partnership. It would be aimed at creating transparency and at confidence-building among all the states involved. Furthermore, the reform processes of the countries in the region should be supported, indeed in all areas of policy, institutions, democracy and law.

The legitimate security interests of all states in the region should be reflected in a System of regional security cooperation based on transparency and verification, disarmament and arms control. The European Union has already made precise proposals to this end in the Barcelona Process.

NATO could make a notable contribution to the success of a political partnership and an effective security partnership. Its particular strengths and the experience gained with the Partnership for Peace program would be of major importance.

A new economic partnership for the Mediterranean countries could be the second focus. Above all, developing and integrating hitherto separate national economic areas could play a decisive role in supporting the process of political and social change.

So why should we not vigorously pursue the ambitious goal of creating a free trade area together by 2010 to embrace the entire Mediterranean area?

What is more Europeans and Americans can create incentives for cooperation within the region by opening our markets precisely for goods produced transnationally.

The partnership in law and culture, the third priority, should include the development of institutions based on democracy and the rule of law, as well as free media and cooperation in education and training.

Similarly, the dialogue between the religions, an intensive exchange and close cooperation m the cultural sphere and a partnership of tolerance in culture and education would be of central importance here.

The fourth focus would have to take in strengthening and integrating civil society and the entire NGO sphere. A strong civil society is indispensable for democracy and the rule of law and at the same time is essential for any process of renewal.

The new transatlantic initiative for peace, stability and democracy in the Mediterranean would have to build on the work of the current institutions. Regular meetings of the foreign ministers or other line ministers of the states involved would therefore be an obvious steering Instrument. Civil society should also have its own forum.

Let me now turn to the second phase of the initiative, the "declaration on a common future". 1t is not just intended for those involved in the EU/NATO Mediterranean process but also for all other members of the Arab League. Iran's participation ought to be considered.

The signatories of the declaration should undertake to promote and support reform together m the countries of the region.

This declaration offers all states involved a partnership based on equality and comprehensive cooperation for a common future.

The treaty should contain a number of principles to which the countries subscribe.

Firstly, the signatories commit themselves to peace, security and the renunciation of the use of force; to democracy and economic cooperation; and to arms control, disarmament and a System of cooperative security. All participants pledge to support the joint fight against terrorism and totalitarianism.

Secondly, the signatories see the decisive response to the challenges of the 21st Century in a policy of political, economic and social reform of state and society. They support the integration of their economies.

They are all striving for good governance committed to human rights as well as law and justice, for participation of the citizens in the political decision-making processes, for a strong and independent civil society in their countries and for equal rights for women and their evolvement in public life.

Thirdly, the signatories pledge to grant all citizens, both men and women, equal access to knowledge and education. The aim is to build knowledge societies in the region. This goal mirrors the central Strategic task identified m the Arab Human Development Report.

In early summer this year, the G8, European Union and NATO summits in rapid succession offer the opportunity to truly launch such a project. Its key components are already included in the current initiatives drawn up by NATO, the EU or the national capitals. A joint offer of partnership with the countries of the region could then be extended in Istanbul.

Nevertheless, such an initiative requires careful preparation and consultation with the partners in the region because it is crucial to avoid any paternalistic misunderstanding.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

These considerations on a new transatlantic initiative are rooted in the conviction that the modernization of the wider Middle East will be decisive for our security in the 21st Century. 1t is therefore in our best interest that the people in the Middle East can share in the achievements of globalization.

On l May this year, the EU will take on ten new members and thus final l y end the division of Europe. Europe is growing closer together. Of course, this does not happen without difficulties, conflicts and arguments, but Europe is growing closer together. I am absolutely certain about that. Our experiences since that dreadful day in September 2001 must have brought us to recognize on both sides of the Atlantic that, in the face of the huge challenges that lie ahead, the transatlantic partnership is indispensable.

If the states of Europe and North America work together strategically as partners in the European Union and in NATO in response to the common threat, and if they bring their particular abilities and strengths to bear in a new cooperation with the states of the Middle East, then we can make this truly paramount contribution to our joint security. If we fail to do so, or if we are too short-sighted, too narrow-minded or too hesitant, we will have a high price to pay.

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'Transatlantic Relations', Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary of State of Defense, United Kingdom

The transatlantic relationship has been marked by a long, history of sustained and reliable mutual support. In practice, the benefits of the relationship have been most clearly demonstrated on the continent of Europe during the 20th century. It has been pivotal in helping us preserve the freedom, security and democracy we cherish.

We in Europe know that our world would be a much more dangerous place if America had chosen to follow an isolationist path. We know that such a course was open to successive US Presidents. We know that it would probably have been politically popular in the United States, l want to restate my appreciation for all those - including many here today - who have resisted that easy route and who have chosen the harder road of international engagement.

Because without that engagement in European affairs by the United States -without a strong transatlantic relationship - we would never have overcome the threat posed by tyranny during the last century.

Without the military power of the United States to back the international community's commitments, the Taleban regime would still be in power in Kabul and Milosevic would still be terrorising Kosovo..

And of course without the US led coalition, Saddam Hussein would still be in power in Baghdad - ignoring his obligation under UNJ resolutions, terrorising and torturing his own people and depriving them of the basic human rights.

I know that the issue of intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction remains controversial - not least in the United Kingdom: but two points are clear from the factual record:

• Firstly, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons and admitted seeking nuclear weapons: theses risks are gone;
  
  
• And secondly, since the intervention there has been more progress on counter proliferation than for a decade in North Korea, Iran and most dramatically in Libya.

But there are still threats to European security - maybe from outside its borders but of a new and terrifying nature. This threat is real and it is shared with the United States.

Consequently, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th , allied democracies drew together in NATO in a show of unity against terror.

In barely two months the Taleban regime was removed from Afghanistan and AI Qaeda was severally disrupted.

But the Americans did not do all this alone - they formed coalitions. As the United States National Security Strategy acknowledges: "There is little of lasting consequences that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained co-operation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe."

Last year, of course, saw strains within NATO and the United Nations over Iraq. Some went out of their way to push a European Union dimension as a counterweight to the defence relationship with the United States. The dangerous consequence of policies that result in the Polarisation of US-EU relations is that it can feed misunderstanding and encourage Isolationist tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic, l want to make it clear that there is no appetite amongst the European Union members, nor indeed among wider invitees, for that to happen,

Economic power and military might are balances that shape our relationships - these balances shift over time. A transatlantic relationship need not be an equal one to be successful - but it does require a common understanding of the challenges we face and a common purpose to meet them together.

The Challenges

The real challenges for the new relationship lie not in the academic definition of the ESDP-NATO relationship. instead, the real and immediate challenges are in the threat posed by international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the consequences of failing or failed states.

It is generally accepted that a strategic conventional threat to Europe is unlikely to emerge in the short term. But the events of the last 5 years have demonstrated the uncertain nature of the global security environment and have underlined the range of new menaces facing us in place of the old threat. Since September 11^th, 2001 the attacks in Bali, Jakarta, Casablanca and Bombay - in Mombassa, Najaf, Riyad, Baghdad - and most recently in Istanbul the very real danger that international terrorism poses to all of us.

The continuing proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is another pressing cause for concern. Soma states will continue to seek WMD, particularly as access to the technology and production capabilities becomes easier. We know as well that international terrorists are seeking to increase their access to chemical, biological and radiological means to .enhance their capacity for disruption and dislocation.

Weak and failing states also present an increasing problem. Such states are characterised by political mismanagement, ethnic and religious tensions or economic collapse. They can contain areas of ungoverned territory, which provide havens and sources of support for terrorist groups and criminal networks. Here the European interest is extensive and enduring. it is an area where ESDP can make a useful contribution, especially in providing quick reaction capability to the United Nations.

Regional analysis

So where will the future threats to the peace and security of Europe arise? The EU Security Strategy sets this out clearly and in ways wholly compatible with the transatlantic relationship. These rag Ions immediately adjacent Europe - the near East North Africa and the Gulf - are likely to continue 10 have the most significant bearing on Western security interests. Potentially destabilising social, political, and economic problems demand that we engage in conflict prevention, as well as responding rapidly to emerging crises.

The Middle East still presents the most significant security challenge. The Israeli/Palestinian problem is undoubtedly a major regional issue. The international community must continue its efforts to secure a lasting settlement Although recent operations have largely neutralised one threat, weapons of mass destruction are continuing to proliferate across the Middle East and beyond and will be a continuing concern. Developing relationships are high on the agenda for the North Atlantic nations.

Looking beyond the regions adjacent to Europe, we have to recognise that there will be a greater need for commitments further afield. Of course, crises could occur anywhere across the world and the transatlantic alliance may not, as a whole, be engaged in every case, But it -will wish to be involved in dialogue and discussions. Expanding effective diplomacy beyond the existing NATO Partnership for Peace countries must therefore be a long term goal.

Much of what I've outlined leads to the conclusion that one of the greatest risks to our peace and security is that the strategic environment will change faster than we can understand - or indeed adapt to, A strong transatlantic relationship is essential in ensuring that does not happen.

Implications for Defence

What then are the implications of these challenges for the Defence strategies of the Allies?

In meeting the global terrorist threat we must be prepared to conduct operations at relatively small scale but at very short notice, at long range, and indeed with high frequency. The relative importance of peace support and humanitarian operations is also likely to increase, as we recognise the contribution that state failure can make to terrorism. We need to try to avoid a repeat of what happened for example in Afghanistan.

We welcome NATO's Steps to take a-wider role in that country and to show our support I can announce that we are prepared to take command of the Northern Region Group there, including the Provisional Reconstruction Tearr,s7 and deploying UK troops currently in Kabul

The range of tasks expected of our armed forces will be broad - from peacekeeping, humanitarian and confidence-building operations through to counter-terrorism and high-intensity combat against s diverse set of potential adversaries.

Regional tensions and potential conflicts are likely to create a sustained high demand for enduring peace support commitments, such as the extended deployments that we have seen in recent times in the Balkans. The military to civil transition demands special skills. There is much to learn about how best to harness the full range of levers that nations and multinational institutions can bring to bear. In planning terms, the Alliance must be better at recognising the long term nature of nation building.

The lessons we are learning in Iraq, in Africa and elsewhere are bitter and expensive ones. We must ensure we do not lose sight of them, particularly when the politics of consensus throws up a less than effective compromise.

The multilateral response required will set a premium on the capacity of our forces to inter-operate with those of other countries. It is highly unlikely that the United Kingdom would be engaged in high intensity large-scale operations without the United States, a judgement born of past experience, shared interest and our assessment of strategic trends. This will drive the technologically challenging and financially expensive requirement to inter-operate with the United States, This will not just be in the 'soft' world of communications and information networks" but in the harder world of strategic deployment and training at the most challenging level of military operations.

European allies in NATO, and through ESDP, have a key part to play in our collective defence and security, it will be vital for them to link together on the battlefield through technology. To play a part nations must be able to plug into a multinational response at different layers-of the military system. Work in the EU, such as the new Defence Agency, and the NATO initiative on Usability are key enablers to develop effective deployable forces.

Also in this context I would highlight a Franco-British proposal made at our most-recent summit, that the EU should develop the capability to deploy battle-group size force packages in response to crises identified by the UN. The aim will be for these battle-groups to be able to act rapidly and robustly under Chapter VII mandate to stabilise the situation before handing over to longer term UN or regional peacekeeping.

This will be an important initiative enhance the real usability of European forces in a fashion complementary to NATO's efforts and we will be presenting our proposals the EU in the near future.

The key to retaining interoperability with the United States is likely to rest in the successful Operation of NATO's new Allied Command for Transformation in short - it is time for Europe to up its game - and America must be an enthusiastic enabler in this process.

Where there is a requirement for active military operations. targets are likely to be fleeting: and the opportunities for effective action will depend on the speed of our response. This will be driven by access to effective intelligence something many nations believe they have - but something that NATO lacks in an integrated form. Developing more effective Intelligence integration is a vital first step.

International Organisations

The responsibility for meeting these threats falls globally, to all of us. So where military action is required, it will be most effective, both tactically and strategically, when it comes in the form of partnerships, alliances and coalitions.

For Europe the key organisations through which we act will be NATO and the European Union. NATO will remain the cornerstone of our collective defence and for crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area. 1t is also the most important transatlantic Organisation, through which the United States will engage with its allies in planning and conducting military operations.

NATO provides a strong base from which to assemble a military response and to facilitate planning, deployment and operations. However, the Alliance will need to further develop their expeditionary and crisis management capabilities. This means investing wisely to create and maintain modern, well-equipped military forces capable of doing the job.

The success of the NATO initiatives agreed at Prague will be a real test of the Alliance's willingness to' transform itself. In turn this will be a factor in ultimately determining whether the United States sees sufficient advantage in continued engagement through NATO itself.

The EU - through its Common Foreign and Security Policy supported by the European Security and Defence Policy - will provide a complementary organisations through which we can act where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The Berlin Plus arrangements and NATO-EU transparency are key enablers to success.

In Europe, there must be a better recognition of America's huge investment in the international system of which they were key architects, from NATO to the United Nations: and an acknowledgement that the current Administration has continued to use the international system, not least on a host of key issues in the Security Council - a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, and many other cases. In turn, America must continue to work hard at its various relationships if she is to retain the support and goodwill she certainly today enjoys.

Conclusion

NATO will continue to occupy a key position in our planning. NATO will also remain the basis for our collective defence, for crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic area and for facing together new threats to our security. The North Atlantic nations understand the common threats and must come together in a common purpose.

The transatlantic relationship must also evolve beyond the parochial. It must face up the challenge elsewhere - turning to addressing the Middle East; finding a new role for Russia; establishing a confidence with China as it emerges into great power Status; and recognise India as an emerging and significant player. These opportunities to establish effective and enduring relations must not be missed. It is crucial that all allies play a part,

The US have demonstrated their willingness to remain engaged. We are fortunate that they continue to see that it is in their own interests to continue to do so. !t is certainly in ours.

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Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of the Netherlands, February 7

Over the past few weeks l have been visiting several Allied capitals, on both sides of the Atlantic. And l came away from all those visits with one strong message: it is time to put the differences of the past behind us. It is time to get back to business.

The transatlantic community has realised that we have no more time to waste. That there are simply too many threats on the horizon, too many challenges for us to tackle. Terrorism, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are confronting us with new and unprecedented Strategic environment.

Transatlantic cooperation is the most effective way to meet these challenges. Open security dialogue among likeminded Allies, and profound security cooperation in the framework of NATO are the best ways to balance the burden of getting the Job done and to get the best bang for our buck.

The first area where we see this new transatlantic realism is Afghanistan, l have said on many occasions that Afghanistan is my Number One priority. Afghanistan may be halfway around the world, but its success matters to our security right here. If the political process fails, that country will become, once again, a haven for the world's most dangerous terrorists. We must not let this happen. And we will not let it happen.

Yesterday's meeting of Defence Ministers has made that very clear. There was general agreement on extending the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. This will help spread stability beyond the capital of Kabul and assist the Karzai Government in its task of consolidating the country and strengthening its ownership of the political and economic recovery process.

We discussed the need to achieve more synergy between the command structures of ISAF and Operation "Enduring Freedom", not least for security reasons, in order to achieve the greatest political and military coherence of our efforts.

We are working with the EUROCORPS countries on deploying this HQ to Kabul once the Canadian lead comes to an end. This is very good news indeed. The use of the EUROCORPS in such a demanding mission is another sign that transatlantic security cooperation has entered a new level of maturity.

Throughout its long history, NATO has always backed up its words with deeds. My Job is to ensure that we do so again in Afghanistan, in concert with other key players such as the UN and the EU.

Another area showing transatlantic realism is the Balkans. Today, the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has improved to the point where we can safely reduce our troop presence. We are now discussing the modalities of handing over important responsibilities in Bosnia to the European Union.

This handover is not about replacing one institutional wiring diagram with another. It is a litmus test for the relationship between NATO and the EU. It is a litmus test for our ability to put behind the theological debates of the past and move toward pragmatic cooperation. And it is a litmus test for the NATO-EU arrangements we put in place with the so-called "Berlin Plus" agreement.

If this handover proceeds in a smooth and transparent way, and l have no reason to doubt this, the Balkans, Europe, and the transatlantic relationship will have made a major leap forward.

Another commitment may also be coming our way: Iraq. Let me be very clear: yes, there were differences over the war. But there cannot be the slightest doubt that winning the peace in Iraq is in everybody's collective interest.

If a legitimate Iraqi Government asks for our assistance, and if we have the support of the United Nations, NATO should not abdicate from its responsibilities. My Job, as Secretary General, is to make sure that, once we reach that point, NATO is ready to do the Job.

We face daunting challenges. As Allies consider them, they must take into account the need to provide the necessary resources to accomplish the missions they task the Alliance to carry out. No one should be under any illusions about the time and effort it will take to create the conditions for self-sustaining peace and stability in those regions.

Our missions in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and maybe at some stage in Iraq, and in addition our continuing collective defence role demonstrate that NATO remains the world's most effective Organisation at generating, leading and supporting large, multinational and long-term military operations.

This is a most impressive track record. But to maintain it requires a lot of work. Above all, it requires us to re-double our efforts to acquire the forces and capabilities we need in order to sustain the missions we take on.

We are making good progress in acquiring the capabilities we need. The NATO Response Force is up and running with an initial capability. It will ensure that all the Allies can engage together at the sharp end of military operations, so there is no division of labour between those who do the fighting and those who "do the dishes".

Together with our new Allied Command Transformation, the NRF will play another vital role as well: as a transmission belt for the latest technology, the latest doctrine, the latest thinking on defence. Because transformation of our armed forces is a challenge for all Allies, not just for a few.

l am also glad that many of our member states are looking seriously at the issue of deployability and usability. The recent difficulties in generating enough forces for ISAF have made the headlines, but the problem is not confined to Afghanistan. We face a significant shortfall in deployable forces.

If this shortfall is left unaddressed, we will soon reach a point where our political reach goes beyond our military grasp. That is why l want nations to take military reform seriously. To pull their weight. To come up with people and equipment. And this means spending on the equipment necessary to allow us to deploy our forces where they are really needed. Because capability plus deployability equals credibility.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

NATO has entered a new phase in its evolution. Through enlargement, we are bringing seven new democracies firmly into the transatlantic community. Through our partnerships - including, vitally, with Russia - we are exporting security, and our values, to the regions neighbouring the Euro-Atlantic area. And through our operations, we are together delivering hard security, in the most challenging circumstances, where it matters.

More than any other Organisation, NATO squares the circle of multilateralism and effectiveness. That is why this Alliance remains indispensable. Because in this 21st Century, we need multilateralism with teeth.

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'International Security in the Context of the Russia-NATO Relationship', Sergey B. Ivanov, Minister of Defense, Russian Federation, February 7

Let me greet the audience and cordially thank Dr. Teltschik for his and that of his colleges contribution to perfect organizing of this 40th Conference!

It gives us valuable opportunity to synchronize our Stands on the most acute issues of the European and global security.

One of our common prior tasks today - creation of comprehensive, all-inclusive and efficient System for countering international terrorism.

First steps in right direction are done. Despite all difficulties, common efforts aimed at bolstering a stronger and broader international counter-terrorist alliance draw stronger and stronger support in the world.

However, the complexity of the modern world results in new issues that should be adequately answered. We all understand that one of the core issues in modern international affairs is that of admissibility of a unilateral use of force, undertaken by a State or a group of States without relevant UN SC mandate, first of all, to fight international terrorism.

I am convinced that the Russia-NATO partnership should fester such an environment in international relations, where the use of force among other things, for combating international terrorism, would exclusively proceed within the realm of international law. It is wrong to fight terrorism with illegal techniques, and it is next to impossible.

So, what has already been done recently, where do we stand now and what should be done next?

Today, one can witness substantial common success in implementation of the international counter-terrorist strategy - quoting nothing but e.g. defeating the Taleban rule and the core Al-Qaeda infrastructures in Afghanistan; successful joint Operation by Russian, US and British special and law-enforcement agencies to suppress an attempted IGLA manpads smuggling. We have also made progress in building up international control system designed to cut off financial fueling of terrorists.

Still, there are some worrying trends at hand. One could witness activation of world-wide terrorist structures. The "spill-over" of the Al-Qaeda cells, in the first place, to the Middle East region, a partial re-building of the combat potential by the Taleban movement in Afghanistan and Pakistan are all dangerous Symptoms corroborating those assessments.

The territory of Iraq has now turned into a real "magnet for terrorists" attracting all kinds of terrorist factions' members from the whole region of a "Wider Middle East".

Today, our need is to jointly search a way out of the Iraqi crisis. That is why we are interested in the success of the United States and their allies in Iraq, and are poised to closely cooperate in order to settle down the Situation in the region politically.

Now, a couple of words on Chechnya in this context. The Russian authorities have never tried to hide what have been really going on there. On the contrary, the goal has ever been to inform the world on difficult developments in this part of Russia.

As it is known, all big terrorist formations are destroyed in Chechnya. We have now moved on and launched a political process. The referendum took place there last year, and the Constitution of the Chechen Republic was adopted by over 80 per cent of the eligible voters. The Constitution clearly states the Republic of Chechnya as an integral part of the Russian Federation. Subsequently, the legitimate President has been voted into power roughly by the same vote percentage. Still to come: election of the Chechen Parliament and singing of a treaty between the Russian Federal Authorities and the Republic of Chechnya on sharing of powers, with wide autonomy rights for Chechnya.

Nevertheless, some scattered operative gunmen units comprising Arabs, Turks, and even some West European nationals are still acting in the mountainous parts of the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation and of Georgia. They reach over there by quite definite routes - we have more than once handed over to the countries involved reliable data, including copies of passports of slain mercenaries, with entry visas to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Georgia.

These facts prove once again necessity of a deeper multi-dimensional and broader international cooperation to shut down the financial fueling of terrorist organizations and formations, wherever in the world they are trying to operate.

There is no doubt, the joint fight against international terrorism is not a unique sphere of the Russia-NATO cooperation. I am pleased to say that the Russia-NATO cooperation has outgrown the "adolescence" age.

Today the main goal is to transform the Russia-NATO Council from a political interface, which is now playing a significant role in creating spirit of the present-day System of international relations, into a factor shaping practical actions both by Russia and the Alliance, in security matters.

A bigger number of practical joint activities is needed. Specifically, in the sphere of auxiliary security technologies (rescue and humanitarian relief operations, data sharing), but alongside basic dimensions of activities of the armed forces of Russia.

It is important to state a clear turn-around towards more practical work.

Substantial progress have been achieved in the field of TMD.

Last year we started enhancing interoperability of the Russian Armed Forces and of the NATO Allied Forces for joint actions. In 2003, moving along this track of cooperation, we held more than 20 activities, both in NATO member-states' territories and in Russia. We are ready to go ahead in cooperation, among other things, in organizing bilateral joint exercises with the "coalition of the willing" NATO States.

I would like to specially focus upon a renewed dialog between NATO and Russia on the SOFA. Status-of-Forces Agreement. We believe that such an agreement will lend an additional impetus to further cooperation in joint training and exercising, to command-staff and troops field exercises to be held at training centers located upon national territories.

The Framework Agreement on Submarine Emergency Crew Escape and Rescue, that was signed here in Munich a year ago is of exceptional importance for a better practical cooperation. It may seem to be purely technical, but in reality it has brought the Russia-NATO interaction up to quite a new practical level.

Yet another problem that needs to be addressed within the Russia-NATO cooperative framework is non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I think that the Russia-NATO mechanism of interaction could turn into the right tool for substantial progress in that sphere. I find it important to tackle those cooperation issues - first at politico-military, thereafter - at military and technological level - to prevent terrorist attacks or following erroneous or accidental use of various WMD-components and to neutralize after-effects of such uses. Ultimately, the nature of threat posed by international terrorist organizations excludes efficient counteraction on a narrow nation-by-nation basis or even within the framework of such an organization as the NATO. Certainly, Russia and NATO should not be substitutes for either the UN or the IAEA. But now, I believe there is an ample opportunity to work out on the basis of the NATO-Russia Council Standards and technologies for crisis response and crisis prevention activities.

Insomuch as we can, we support the efforts in order to bring Pakistan into the fold of non-proliferation arrangements.

Military and technical, cooperation between the Russia and NATO, regrettably, remains at its initial stage of development and is remarkably lagging behind, both in terms of its dynamics and deliverables, the ongoing joint programs in the in the military and political sphere. Still, to date, we judge the following cooperation prospects as promising ones:

• technological support for programs outlined as priority ones in the Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, notably, including the TMD, soon-to-be-cut ammunition disposal and military hardware dismantlement;
• Upgrade efforts, assuring serviceability and maintenance of Soviet-made arms and military equipment in Service with in NATO states;

• technological support for programs outlined as priority efforts in the Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, notably, including TMD, soon-to-be-cut ammunition disposal and military hardware dismantlement;
• Upgrade efforts and serviceability and maintenance of Soviet-made arms and military equipment in Service with NATO states;
• participation of Russian experts on regular basis in activities organized by the NATO agencies and committees.

• first, on implementation of the principle of transparency in military policy-making and military planning;
• second, on giving up with the Alliance-centric principle for major operations.

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'NATO and the Greater Middle East', Senator Richard G. Lugar (Republican - Indiana), Chairman, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 7

NATO was founded to address the major security challenge of the time, the Soviet Union. After winning the Cold War, NATO again took on the greatest security challenge of the time-namely, extending a zone of peace and stability to the new and newly freed states of eastern and central Europe and the Balkans. NATO's decision to go "out of area," rather than "out of business" has proven to be wise, despite hesitation and doubts at the beginning.

Now the world-and NATO-faces a major new security challenge. It is the threat of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, failed states and instability that arises in major part from extremist organizations in the Greater Middle East. The terrorist ideology generated there has global reach. The region is the prime source of what I believe is the greatest single threat to modern civilization in the 21st Century-that is, the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. We must promote security and stability in this vast but troubled region, where demographics, religious extremism, autocratic governments, stagnant economic Systems, and war have often overwhelmed the talents of its peoples and the wealth of its natural resources.

Common Interest

It is a challenge for all of us in the West, Norm Americans and Europeans alike. Instability, poverty and joblessness increase the flow of migrants to Europe. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict causes unrest and discord among Europe's Muslim populations. For some, this long-standing struggle is both a reason and an excuse for anti-Americanism and anti-western sentiments in the Arab world.

The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, proved that two oceans are not sufficient to protect my homeland from the threat of Islamic terrorism. Yet Europe is, geographically, even more vulnerable. Indeed, many of the September 11 plotters planned their attacks in Europe and were based there. AI Qaeda has already launched a deadly attack against one NATO member, Turkey. AI Qaeda tried to blow up the plane of another, France. AI Qaeda has attacked European citizens throughout the world. The Greater Middle East remains the home of many dangerous WMD capabilities-nuclear, chemical and biological.

Iraq and Beyond

As we deliberate together on how we can best meet the central security challenge of our time, we should not ignore the repercussions caused by the U.S. military action in Iraq. The United States' decision to go to war, the process and timing of this decision, and the recruitment of supportive allies-all this deeply divided many in Europe from America, and opened a fissure in NATO. NATO has largely healed that breach, but considerable discord remains. As Lord Robertson told the North Atlantic Council upon his departure last December, "With Saddam now captured, a cancer has been removed from Iraq and the Middle East." But the allies and the Middle East don't have the luxury of a lengthy period of recuperation from that Operation.

It is now time to look forward in Iraq. It is in the interest of European countries and the United States that Iraq becomes a stable democratic country which embraces the goals of individual, religious and political freedom and a market economic System which could lead to a much higher Standard of living for all of its citizens.

Hundreds of millions of people in the Greater Middle East suffer from grinding poverty and hopelessness. As a result, some young people have been attracted to terrorism and express their despair by lashing out at others more fortunate. At the extreme, some have chosen suicidal missions.

We all recognize the huge gaps between the world's rich and poor. Some 24,000 people die each day from starvation and another 8,000 die daily from combinations of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malnutrition. We are working through the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and bilateral programs to alleviate the suffering.

But if we produce in Afghanistan and Iraq successful states which embrace freedom and enjoy broadly shared economic development, this could generate extraordinary encouragement to millions of people now mired in hopelessness.

Long Term Strategy

Terrorism and Islamic extremism, Afghanistan, and now Iraq are three separate but related fronts which are merging as part of a single Strategic focus. As President Bush outlined in his London speech, the long-term strategy is to replace the region's pervasive repression, intolerance and Stagnation with freedom, democracy and prosperity. The war on terrorism is a crucial part of this broad and ambitious agenda. And in that speech, the President rejected the false Charge of unilateralist. Although America will never be afraid to act alone if it must, we clearly prefer effective multilateralism. We seek and welcome partners to help stabilize and secure this troubled region.

In particular, we seek the help of NATO.

NATO has already identified Central Asia and the Caucasus as areas of potential concern. NATO should continue along the path it started in this regard at the December ministerials. But the Greater Middle East is another source of conflict now and for years to come. I believe that NATO must become more fully engaged in this area, using both its military and its political strength. This shift in focus will not take place in a vacuum. And it will not provide a quick fix. Victory in the Cold War resulted from decisions made some 50 years before.

Then, NATO was part of web of institutions that brought Europe and America together militarily, economically, and politically against a common foe. Today, we must meet the challenge of the Greater Middle East by forging new arrangements and adopting our institutions across a broad front. I see, for instance, the G-8 as a key Instrument to effect long-term political and economic change. It was the G-8, for example, that launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and has pledged an additional $10 billion over 10 years for Nunn-Lugar programs in the former Soviet Union. And I see a role for stronger U.S.-E.U. cooperation on an outward-looking agenda. This will help drive home the point which has, I hope, come to be the prevailing opinion on this side of the Atlantic- namely, that Europe's future lies in being a partner with the United States, not a counterweight to it.

NATO's Role

NATO, too, must adapt to play its part in this new transatlantic program for peace, justice and security in the Greater Middle East. At Prague, NATO launched its military transformation for the 21st Century. At the Istanbul summit in June, NATO can finish the work of Prague and embark upon a complementary political transformation for the new era. This would involve orienting NATO to look outward toward the Greater Middle East and beyond, and to realign the alliance's decision-making processes to match the new missions that flow from its military transformation. In my view, the Istanbul summit represents an opportunity to complete the process of reunifying the Alliance by coming to a political agreement on NATO's role in the Greater Middle East.

Let me outline some of the challenges and possibilities. First, NATO can play a role in combating the number one threat from the region-development of WMD capabilities. Joint diplomacy with one of our NATO partners, Britain, has brought apparent success in Libya, which has promised to dismantle its clandestine nuclear and chemical weapons programs. Similarly, we share with our European partners grave concern about the nuclear program in Iran. We appreciate European diplomatic efforts to induce the Iranians to open up to more International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

Secondly, it is time for NATO members to become more formally involved in helping to stop the spread of WMD capabilities by committing themselves to President Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). This is an important complement to the first line of defense against weapons proliferation, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Nunn-Lugar has already secured and dismantled thousands of nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which I introduced and was recently signed into law by President Bush, allocates $50 million for U.S. threat reduction programs to address weapons of mass destruction threats outside the former Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar program seeks to stop proliferation at its source, and PSI forms a second line of defense by attempting to interdict shipments of illegal weapons and materials on the high seas. The program has already scored one important but little-noticed victory in October, 2003, when it intercepted nuclear-weapon-related material bound for Libya. This helped persuade Libya to continue negotiating an end to its WMD program. In addition to bringing more warships, NATO's intelligence and surveillance capabilities would be a major boost to PSI efforts in the region.

Thirdly, NATO can also be more effective in the central security challenge of the region- namely, fighting terrorist networks and protecting vulnerable sea and land lines of communication. If NATO is to be prepared to take part in future Afghanistan-like operations, it must continue its transformation to a post-Cold War military alliance, with lighter, more flexible forces that are dedicated to such missions and can be deployed quickly over long distances. Supreme Allied Commander, General James Jones, has made an admirable start in working with allies to establish the NATO Response Force. We should encourage Gen. Jones and all NATO allies to achieve rapid progress.

Lastly, in the short term, I believe that NATO, at Istanbul, must adopt a formal role in Iraq and become comprehensively involved in the Iraqi democratic transformation. NATO's interest in a successful Iraq is every bit as strong as ours. NATO's involvement, by further internationalizing the reconstruction effort, will make that outcome more likely. Defining NATO's role in Iraq should be a top priority of Istanbul. The Europeans, as much as the Americans, want both a stable Iraq and a strong NATO to emerge from the Iraq conflict. In fact, the two goals are related: in order to fully repair NATO, we need to successfully resolve Iraq.

Post-conflict reconstruction

I met last Tuesday with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan about the new U.N. mission to Iraq. He told me his representatives plan to meet with a wide variety of political players inside Iraq as they plan the transition to sovereignty. They will address the constitutional framework, elections, participation by all major religious and demographic groups, law enforcement and national security. The United Nations will also work with neighboring nations to help bring peace and security to the new Iraq. The United States and NATO should work closely with the U.N. Secretary General to ensure a successful mission.

In the meantime, we in NATO must devise means whereby European members of the Alliance can play larger roles in postwar reconstruction and stabilization. NATO must be a full-spectrum alliance. NATO should develop a better organized Standing capacity to perform the kind of stabilization and reconstruction missions that will be needed.

To develop these capabilities-and equally important, to ensure that they can be delivered "the day after" a conflict ends-important changes are necessary on both sides of the Atlantic. I recently convened the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Policy Advisory Group to propose ways in which my own country can strengthen its capacity to respond to complex overseas crises. We hope to work with President Bush to establish a System to recruit and train civilian personnel with a variety of skills who can be mobilized on short notice to participate in post-conflict operations. The NATO Alliance should undertake a similar examination. Post-conflict reconstruction is not going away. Nation-building may be one of the most important missions for the Alliance of this Century.

Partnership

And lastly, although NATO is first a military alliance, there are other ways it can contribute to the peace and stability of the Greater Middle East. President Bush has correctly identified the lack of democracy as one of the prime sources of radicalism in the region. The administration has launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative to support economic and political reform in the region. President Bush has provided the vehicle and it is now our responsibility to propose specific components. I suggest the Alliance commit itself here in Munich to creating and shaping that substance by the time of the Istanbul summit.

Our European allies rightly insist that the Middle East Peace Initiative should complement, not substitute for, the EU-Mediterranean Initiative launched in Barcelona in 1995. NATO should take the lessons learned from its own Mediterranean Dialogue with seven Middle East nations, including Israel, and launch at the Istanbul summit a major new effort open to countries throughout the Greater Middle East, a program which might be called Cooperation for Peace.

This program would cover many forms of military cooperation and education, much as Partnership for Peace did with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Unlike Partnership for Peace, the aim would not be eventual NATO membership. But following the Partnership for Peace model, a bold NATO Cooperation for Peace program such as this could help militaries in the region with training and education for peace-keeping missions, counter-terrorism, and border security, as well as with defense reform, and with important issues related to civilian control of the military.

NATO's work with Greater Middle Eastern militaries would signal to the region's political and civilian institutions that they can proceed with reform efforts under helpful, if not protective, Western support. As many East and Central European military figures can attest, their sense of confidence in developing civil society was bolstered by their own interactions with Western military and policy leaders through Partnership for Peace.

The search for stability in the Greater Middle East must proceed hand in hand with the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Too many Muslims in the region judge the U.S. solely by its perceived unwavering support for Israel, just as too many Americans see Muslims solely through the prism of their fear of terrorism. A new Transatlantic Middle East Peace Initiative could pump new life into the "Roadmap". Of equal importance, NATO must remain alert to the possibilities of a stabilization and reconstruction effort in connection with any final settlement, along with efforts modeled after the Proliferation Security Initiative and Partnership for Peace. Creative NATO initiatives are timely and necessary.

Conclusion

The proposals I have outlined follow from the psychological and physical changes I believe NATO has experienced over the past year. We are rebounding from major disagreements over how to reorder the world and the role that military force plays in such reordering. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic have drawn important lessons from 2003. They now dare to entertain roles for NATO that were unthinkable only six to nine months ago.

Having made something of a leap of faith to Afghanistan and beyond, there clearly is a will. But there is not yet a way. Our partners on the continent must match these new aspirations with resources and military capabilities to give substance to their enlarged visions. They must ensure that in each NATO nation the military restructuring underway doesn't lead to budget cutting, but instead generates robust spending on 21st Century forces. Otherwise, the next big crisis will return us to the sterile debates of 2003. This will require political commitment and hard work, not least because many of our publics remain skeptical. They prefer a trial reconciliation between the two sides of the Atlantic before embarking on another honeymoon.

Alliance leaders' dreams of new roles for NATO will turn into nightmares if they are not firmly based on political and economic realities. Afghanistan today, perhaps Iraq in a few months, and, I dare to suggest, the Greater Middle East in the next few years. The realization of this vision will not come on the cheap, either politically or monetarily. But the basis for NATO vision and sustained action is sound.

We can achieve greater security through careful mitigation of well-defined threats. We can extend our idealism to create broad opportunities for millions of people to enjoy more promising lives for themselves and their children.

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Senator John McCain, (Republican - Arizona), Chairman, US Senate Commerce Committee, February 7

History may disregard a year as an insignificant measure of time and events. But we can be forgiven for thinking the year just passed was longer and more momentous than most, considering how the distress caused by discord among friends seems to slow time and exaggerate the magnitude of our disagreement and its consequences. When we met last year, we gave ample voice to our disagreements, and, as is my habit of many years, I sought enthusiastically to participate in the festivities. I have long held, perhaps to my disadvantage, the maxim that a fight not joined is a fight not enjoyed. However, my regard for our alliance, an alliance in which my country confides not only a narrowly calculated national interest, but our best hopes for the progress of humanity, imposes on me an Obligation not to aggravate the occasional strains in relations among allies. Rather, it is our duty to help fortify our common purpose in Service to the ideals that made our alliance more than a collective response to a once imposing and now finished threat, but a fraternal, if occasionally fractious, order of liberal democracies with the will and the means to protect our shared values from outside threats, and to help advance them where they have too long be denied to others.

The months before the liberation of Iraq were an unhappy time in trans-Atlantic relations, dividing the United States from some of our core European allies and dividing Europe itself. That time is behind us, but it demonstrates why the Chinese characters for crisis mean "danger" and "opportunity". The danger of disarray and discord has diminished. Ahead of us lie historic opportunities where American and European interests and approaches converge. Like our shared commitment to rebuild Afghanistan, our shared interest in the democratic future of Iraq and reform of the greater Middle East presents the Euro-Atlantic community with a singular opportunity to use our power and our principles to promote a shared purpose in a region whose political and economic decay threatens all of us. Deepening our commitment to the Middle East's democratic transformation, and redoubling our efforts to build democratic stability in Europe's borderlands, will demonstrate that the values that unite us are too strong a bond to be sundered by a temporary division over how to address Saddam Hussein's defiance of the international community.

Our disagreements over the Iraq war last year obscured a revolutionary/ change in NATO that will prove to be of greater consequence than our passing dispute. For the first time in its history, the Alliance took command of a military Operation outside of Europe. That NATO's flag flies over Kabul today, with NATO forces deployed thousands of miles from Berlin and London, would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. Indeed, exactly one year ago, many predicted the approaching demise of NATO. Yet, today, an alliance forged to protect Western Europe against the Soviet threat Stands as guarantor of a landlocked Asian nation's democratic future.

Afghanistan demonstrates the extraordinary potential of our alliance to undertake new missions in defense of shared values. It also highlights the responsibilities that accompany our ambitions to build democratic security in the greater Middle East. Americans welcome the leadership shown by Germany and other allies in Afghanistan, and I hope our allies welcome America's commitment to multilateralism through NATO in a U.N. Security Council-endorsed mission. Our progress in Afghanistan is constrained by an insufficient commitment of forces and resources to what remains a very small peacekeeping Operation centered in two of Afghanistan's most secure cities. Our European friends who want the United States to work multilaterally in operations approved by the UN and led by NATO have their model in Afghanistan. Let us all match our political commitment with a commensurate commitment of men and resources sufficient to ensure the success of our mission.

Just as America and Europe have converged on our approach to Afghanistan, so too do we agree on our goals in Iraq: a stable, secure, self-governing country on a democratic path that threatens no neighbor. All members of the Euro-Atlantic community stand to gain - or lose - as much as we do from the outcome of our mission. Iraq's democratic transformation will put the region that produced Saddam Hussein, the Taliban, and AI Qaeda on a new course in which democratic expression and economic opportunity, rather than a radicalizing mix of poverty, extremism, and alienation, defame a new modernity in the Arab world that does not threaten its people or its neighbors.

Europe shares a border with Iraq, in Turkey. Failure in Iraq would embolden and further radicalize extremists throughout the Muslim world - including in Western Europe's Muslim communities. Failure in Iraq would strengthen the hand of the terrorists of AI Qaeda, whom we know have planned attacks in Western Europe. Failure in Iraq would strengthen the hand of the hard-line clerics in Tehran and in Saudi Arabia, both of whom fear secular democracy in the majority-Shiite Iraq. Success in Iraq would embolden Iranian reformers and help push Syria in the direction of an accommodation with the West on weapons of mass destruction. Failure in Iraq would send an unmistakable sign of weakness and retreat to those who wish us ill. In short, the only "exit strategy" for Iraq is victory.

Already we are seeing some dividends from the progress since Saddam's downfall. Libya has decided to end its weapons of mass destruction programs and fully cooperate with international verification of its promises. Iran has agreed to expanded international inspections of suspect nuclear weapons facilities. Syria has engaged with Turkey in a fashion not seen for decades and has proposed peace talks with Israel. A new debate over reform and renewal in the Arab world has broken out, and we see measured signs of progress, including greater space for civil society and some fledgling democratic reforms, in a number of Arab states from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. Most importantly, Iraqis are participating in an intensive debate over the form and character of their new government, once full Iraqi sovereignty is restored on July first. That Iraqis are marching not to get American and coalition forces out, but to seek a greater say in their democratic future, is a defining event of our era.

Concerns that military intervention in Iraq would set the Middle East on fire were mistaken. No friendly Arab regimes have fallen from popular pressures generated by the conflict. Iraq has not disintegrated along ethnic lines. The predicted wide-scale humanitarian crisis did not occur. The vast majority of Iraqis are united in rejecting Saddam's brutal legacy. Neither Israel nor Turkey were drawn into the war, and both are now more secure. The international terrorists and Baathists operating in Iraq have killed more Iraqis than coalition military forces and, consequently, have increasingly lost support from within Iraqi society. NATO has not been destroyed by allied divisions over the war. Admittedly, we have not found stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. But we have found ample evidence of concealment and deception - along with thousands of mass graves.

With the region out from under the shadow of Saddam's tyranny, a historic opportunity exists for the Euro-Atlantic community to support and encourage positive change in Iraq and across the Middle East. Success in Iraq would empower moderate, progressive political leaders across the Arab world, including women, whose voices too frequently have been drowned out by Middle Eastern dictators. America and Europe have too often supported the false stability of authoritarian rulers in the Middle East. We should agree that those days are over. The upcoming G-8, US-EU, and Istanbul summits offer us an opportunity to focus the power of our values on the democratic transformation of the greater Middle East, and to advance democratic reform across wider Europe. Achieving these goals will require less the application of military force than leveraging the West's economic, political and diplomatic resources to reinforce our shared commitment to the progress of freedom. A grand Western project to support democratic reform across the greater Middle East should be welcomed in Europe, for it requires much more of the soft power embodied in "trade and aid" than the hard power of "shock and awe."

We should pledge to match our commitment to Afghanistan's democratic development with the necessary manpower and resources to meet NATO's goals to provide security across the country. We should build on the success of the NATO mission in Afghanistan by expanding NATO's role in Iraq. NATO command of the southern third of Iraq would decisively put to rest lingering charges of alliance divisions over Iraq and bring to bear every alliance member's capabilities to support Iraq's democratic future. We should find new ways for NATO and the G-8 to engage, politically, economically, and militarily, with nations in the greater Middle East who would welcome Western expertise in promoting political and economic reform, controlling proliferation, fighting terrorism, and protecting human rights.

Turkey, Europe's only majority Muslim nation, will be central to the new Atlantic project in the Middle East. Turkey's membership in the European Union will make Europe stronger, not weaker, and will be a gateway for a new level of Euro-Atlantic engagement with the Muslim world at its doorstep. Turkey has made critical progress on judicial and human rights reforms, meeting the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, and resolving the Cyprus conflict. Turkey has made vast contributions to Euro-Atlantic security in Southeast Europe, the Black Sea region, and the greater Middle East. We cannot build a new NATO and a Euro-Atlantic alliance that will endure in this Century without Turkey as a full and equal member of our community and the institutions of the West.

In Istanbul, NATO members should commit to accelerating the alliance's transformation by giving it the capabilities to meet new threats, so that Americans and Europeans can meet them together. This year, for the first time, the new NATO Response Force will give the alliance the capability to rapidly deploy combat-ready forces within and beyond Europe. But NATO remains hobbled by bloated national force structures and stagnating defense budgets in many long-standing member states. We should all be concerned that of 2 million men under arms among NATO's European members, barely 5% are deployable and sustainable on an expeditionary basis. Europeans who want Europe to play a meaningful role defending international security, and who complain when other countries do not take them seriously, should lead their nations to pursue aggressive defense reforms that give them the capability to do so.

The trans-Atlantic community should also build concretely on the enlargement of NATO and the E.U. to expand the frontiers of freedom in Europe. Ten million people in Belarus continue to be held hostage to Europe's last dictator in Minsk. Working with Poland and the new Baltic members of NATO and the E.U., the West should pursue a concerted strategy to roll back Lukashenko's tyranny. In Ukraine, the United States and Europe should work assertively for free and fair elections this fall, and pledge in Istanbul that Ukraine will be welcomed into Euro-Atlantic institutions as soon as it meets basic Standards of democracy. Europe should lead on finding a swift and peaceful settlement to the frozen conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Nagomo-Karabakh. NATO should pledge robust support and security assistance to our democratic allies in Georgia, whose aspirations to join Western political and security institutions we should welcome and encourage.

Notwithstanding all the challenges and opportunities before us, we cannot tire or grow disinterested by our common work in the Balkans. This, after all, was our first warning that we faced new challenges after the end of the Cold War, where our commitment to human rights and democracy were first tested, and where NATO began its adaptation. We are within sight of our objectives. Albania, Macedonia and Croatia should be given more encouragement at the Istanbul summit on their path to NATO membership. Bosnia and Serbia should be included in NATO's Partnership for Peace. Once its last indicted war criminals are delivered to the Hague, we should encourage Serbia's full participation in the Euro-Atlantic community.

We in the West should also hold Russia to the same Standards of democracy and justice that we expect from Russia's neighbors. Friends, let me speak forthrightly, and with the best interests of the United States, Europe, and Russia in mind: President Putin's rule has lately been characterized by the dismantling of Russia's independent media, a fierce crackdown on the political Opposition, the prosecution of a bloody war against Chechnya's civilian population, and a new assertiveness that challenges the democratic and territorial integrity of Russia's sovereign neighbors.

Under President Putin, Russia has refused to comply with the terms of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Russian troops occupy parts of Georgia and Moldova. Russia has effectively annexed the Georgian province of Abkhazia. Moscow has supported attempts to overthrow neighboring governments that appear too independent of Russia's embrace. Russian naval forces recently attempted to assert control in the channel connecting the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea from Ukraine. Russian secret Services are credibly accused of meddling in elections in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russian agents are working to bring Ukraine further into Moscow's orbit. Russian support sustains Europe's last dictatorship in Belarus. And Moscow has attempted to cynically manipulate Latvia's Russian minority and enforced its stranglehold on energy supplies into Latvia in Order to squeeze the democratic government in Riga. Russia's assertion of political control over its neighbors is the international dimension of rising state control at home.

The dramatic deterioration of democracy in Russia calls into question the fundamental premises of our Russia policy since 1991. Russia's privileged access to critical Euro-Atlantic institutions was premised on the understanding that President Putin was committed to free markets, the rule of law, pluralist democracy, journalistic freedom, the lawful constraint of the intelligence and security Services, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors. These now appear to be false premises. It is time to send a strong signal that un-democratic behavior and threats to the sovereignty and liberty of her neighbors will not pro fit Russia nor help her build upon the ruins of her tragic past a new society and a place in the world as an enduring and admired great power, but will exclude her from the Company of Western democracies and consign her to the distrust and misfortune she had begun to escape in the more hopeful days of her liberation from tyranny.

A focus on the Euro-Atlantic community's responsibilities toward the greater Middle East and wider Europe reminds us of how much NATO and Europe themselves have changed since the end of the Cold War made pundits question whether NATO would survive at all. With NATO's enlargement to twenty-six at Istanbul, our goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace moves decisively forward - and with it NATO's ability to foster peace and stability beyond Europe's borders. With the European Union's enlargement this May, we witness another step forward in the historic unification of a continent of democracies. The future of the trans-Atlantic partnership that has made this progress possible now rests on our hopes of working together to democratize Europe's borderlands and the countries of the greater Middle East, many of which are closer to Europe than some European nations are from each other.

The European Union has identified terrorism, proliferation, and state failure as among the principal threats to Europe. These are also the principal threats to the United States. The values we bring to bear in the face of these common threats bind us still, and the scale of the challenges we face requires us to act together. I trust we can continue to do so with the success that has characterized the most remarkable and enduring political-military alliance the world has ever known, and the friendship that has meant as much to the rest of the world as it has meant to us.

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Solomon Passy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Bulgaria; Chairman-in-Office, OSCE, February 7

Allow me first of all to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Horst Teltschik and his associates for their leadership and for giving us the chance to celebrate this jubilee 40th Munich Conference on Security Policy. I commend their enthusiasm and perseverance in keeping up and further enriching, over the last six years or so, the long-standing tradition of this distinguished international security forum.

The last 15 years have seen very dynamic developments and dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic area in terms of international relations and the global security architecture. The overall picture is unrecognizable compared to what it was in the period before the fall of the Berlin Wall. This requires a new vision and new ways of thinking by the main international organizations if they are to meet the new challenges.

NATO and the EU are undoubtedly the leading actors in this new world. Both organizations are developing successfully and dynamically within the new context. Looking at the way they have developed, it is interesting to try to imagine what the OSCE will look like 15 years from now.

The processes driving change at NATO and the EU are relevant to a great extent for the OSCE as well. For that reason, I propose to take a quick look at the key milestones in the development of all these organizations. In a few weeks NATO will have 26 member-states - 10 more than at the beginning of 1989. Three more accession countries are fulfilling their action plans and preparing for membership as well.

At the end of the 1980s, the EU encompassed 12 states. After the conclusion of the fifth wave of enlargement which includes Bulgaria that number will have more than doubled to 27. These figures speak for themselves about the scale of the changes that are going on.

At the beginning of the 1990s, there were still heated discussions in NATO on the scope of responsibility of the Alliance, especially concerning so-called "out of area" missions and operations. Realities on the ground resolved this debate at an amazing pace.

Today, NATO is not only continuing its operations in the Western Balkans - Kosovo and Bosnia. It is also taking over ISAF in Afghanistan and provides assistance to Alliance member countries which are active in Iraq. A discussion is going on about a greater involvement of NATO in the reconstruction and stabilization of this country.

The scope of Partnership for Peace and the intensity of the work related to it, as well as other co-operation and outreach operations have expanded the zone of NATO activities to cover virtually the entire geographical span of the OSCE - and as you know, we are 55 countries, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Only a few years ago, problems related to involvement in the fight against terrorism, border security and countering new challenges were a matter of controversy in NATO. September 11, 2001 put a brutal end to those debates. Now all of these issues, which can be grouped together under the heading of new threats to our common security, are very definitely on the Alliance's agenda.

Countering the new challenges to security has had a dramatic impact on armed forces and their functions, armaments and equipment. It has required sweeping changes in the Strategic posture of NATO forces, especially those of the United States. Could you imagine a similar debate 15 years ago! So history gave a definite answer to the question "should NATO touch out-of- area issues". NATO in the future is expected to tackle mainly, if not only, out-of-area issues.

Old ways of thinking from the time of the Cold war are firmly in the past. The key words today are flexibility and the ability to react quickly. There is increasingly widespread recognition in the Euro-Atlantic region that changes in Strategic posture are a necessity for all our countries. Bulgaria is volunteering to host US military facilities which will provide common defense for all of us against common threats.

As far as the EU is concerned, alongside enlargement there have been at least three other striking developments.

Firstly, within a very short period, the EU defined and launched its own common security and defense policy. It established mechanisms for interaction with NATO and successfully started its first operations - in the Republic of Macedonia and in Congo. The EU is also preparing to take on peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. All this would have been unthinkable just five years ago.

The second element that I would like to emphasize is the common European currency. The launch of the Euro reflected a bold vision of the future, not only of the continent, but of the whole world.

It is also worth mentioning the new European Constitution, which is currently under discussion, and which underlines the fact that we in Europe have developed a common European identity. Let us note also that this constitution has a completely visionary Interpretation of the concept of national sovereignty and therefore limits the scope of issues that require a consensus to be decided upon. This was also unthinkable a decade ago.

Against this backdrop of dramatic change in our partner organizations, it is worth reflecting on what the OSCE could look like about 15 years from now. How should the Organization respond to the dynamic processes underway in our region and in participating States so that it does not lose its relevance and increases the added value it provides to the States?

In the first place, I am confident that sooner or later the debate on the method of decision-making- consensus - in the organization will be resumed. Consensus has the great advantage that when a decision is made in the OSCE, it has the backing of 55 sovereign states, on whom it is politically binding. The disadvantage is, of course, that important action can be too easily blocked by a single country. We risk decision-making on a "lowest common denominator" basis. And therefore we move forward at the speed of the slowest ship in the convoy. And some of the small ships are still very slow.

I am fully aware that making changes in this respect will be difficult. They require the concerted will and conviction of all participating States. However, this does not mean that the effort should not be made.

Secondly, we should emphasize the importance of our field missions. If there is something that makes the OSCE uniquely valuable, it is the expertise of the field missions - the "eyes and ears" of the organization as they were called by my predecessor Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. At present there are 18 field missions in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. They represent a long-term presence which can develop real expertise. They do not seek to impose solutions from outside but work closely with the authorities and with civil society to help meet needs which the countries themselves help to define - everything from training police officers to drafting a new constitution. If these missions are not effective, we risk reducing the OSCE to little more than just one of many international bodies producing paper.

I would also like to mention that my recent visit to Georgia and the meetings I had there are making me confident that positive developments can be expected in the future. I was impressed by the tremendous work the OSCE is doing in Georgia and was really encouraged by the fact that the OSCE is so needed by its participating states.

We should use all the opportunities and the existing good will for outreach activities and partnerships in Asia and the Mediterranean.

Talking about the Mediterranean, I would like especially to note that the EU, NATO and the OSCE each have their own formats for cooperation in this region, with different emphases and dimensions. It could be said that the EU is in the lead. At the same time, however, the seriousness and the complexity of the problems we face in the Mediterranean region call for full use of the existing potential, so that the efforts of our organizations can be mutually reinforcing and even coordinated. Perhaps a EU-NATO-Mediterranean Conference could provide a good Start for such a process.

In this context, I would like specifically to mention relations with Libya. Just a few weeks ago this country began a serious positive change in its policy. It demonstrated its willingness to terminate its programs for developing weapons of mass destruction. This responsible move deserves strong encouragement. It marks a sharp contrast to the destructive policy of Saddam Hussein 's regime, which brought so much misery and misfortune to the Iraqi people and ultimately forced the international community to use extreme measures.

In the last three years, including during our term on the Security Council, Bulgaria played a pilot role in changing relations with Libya. However, apart from the positive actions on the weapons of mass destruction, radical progress is also needed in another important field, namely human rights. Organizations such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, with their clear competencies in the field of human rights protection, could render valuable assistance to Tripoli to resolve outstanding issues.

Another key OSCE player is Russia. Russia is undoubtedly a crucial factor in Euro-Atlantic security, as well as in all other fields. In the past 15 years Russia and the Western countries have come a long way, which brought them to a closer and better mutual understanding. Today we witness a very productive and large-scale interaction in the NATO-Russia Council, especially in the fight against terrorism and countering the new challenges.

As far as current issues within the OSCE are concerned, I am confident that the contradictions that occurred before and during the Maastricht foreign ministers' meeting in December - when we were unable to agree a Ministerial Declaration because of differences over key regional issues - will prove to be temporary. I am convinced that eventually the common interest will prevail and the OSCE will show itself to be a truly effective international Instrument for resolving problems, including our so-called frozen conflicts.

I also believe that the OSCE, with its own pace and logic, will move, like NATO, towards a more active contribution and engagement in adjacent areas. An example of this is our partnership with Afghanistan and with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Events, as we have seen, are dynamic. I am confident that the OSCE will continue to demonstrate its dynamism in response to the new challenges which we all face.

After 15 years we can expect new members of the OSCE coming from different continents. Maybe at this future juncture NATO and the EU will grow from 26 or 27 to 36 or 37 countries, and the OSCE from 55 to 65 or 75. And the Euro-Atlantic area will span not only from Vancouver to Vladivostok, but from Vladivostok from Vancouver as well.

If the post-Iraq war momentum is maintained, we can expect in the next 15 years more democracy and less tyranny globally and a far better world.

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Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, United States of America, February 7

Thank you very much and good morning Horst, Herr von Kleist, and ministers, parliamentarians. It's good to see so many old friends here.

I am delighted to be here for this important gathering, and it is an important gathering. I guess I have been coming to this Conference off and on for several decades now, and I've always found the exchanges informative and interesting, sometimes amusing.

It has been interesting watching the remarkable changes that have taken place from year to year between these Conferences and certainly the last year has been no exception.

Consider what has taken place in the 12 months since we met here:

In one year, NATO has undergone probably more positive change than in most ten-year periods in its history.

• We've streamlined the NATO Command Structure;
• We've stood up a new NATO Response Force;
• Stood up a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Battalion;
• Worked with Poland and Spain to stand up a Multinational Division in south central Iraq;
• Stood up a transformation command that's working with Allies and indeed friends and Allies from all over the world to improve interoperability and our ability to work together;
• Deployed NATO forces to lead the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan - the Alliance's first mission outside of Europe and the North Atlantic area;
• And we are preparing to welcome seven important new members to the Alliance at the Istanbul Summit later this year.

• Morocco now has a diverse new Parliament, and the King has called for it to extend rights to women.
• In Bahrain, citizens recently elected their own Parliament for the first time in three decades.
• Oman has extended the right to vote to all of its adult citizens.
• Qatar has adopted a new constitution.
• Kuwait has a directly-elected national assembly now.
• Jordan has held historic elections this last summer.

• Counter-terrorism;
• Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction;
• Peacekeeping;
• Border security;
• Opportunities for attendance at NATO schools;
• Participation in the Partnership for Peace exercises.

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'Future of NATO', Dr Peter Struck, Member of the German Bundestag, Federal Minster of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany, February 7

Whereas not so long ago a frequent question was: "Is there a future for NATO?" the questions asked today are : "What is the future of NATO?", and: "What must we do so that NATO can continue to perform its task in future?".

I believe that the "existential crisis" of NATO which some people forecast is a thing of the past. Even so, not all questions on the future course of the Alliance have been answered yet. The NATO Prague summit in 2002 was the decisive step forward. The decidedly global orientation of the Alliance embodied in the commitments undertaken at that summit, in keeping with the new security situation, is right.

The Alliance must be able to defend the security interests of its members wherever they are endangered. Otherwise it will lose its relevance. The decisions taken in Prague on enlargement of the Alliance, on reform of its command structure and on transformation of its forces - reflected particularly in the establishment of a NATO Response Force - laid the foundations for the fact that today, at the beginning of the year 2004, we are discussing the role and operations of NATO under changed conditions.

In Istanbul the Alliance must therefore issue a clear message:

• First: The members of the Euro-Atlantic community are determined to maintain and further develop NATO as their central security institution.
• Second: The adaptation of the armed forces of the Alliance to the security environment of the 21st century must be completed as swiftly as possible.
• Third: NATO is taking on an increased amount of international responsibility and is contributing decisively to mitigating dangers to our security in crisis regions - for instance, in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.

• so that as the largest European partner in the Alliance, Germany can continue to accept responsibility for safeguarding peace, and
• the Bundeswehr can make its contribution to the necessary transformation of NATO.

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© 2003 The Acronym Institute.