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'[A] new relationship with NATO', US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow, February 13

'U.S., European and Russian Interests Best Served by Cooperating', February 13, 2004.

"RUSSIA: BETWEEN EUROPEANISM AND ATLANTICISM?"

Speech by Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation

Center for European Security Studies
Winter Academy
Moscow - February 13, 2004

It's a pleasure to be here once again to participate in the Winter Academy. Not only does Tatyana make you feel welcome, but she is also a powerful source of enlightenment. Her unstinting efforts have contributed greatly to helping Russians better digest the complicated alphabet soup of modern international relations, whether it be the UN, NATO, the EU, ESDP, CFSP, the NRC, the EAPC, PFP, or the OSCE, not to mention economic organizations such as the WTO, IMF and EBRD, international businesses such as IBM and 3M, or even musical groups such as U2, UB-40, B-2 or the BeeGees.

I want to do my part today by attempting to shed light on some current issues of European security architecture, in particular Russia's relationship with NATO and the EU, or what Tatyana has called Russia's European and Atlanticist vocations. I am especially pleased to do so with young people such as you, for it is your generation that will one day determine Russia's future. As usual, Tatyana has framed the issue in a provocative way. I'll try not to speak too long, because I want to leave plenty of time afterwards for discussion and questions.

It is perhaps popular to think, as a result of the Iraq war and recent tensions between the United States and the European Union - or at least some EU members - that Russia is now confronted with a choice between "Atlanticism" and "Europeanism." Others have called this a choice between Mars - the god of war - and Venus - the goddess of beauty and "soft" power. This theory (best articulated by Robert Kagan) would have it that the Iraq war turned the Atlantic Ocean into an unbridgeable expanse in terms of American and European concepts of security; that the irreconcilable differences that arose as a result will inevitably lead the U.S.-European couple to separation and eventual divorce rather than a recommitment to lasting partnership. Under this scenario, Russia has to make an existential choice between cooperating more with the United States or with Europe.

In reality, differences between the United States and the EU are more a sign of a vigorous relationship than a marriage on the rocks - although I won't deny that every relationship has its trying moments. And, just as U.S.-EU relations have their ups and downs, so too do Russia's relationships with NATO and the EU.

Let me illustrate what I mean. When I first arrived here three years ago, Russian objections to NATO enlargement and continuing anger over the Kosovo air campaign caused Russians to view NATO essentially as a rival. If an expanding NATO was "bad," EU enlargement was considered "good" by definition, perhaps because many Russians hoped it would be an alternative to NATO enlargement for countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

But the situation has changed dramatically in less than two years. Although Russia still has misgivings about enlargement, the fact is that Russia has successfully forged a new relationship with NATO through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, or NRC. Russia's voice counts as one of twenty, and decisions are taken by consensus. NRC subcommittees have proliferated, and after two years it is possible to say that the NRC has made good progress in areas of practical cooperation, conceptual work on peacekeeping, and common analysis of proliferation and terrorism threats. There is still much to be done, of course, and both Russia and NATO allies are seeking ways to take the relationship to a new, more operational level. But the undeniable fact is that the NRC is off to a good start, and Russian attitudes toward NATO have become more positive as a consequence.

By contrast, Russian attitudes toward the European Union appear to have taken a slightly negative turn in the last two years, as Russia was confronted with the real impact of EU enlargement on the daily lives of Russian citizens. This is only natural. It is one thing to worry theoretically about the security consequences of the accession of the Baltic states to NATO. It is another thing when an average Russian worries about what documentation will be required to hop on a train to Kaliningrad to visit friends or relatives. My purpose in mentioning this is not to suggest that NATO is somehow "better" than the EU, but rather to show that Russia's relationship with each organization is complex and characterized by its own peculiar set of accomplishments and problems. At times it gets on better with one, at times with the other.

It's also important to remember that NATO and the EU themselves are different institutions. Although both have a comprehensive understanding of security, the first has always been devoted primarily to the political-military aspects of security, whereas the second began as an economic institution and is only now taking on a more explicit political-military dimension. What both organizations have in common, however, is their dedication to the same overarching goals, bedrock values and principles. What really unites NATO and makes it an enduring alliance are common values. Only functioning democracies, with multi-party systems, are admitted to NATO.

Americans and Europeans also share the same comprehensive concept of security, when looking beyond institutions and beyond specific threats: namely, that the well-being of the United States and European societies is based on a worldwide system of mutual trade, investment, and information of which we are both joint custodians and stakeholders. It is in our interest to preserve the stability of that system. In that sense, NATO and the EU are interlocking and reinforcing. This is why all the bickering about NATO's and the EU's differing roles will never fundamentally change the fact that we will always cooperate. One might say that we are doomed to cooperate!

It is also in Russia's interest to cooperate with both the United States and Europe. Russia is interested in prosperity and stability, and needs technology and foreign investment as well as markets for its energy production. In short, the choice between Europeanism and Atlanticism - by which people in reality are referring to the United States - is a false one. The United States does not want good relations with Russia at the expense of Russia's relations with the EU, nor does the EU want its good relations with Russia to preclude Russia from maintaining good relations with the United States. Both have the same concerns about human rights in Chechnya or the fairness of Duma elections. Both want to cooperate - not compete - with Russia in promoting stability and security in the former Soviet space. Both understand that they need each other for security and prosperity in Europe as well as globally.

Any attempt to draw distinctions between Europeanism and Atlanticism - or ESDP [the EU's European Security and Defense Policy] and NATO - also overlooks the fundamental reality that, for now and for the foreseeable future, NATO remains the preeminent security institution for the United States as well as for Europe. This does not mean that Europe will never be able to lead its own independent missions. But it does reflect a general understanding - for reasons of capability as well as resources - that it is in the interests of the United States and Europe to work together. This, of necessity, means finding suitable frameworks under the NATO umbrella. The "Berlin plus" mechanism was created to allow the EU to create forces that are "separable, but not separate." Americans and Europeans have a common interest in avoiding duplication of planning headquarters and the like. Developing separate capabilities would be prohibitively expensive and would hinder efforts to transform European militaries to meet the new challenges of the 21st century, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). When it comes to military capabilities, Europe has much farther to go to transform its military forces to meet the new challenges to security. In short, we need each other.

Which brings me to another major point, the changing security environment. If NATO's mission were restricted to safeguarding European security alone, then one might make the case - and many have - that NATO is no longer needed and that the Europeans can do this themselves. Under such a scenario, one might argue, Russia's interests would be purely European. Certainly, over the past half-century, and especially since the end of the Cold War, NATO and EU have brought a degree of peace, security and integration to Europe that makes the prospect of a new war between Europe and Russia almost unthinkable.

But new threats emanate from outside Europe. And when it comes to confronting these kinds of threats - for instance, in Afghanistan or in Iraq - some might argue that the United States thinks and acts more globally than Europeans. But, even if Russia sided with France and Germany during the Iraq war, this has in no way prevented U.S. cooperation with France and Germany on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or on reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the United States and Russia continue to cooperate closely on such issues as North Korea and Iran (the latter in tandem with leading EU members).

NATO's challenge today is to counter these threats emanating from outside of Europe, whether we are talking about the threat of terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Clearly, America and Europe have a common interest in working together to address these threats. These threats are global in nature and threaten the core values and security of our societies. What's more, no single country can deal successfully with them alone. This does not mean that the United States and Europe will always agree on tactics, or that situations will never arise when the United States concludes it must act alone if necessary. But there can be no doubt about our common interest in protecting ourselves from such threats.

Obviously, the changing security environment, in particular the geographic shift of danger from within Europe to areas on its periphery, also has enormous implications for Russia. As President Putin has said, terrorism and WMD proliferation are dangers for all civilized nations. In other words, the dangers facing Russia are the same as those facing NATO and the EU, or the United States and Europe. This once again can only lead to the conclusion that there is no need for Russia to have to choose between Atlanticism and Europeanism in confronting them.

The recognition of this is reflected in Russia's decision to join the NATO-Russia Council. And it justifies our references to the broader Euro-Atlantic Community of which Russia is a part. In short, the United States, Europe and Russia all have a common interest in working together to counter these threats. This explains why Russia has supported United States and NATO involvement in Afghanistan, as well as a temporary U.S. military presence in Central Asia in support of the war on terror. If NATO should decide to become involved in peacekeeping in Iraq, I hope that Russia would also agree to support that on the grounds that Iraq's long-term security and stability is also in Russia's interest.

If I had a complaint, it would be that, although Russia seems to agree on the importance of cooperation against the 21st century threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, unfortunately it does not yet always fully appreciate the advantages of proactive cooperation in promoting stability to help prevent threats before they arrive. This is particularly true for the former Soviet republics on Russia's borders, where Russia has tended to view NATO's and the United States' interest in promoting stability in these regions as a threat to Russian interests. It is a case of zero-sum thinking - in which one's gain is automatically viewed as another's loss - instead of what we would call a win-win situation, in which all can benefit. I would argue that all these countries, and Russia itself, can benefit most by a cooperative approach that involves Russia, Europe, and the United States. We should work together to promote democratization and economic reform, together with regional cooperation against the full spectrum of threats - from terrorism to organized crime to infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS. This can be accomplished not only through NATO, the Partnership for Peace and the NATO-Russia Council, but also through the OSCE, EU mechanisms, and direct bilateral engagement.

Let me sum up by reiterating that the choice between Europeanism and Atlanticism is a false one, and that Russia's interests are best served by being both European and Atlantic - or by being what we commonly call a full member of the entire Trans-Atlantic or Euro-Atlantic community. Our goal should be one in which the United States, Europe and Russia cooperate together as part of a geographic continuum. It is only by working together that we can confront successfully the threats to security of the new century. And, just as NATO and EU enlargement have brought more security and prosperity to Europe, it is my firm belief that Russia, Europe and the United States, if they work together, can be an effective force for helping to foster them in other parts of the world.

Source: US State Department, Washington File, http://usinfo.state.gov.

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