Disarmament Documentation

Back to Disarmament Documentation

Interview With Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, February 15

TRANSCRIPT

THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 15, 2004.

Following is a full transcript of an hourlong interview with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan in his army office in Rawalpindi, Pakistan on Feb. 9. General Musharraf spoke in English. The interview was conducted by Amy Waldman and David Rohde, co-chiefs of The New York Times' South Asia Bureau.

Q: We're interested in talking to you about your broader vision for Pakistan as an Islamic state, but David is going to start with some questions about the nuclear proliferation issue just to get that out of the way.

PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF: Yes, we need to clarify a lot of doubts. I know the articles that you have written.

Q: One thing I wanted to ask you about is there is a lot of, as you've pointed out, and I think correctly, there are Europeans involved in this also. I just wanted to ask you if you know more about - there's three Germans, one Dutch gentleman, and are there any Americans that are involved in this that you've found out?

A: No, the ones that I know of, no it doesn't. The list that is known to me doesn't contain Americans.

Q: What role did these three Germans and the Dutchman play?

A: Frankly, I don't know, they need to, that's why I keep saying they need to [inaudible], to really unearth all the underworld. We need to, every country needs to investigate. What really hurts me is when it's only Pakistan doing it and the others seem to be not doing anything about it. When you see the history of proliferation or history of, not proliferation, I would say start with the history of developing a nuclear device by anyone, including Pakistan, India, or for that matter Israel, after all there is an underworld involved. Right in the beginning, underworld involved in fabrication.

One must differentiate, one is the design, which obviously is to be known by scientists of knowledge, designing a centrifuge, but then it is, it's fabrication, which is very, very important. People seem to be overlooking that. Now fabrication is a very high technology issue, affair. It can't be done in some backward country. It has to be done in a very developed, industrially developed country. So fabrication is all in the industrialized world. It's all probably in Europe.

The second thing that I would like to also right away clarify maybe not in answering your question really, is if at all anyone transfers anything to any second country. A person can transfer knowledge in the form of designs again, which can be on a piece of paper, on a computer. They can transfer some, or sell some parts. Or sell a huge centrifuge itself. But then to really go for enrichment you require hundreds of centrifuges, that is what I know as a layman.

Now, nobody could be transferring hundreds of them. They have to be fabricated somewhere. Copied if at all one has been transferred the others have to be copied. Now where, where from? Again, you think of European countries or now they are indicating Malaysia, yes there is a factory established there. There again, it needs a high technology. It cannot be done everywhere. This is my argument. We know where we are involved in. I hope the world understands who has been involved. That's my point of view.

Q: Can you say anything about the role Dr. Khan [Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan's nuclear program, confessed on national television on Feb. 4th that he had shared Pakistan's nuclear technology with other countries. General Musharraf granted him a full pardon a day later.] played in the underworld? Did he just provide parts or was he actually guiding this network, leading it, in any way?

A: Well, he was involved, as I said. Involved in the designing part, in passing over designs and maybe some parts. Then the underworld, as I said, has been operating since decades. That underworld was involved in all nuclear development in any country. So contacts must have been there and I have always said that Pakistan's nuclear device has come up in a covert manner. So has the Indian for that matter, so has the Israeli. It's not Pakistani only. It's all covert activity and when you are going into a covert activity, activity it's all clandestine, secret and you are into the underworld. And I don't know whether Dr. A.Q. was using the underworld or the underworld was using A.Q. maybe. So, one doesn't know that.

Q: Can you say anything about, there's been these reports of an offer to the Iraqis from one of the middlemen, citing Dr. Khan would help them with a nuclear device? And there was also a report about a warhead design from Dr. Khan going to Libya?

A: No, no we don't know that. We don't know any involvement in Iraq. That is not known at all. And we don't know about the nuclear design also.

Q: I don't know, you said it in Urdu, but it was reported that you had said in terms of Dr. Khan, "let him keep his money." And I know how you personally feel about corruption, it's a major issue for you.

A: Yes, yes, I do.

Q: Just again on the pardon, I think in Davos [the World Economic Summit held in Davos, Switzerland, in January] you had talked about these people as being enemies of the state, and then your decision to pardon him. I mean, what did you wrestle with when you made that decision? And what kind of message do you think it sends to the Pakistani people in terms of--

Q: Accountability

Q: He could keep his money. You know, you've fought so hard against corruption.

A: Yes. Let me first of all take on the pardon issue. These are very sensitive matters. They have an international implication or connotation and a domestic connotation. I certainly had to take both of them into consideration. But historically I would also like to, I hope, I'm sure you know the history of any scientist. I've gotten involved in what has been happening in the past and let me tell you about United States. Do you know that Dr. Robert [Oppenheimer], who was the father of the United States nuclear bomb, atomic bomb, transferred technology to Russia in 1954? And that is how the Soviet Union had its nuclear device. What happened to him? He, nothing happened to him. He was only punished by revoking his security clearance.

Then Dr. [Wen Ho] Lee, why go so far, I also found that about Dr. Lee in 2002 and 2003 for transferring nuclear secrets to China. And what happened to him? He was charged, 59, there were 59 charges put against him. I found that out. Absolved of 58. The 59th charge was for transferring sensitive nuclear material on nuclear data onto a disk and given nine months R.L. and that too, they said that since he had been in custody for that long, he wasn't put behind bars at all.

No, I'm not challenging. I don't know the conditions. I don't know the environment. Every country has an environment and these are sensitive matters. They are dealt with in a, secretively. There is no publicity possible. Because they are very, very sensitive.

So now, coming to Dr. A.Q. and Pakistan. Yes, we know that money was involved. But we don't know exactly where all of these accounts are. We need to find that out. We don't know that. Now what I said was when I pardoned him, yes, yes, let's forget about whatever money he's made. I mean what can be done about it?' To find out accounts is the most difficult thing. We are involved in National Accountability Bureau also. I know how difficult it is because the international system really provides all the protection to these money, people who are making money in a clandestine manner.

So, in its overall context I saw the domestic environment, which was very, very important. That here we are dealing with a national hero. And domestic environment, first of all, they had to be told that he has done something wrong. But since he had acquired a larger-than-life figure for himself, one had to pardon him to satisfy the public. And I think it has gone extremely positively, that why he is guilty people have realized that he is guilty, he's done something. But since he's a national hero and he's done something to Pakistan, something great for Pakistan. That he restored the parity in unconventional deterrence for Pakistan. This is the greatest achievement of his. So therefore he was pardoned.

Q: But if you don't know where his accounts are, you don't know about a possible offer to Iraq, you don't know about a possible design to Libya, then you haven't really gotten a full accounting from him of what he did, what money he made.

A: No, we know a lot. I mean Libya certainly we know that he has transferred designs and he has transferred parts of centrifuge. We know that. There is no doubt about it.

Q: And North Korea?

A: North Korea also.

Q: Full centrifuges or just parts?

A: No. Again, he is involved in transferring designs but we don't. We are still looking into the details.

Q: And the Americans, some American intelligence officials, have said they think there was this barter, where there was Nodong missile technology for nuclear technology, that Dr. Khan struck himself. Is that true?

A: This is absolutely untrue. I can, we had a relation with North Korea. We were developing SA-16's. [An SA-16 is a type of surface to air anti-aircraft missile.] We purchased SA-16's with them, from them. And we, even they transferred technology to us. And we produce these SA-16's now in Pakistan. We call them Anza missiles. They are produced in KRL, [Khan Research Laboratories, Pakistan's top secret nuclear lab named after Dr. A.Q. Khan] by the way. Our air defense owns these. We produce them ourselves now. So now, and all payments have been made to North Korea. We have accounts that we've checked. They have been given money in fact.

Q: I saw this morning that Mrs. Bhutto [Benazir Bhutto served two terms as Pakistan's prime minister in the 1980's and 1990's] says she is the mother of the Pakistani nuclear bomb.

A: She doesn't know what she's talking about, unfortunately. She can become a grandmother also [inaudible]. But you may have, you maybe, I would like to add here, O.K., since she said that, what Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg [Pakistan's Army chief from 1988 to 1991] said on a television interview, that in during his tenure he took four decisions with Benazir Bhutto. And one of those were to stop enrichment from 95 percent to 5, under 5. Now this exactly is rolling back. Rolling back is really stopping enrichment. In other words, you stop producing nuclear devices. Now, she may be mother of the nuclear bomb, but she is responsible for killing the child also during that period.

Q: I just want to ask you a series of questions about what you had heard about Dr. Khan at different times. I guess the first time period would be in October '98 when you became army chief.

A: Sorry, say again?

Q: When you became army chief in October '98, there were many rumors about Dr. Khan and, I think, corruption. I mean, what did you hear then about corruption? Did you hear anything about proliferation, rumors or concerns?

A: Yes. Yes, I didn't know about proliferation, but we did, I did notice some suspicious activities. I did notice some suspicious financial improprieties I would say. And therefore we thought that he should be removed and we removed him. And that was not an easy job.

Q: And the reason you removed him was, did you have any reports of proliferation in March 2001?

A: No. No. We, I wouldn't say any reports of proliferation, but yes we did have some doubts about some, some illegal contacts. Maybe suspicions of contacts, that we did have. Because this was when we centralized the security. Centralized the intelligence system under the strategic planning division. Previously it was decentralized under him. He himself was looking after the security of his, all the science organizations had their own security organizations under them. We brought them under central control of the strategic planning division. And that is when we started getting this feedback of some suspicious activities going on. That is why we thought we should nip it in the bud. And we didn't know that this is so deep. That it started somewhere in late 80's. We didn't know that at all. And frankly, again, the sensitivity of the issue, and we tapped it and we just sidelined this one individual.

Q: There has also been reports that the I.S.I. [Inter Services Intelligence, Pakistan's military run intelligence agency] raided a plane in the year 2000 that Dr. Khan had chartered? Was that an American tip that led to that? And what was found on the plane?

A: They were SA-16's.

Q: Oh, really.

Q: Certainly. This was the period when we had tensions with the Indians, on the border. And there is a degree of disparity in the air. And we thought we should rectify it through saturation on the ground saturation of air defense missiles on the ground. Although we were producing, we were producing these SA-16's on [inaudible], as I said, but they weren't enough. So we thought we must purchase as many as possible. And we purchased them. We got them through C-130.

Q: And these were the C-130's that were seen in North Korea, I think, in 2002?

A: Yes, yes, yes.

Q: There was a separate report of a raid inside Pakistan by the I.S.I. on Dr. Khan's planes in 2000, before you had removed him.

A: Yes, yes. There is.

Q: What led you to check the plane?

A: Yeah there were again, they said, we got some suspicious reports through the security agencies that there is some suspicions of some items to be loaded and taken somewhere in the plane. So, unfortunately, either you know, he was tipped off or whatever, we didn't find anything. But we were very sure that there was some activity likely. But it was nipped, but we didn't catch them red-handed.

Q: I'm almost done. The Americans said that they had given you repeated warning. That they had a report of, I think they may have tipped you off on the plane in 2000, North Korea had an enrichment program, I think you were told, in 2002 maybe by [National Security Council Stephen Hadley]. They showed you satellite photos of Iran in 2003, a centrifuge complex there. And then there was just this report of a briefing by from, you know, Mr. Armitage [Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage], Ms. Rocca [Assistant Secretary of State Christina B. Rocca], and Gen. Abizaid [United States Central Command Commander Gen. John P. Abizaid], in October 2003. Is that true, they were they giving you those reports?

A: No, well, certainly we were sharing information, but never did we know that there is the degree of proliferation that we are talking of. Never did we know that. I only wish that if it was told to us, if they knew it earlier, they should have told us and maybe a lot of things would not have happened, what happened later. But we were never told of this degree of level of proliferation that we are talking of. That this network in Dubai and network in Malaysia and proliferation with North Korea and Iran and Libya, no, not at all. It kept trickling. In fact, it started with Iran and then it kept tricking that Libya is also there and that Libya has also said something. So we were getting this information in trickles. We never were given complete, certainly not that far back. Just telling us, giving us photographs of nuclear enrichment centers in Iran is not enough. I don't know. I didn't, I didn't even see that frankly. I haven't seen that on the television or anything. But to inform us that this is what they are doing and you are, somebody from Pakistan is involved. No sir, this was not the case.

Q: And there was a press report that the briefing from Armitage and Abizaid was very detailed. That the American knew where Dr. Khan had gone, and mind-boggling was a word that someone.

A: When?

Q: This was actually in, just this last October, October 2003.

SYED ANWAR MAHMOOD [Pakistani government's information secretary, who attended the interview]: This was in the newspaper yesterday. That in October.

Q: Last fall

MR. MAHMOOD: The details by Armitage.

Q: Armitage, Abizaid and Rocca and it was very detailed.

A: Yes, October. Yes. Yes, that's right. October, you are talking of October 2003 now. Yes, yes, then we knew. We had started our investigation. Yes, we were told. That initiated the process. That is the time when we first came to know that the extent of an involvement, the depth of involvement. And then we certainly started moving and investigating this where debriefing came in and all that stuff. That is exactly when we started.

Q: Any other signs, any other countries involved beyond the three? I mean did Saudi Arabia receive any aid that you know of?

A: No, not at all. Not at all. We don't know any other country than these three as far as I'm concerned.

Q: You answered this question in your press conference, but opening the labs up for international inspection? Any?

A: No, that's not possible at all here. No, not at all. We are for any controls, any checks against proliferation. We will act as a very responsible state. We have all our nuclear devices, our strategic assets, our facilities under very strong custodial controls. And I maintain maybe they are the best possible in the world. We know that. We have studied all. We have analyzed all. And we have taken all measures because there is a full secretariat under Lieutenant General Kidwai [Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai heads Pakistan's Strategic Planning Division] functioning, which is looking after this. We have total control and we have established three rings of security around them. All centralized. I, this is all that we could do humanly possible. So we are sure that we have them under great control. Now, we don't want any.

This is a very sensitive issue here. Already everyone keeps accusing us that we are rolling back. One has to keep telling them, no. This is a very, very sensitive issue in Pakistan. So, it's rolling back. If we want to put somebody on the defensive start saying that this man is rolling back our nuclear devices. We can't be seen doing that at all. Ask us for any intelligence, any information, we will share all information. Give us information also, of whatever is known of the European end [inaudible.] Let's cooperate on that, so there is a requirement of sharing intelligence, which we are, frankly. But let's share the intelligence. Pakistan will not be wanting in sharing any information that we have. So that we really remove or eliminate all this underworld.

Q: Will you allow the I.A.E.A. to interview Dr. Khan? [The International Atomic Energy Agency is the United Nations' nuclear watchdog group.]

A: We don't mind him, them really, but we need to think about it. We need to think about it. What do they want to? Because I.A.E.A. is not really an investigative agency as such. What do they want to know? And we will tell them everything. We will fully cooperate with I.A.E.A.

Q: I had heard a report that there was a high-level request from Iran to you two years ago for nuclear aid?

A: To me, personally?

Q: Yes, you personally?

A: Never. Never.

Q: They didn't ask?

A: Never, I don't entertain such.

Q: I heard you said no, but did they ask you? Has anyone asked you? Any country since you've?

A: No, no, no, no.

Q: And my very last question and I apologized for this. Who would you say is father of Pakistani nuclear bomb?

A: A.Q. Khan.

Q: Still, Dr. Khan? I was just curious, there is a debate among the scientists, you know, OK.

A: No. He is the one who came in 1976 and started developing. But of course a nuclear device has many, many, many stages in coming to that. Like you extract uranium. You convert that into gas. You [inaudible] and then you enrich it to weapons grade. That enrichment part is of course Dr. A.Q. Then you have to have a trigger mechanism. You have to have a delivery system. So, there are a lot, that's why there are about 6,000 scientists involved. There are important roll being played by others also. But your question, the short answer is: yes sir, he is the father of the nuclear bomb.

Q: Are you getting any American assistance on securing the, your nuclear arsenal?

A: No, no, no. We are not. We certainly ask for information on methods. We have found out methods of ensuring its [inaudible] security. But there is no involvement whatsoever of anybody from outside. We do everything ourselves. But we try to find out the best practices around the world, including United States.

Q: I just want to follow up, one thing you said earlier. You said as far as back 2000, or even earlier it sounds like, there were, as you said, some suspicions or some doubts about Dr. Khan having possibly inappropriate contacts, separate from the corruption concerns. Can you tell us any more about what you were hearing then? Who was he having contacts with? What were the nature of the doubts about Khan?

A: Well, I wouldn't be able to get into those details. Yes, as I said, there was some suspicious movements, some suspicions on, because, as I said, again, this is so sensitive, there were special handling of cargo, special handling of anything that had to do with KRL, the organization that he was running. And in that special handling we were getting suspicious. That in under the garb of the special handling, maybe there is some proliferation activity, some underhand proliferation activity going on. That is what we suspected. Because there was a scientist who was sidelined and that is how we came to know. And therefore I thought, we thought, it's better to sideline him, remove him from the place, so that we nip all this. But as I said we didn't know that this stretches back to 15 years almost.

Q: Did Brigadier Tajwar report anything? [This is a reference to the head of security at the Khan Research Laboratories who served under Dr. Khan, Brig. Gen. Mohammed Iqbal Tajwar. Brigadier General Tajwar, who is now retired, is one of seven people who have been detained by the Pakistan government as part of its investigation into nuclear proliferation.]

A: No, he didn't and frankly, he hasn't even now. He, in fact, has said that yes, he regrets that he was inefficient. He couldn't unearth. He didn't know. He says he didn't know whatever was going on. And he swears by that, even now. But, however, he is being investigated for at least inefficiency. He didn't know anything, being security in charge. But really I mean, the possibilities one has to see. You see, when a person in charge of an organization is doing something. If I was to do something here, who is going to check me? I mean is the security guard going to check me? I mean are they going to find out what are you carrying in your car, in the boot of your car? What is this crate that you're carrying home? Nobody is going to find out because you are the custodian of everything. You are the father.

So therefore, I mean, I don't want to defend this Brigadier Tajwar at all. He has to be punished for his inefficiency at least. But unfortunate reality is this what I've said. When the father of an organization is doing something himself and this involves really when you are talking of designs, I mean what's the design? It's a piece of paper, that paper. You give a centrifuge design on that piece of paper. That's proliferation, proliferation of a design.

Q: That's correct, but what I'm curious about is if you as you said you had suspicions why not launch a full investigation then? Why did you wait until Richard Armitage presented you in October with these facts when you had suspicions going back for years?

A: No. It was an extremely sensitive issue and you would have created an uproar again against the father of the nuclear, I mean we know that he was a hero. And even removing him from there, we had to deliberate for hours how to handle the situation. We first removed him. Appointed him as adviser, but gave him an office at KRL. O.K., you are not there, but you can sit and sort of carry on your lifelong, because he said that this is my, it's his baby, that KRL. So then gradually, after some time, we also closed that office and totally removed him. But we appointed him as an adviser to give him some comfort. I mean this had to be done as a gradual process. As I said, it was extremely sensitive. One couldn't outright start investigating as if he's any common criminal.

Q: Right. I understand that and I definitely understand the sensitivities, at the same time though, if you want to be, and in general are, a responsible nuclear state how could you look away when there were suspicions that somebody was proliferating? And it continued after that. Now there are reports it went to 2003.

A: The important thing is that the person is removed and we nipped the proliferation in the bud. We, we stopped the proliferation. That is the important part. It's not the punishing of the man, which is important. It is stopping the proliferation, which is important. Now we did not at all think that the depth of proliferation extending to 15 years, or 10 years, at that time, yes. That we didn't know. So therefore we didn't get involved in it. We thought we stopped everything and that is all. Now it was later that we know that we know the depth of the involvement and the underworld, the whole underworld, and when it started and how it has gone. Then we, when we came to know, we started investigating and we caught the bull by the horn. I mean, [inaudible] we, in this action we suffered a lot of, the nation suffered a trauma, and we had a lot of internal destabilization which had to come forth then.

Q: You said that there are still some details about North Korea that have yet to emerge or that you are looking into. So, is he still cooperating with your investigation?

A: There are other people also. There are other people involved and therefore he wasn't doing everything with his own hand. There are other scientists. There are the people who are involved in purchases from abroad and the handling of equipment, etc. And the security people, and therefore we will get the information.

Q: Is it possible that other people will be punished?

A: We are looking into that now. Now, we have to decide how to proceed with them. Frankly, we haven't decided. The government and the cabinet has to, has to be taken into confidence and we need to see how to proceed, how to try them, if at all. And every time when we try them the same sensitive issue of Dr. A.Q. Khan coming in again, getting roped in every time.

So, these are sensitive issues. We'll see how to handle it. And a trial continues for maybe six months or eight months, would we like to have a destabilize, every newspaper every day for six months with headlines, so and so has said this and so and so has said this, all this confusion even now without the trial. Look at the papers everyone is talking something different. Iran has now come up with that we haven't given anything to them. There is no limit to these kind of. I'm fed up of all this. I mean everyone is trying to say something different. So that is the sensitivity of the issue. We need to tread on very, very carefully.

Q: And you feel, because of his status, as you said, as a hero, a national figure, that it's important to shield him?

A: To?

Q: To shield him, to protect him essentially at all costs from that kind of exposure?

A: No, there is no, as far as the information is concerned, from him we have everything. We need to get more corroboration through other scientists, the security people, to create a full picture and maybe also sharing by other intelligence agencies. Whatever they know so that we can complete the proliferation picture. In this, there is no doubt we will, we will ask him, we can ask him anytime more or other scientists also. We will participate in completing this proliferation picture. We will fully and actively participate in that.

Q: O.K., now we can move onto other subjects. In terms of trying to de-Islamicize Pakistan, do you see your mission as undoing what General Zia did? [Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, an American-backed military dictator who ruled Pakistan from 1977 to 1988. Critics contend that he tried to Islamicize the country.]

A: I don't have to undo whatever anyone did. I haven't analyzed really - frankly I haven't analyzed who did what. I'm very clear on my own perception of what Pakistan should be and what direction we should follow and I draw inspiration from whatever our founding father, Quaid-e-Azam [Gen. Musharraf is using an expression that means "father of the nation." He is referring to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who founded Pakistan in 1947], I really draw inspiration from that. I'm not here to look into history or what Ayub Khan [Field Marshall Ayub Khan, Pakistan's military ruler from 1958 to 1969] did or what Bhutto [Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's president and then prime minister from 1971 to 1977] did or what Zia [Gen. Zia-Ul-Haq] did. They did good, they did very bad also. I wouldn't like to get into that. I don't want to confuse myself. I am thinking very clear analyzing what is for Pakistan - forget the past and move ahead. I don't want to get bogged down in history.

Q: What brought Pakistan to the point where it is now? When you took office you were quite outspoken about the problems you inherited. What went wrong; where did Pakistan deviate from Jinnah's original vision?

A: I personally this country, I have been saying always this country has all the potential of rising, of developing. It has all the resources human resources, natural resources - all the requirements that a nation wants. When I think of what a nation wants it must first of all it must be self-sufficient in food - we are very much self-sufficient; we can export. It must have water to drink and also to irrigate its land for the agricultural requirements. We have six rivers flowing and several minor rivers. It ought to have energy, be able to produce energy. We have gas, we have coal, abundant water, we have mastered nuclear technology also, and we also have some oil, so we can produce our own oil energy. We have natural resources, an abundance of natural resources, in fact untapped.

So what do we lack? We have the human intelligence also - I think our nation is quite intelligent, I would say.

So what is lacking I have always said is the will. Corruption and nepotism these two things have really sapped us. Because nation is to be run by people, corporations, organizations, efficiency is run by people. You put the wrong man he will ruin everything.

How we have turned around all these institutes - like P.I.A., the railways, the steel mill, the national shipping corporation, how have we turned them around - what have I done - I have just put the right man in charge, that's all. It had its own inherent capacity to do well, it was being looted and plundered, so the same organization was turned around just by one man. Really it is corruption and nepotism which have been the main cause of our failure to perform.

Q: You have put the military, active and retired, in a lot of posts. Do you believe they are inherently better suited to govern?

A: No, no, a lot of people accuse me of putting military. I look at an individual, if a military man fits I'll put him in irrespective of any negative criticism. If a civilian fits I'll put a civilian. My focus is only merit. That's why I don't care what anyone says. I'll put a military man if he is the best one for the job. Now when the steel mills M.D. [managing director] died, I put a military man in spite of all criticism because I think he is the best man suited for the job. I knew about the problems of the steel mill. They cannot be handled by a weak man. I know the man I pushed is very capable and he'll take it forward and he'll carry it on the path he has set it on. But there are many other instances where I put civilians because I thought they were the best. So many I will not quote. But even the cricket board I put a civilian there. [An aide volunteers PIA, Pakistan International Airlines, the national airline.] Yes, PIA - there had been an Air Force man. W.A.P.D.A. [Water and Power Development Authority] I put a civilian because I found a man who is suitable. Not because I am affected by anything people are saying and I must save myself or protect myself, no sir I don't believe in that. I believe in merit, irrespective of whatever. They must understand that I am not a fraud and I am doing something for this country. I don't care what people say. I pick the right man, whether he is a man in uniform or a civilian. No such consideration at all. I am above these things.

Q: In terms of uprooting extremism, why has there been so little progress on reforming madrassas [religious schools]? Why has it been so difficult?

A: Yes, it is very difficult. Frankly we must understand that there is really a very big gap between policy formulation and policy implementation. For a developing country this gap is very large. And implementation is far more difficult than policy formulation. You can come out with strategies, but to implement them on the ground is very very difficult because you don't have the implementation machinery. You don't have the kind of motivated people who back up the policy - the sincerity of the policy - for translation into implementation. That is the problem.

Now, having said that, that doesn't mean we want to backtrack, that we want to just stop and not do anything. But the world must understand - we are not backtracking - I am not scared to implement. The problem is how to do it is the question. We are trying our best, the ministry of education now is trying its best. It has already asked - they are in contact with the madrassas - asking them to register and to teach the four subjects. I know from our education minister that there are over 1,500 madrassas who have registered.

But out hands are also tied. Now we have to give them the money for the teachers to teach. And also give them the capacity - find the teachers. We are not talking of madrassas in Karachi or Lahore. We are talking of madrassas in remote mountainous areas to get the teachers there. Who are the teachers who are going to go there and teach? These are not simple affairs. It needs finances, it needs capacity.

We didn't stop at that - we haven't stopped. I wonder whether you know the national human resource development, the National Commission [for Human Development, headed by] Dr. Nasim Ashraf. Now this is a brilliant thing that is happening. I see a great future in it - bridging this gap between policy formulation and policy implementation at the grassroots level. Although the local government is there, doing policy implementation, it is a revolution, but simultaneously,

Dr. Nasim Ashraf's organization - he's sitting here in Islamabad. He's penetrating directly into the districts - in all the districts. He has already gone in 16 districts fully, but in education he is in 20 more, I think he has penetrated into 36 districts out of the 100. Now he is involved in education, health and capacity building. He's doing that.

I have also tasked him for this - I think I tasked him six or seven months back, that he should find out, this team of his in the districts, that he should also find out what are the madrassas, what are they doing, do they need assistance in the form of capacity building, maybe also assistance in financing some developmental activity, improving their conditions, so they are also involved.

I want to make the religious affairs ministry more potent. There is no minister as yet. I am looking for the correct minister frankly to suggest to the prime minister to maybe appoint a very capable minister who is into our line of thinking. I would expect then that this ministry of religious affairs also would be playing a very active role in transforming madrassas.

But the world has to be bear with us. I get very disturbed when people think that we are backtracking or I have stopped. No, I have not stopped - you must understand I don't have a magic wand to just tell them. Many of them oppose whatever our ideas are. So we have to be maybe harsh on somebody, if they are caught teaching extremism or sectarian hatred we have to be very harsh with them, but who is going to tell me this madrassa and this individual is teaching extremism and hatred, these are not simple affairs that I know everything sitting here, O.K., close this one down, please catch four people here, it is not that easy. It's a very big nation of 140 million people. We are handling it to the best of our capacity.

Q: How over time do you plan to undo this mindset that has been cultivated over the past 15 or 20 years?

A: The first report that Dr. Nasim Ashraf gave me was very encouraging. He found that most of the madrassas are not teaching any extremism, they are involved in welfare activities, many of them are teaching all subjects already. And they are prepared to take the board exam. I'm telling them if you are teaching why don't you take the board exam; why are you confining yourself to religious certificates only?

That is what the report says - there are a few that we need to identify that are teaching extremism and hatred, that is where we need to stop them.

Once we get all this data we are going to help some, force some - that is how we are going to take on the problem. There is no shortcut.

Q: What about dealing with the various jihadi groups, including the Kashmiri groups?

A: All jihadi groups or those under the garb of jihad who are spreading extremism, terrorism, inside Pakistan or going outside Pakistan will not be allowed. We will move very strongly, we have already moved very strongly against them, we will not allow them even if your next question is that if they change their names and again reappear, no we will not allow that.

Q: You've joked about your nine lives, that you're not worried about anything, but do you feel any strain about the attempts on your lives, the fact that you have to live a much more careful, cloistered existence?

A: Yes, (laughs) my staff is restraining me a lot. I've always been violating security, I've been going out, every second evening. I either went to the Marriott for a cup of coffee or the P.C. for some dinner or coffee. If guests came instead of treating them at home I used to take them out for a barbecue in this P.C. and all that. I even went out and had paan directly from a paan shop directly here in Rawalpindi. All people used to come around and I used to stand there and he used to make a very special paans for me. All that activity unfortunately has been stopped. That hurts me, because I am not an introvert, I am not a man sitting at home, I have always been very active and meeting people, I enjoyed that. But that life - unfortunately one has to give up certain things. Not for myself - let me say, I'm not scared - you might find it very odd but I am not scared. It's the bigger issue of the country which constrains me.

Q: Do you think that you're uniquely qualified at this point in history to move Pakistan forward?

A: I would like to believe that.

I think when I look back on the three years that I ran the government, if you asked me this question in early 2000 maybe I wouldn't have given you a confident answer because I thought it's not doable, correcting this country is not really doable, so much wrong. Every corporation, every institution bankrupted, all banks bankrupt absolutely, the economy zero, misgovernance, politicization, but then when we started tackling issues, I realized that no this country has all the potential. I've changed my views - this country, as I said, has all the potential, everything is doable, you just have to have the correct intentions, noble intentions, you have to be honest, you have to be merit-oriented, and everything is doable.

That is why we have achieved a lot, now that we have achieved a lot, that is the way forward, it must continue. Therefore I think yes, I can act as a catalyst - there's a government in place, they have to run, they have to function well. They have to govern well, and maybe I could be a catalyst in ensuring that good governance, meritorious, not corrupt, honest governance continues.

Q: Don't you think there's a danger though in having the country predicated so much on one man, rather than a strong democratic system?

A: I don't agree with this statement of yours - one man and a democratic system. There's very much a democratic system here - we've had elections, there's a senate, chairman senate, national assembly, prime minister running his cabinet, there are chief ministers and provincial assemblies, ministers in the provinces - so there's a system in place. It's not dependent on me alone. But if people think that I'm the only one who can make the country run efficiently, that is a different matter. But the system is on ground. All the structures of a political system are on ground. If I'm not there there will be a senate chairman who takes over the system, and there is a prime minister. So what is the problem? The political structure is on ground. But people somehow perceive that I am the only one who maybe can keep taking the country in the course I've set in those three years. But that is a different issue. That doesn't mean that Pakistan will collapse if I'm not there. The system is there, the political structures are there.

Q: If something were to happen to you, would you want to see elections? Would Nawaz Sharif and Benzair Bhutto be able to come back?

A: That would be a very sad day because I think they have looted this country. Now we've built the economy, if they come back to loot this country again it will be very sad. Because they brought this country to the state we got it in. They talk of democracy - what democracy they were running in the 11 years, from '88 to '99, I would like to know? Was there freedom of speech, was there human rights? Everything was stifled, everything was controlled. It is me as a military man who opened out the media, the press, we gave so much of liberty to the opposition, and then of course corruption and neopotism as I said, which was the main cause where we had foreign exchange reserves of only about $200-$300 million. That was the kind of money this nation had. Only two weeks of imports this nation had. We were a technically defaulted nation, a failed nation, so this is what they did in two tenure each one of them. If they were to come back and do it again I'm afraid that would be very sad for the country. The country must find a new leader who is honest, who is dynamic, and who's capable of taking the nation forward.

Q: Is it true that you're starting or thinking of starting your own political party?

A: No. This assembly must go to 2007, these assemblies must go to 2007. I want to set a record because it's never happened in Pakistan, democracy has never functioned, no assembly has completed its tenure. We must make sure that we act as a civilized nation running a very organized democracy and one of the requirements is this - they are here for five years, they must stay for five years, and then through another election people should come up. No, I haven't thought about what will happen in 2007, when fresh elections take place - and I really don't know - it's really too early.

Q: Regarding the peace process with India, how much does the process depend on [Indian] Prime Minister [Atal Bihari] Vajpayee, and if he's not there how much faith do you have in the BJP or other leaders there?

A: That's difficult to analyze. Prime Minister Vajpayee I see as a man of peace, I saw that in Agra also. We drafted a declaration - an Agra declaration - which had all the contents we have now drafted. Recognizing, once a dialogue process will start, recognizing Kashmir as an issue to be resolved, that is what we were talking and we had drafted.

There are some others who appear to be extremely hard and rigid on their stand. Similar people are here. Now if they were to come up I only hope they realize the ground realities. The ground realities have changed. My hope is in the groundswell of a desire and a yearning for peace and harmony. I think this groundswell is in India also, that the people of India have realized that they are missing an opportunity in South Asia - there is so much of economic gains that would accrue to India and Pakistan and the South Asian region, the other countries also, through peace between India and Pakistan - because this is what is being missed.

So this realization is there, and I hope this realization spreads well in the masses, in the media, and also in the business community - the business community is strong everywhere - who should then act as catalysts to push the process forward - that will be the pressure on the politicians, on the leaders. The leaders are looking for what the public desires for their votes. Look at the changed environment - that while previously vote-catching was through Pakistan-bashing in India, maybe now it is different - vote-catching is through peace overtures with Pakistan. So this is a changed scenario, and I hope this scenario continues and we keep moving, irrespective of leadership in India,

But we have a lot of hope in Prime Minister Vajpayee, having interacted with him.

Q: In a recent interview, you seem to have dismissed the seriousness of the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. A lot of people in Afghanistan would disagree with you.

A: It's not a serious threat under the current environment where we are operating. I have been saying more about Pakistani side because everything has been thrown on Pakistan - that all that is happening in Afghanistan is happening from Pakistan. I totally disagree with that. We know what is happening in our territory, we know that yes, something is happening here. We know that out of the seven tribal agencies - only one - the South Waziristan agency - we see Al Qaeda and Taliban, their supporters being there, their sympathizers being there, and we are acting against them, we are going to take military action against them, we've involved the governor and local maliks also to act against them. So we have evolved a strategy to act against them. So we are very sure that on the Pakistani side that this threat of a strategic kind will never take place. I'm very sure of it.

Now let's cross the border - a lot is happening there. In fact I even because of such accusations against Pakistan from the Afghanistan side I even went ahead and analyzed the operations that are taking place in Afghanistan. The various acts and operations. I divided it into 50-mile belt within Afghanistan, because maximum that could be happening from Pakistan could be within that 50 miles, where people go and come back into Pakistan. We saw that only 44 percent happened within that 50-mile belt; 56 percent of all operations happened beyond 50 miles, maybe 150 and 200 miles, Kabul and all of these places. How can Pakistan be responsible there?

Now, what is happening there is the question. Yes, there is a vacuum in the countryside where neither Afghan National Army [A.N.A.] is there, nor coalition forces, nor United States forces are there. Now that is the area which we need to also guard like we are doing on our side. Either through A.N.A. or U.S. forces or coalition forces - they must stretch out to these areas. This I've been saying since day one, that there are 12 or 13 power centers in Afghanistan, stretch out to each one of them, and that is how you will really suppress is the strategic threat coming into reality.

The other thing I've been saying: don't ignore the vast majority of ethnic Paktoons [Afghanistan's majority ethnic group. In Afghanistan, they are referred to as Pashtuns. In Pakistan, they are referred to as Paktoons]. They have to have their rightful role. These two elements are the key to denying the strategic threat from getting realized. I have been saying this from day one, I have written a paper on this and submitted it, exactly the same thing I have written, I gave it to the United States, a paper written by me personally, let me say. This contains all this, this is the way forward, and I wrote it I think two years ago.

Q.: On that note, you right now are a pivotal figure in a global struggle the U.S. says its against terrorism, but also a struggle within Islam, against fundamentalism. You're risking your life doing this? What can the United States be doing more to help you? Did Iraq hurt you? Of course, of course.

A.: I am very clear. I try to visualize things in a global perspective, then I visualize in a Muslim/Islamic perspective the Islamic world - O.I.C. [Organization of the Islamic Conference], and then I see it in the perspective of Pakistan.

Now in the global perspective that is the area where the United States can do a lot. And I come to the strategy of enlightened moderation that I have been saying. I would like to say that both - in the O.I.C. level - the Islamic world and the global perspective, enlightened moderation affects both. I've said the Muslim world must be taken on a path where we reject extremism and go on the path of social and economic development.

Therefore let us restructure the O.I.C. I am very, very proud to say that at the last O.I.C. summit they accepted my proposal for enlightened moderation, and they have accepted that we need to create a special commission to do the restructuring of the O.I.C. so that we move in the direction of enlightened moderation. And this will be presented to a special O.I.C. summit by December this year. We are moving a little slow - I am not happy with that. But we are very much engaged, and I am sure this commission will be formed and will start thinking.

The second part of this strategy is where the United States fits in. We must resolve disputes - even if means using force, using coercion, I mean frankly. And which dispute are we talking about? Palestinian dispute. There is negotiation going on. This is the start point of all the hatred in the Muslim world against the United States and the West, that probably the United States has a one-sided approach to the Palestinian problem. This is the perception in the Muslim world. So unless they kill this perception through finding a solution to the Palestinian dispute - whatever it costs it has to be done. I've said this to President Bush - failure is not an answer, or no success, or status quo is not an answer. We are losing. We have to solve it.

Then I would say as far as we are concerned, the Kashmir dispute which we are trying to resolve between India and Pakistan bilaterally. Here also the United States can play a role in making sure that this dialogue process remains on track, that we move forward on all issues including Kashmir, and we cannot be not solving the Kashmir dispute.

Then of course is the issue of Iraq and Afghanistan. I can assure you that resolution of Palestinian will create such effects - positive effects tremendous positive effects - the gains will then get translated into Iraq and Afghanistan also. If we keep progressing on these political disputes, that will really be saving the world, bringing peace and harmony into the world.

Q: One last question - do you think you're getting any closer to catching Osama?

A: It's such a thing that we can't say. Maybe tomorrow we get him, or we may not see him in a year. Really it's not so mathematical, that now we are close, now we are distant.

Q: No new reports on his whereabouts?

A: No, frankly, no.

Q: Would you like more assistance from the U.S.? In what area?

A: Yes, we would like to have any amount of financial assistance in the social sector - education especially, health and education, poverty alleviation. With macro-economic indicators being very good now we are concentrating maximum on the social sector and human resource development because I think the future of any country is in human resource development. Initially, we had to develop resources for financing human resource development - we have that now - therefore we are concentrating on human resource development. And this is the area where development assistance would help.

Q: Do you think development would counter fundamentalism?

A: Fundamentalism is political disputes, lack of education and illiteracy, combined with it poverty. A hungry man, an illiterate man, anyone who comes and puts a Kalishnikov in his hand, well he's available. He's going to feed himself and he doesn't understand what he's doing also, therefore he's available gunfodder.

Source: New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com.

Back to the Top of the Page

© 2003 The Acronym Institute.