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'Serious concern' as the IAEA addresses Iran's nuclear programme, IAEA Board of Governors meeting, March 13, 2004

See also: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report by the IAEA Director General, GOV/2004/11, February 24, 2004, available on the IAEA website at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/
2004/gov2004-11_derestrict.pdf

and: Excerpt from the Record of the 1094th Meeting of the Board of Governors, March 13, 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2004/govor2004-1094.pdf

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution adopted by the Board on 13 March 2004

IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2004/21, March 13, 2004.

The Board of Governors,

(a) Recalling the resolutions adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81), and on 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69) and the statement by the Board of 19 June 2003 (GOV/OR.1072),

(b) Noting with appreciation the Director General's report of 24 February 2004 (GOV/2004/11), on the implementation of safeguards in Iran,

(c) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their continuing efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement with Iran and to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran,

(d) Noting with satisfaction that Iran signed the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003 and that, in its communication to the Director General of 10 November 2003, Iran committed itself to acting in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol with effect from that date; but also noting that the Protocol has not yet been ratified as called for in the Board's resolutions of 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81) and 12 September 2003 (GOV/2003/69),

(e) Noting the decision by Iran of 24 February 2004 to extend the scope of its suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and its confirmation that the suspension applied to all facilities in Iran,

(f) Noting with serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution, in that the Agency has since uncovered a number of omissions -- e.g., a more advanced centrifuge design than previously declared, including associated research, manufacturing and testing activities; two mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment programme; and designs for the construction of hot cells at the Arak heavy water research reactor -- which require further investigation, not least as they may point to nuclear activities not so far acknowledged by Iran,

(g) Noting with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent, and nature of work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments, and

(h) Noting with concern, also in light of the Director General's report of 20 February 2004 (GOV/2004/12), that, although the timelines are different, Iran's and Libya's conversion and centrifuge programmes share several common elements, including technology largely obtained from the same foreign sources,

1. Recognizes that the Director General reports Iran to have been actively cooperating with the Agency in providing access to locations requested by the Agency, but, as Iran's cooperation so far has fallen short of what is required, calls on Iran to continue and intensify its cooperation, in particular through the prompt and proactive provision of detailed and accurate information on every aspect of Iran's past and present nuclear activities;

2. Welcomes Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol; urges its prompt ratification; underlines the Board's understanding that, in its communication to the Director General of 10 November 2003, Iran voluntarily committed itself to acting in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol with effect from that date; and stresses the importance of Iran complying with the deadline for declarations envisaged in Article 3 of the Protocol;

3. Recalls that in its resolutions of 26 November 2003 and 12 September 2003 the Board called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, notes that Iran's voluntary decisions of 29 December 2003 and 24 February 2004 constitute useful steps in this respect, calls on Iran to extend the application of this commitment to all such activities throughout Iran, and requests the Director General to verify the full implementation of these steps;

4. Deplores that Iran, as detailed in the report by the Director General, omitted any reference, in its letter of 21 October 2003 which was to have provided the "full scope of Iranian nuclear activities" and a "complete centrifuge R&D chronology", to its possession of P-2 centrifuge design drawings and to associated research, manufacturing, and mechanical testing activities -- which the Director General describes as "a matter of serious concern, particularly in view of the importance and sensitivity of those activities";

5. Echoes the concern expressed by the Director General over the issue of the purpose of Iran's activities related to experiments on the production and intended use of polonium-210, in the absence of information to support Iran's statements in this regard;

6. Calls on Iran to be pro-active in taking all necessary steps on an urgent basis to resolve all outstanding issues, including the issue of LEU and HEU contamination at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and Natanz; the issue of the nature and scope of Iran's laser isotope enrichment research; and the issue of the experiments on the production of polonium-210;

7. Notes with appreciation that the Agency is investigating the supply routes and sources of technology and related equipment, and nuclear and non-nuclear materials, found in Iran, and reiterates that the urgent, full and close cooperation with the Agency of all third countries is essential in the clarification of outstanding questions concerning Iran's nuclear programme, including the acquisition of nuclear technology from foreign sources; and also appreciates any cooperation in this regard as may already have been extended to the Agency;

8. Requests the Director General to report on these issues before the end of May, as well as on the implementation of this and prior resolutions on Iran, for consideration by the June Board of Governors -- or to report earlier if appropriate;

9. Decides to defer until its June meeting, and after receipt of the report of the Director General referred to above, consideration of progress in verifying Iran's declarations, and of how to respond to the above-mentioned omissions; and

10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org.

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Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Board of Governors, March 8, 2004

...

Nuclear Verification

The past year has been a challenging period for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Current challenges include: the continuing refusal by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to submit its nuclear activities to international verification; our ongoing efforts to verify the nuclear activities of Iran and Libya; the discovery of a sophisticated black market in nuclear technology and materials; the failure of some countries to fulfil their legal obligations to conclude and bring into force safeguards agreements; and slow progress on the conclusion and entry into force of additional protocols. For the nuclear non-proliferation regime to maintain its integrity, we must find a way to make tangible progress on all these fronts in the near future.

Status of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
Since my last report to the Board, the Secretariat has continued its intensified efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including two outreach seminars ' one last November here in Vienna, and the other last week in Burkina Faso ' and expanded consultations on the Model Additional Protocol with representatives from a number of governments.

Despite these efforts, progress remains limited. Since my last report, one safeguards agreement has entered into force, for the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and one additional protocol, for the Republic of Korea. Additional protocols were also signed by Kazakhstan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the European Union, all 15 Member States have now notified the IAEA of their ratification of the additional protocol, but entry into force will occur only when the European Commission has notified us that the acceptance procedure by EURATOM, which is also party to the protocol, has been completed ' which I hope will occur without delay.

Overall, 44 States have yet to fulfil their obligations under the NPT to bring safeguards agreements with the Agency into force, and even counting the addition of the European Union, additional protocols will have entered into force for only 54 States. I would reiterate my call on all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force their respective safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

Implementation of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
The nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and its notice of withdrawal from the NPT, have set a dangerous precedent and thus remain a threat to the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Since 31 December 2002, when at the request of the DPRK the Agency's onsite verification activities were terminated, the Agency has been unable to draw any conclusions regarding the DPRK's nuclear activities.

Last month, the second round of six-party talks took place in Beijing, with the participation of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the USA and the DPRK. The agreement to continue these talks is a welcome development. The Agency is not party to these talks, however, and I am therefore not in a position to report on their outcome. The Secretariat nonetheless remains ready to work with all parties towards a comprehensive solution that strikes a balance between the security needs of the DPRK and the need of the international community to gain assurance, through international verification, that all nuclear activities in the DPRK are exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran
You have before you a detailed progress report on the Agency's verification work in the Islamic Republic of Iran. I will limit myself, therefore, to a few broad observations.

First, I would like to note with satisfaction the marked progress in cooperation on the part of Iran since last October ' in particular, by providing Agency inspectors access to requested sites, documentation and personnel, and by suspending reprocessing and uranium enrichment related activities, as a confidence building measure.

Second, I am seriously concerned that Iran's October declaration did not include any reference to its possession of P-2 centrifuge designs and related R&D, which in my view was a setback to Iran's stated policy of transparency. This is particularly the case since the October declaration was characterized as providing "the full scope of Iranian nuclear activities", including a 'complete centrifuge R&D chronology'.

Third, it is vital that, in the coming months, Iran ensures full transparency with respect to all of its nuclear activities, by taking the initiative to provide all relevant information in full detail and in a prompt manner.

Fourth, it is essential that the Agency receive full cooperation on the part of those countries from which nuclear technology and equipment originated. This cooperation has already been forthcoming, and I hope it will continue and expand. This is particularly the case with respect to the major outstanding issue regarding the low and high enriched uranium contamination found at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and Natanz. Hopefully, with no new revelations, and with satisfactory resolution of these and other remaining questions, we can look forward to a time when the confidence of the international community has been restored.

Implementation of Safeguards in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
On 19 December 2003, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya announced its decision to eliminate all materials, equipment and programmes leading to the production of internationally proscribed weapons ' including nuclear weapons. In the months since, we have been working closely with the Libyan authorities to gain a complete picture of Libya's nuclear programme. The report before you summarizes the details of those efforts.

Libya's failure, over many years, to declare to the Agency its nuclear material and activities represents a breach of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its safeguards agreement, and its acquisition of a nuclear weapon design is clearly a matter of utmost concern.

Following the disclosure of its undeclared nuclear activities, Libya has granted the Agency unrestricted access to all requested locations, responded promptly to the Agency's requests for information, and assisted the Agency in gaining a full picture of its nuclear programme. Libya also agreed to conclude an additional protocol, and to act in the meantime as if the protocol is in force. I will be signing this additional protocol with Libya this week. This active cooperation and openness is welcome, and will facilitate the Agency's ability to complete its verification of Libya's past nuclear activities. As in the case of Iran, the Agency also requires the full cooperation of the countries from which the nuclear technology and material originated.

Implications for the Non-Proliferation Regime, and Additional Measures
As part of verifying the nuclear programmes and activities of Libya and Iran, the Agency has been investigating the supply routes and sources of nuclear technology, including related equipment, materials and expertise. As mentioned in our reports, we have found increasing evidence of a complex black market network. We are working with many governments, both to bring relevant findings to their attention and to request assistance in our further investigation. An important part of our investigation is to find out whether the sensitive nuclear technologies in question have been spread to any other countries or end-users. I will continue to keep the Board informed of developments.

In my view, one of the most important outcomes of our verification work in recent months is the lessons we have learned on measures that must be taken to adapt the nuclear non-proliferation regime to the new challenges.

First, it should by now be obvious that the additional protocol is a sine qua non for effective verification. Without an additional protocol in force, the IAEA has little prospect of uncovering the increasingly sophisticated clandestine nuclear weapons programmes. I believe that, for the Agency to be able to fulfil its verification responsibilities in a credible manner, the additional protocol must become the standard for all countries that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Second, it is clear that the system in place to control the export of sensitive nuclear technology must be broadened in its reach and tightened in its controls. A system that aims to strike proper balance ' between necessary controls against abuse, on the one hand, and the importance of assured access to peaceful technology, on the other ' is in the interest of all, and should command global support. While many aspects of export controls are not managed by the Agency, they are clearly of direct relevance to our verification mandate, and we should put in place mechanisms to ensure that the IAEA is informed of all sensitive nuclear or nuclear related technology exports.

Third, as I first outlined at last year's General Conference, it is clear that the wide dissemination of the most proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle ' the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, and the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste ' could be the 'Achilles' heel' of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Here again, it is important to tighten control over these operations, which could be done by bringing them under some form of multilateral control, in a limited number of regional centres. Appropriate checks and balances could be used to preserve commercial competitiveness, to control proliferation of sensitive information, and to ensure supply of fuel cycle services. I am aware that this is a complex issue, and that a variety of views exist on the feasibility or possible modalities of such a multilateral approach. However, I believe that we owe it to ourselves to examine all possible options available to us. For that reason I will soon appoint a group of experts to examine in depth the feasibility of moving forward with such measures, and I will naturally share their findings with you.

In the meantime, existing facilities that use high enriched uranium (HEU) applications ' for example, to produce medical radioisotopes ' should continue, gradually but irreversibly, to be converted to low enriched processes. In this respect, I am pleased to note continued progress with Agency support on converting research reactors to use low enriched fuel.

Naturally, we must continue also to press for a more effective global regime for the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials and nuclear facilities, particularly in regions that remain vulnerable.

Finally, I hope that, at next year's NPT Review Conference, parties to the Treaty will consider some of these urgently needed measures and agree on a specific course of action that will help re-engineer the non-proliferation regime and revive the stalling nuclear arms control and disarmament process.

Financing of the Technical Cooperation Fund

As I reported to you in February, we experienced a serious shortfall in contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) in 2003, resulting in a rate of attainment of only 77% for the year, well below the 90% minimum set by the General Conference. As outlined in my report on this subject, the Secretariat has had to take the unprecedented step of cutting the 2004 TC programme by $5 million as an immediate response to this shortfall.

The Secretariat remains hopeful that additional payments will be made to the 2003 TCF so that the rate of attainment for that year can be reached. Nonetheless, the current situation deserves the Board's serious attention.

The TC programme is a major part of the Agency's mandate. As such it should be a matter of concern for all Member States and I hope in that regard that the symbiotic nature of all parts of our mandate is understood by those who are not paying their target share. I should also remind all Member States that the TCF target and the rate of attainment were part of a good faith agreement that aimed to remove the shielding of safeguards expenses in the regular budget and ensure adequate funding for the TC programme, through the TCF. When Member States fail to contribute their dues, either to the regular budget or the TCF, the balance in Agency activities, as well as the bargains inherent in the non-proliferation regime, are placed in jeopardy ' at a time when we can all ill afford it.

Poor payment records are not limited to one geographic region. The failure of large donor States to meet their contributions may have a more sizeable impact on the TCF, but the failure by large numbers of recipient States to contribute their share ' in some cases paying nothing at all ' has an equally detrimental effect on the programme and its objectives.

We are presently engaged in appraising all the project requests that have been submitted for the 2005'2006 TC cycle. The ability to reliably plan and deliver an effective programme ' and to help Member States meet their developmental priorities ' is dependent on whether all countries contribute their full share.

Naturally, the Secretariat remains committed to efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out the TC programme. In that regard, we have continued to benefit from the assistance and advice of the Standing Committee on Technical Assistance and Cooperation (SAGTAC). I should note that during its meeting last week, SAGTAC referred to the 'significant progress already achieved within the TC Department in redirecting the Agency's technical cooperation programme since 1997. Today this programme operates with significantly improved efficiency and more effectively addresses the identified priority needs of its Member States.' SAGTAC also noted that this progress had been achieved despite human and financial resource restraints. I should also mention that the Agency's Office of Internal Oversight Services has also been carrying out a review of TC processes and needs, and a report on that review will be made available to the Board in June...

Conclusion

The Agency's verification role continues to be in the spotlight; the nuclear non-proliferation regime remains under stress, and a range of measures will be needed to restore confidence in its effectiveness. We have made solid progress in building an effective nuclear safety regime ' but pockets of weakness remain, in both the nuclear and the radiation safety areas. Nuclear technologies provide significant opportunities for economic and social development ' but we must work together to maximize their benefits and minimize their risks. And our effectiveness in delivering peaceful nuclear technologies to address development needs is dependent on all Member States contributing their financial share. I look forward to your continued support on all these fronts.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org.

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Statement on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran by Director-General for International Political Affairs, Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. Amir H. Zamaninia, IAEA Board of Governors, March 13, 2004

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Director-General, Distinguished Governors,

I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation to Director-General, Dr. ElBaradei for his leadership and acknowledge the hard work that his staff and inspectors should carry out under strenuous circumstances.

The report of the Director General illustrates the positive trend of active cooperation by Iran and also of a process of resolving issues that is gaining pace exponentially. In more than eleven different paragraphs, the Agency underlines that it is either analyzing information provided by Iran or is waiting for the results of swipe sampling. Issues are either resolved or are at the verge of being resolved.

In our view, the Director-General's report, particularly the section on assessment and next steps, narrowed down to issues of importance in his introductory statement of 8 March 2004, reflects in clear terms the approach and the elements which should have served to produce the resolution to be adopted in the Board. That is if indeed a resolution was necessary. I am sure the Board is aware that a large number of countries did not consider this session 'with a transitional report by the DG- to be an appropriate occasion for a substantive text to be adopted. A resolution is being imposed -and I think I am using the expression with true definition of the word- on the Board by a single country through few associates nonetheless.

The author of this resolution would no doubt try to argue that the draft coincides with the Director General's report and reflects the same points and issues addressed by him. But even an elementary review reveals immediately that it is nothing but a tool to serve a narrow minded, increasingly isolated conviction, by no means shared by the report.

The Director General has repeatedly stressed here:

  • that this is a work in progress;
  • that there is extensive cooperation;
  • that there have been no impediments to access;
  • that the Protocol has been signed and being applied voluntarily;
  • that our rightful enrichment activities have been voluntarily suspended to build confidence;
  • that all essential and urgent requirements have been implemented;
  • that corrective measures have been taken or are being taken; and
  • that outstanding issues are being resolved one after the other.

True that he has referred to a few shortcomings. But I do not think any observer with a minimum level of fair-mindedness could judge this as implying a reversal or even a detour in the process or a menace to it. The draft resolution on the other hand intends clearly to portray a rather benign progressive situation as a condition of high alert. Despite its limited modifications, owing to the principled position of many countries here, it is still a set back, a serious set back.

I shall not fail to express gratitude to the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, its Chairman and the troika of the Movement for their extensive effort and good faith negotiations to reach a draft resolution that commands general agreement. We took note of the understanding of the NAM of this resolution and of Paragraph 9, which as it stands, does not meet with its approval.

Since repeated delays and postponements have already exhausted the patience of the members, here I will refrain from presenting, in detail, the progress achieved on various issues and the pitfalls that we still need to tackle. But a brief summary to help establish where things stand today, and what may lie ahead, we hope would be useful.

Additional Protocol

For much of last year, signing the Additional Protocol, provisionally applying it prior to its ratification and its ratification were among the most important issues that Iran was called upon to do in order to dispel doubts and promote transparency and confidence in its peaceful nuclear program. Now, this is fully in place.

Suspension of Enrichment Related and Reprocessing Activities

The same is true for suspension of enrichment related and reprocessing activities, which was to put all concerns about Iran's nuclear programme to rest, particularly when combined with the provisional application of the Protocol. Iran's voluntary decision for suspension was not easy decision to make in view of the rights of NPT signatories to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. But, in order to secure international confidence and promote transparency about its peaceful nuclear programme, Iran mustered the political will to take that voluntary decision. The Director-General welcomed Iran's decision and wrote in his report, in Paragraph 72 that it will contribute to confidence building. However, the author of this draft resolution apparently knows better and in order to avoid acknowledging this positive trend resorted to distortion of English language in Operative Paragraph 3 and vehemently resisted NAM's amendment to bring it somewhat closer to a decent language and the Director-General's report.

Conversion Program (UCF) at Isfahan

Only three months ago we were being told by the Agency that Iran has had a quantum leap in construction of the facility for the UCF project at Isfahan. This was deemed as a significant and major issue not expected to be resolved with ease. The Agency is now concluding that Iran's declaration on UCF "appears to be credible." When the inspectors come to Isfahan next time, they only need to compare some documents to confirm that this outstanding issue is resolved.

Laser Enrichment Programm

Our laser enrichment programme has been considered as a second major outstanding issue. The Report indicates that our programme has had two parts; MLIS programme, and AVLIS programme. Our information on MLIS programme, as the Report says, "appears to be coherent". On the AVLIS programme, there is nothing else that Iran is expected to do. As far as we are concerned this issue is also resolved. However, the Agency needs to receive confirmation from third states with regard to deliveries of equipment related to our AVLIS programme.

Plutonium

The question of Plutonium was also highlighted during November debate as a significant issue of concern and contention. Now, it has been reduced only to the degree of accuracy of calculation by the Iranian scientist of the weight of Plutonium produced. This is among the eleven subjects that the Agency is awaiting the result of sampling. We believe this issue will also be resolved next time the inspectors attend to it. The issue is now whether the calculation by the Iranian scientist which estimated that 200 Microgram of Plutonium was produced is accurate or the calculation by the Agency which estimates that approximately 200 Milligram could have been produced, or somewhere in between, taking into account the quality of equipment used and expertise applied.

Plonium-210

On the question raised about Polonium-210, I would refer the Board of Governors to the explanation and information provided in our INFCIRC/628. Furthermore, we have provided the Agency 41 pages of information about this pure research, which await analysis by the Agency. We are confident that our explanations will be confirmed following their analysis by the Agency. Suffice it to say that Beryllium is an indispensable item in a research geared into a military program. And Beryllium was never part of Iran's buying list. Additionally, if Iran had a military application in mind for the research on P-210, about thirteen years ego, what factor prevented Iran from repeating the research over and over again during the past thirteen years? Why was the project abandoned rather than budgeted and pursued?

The research on Polonium, in any case, is not required under the safeguards and the Additional Protocol to be reported. Even as a neutron source, it has widespread civilian applications including, in particular, for oil and gas logging.

Contamination

The only outstanding issue which may prove somewhat difficult and time consuming to resolve is the question of contamination beyond 1.2 per cent enrichment. And that is due to the independent factor of the foreign source. However, with the recent revelations from third countries even the question of contamination may get resolved sooner rather than later. We are determined to reconstruct the import and movements of imported components in Iran to isolate contamination to the extent possible so as to enable the Agency to resolve the issue with a greater number of swipe samplings. In our view, as the results of new samplings become available more pieces of this puzzle fall into place.

P-2 centrifuge design

The question of P-2 design, on the other hand, is overblown disproportionately for the reasons listed in our INFCIRC 628 and for the following reasons.

It was Friday the 13, in February when the whole world came lose. It was the day when newspapers in Europe and the United States wrote that the IAEA officials made the discovery and proved that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. The times of London, Washington Post, LA times and the Financial Times were the most creative and all attributed their stories to officials of the IAEA.

In an Article entitled "blueprints prove Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons", and after elaborating IAEA officials' discovery of blueprints of G-2 centrifuge, the Times of London went on to say: "Several IAEA officials said they believed Iran had bought the same nuclear warhead designs that Libya handed over to the IAEA."

Referring to the same discovery, Washington Post wrote: "Before yesterday's disclosure, Bush administration had begun to signal a tougher line against Iran, hinting of new intelligence findings that strongly suggested that Iran was harboring nuclear secrets. Some of these things the IAEA does not yet know, said one administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity."

Apart from problems associated with the breach of confidentiality envisaged in the Statute of the IAEA and the Additional Protocol, I would like to suggest to the distinguished Governors that the issue of P-2 has been unduly exaggerated by the media and the Agency. The Agency's uranium enrichment expert who inspected our P-2 drawings and associated experiments and testing activities, and interviewed the thirty some year old contractor, better than anyone else, can now confirm or reject that the sensations created around the P-2 is justified or is exaggerated.

For your information, I have with me copies of five pictures signed by the Agency's uranium enrichment expert. These five pictures tell the whole story about all the research and manufacturing of the P-2 centrifuge in Iran. All the research and manufacturing are done by a small private work shop and are limited to making components for only one set of centrifuge with several rotors. And these few components are now in a storage visited by the inspectors. These pictures are here for anyone interested to see them. Having said this about the scope and nature of Iran's activities in relation to P-2 centrifuges, I turn to the question of omission from our letter of 21 October 2003 of any reference to Iran's possession of the P-2 centrifuge drawings.

Our arguments on this issue have been listed in INFCIRC 628, and most of them are summarized in Paragraph 47 of the report. I wish to state for the record that Paragraph 46 represents a problem with communication between us and the Agency, in as much as we have never meant to say that we neglected to include the P-2 in our letter of 21 October due to time pressure in preparing the letter.

The crux of the matter seems to be a difference of view between us and the Agency on this issue as far as the timing of reporting it is concerned. Our technical people who provided the material for what became our 21 October 2003 letter thought they are expected to provide a full picture of their nuclear activities as well as complete centrifuge R & D involving nuclear material that represented a failure of our obligations under our Safeguards Agreement. The P-2, in our view was to be reported under the Additional protocol declarations. We could not have perceived to stand to gain by reporting the P-2 under the Additional Protocol and not as part of our letter of 21 October 2003. It was a matter of judgment in good faith.

What should be important to the Agency and the Board is the fact that we have provided the information on the nature and scope of our activities related to P-2 centrifuge, and will provide any clarification which the Agency may require to enable it to confirm that our gas centrifuge program has been entirely based on P-1 centrifuge, which has been suspended.

Mr. Chairman,

Iran's agreement with the three European countries constituted the foundation of a new chapter in the cooperation between Iran and the IAEA. It opened the way for further Iranian commitment to the cause. Iran has been faithful to this commitment and has spared no effort to ensure that this process moves forward efficiently, expeditiously and exhaustively in order that a definitive conclusion of the matters at hand would come to light. A fair and balanced review of the substantive progress that has been made on resolution of major issues within the short period of time since October testifies clearly to this fact.

The questions related to conversion, plutonium, and laser enrichment, deemed by some of the skeptics during the November meeting as significant sources of uncertainty about peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, have now been either resolved or are on the verge of final resolution.

If the current process would be allowed to proceed within its positive context of mutual confidence and cooperation, we have no doubt that these and other questions referred to in the Director General's report will be settled by the next Board meeting. With the additional information recently requested by the secretariat, our share of what we can provide to the best of our ability to help clarify the complex issue of contamination would also be completed by the same Board meeting. Our obligations and commitments will thus be thoroughly fulfilled and remedies and corrective measures completed.

The succinct summary assessment presented by the DG at the opening of this board meeting, save for his interpretation of the P2 question as a setback, which will prove to be benign, concurs with this assertion. We believe that his statement was plainly clear in identifying the single issue of contamination as the one requiring further work and continued cooperation from Iran and other Parties. It was in this context that he expressed his hope that, in the absence of new revelations, these and other remaining questions will be resolved and confidence restored.

The fundamental conclusion which constitutes the essence of the whole safeguards system pertaining to non diversion of nuclear material and activities to military purposes is, in the meantime, sustained. Since November when the Director General reported no evidence of diversion, a robust system of verification has been effectively and extensively in place. The conclusion remains the same. There is no evidence of diversion today; there will not be such evidence tomorrow, nor there will ever be such evidence or indication of diversion in the future.

It is of course not easy for some to accept the fact that our nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. Those who have for long set their policy and approach on the false perception that Iran seeks weapons of mass destruction cannot change course with ease. Their negation is naturally a first psychological reaction before accepting the truth. Yet the truth remains the same. Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. The Agency's inspections will progressively confirm this assertion.

Against this background, the attempt to unravel this otherwise healthy process, which is now a matter of public information, is clearly out of order. There is a fervent unjustified desire to maintain undue pressure on Iran through misrepresentation of facts, over-exaggeration of minor misgivings, and excessive prejudgments.

The move to pass a tough resolution here runs primarily on prejudiced ideological emotions. If this prevails, which apparently will through the logic of force and exercise of systematic intransigence, extremists 'mutually reinforcing- will gain momentary comfort.

The well wishers here tell us that there is a lot of hot air in certain ideological circles. They say it is best to let the steam blow away. To be frank we are not sure whether this serves any purpose or gives a chance for things to improve.

What we see however is that the damage has already been done. The process is geared to suffer. Recovery will require enormous efforts. Those who have worked relentlessly to put this venture in place have tedious work ahead of them. They may not be so outspoken, as sensationalism betrays sensible work. But they are 'as we still view them- dedicated to see this process through and make sure it succeeds.

With change of obstinate minds and cold hearts, June may prove to embody a different spirit. Looking in hindsight, this March Meeting may then be remembered only as a piece of bad memory.

Thank you.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org.

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IAEA Board of Governors Meeting
Agenda Item 4(a): Implementation of Safeguards in Iran
Statement by the United States of America
March 13, 2004

Mr. Chairman,

First I would like to thank the Director General and the Safeguards staff for the considerable skill and perseverance they have demonstrated on the Iran issue.

Three days ago the Board addressed the implementation of safeguards in Libya and discharged its responsibilities under the Statute. Today we are considering another critically important nuclear nonproliferation case, that of Iran. Although the Director General has rightly referred to some "common elements" in the Libyan and Iranian programs, the two cases are in fact far more remarkable for their present differences than for their past similarities.

In Libya, we saw an IAEA member state that in December made a far-sighted and courageous decision to turn voluntarily away from the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Libya's government recognized that the pursuit of -- and even the possession of -- such weapons eroded the security of its people, and would have been a crippling drain on its economic development and its prospects for integration into the international community. The December decision and the many constructive steps Libya has made since then to implement it have moved the issue quickly towards resolution, increased the security of its region and the world, and set a constructive precedent for others to follow.

Iran, in contrast, is continuing to pursue a policy of denial, deception, and delay. Time after time, when IAEA inspectors have confronted the Iranian government with verified facts it could no longer contest, Iran has revised its story and blamed others for its duplicity. But from the beginning the responsibility for prolonging this investigation has lain solely with Iran itself.

Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, the months during which IAEA inspectors have been trying to uncover the full facts about Iran's nuclear program are now beginning to turn into years. Let me remind you: in August it will be two full years since the public revelations were made that gave the Agency the initial leads it needed to start peeling away the layers of concealment Iran had put in place.

Last October 21, finding itself under increasing pressure from the Secretariat's inspections and the Board's strong September resolution, Iran reached a political agreement with France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In that agreement it committed itself to "full cooperation with the IAEA" and "full transparency" to resolve all outstanding issues. Two days later, the IAEA received a declaration that Iran itself characterized at that time as "the full scope of Iranian nuclear activities."

At the November meeting of the Board, the Iranian Ambassador gave an explicit assurance that his country had gone "to unprecedented lengths in trying to secure the trust and winning the confidence of the international community by disclosing all our past peaceful nuclear activities. . . .' Mr. Chairman, that explicit assurance was not qualified by any reference to what Iran was legally required to disclose under either its comprehensive safeguards agreement or the Additional Protocol. Its point of reference was the trust and confidence of the international community, which Iran claimed to have earned by having finally "come clean" about "all" its past and present nuclear activities.

Most of us now in this room were present when Iran made that assurance. Some of us were skeptical then; others were ready to take Iran at its word. We found common ground in a resolution that strongly deplored Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with its safeguards agreement, that noted with the gravest concern Iran's pattern of concealment and the contradictions in its varying explanations of its activities, that requested the Director General to confirm that the information Iran had provided in October was in fact correct and complete, and that decided that if further serious Iranian failures came to light, the Board would meet to consider "all options at its disposal."

Four months later, the Director General's fourth report on Iran now provides a basis on which we can assess the value of the assurance Iran gave us in November. The report sets out facts that, by any measure, are remarkable. In brief, it makes clear beyond question that Iran's assurance to the November Board that it had revealed "all" its nuclear activities was just another active measure in its ongoing policy of deception. To cite but two examples from the report:

' When Agency inspectors confronted Iran in January 2004 with new information, it had to admit it had failed to declare the more advanced P-2 centrifuge design drawings and associated research and testing, and indeed that it had not previously acknowledged even the existence of the P-2 program. If Agency inspectors had not followed up leads discovered during their work in Libya, there is no reason to believe Iran would have declared the P-2 program at all I can only echo both the DG's expression of "serious concern" about that concealment and his judgment that the explanations Iran has offered to date are "difficult to comprehend."

' Inspectors also had to discover for themselves that Iran had carried out experiments to produce polonium 210, a rare and toxic material that can serve as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons but has very few civilian applications, none of which is plausible in the Iranian context. Again, Iran has not been able to document or otherwise persuasively explain why it conducted that work.

In the face of this demonstration that the assurances Iran gave in October and November were not fulfilled, it is not surprising that today we have heard Iran try to explain away its previous assurances and retroactively to redefine different commitments. The record, however, is clear.

The DG's report also detailed numerous cases in which information that Iran provided in explanation of its nuclear activities turned out, once again, to be' either not complete or not persuasive. One such issue still lacking a credible explanation is why one room at the Kalaye Electric Company was contaminated with uranium enriched to the 36 percent level. Indeed, the broader question of how the evidence of nuclear activity in Iran confirmed by environmental sampling can be squared with Iran's assurance that it never enriched uranium to more than 1.2 percent -- an assurance that itself, I would remind you, was "in contrast" to Iran's initial insistence that it never had enriched uranium at all. That issue continues to pose a challenge both to Agency inspectors and to the broader international community.

Paragraph 75 of the DG's report indeed indicates that the enrichment issue remains "the major outstanding issue" the Secretariat is facing, despite all the intensive work it has done on that subject since last summer. It is therefore all the more extraordinary, Mr. Chairman, that the report had to note that "the Agency is still waiting for Iran to provide requested information" not only on the origin of the centrifuge equipment and components, but even on "the locations in Iran to which such equipment and components were moved and the associated details of timescales, and the names of individuals involved."

As the months pass, the Board must once again ask whether it can really be so difficult for Iran to provide the information the Agency needs to finish its investigation. We must consider whether the real reason for the continuing delays is the same reason why last year Iran refused for months to allow environmental sampling at the Kalaye Electric Company, while it was carrying out extensive modifications intended to prevent the Agency from verifying the activities previously conducted there. Is it possible that, even as we meet, squads of Iranian technicians are working at still-undeclared sites to tile over, paint over, bury, burn or cart away incriminating evidence so that those santitized locations can finally be identified to the Agency as new evidence of Iran's full cooperation and transparency? Is it possible that nuclear activities are continuing at facilities Iran has no. intention of declaring?

I call to your attention, Mr. Chairman, the facts that the DG's report revealed about the manufacturing of centrifuge components in military-industrial workshops. We commend the Agency for its conscientious pursuit of the truth about Iran's nuclear program, including the extent to which that program involves the Iranian military. In a country like Iran, with a sophisticated and well-capitalized energy sector, it is more than curious that a nuclear program -- said to be purely civilian in nature and purely for power generation purposes -seems to have much closer ties to the Iranian military than it does to the rest of the civilian energy sector. We look forward to learning whether Iran's forthcoming declarations under the Additional Protocol clarify the nature and extent of military involvement in the Iranian nuclear program. The Agency should also follow up on any indications A. Q. Khan could have provided nuclear weapons design information to Iran.

I might note that the Iranian delegation's willingness to support only those things in the Director General's report that it agrees with and to question or denigrate the many Iranian shortcomings and problems the report details speaks volumes about Iran's true attitude to the Agency's work.

The United States hopes that a robust implementation of the Additional Protocol in Iran will help throw much-needed light on those and other issues. In that connection, however, I am sure all Board members were troubled by the recently reported public statement by a high Iranian government official that in addition to the P-2 advanced centrifuge program, Iranian experts are engaged in other types of research that Iran has not reported to the IAEA and does not intend to report. Such statements hardly increase the confidence of the international community in the strength of Iran's commitment to its safeguards agreement and to the Additional Protocol.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. supported the efforts of France, Germany and the United Kingdom announced last October to reach an accord with Iran on an internationally verifiable suspension and then cessation of Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities. We said at the time that such actions by Iran, combined with full, verifiable transparency, would be the best way for it to build international confidence regarding the nature of its nuclear program. However, we have witnessed Iran, though its actions and its repeated public statements, making a mockery of that agreement. Far from suspending all enrichment-related activities on the path to cessation, Iran continued until January to manufacture, assemble and test centrifuges, and continued construction at the massive Natanz site.

In addition, we are concerned that Iran's February announcement -- that it will suspend centrifuge assembly and testing, as well as component manufacture "to the furthest extent possible" -- may represent another tactical diversion, and that Iran may intend to continue its programs in defiance of the Board's resolutions. In that regard, we are deeply troubled by statements made by senior officials in Tehran -- issued at almost the same time Iran was announcing a new commitment to suspend its assembly of centrifuge components -- to the effect that Iran intends to produce and export nuclear fuel to world markets, and more recent statements that Iran 'definitely' intends to resume its enrichment activities 'when our relations with the IAEA return to normal.' We also find difficult to comprehend what commercial obligation could outweigh a sovereign decision by Iran to suspend domestic manufacture of centrifuge components -manufacturing that, as the Director General has reported, is taking place mostly at military-controlled workshops. One must ask whether Iran sees suspension and cessation as a route to better relations with the world community, or merely as a short- term maneuver intended to avoid a Board report to the UN Security Councilor other criticism by the Agency. The fact that, after months of resistance, Iran's latest partial step on suspension came only at the last possible minute before the Director General's February 24 report, speaks volumes.

Whatever Iran's motivation may be, the Board must adopt at this meeting a resolution that makes clear, as did our resolutions in September and November, that only a prompt and comprehensive suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities can begin to build international confidence in Iran's intentions after the breaches, failures an deception that have come to light over the past year. We again urge Iran to respond positively and fully to the Board's concerns on the suspension issue.

The resolution the Board adopted today makes no definitive judgments, but it makes clear Iran has yet to discharge the obligation of full cooperation, compliance and transparency essential to the fulfillment of its legal commitments, not to mention its more recent political commitments. That clear statement of the facts is common ground on which we all stand. As our resolution says, the Board will consider in June how to respond to Iran's omissions of important information, as well as other relevant issues. But although Iran continues to press in Vienna and in many capitals for its 'file' to be closed in June, there is no indication the work of the Secretariat, of the Board, will have been completed by that time. No member of the Board should lend any support to efforts to impose artificial restrictions on the authority and responsibility of the Board and the Secretariat to perform their duties under the Statute and safeguards agreements. Surely doing so would be inconsistent with our responsibilities as members of this Board.

Libya has now demonstrated, Mr. Chairman, that a country genuinely committed to reversing course can move swiftly and pro-actively to eliminate weapons of mass destruction programs. In Iran's case, in contrast, we regret that once again, as at every Board meeting over the past year, Board members find it necessary to call on Tehran to intensify its cooperation with the Agency, as the Director General urged in his latest -- but not last -- report. The "Iran file" at the IAEA cannot and will not be closed until all the facts are known and an appropriate finding of the Board is made upon them.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes the statement I had intended to deliver today. But in light of the very troubling news reports over the past 24 hours about Iran's sudden decision to halt inspections for at least a number of weeks -- and the Iranian delegation's less than subtle hints today that Iran's cooperation with the Agency has conditions attached to it -- I think Board members would benefit from information from the Secretariat about what impact that decision may have on the inspectors' work. Can the Secretariat tell us whether the inspections that were postponed were essentially routine inspections, or were inspectors planning to visit new sites or facilities? Has Iran said how long the postponement will last? How will the delay affect inspection plans and schedules? Especially in light of Iran's past record of carrying out sanitizing 'modifications' to sites before allowing inspectors to carry out environmental sampling, could such a postponement potentially provide time for work that would affect the inspectors' ability to address all relevant outstanding issues and draw closer to conclusions about the Iranian nuclear program?

Finally, I note the Agency circulated the Iranian written response to the Director General's February 24 report, which, as far as we can tell, duplicates the oral presentation the Iranian delegation made during Deputy Director General Goldschmidt's technical briefing -- and indeed we have heard yet another exposition of this information today in Iran's statement. My delegation, and I'm sure other delegations, would appreciate receiving the Agency's written reaction to Iran's continued assertions that the Director General's report is full of mistakes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Source: US Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, http://www.usun-vienna.usia.co.at/

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Statement by the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (Paris, 15 March 2004)

The IAEA board of governors adopted a resolution on Iran's nuclear activities on February 13. We consider this resolution to be balanced and in line with the process of dialogue between Iran and the international community initiated with the Teheran declaration on October 21.

The resolution is based on the director general's report and asks Iran to clarify certain aspects of its undeclared nuclear program and certain outstanding issues. It emphasizes the progress made by Iran in cooperating with the IAEA, particularly the signing of the additional protocol and extending the suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing.

We are pleased that the resolution was adopted by consensus as this shows the unity of the international community.

Regarding Iran's refusal to allow inspections, I recall that the report of the IAEA director general on February 24 noted Iran's satisfactory cooperation regarding access to sites and verification of nuclear materials. We invite Iran not to take measures that could harm this cooperation.

Source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.diplomatie.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=41030

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