Disarmament Documentation: Statements of current and former Secretaries of State and Defense to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, March 23

Chairman Kean, Vice-Chairman Hamilton, members of the commission, good morning. I am pleased to testify before you and to reiterate my offer to be of help to you in whatever way I can.

It is vital that our nation know as much as possible about the events leading up to the terror attacks of September 11 so that we may consider carefully the lessons of that tragic date and act wisely to ensure that nothing similar happens again. That is the least we owe the families of those who were killed on that horrible day; and it is the best way to safeguard our own future.

That is why everyone who has served in a position of responsibility or who has information or knowledge related to this commission's mandate should hout conditions. And why the commission should be given all the time it needs to do a thorough, fair and professional job.

There are many facets to this issue and whole books have been written about each.

During the past thirty months, the facts about Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden have been extracted from the clutter of other information that once surrounded them and then assembled into a monstrous tale of evil narrated in neon lights.

We did not see all of these facts as clearly during my years in government as we do now. But we learned continually and did everything we could think of-- based on the knowledge we did have--to protect our people and disrupt and defeat this shadowy network of terror.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you and before the American people about the policies we developed and the actions we took. I am pleased, as well, to have the chance to offer recommendations for the future.

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice-Chairman, in your letter of invitation, you suggested that I provide testimony on eight specific topics. I have organized my statement to reflect that request.

Counterterrorism and United States Foreign Policy During the Clinton Administration

There can be no doubt that countering the terror threat was a top priority for President Clinton and every member of our foreign policy and national security team. The "transnational threats" of terrorism, crime and the spread of weapons of mass destruction were a dominant theme in our public statements and private deliberations and played a role in bilateral relations with nearly every nation. These concerns were evident in the president's frequent warnings about the possibility of a bioterror attack on the United States. They were reflected in the administration's decision to expand the CIA's Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) and establish a special CIA bin Laden unit during the mid-1990s. They prompted the administration's effort to improve counterterrorism coordination by placing a senior FBI official at the CTC and a top CIA official at the FBI. They led to the activation of a high-level White House interagency counterterrorism working group that met several times a week to review threats and coordinate counterterrorism efforts. And they caused the president to decide in May 1998 to restructure the National Security Council and appoint a National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Infrastructure Protection with a mandate to organize the government more effectively to safeguard our citizens from unconventional dangers.

During the Clinton Administration's eight years in office, we intensified intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with other countries, resulting in the arrest and prosecution of scores of terrorist suspects (including Ramzi Yousef--responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing--and Mir Aimal Kansi--murderer of two CIA employees that same year). We worked with foreign partners to prevent planned terror strikes such as a conspiracy to bomb New York City landmarks in 1993, a plot to assassinate the pope, plans to sabotage 12 U.S. commercial aircraft over the Pacific in 1994-95, and a 1998 plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in Albania. We expanded our overseas Counter-terrorism Training Assistance Program, instructing more than 20,000 law enforcement officers from more than 90 countries in subjects ranging from airport security and bomb detection to maritime security and hostage rescue. In response to intelligence warnings shortly before the start of the new millennium, we undertook the largest counterterrorism operation in U.S. history to that time, preventing multiple al-Qaeda attacks in America and Jordan. Cabinet-level national security, intelligence and law enforcement officials met in the White House virtually every day for nearly a month during this period to ensure the coordination of threat information and security responses.

President Clinton also pushed for and signed into law the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which banned designated terrorist organizations from fund-raising in the United States and made it easier to bar terrorists from entering our country. The administration asked for, but Congress failed to approve, anti-money-laundering legislation, authority to place roving wiretaps on suspected terrorists, and proposals to attach taggants to identify the origin of explosives that could be used by terrorists. We took steps to freeze the financial assets of radical outlaw groups (In 1998 and 1999 President Clinton blocked al Qaeda financial transactions and froze approximately $255 million in Taliban assets). We increased the size of rewards offered for information leading to the apprehension of terrorists. We more than doubled our nation's counterterrorism budget (from $5 billion in FY 1996 to $11 billion in FY 2000), increased sharply the number of FBI agents working the issue, and accelerated technological research to improve our ability to detect explosives, counter weapons of mass destruction, protect against cyber sabotage and provide physical security. We imposed economic sanctions against state sponsors of terror, which included Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. We used a combination of diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions to force Libya to hand over for trial two persons indicted in the 1989 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103. We worked with officials in the former Soviet Union through the Nunn-Lugar and other programs to secure materials and expertise that might cause weapons of mass destruction to fall into the wrong hands.

At the same time, the president issued a series of directives to enhance our ability to disrupt terrorist operations abroad, and prepare for the possibility of strikes in the United States involving the use of chemical or biological weapons. He ordered the training of firefighters and other first responders in more than 150 American cities. He initiated creation of a nationwide stockpile of drugs and vaccines and a plan to protect critical infrastructure such as power grids and computer networks from cyber attacks.

The White House also used the bully pulpit of the presidency to heighten awareness of the terrorist threat and rouse global support for defeating it. For example in 1995 during ceremonies surrounding the 50th anniversary of the UN, President Clinton said that "Our generation's enemies are the terrorists…who kill children or turn them into orphans, people who target innocent people in order to prevent peace…Today, the threat to our security is not in an enemy silo, but in the briefcase or the car bomb of a terrorist." In 1996, the president helped organize the international summit on counterterrorism at Sharm-al-Sheikh, in which 29 world leaders participated, including 13 from Arab states. Year after year, the president told the UN General Assembly that combating terrorism was at the top of the American agenda, and should be at the top of the world's agenda. He urged every nation to deny support and sanctuary to terrorist groups; to cooperate in extraditing and prosecuting terrorist suspects; to regulate more rigorously the manufacture and export of explosives; to raise international airport security standards; and to combat the conditions internationally that fuel intolerance, spread violence and multiply despair.

Though we did not achieve all we hoped, I am proud of the Clinton Administration's record in fighting terror. We were the first to make it a centerpiece of our national security strategy. We laid the groundwork for a comprehensive global response to the terrorist threat and launched homeland planning initiatives that would be built upon in subsequent years. We recognized the need to improve cooperation between the FBI and CIA and took steps in that direction. We re-organized the National Security Council with the terrorist threat in mind. And, as described below, we used a wide variety of national security tools in an effort to apprehend and stop the terrorists who were threatening the United States.

My worst day as secretary of state was August 7, 1998, when terrorist explosions struck our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds of people were killed, including twelve Americans.

Within a matter of days, we had captured several suspects who made it clear that Osama bin Laden was behind the attacks. The question for us was whether to consider this a law enforcement matter demanding a judicial response or a military matter in which the use of armed force was justified. We decided it was both. We proceeded to prosecute the conspirators we had captured. But we also decided within a week to hit back militarily and within two weeks launched cruise missiles at a target in Sudan and at several al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The timing of the strikes was determined by highly credible predictive intelligence (the rarest kind) indicating that terrorist leaders-- possibly including bin Laden--would be meeting at one of the camps.

The day after the cruise missile strikes, the White House convened a meeting to study further military options. Our primary target--bin Laden--had not been hit, so we were determined to try again. In subsequent weeks, the president specifically authorized the use of force to capture bin Laden with the expectation that he likely would be killed in any such operation. Later presidential directives were more explicit, making clear that lethal force could be used against bin Laden and his lieutenants. There should have been no confusion-and in my mind at the time there was none-that our personnel were authorized to kill bin Laden. We did not, after all, launch cruise missiles for the purpose of serving legal papers. We wanted to put bin Laden out of business permanently.

To maintain the option of force, we placed submarines equipped with cruise missiles permanently on call in the Arabian Sea. The Pentagon eventually wearied of this deployment and said prolonging it was not justified in the absence of more specific information about bin Laden's whereabouts. However, President Clinton insisted because it gave us the capability to hit bin Laden quickly if credible "predictive intelligence" did materialize.

Anxious to explore every alternative, we studied the possibility of sending a U.S. Special Forces team into Afghanistan to try and snatch bin Laden. The Pentagon raised concerns that I believe were understandable. The first was the lack of real time intelligence. We couldn't snatch someone unless we knew where he was. The second was that if we did obtain good intelligence, a missile would get the job done more rapidly than a strike force. There was never any doubt that, if we knew where bin Laden was or where he was going to be, we would go after him. We all felt the loss of those murdered in the embassy bombings, had met with the families of victims, and were determined to prevent additional attacks.

The reason for the strikes we did make was that we had received word of a scheduled meeting of terrorist leaders including--we hoped--bin Laden. We did not get a similar break again. Instead, we occasionally learned where bin Laden had been or where he might be going or where someone who looked a little like him might be. We heard of suspicious caravans or of someone tall with a beard moving about with bodyguards. At times, the information seemed promising enough to intensify military preparations until the leads proved unverifiable or wrong. We also heard reports of skirmishes inside Afghanistan between tribal militias and al-Qaeda, but the skirmishes were inconclusive and the reports questionable.

It was maddening. I compared it to one of those arcade games where you manipulate a lever hooked to a claw-like hand that you think, once you put your quarter in, will easily scoop up a prize. But every time you try to pull the basket out the prize falls away.

At the president's direction, our military continued to pursue ideas for improving real-time information on bin Laden's whereabouts. In 2000, beginning in late summer, we tried using the Predator, a slow-moving unmanned drone, to gather photographic data in Afghanistan. The results were encouraging -- but then the aircraft crashed. The NSC proposed arming a new drone with a missile. Early in 2001, the Air Force tested a prototype, but by then a new administration was in office.

One question that has since been raised is why we didn't simply invade Afghanistan, depose the Taliban and disperse al-Qaeda. As far as I know, this option was never seriously advocated by anyone in or outside the administration. There would have been reason to justify military action; but without the megashock of September 11, we would have not had a local staging ground to support such an attack, and diplomatic backing would have been virtually non-existent.

The Africa embassy bombings intensified our efforts to neutralize bin Laden, and also to protect our own people. Within days of the explosions, I appointed two Accountability Review Boards chaired by retired Admiral William Crowe to investigate and make recommendations. In January 1999, the boards recommended a dramatic increase in funds for U.S. embassy construction and repair and also that a single high-ranking officer be accountable for all protective security matters. To that end, I proposed the creation of the post of under secretary of state for security, terrorism and related affairs. Pending congressional action on that proposal, I decided that I had to be the one to make the final decisions; albeit with professional advice. So every morning I was in Washington, I reviewed the latest information about threats and potential threats to our diplomatic posts with Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security David Carpenter-the first career law enforcement professional ever appointed to that position. I was struck by the number of danger signals we received and also by the difficulty in many cases of making a clear judgment about whether a threat was sufficiently credible to warrant closing an embassy or embassies temporarily.

In this period, we received about 1000 threats a month against U.S. facilities or officials overseas. If we had responded to each by closing down the facility in question, we would have been paralyzed. If we had simply refused to order shutdowns as a matter of principle, we might have paid for our bravado with more lives. The only way to make an informed decision was to analyze the seriousness of each threat. To do this more efficiently, we arranged to have a Diplomatic Security officer stationed at the CIA, so we would know the moment a threat against one of our posts was received. We also had a group in the State Department operations center, working literally every hour of every day, to coordinate our response.

We also sent security assessment teams to each of the more than 250 foreign missions America maintains abroad. The teams conferred with the ambassador and with local representatives of such agencies as the FBI, CIA and Defense Department, as well as the State Department's administrative and security personnel. Together, they reviewed security procedures and the need for enhancements such as additional guards, concrete barriers and surveillance cameras. They analyzed vulnerabilities and discussed ways to strengthen working relationships with the local military and law enforcement authorities. And they emphasized the primary role the embassy itself would play in deciding when it was necessary to extract dependents, curtail operations or temporarily close down.

Although the focus of our anti-terrorism efforts throughout 1999 and 2000 was squarely on al-Qaeda and other groups with connections to Osama bin Laden, we did not always stress this publicly. We did not want him to have that satisfaction. Our counter-terrorism experts urged us in our public statements not to single him out, build him up or refer to the vastness of his operations. As a result, when I testified before Congress and made speeches about terror, I tended to talk in general terms and minimized specific mentions of bin Laden.

Two days after we launched our cruise missile attacks in response to the Kenya-Tanzania bombings, a Taliban representative called the State department to complain. He even put his reclusive leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, on the line. This conversation led to a dialogue spread over more than two years during which we repeatedly pressed the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden.

Taliban officials replied not by saying no directly but rather by offering a menu of excuses. They said that surrendering bin Laden would violate the Pushtun cultural tradition of courtesy to guests. They said that bin Laden was a hero to Afghans because of his role in ousting the Soviets and that the Taliban would be overthrown if they "betrayed" him in response to American pressure. And they said that they did not believe bin Laden was responsible for the embassy attacks because they had asked him and he had told them he was innocent.

For a time, we thought the Taliban might be persuadable. Notwithstanding their excuses, Taliban officials admitted that their "guest" had become a big problem. They told us that perhaps he would leave "voluntarily." At one point, they told us he had already gone. There were rumors that he was ill and had slipped away to find medical treatment. In any case, Taliban leaders assured us that bin Laden was under house arrest and would be prevented from contacting his followers or the press. We didn't buy these pledges, since the terrorist continued to show up in the media vowing to kill Americans.

Early in 1999, Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Sheehan--the State Department's director of Counter-terrorism--proposed a comprehensive diplomatic approach entitled "A New Strategy to Get Bin Laden." After inter-agency deliberations, the strategy was approved in May. The plan basically was to go to each of the countries that we thought had influence and urge them to tell Taliban leaders that they must hand over bin Laden or else face the loss of diplomatic contacts and a prohibition on international flights by Afghan airlines. Meanwhile, we would make clear to Taliban officials directly our intention to propose UN sanctions if they didn't come around.

In succeeding weeks, we implemented this strategy according to plan, but the plan did not work. Officials from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed to deliver the right message. The Saudis sent one of their princes to confront the Taliban directly. He came back and told us the Taliban were idiots and liars. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah visited the Pakistanis for the purpose of putting pressure on them. When the Taliban failed to cooperate, the Saudis did downgrade their diplomatic ties, cut off official assistance and denied visas to Afghans traveling for nonreligious reasons. The UAE took similar actions.

Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Rick Inderfurth and Mike Sheehan met directly with Taliban leaders. They hinted that cooperation would result in the only thing the Taliban desperately wanted: international recognition (although drug and human rights issues remained obstacles). We told the Taliban that if they did not come through they could expect nothing more than the barest kind of humanitarian aid from the international community. They could forget about economic assistance or loans. And we warned Taliban leaders clearly and repeatedly that they would be held responsible for any future attacks traceable to bin Laden, and that we reserved the right to use military force.

Faced with Taliban intransigence, we made good on our threat to impose sanctions. On July 5, 1999, the president issued an order freezing the Taliban's U.S. assets and prohibiting trade. This was followed by UN sanctions imposed in 1999 and toughened in 2000. Those UN Security Council resolutions were approved under chapter 7 of the UN Charter signifying a threat to international peace and security. They demanded that the Taliban turn over bin Laden and close all terror training camps. The 2000 resolution imposed an arms embargo, urged the closing of any overseas Taliban offices, and barred the Afghan airline from most international flights.

During this period, we continued to meet with the Taliban occasionally, although the dialogue-never productive-had become completely sterile. In repeating our warnings, Mike Sheehan was explicit, "If bin Laden or any of the organizations affiliated with him attacks the United States or United States interests, we will hold you personally accountable. Do you understand? This is from the highest levels of our government." In May 2000, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Pickering reinforced this message yet again in a meeting in Pakistan with Mullah Jalil, "deputy foreign minister" and a close associate of Mullah Omar.

The Taliban was a national, not an international movement. It did not exhibit the same malevolently grandiose ambitions that al-Qaeda did in carrying out acts of terror abroad. Further, bin Laden had already relocated to Afghanistan when the Taliban seized power, so there was no pre-existing connection between them. Nevertheless, a symbiotic relationship developed between the Taliban and bin Laden. The Taliban needed money and muscle that bin Laden provided. Bin Laden needed space for his operatives to live and train. By mid-1998, bin Laden's influence was reflected in the increasingly pan-Islamist statements of Taliban leaders. Mullah Omar must have concluded that without bin Laden his power in Afghanistan would be threatened. In retrospect, it is clear the Taliban never had any intention of giving bin Laden up or of forcing him to leave.

One obvious question is whether we placed a high enough priority on trying to pressure the Taliban. After September 11, it is a fair question, but it is also a question few asked before that date, so the issue of hindsight is relevant here.

For example, the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, did not express any concern, or make any recommendations, about U.S. policy toward the Taliban in its congressionallymandated June 2000 report, other than to suggest that the Taliban be placed on the U.S. Government's official list of state sponsors of terror. We didn't do this because the Taliban was already the target of sanctions and because listing it as a state sponsor of terror would have been tantamount to international recognition of the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. That was a bargaining chip we had no intention of giving up in the absence of cooperation on terror.

In the fall of 1997, as secretary of state, I journeyed to South Asia, arriving in Pakistan at a turbulent time. Earlier in the year, I had personally requested the assistance of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in arranging for the return to American jurisdiction of Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani wanted for shooting and killing two CIA employees outside the agency's headquarters in January, 1993. Sharif agreed, but asked that word of his government's cooperation in the arrest and transfer not become public. Unfortunately, the news leaked almost as soon as Kansi reached American soil, embarrassing Sharif and triggering anti-American demonstrations. On November 10, just days before my trip, a Fairfax County jury found Kansi guilty. The very next morning, four American oil company employees were gunned down in the Pakistani port city of Karachi. Speculation was strong that the killings were in retaliation for Kansi's trial, and had been carried out by members of a militant extremist group that I had recently included on the State Department's newly formal list of international terrorist groups.

The killings highlighted the lawless frontier mentality that had developed in areas along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The region had been used as a military staging ground throughout the 1980's, funneling U.S. and Pakistani help to Afghan mujahadeen forces resisting the invasion of their country by the Soviet Union. When the hated Soviets were driven out, the area lost its claim on the attention of the international community and most particularly the United States. This left a vacuum in which lots of very militant people had guns, but no jobs. For several years, regional warlords battled each other and carved Afghanistan into pieces, attracting terrorist groups, and creating waves of instability that crossed the border. This undermined security in Pakistan while also making it harder for Pakistanis to export goods through Afghanistan to points further north. As a result, Islamabad welcomed the restoration of relative order in Afghanistan that followed the rise of the Taliban.

During my 1997 visit, Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan told me that Pakistan favored a negotiated settlement to the civil war in Afghanistan, but blamed Iran for stirring up trouble by supplying arms to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. I said, "the Taliban may have imposed law and order, but their rules are excessive. The Taliban can never control the whole country, so all groups must be involved in a solution. It concerns the United States that Pakistan is in danger of being isolated because of its support for the Taliban, which is seen as authoritarian at best, and preposterous at worst, by the rest of the world." At a press conference later, I denounced the Taliban for "their despicable treatment of women and children and their general lack of respect for human dignity."

In our diplomacy following the Africa embassy bombings, we naturally focused on Pakistan as a source of pressure against the Taliban. Unfortunately, we lacked leverage. Pakistan's 1998 decision to follow India's example and conduct nuclear tests had triggered sanctions that barred us from offering economic or military aid. It did not help that Prime Minister Sharif was on shaky ground politically and worried about the opposition of militantly political Islamists within his country. When the prime minister visited Washington in December 1998, however, our message to him was uncompromising and blunt. We told him that "Bin Laden is a terrorist and a murderer and plans to kill again. We need your help in bringing him to justice."

Before Sharif's second visit in July, 1999, President Clinton wrote to the Pakistani President on two key issues - one was Bin Laden (the other an ongoing military confrontation between Pakistan and India). "I urge you in the strongest way," he wrote on June 19, 1999, "to get the Taliban to expel Bin Laden, a man who represents a very serious and continuing threat to all of us. As we discussed, there are a number of levers like oil supplies and liaison ties that Pakistan could use to distance itself from the Taliban until and unless they expel bin Laden. You also mentioned your control over the Taliban's access to imports through Karachi. I would like to see you use any or all of those levers."

Sharif replied that it was too hard to get the Taliban to give up bin Laden voluntarily. It made more sense for the Pakistanis to send in a team to snatch him, which is what Sharif now proposed to do. We didn't trust the Pakistani Intelligence Service because it was so close to the Taliban. Our experts did not believe an operation could happen without bin Laden being tipped off in advance. But we had nothing to lose by testing Islamabad's intentions. At a minimum, Sharif's gesture was a sign that our pressure was getting to him. He did not feel he could put off President Clinton's demands any longer. The plan to snatch bin Laden was soon aborted, however, after Sharif was ousted in a military coup in October 1999. We pressed his successor in power, General Pervez Musharraf, very hard but still lacked leverage because anti-coup sanctions kicked in just as congress granted permanent waiver authority for the sanctions previously imposed.

As the millennium celebration approached, we were getting threats by the bushel and had already arrested a number of Al-Qaeda operatives. At a meeting of our foreign policy team on December 20, 1999, we decided to send emissaries to General Musharraf with the message that we expected bin Laden to be turned over in short order. In return, we promised support for international lending, talks on enhanced military cooperation and a commitment by President Clinton "to take a personal interest in encouraging Indian-Pakistani dialogue on Kashmir."

Rick Inderfurth and Mike Sheehan went to Islamabad early in 2000 and had a three hour discussion with Musharraf on bin Laden and other items. President Clinton underlined the same message during his visit to Islamabad in March. The Pakistani leader said he understood our views and expressed a desire to cooperate but did not commit to decisive action. It was not until September 11, 2001 that Musharraf would have the motivation and justification in his own mind to try to sever ties between al-Qaeda and Pakistani militants. Even that has not yet resulted in the apprehension of bin Laden, although it has apparently resulted in several attempts on Musharraf's life.

The bottom line is that we did not have a strong hand to play with the Pakistanis. Because of the sanctions required by U.S. law, we had few carrots to offer. And the Pakistanis saw the Taliban as a strategic asset in their confrontation with India over Kashmir.

During my years as secretary of state, we were well aware of contacts between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban. Both ran highly conservative Sunni Muslim regimes. This is why we went to the Saudis after the Africa embassy bombings to solicit their help. We felt if anyone other than the Pakistanis would have influence, they would. The Saudis claimed to us that they did their best to persuade the Taliban to turn over bin Laden for trial either to the United States or to a third country where he could be tried in accordance with Islamic law. When the Taliban refused, the Saudi government took some of the steps we requested, such as downgrading diplomatic ties and halting most flights from the Afghan airline.

Especially after the Africa embassy bombings, Saudi officials were emphatic in expressing to me their disgust with bin Laden and their embarrassment, quite frankly, at his Saudi origins. Like the United States and Israel, the Saudi royal family was regularly denounced by bin Laden in his periodic videotapes. On various occasions, I asked the Saudis for information and assistance on specific cases and it was my impression, based on the feedback I received later from our intelligence and law enforcement personnel, that they were often helpful. For example, FBI Director Louis Freeh wrote to me to express appreciation for Saudi cooperation in the investigation into the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.

Officials from the Treasury Department met with the Saudis as part of our worldwide effort to freeze the assets of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In my own meetings, I urged the Saudis to cooperate and they said they would. I should note, however, that my personal dealings were primarily with Crown Prince Abdullah and Foreign Minister Saud, both of whom had rivals within other factions of the Saudi government. I could not always verify that the promises of the crown prince and foreign minister to do their best produced concrete results. Nor did I have any assurance that the Saudis had an effective system in place for monitoring the flow of private funds to self-described "charities" that were in reality front groups for terrorist organizations.

Many of my conversations with the Saudis on terrorism and terrorist financing focused on anti-Israeli violence emanating from radical Arab groups. We knew that the Saudis provided money, both officially and unofficially, to the Palestinians. Some of this went to the Palestinian Authority; some to umbrella organizations with a terrorist component, such as Hamas. The Saudis insisted that the funds for Hamas were for humanitarian purposes. I said there was no way to control that.

Like many Arabs, Saudi leaders did not see groups like Hezbollah and Hamas as terrorists. Although the Saudis did not specifically condone attacks against civilians (at least not to me), they did consider attacks against soldiers and armed settlers part of a legitimate struggle to reclaim occupied Arab land. I had long arguments with them about this. They thought our policies were biased against Arabs. I said that what we were biased against was terror and other actions that made it more difficult to make progress toward peace.

Our relationship with the Saudis on the whole range of security issues was highly pragmatic. Both sides recognized that there were wide differences of values and world view. We hoped, however, that the Saudi government grasped our shared interest in defeating al-Qaeda, killing or jailing bin Laden, and halting acts of violence throughout the region.

During the eight years of the Clinton administration, we made repeated efforts to secure cooperation from Sudan on terrorist issues.

In 1994, while serving as U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, I traveled to Khartoum to meet with Sudanese President Omar al- Bashir. We had particular concerns, which I raised with the president, about Sudan's role in providing safe haven, training bases and staging areas for numerous terrorist organizations including Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Abu Nidal and Gama'at al Islamiyya. We were angered that government officials accredited to Sudan were directly involved in the foiled plot to bomb UN headquarters in New York. And we were disturbed by the plans of some Sudanese leaders, particularly Hassan Turabi, head of the National Islamic Front (NIF), to forge an international movement that would champion radical causes using methods that included terrorism.

In 1996, following Sudanese involvement in harboring and assisting the perpetrators of an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, I succeeded in winning UN Security Council approval of sanctions against the Khartoum regime. I was not, however, aware of any information related to Osama bin Laden's departure from Sudan and his return to Afghanistan that same year.

During my tenure as secretary of state, I spent a great deal of time in meetings related both to Sudan's record on terrorism and its prosecution of a bloody and tragic civil war characterized by repeated and massive violations of human rights. We did not at that time have a regular diplomatic presence in Khartoum, due to continuing threats made against our personnel. U.S. representatives did, however, meet with Sudanese officials on multiple occasions in various venues. These representatives included Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice, and the State Department's Counter-terrorism Coordinator Mike Sheehan. We made clear to the Sudanese that if they desired better relations with the United States, they would have to sever their ties to terrorist groups and cooperate in providing detailed information on Osama bin Laden's network and finances. Despite our specific and repeated requests, the Government of Sudan did not to my knowledge make available any information or files of significant intelligence or law enforcement value. Meanwhile, we believe that Sudan remained complicit in al-Qaeda and bin Laden's operations through the provision of falsified passports and the transportation of operatives, weapons and other equipment.

In 1999, the Sudanese government arrested NIF leader Turabi. We probed to see if this welcome step might foretell a shift in Sudan's willingness to cooperate on terrorism issues. We appointed a special envoy for the Sudan peace process and in May 2000 dispatched a full-time counter-terrorism unit to Khartoum. This led to increased dialogue with Sudanese officials, but no meaningful improvements in cooperation prior to the end of my term in office. To this day, Sudan remains on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terror.

On October 12, 2000 a small boat pulled alongside the U.S.S. COLE, which was re-fueling in Aden Harbor off the coast of Yemen. The boat exploded, and ripped a hole in the vessel's hull, killing 17 American sailors. The CIA and FBI investigated but were not able to assign responsibility as rapidly as in the case of the Africa embassy bombings. A definitive judgment assigning blame to al-Qaeda did not take place until our administration had left office.

Notwithstanding the lack of a clear statement regarding culpability from the CIA and FBI, Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke urged our national security team to recommend to the president that he order air strikes against suspected al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Although we fully shared Mr. Clarke's anger and frustration, his proposal was not supported by the agencies represented on the foreign policy principals committee. Given the scattered and low-tech nature of al-Qaeda operations, it was not clear that air strikes directed at training camps would cause any significant disruption to al-Qaeda. We did not have operational intelligence at the time about the location of bin Laden, so it was extremely unlikely the strikes would have removed him from the scene. If we attacked, we would have to explain why, and our explanations would not be accepted even by allies without persuasive evidence. It seemed to me at the time that the proposal to recommend strikes was certainly an option our team should have been considering, but one that would likely have produced a new spike in anti-American sentiment in the Arab and Muslim worlds without any significant reduction in the threat posed to our citizens by al-Qaeda.

After the Africa embassy bombings, we repeatedly warned the Taliban that they would be held accountable if bin Laden were responsible for any further terrorist strikes against U.S. targets. We said after the COLE bombing that we would not rule out any option if and when the attack was traced back to bin Laden. That connection was reportedly established after the Clinton administration left office. According to the Joint Inquiry by the House and Senate Intelligence Committees into the U.S. Intelligence Community and the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration subsequently sent a demarche to Pakistan warning the Taliban that it would be held responsible for any further attacks. This was simply a repeat of the warning we had issued many times previously. So instead of making good on our threat, the Bush Administration chose simply to restate it. This was a reflection of the complications involved in trying to oust the Taliban via military force prior to September 11, 2001.

It is also worth remembering that from the time of the Africa embassy bombings until the day the Clinton administration left office, the president was prepared to order military action to capture or kill bin Laden. If we had had the predictive intelligence we needed, we would have done so - before or after the attack on the COLE - and I would have strongly supported that step.

Clarity of Goals. Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I am pleased to have the chance to offer recommendations for the future. I think this is the area where this panel can make the most significant and lasting contribution to our nation. The commission was created because of what happened on September 11, but what happens next is something we still have time to influence.

We must begin by thinking clearly about what it is we are trying to accomplish. After September 11, President Bush said that our nation's goal and responsibility to history was "to rid the world of evil." That is a noble but impossibly ambitious quest. As long as humans are human, evil will exist. Our nation's strategic purpose can only sensibly be expressed in more mundane terms--to confront and defeat the individuals and groups who attacked us.

We need to remember that we were not attacked by a noun--terrorism. We were attacked by individuals affiliated with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. They are the declared enemies of America; they are the ones who killed our fellow citizens; and they are the ones who boast of their intention to do so again. Pursuing, confronting and defeating them should be the focus of our policy.

American power and resources are extensive, but not inexhaustible. If we establish strategic goals that are unnecessarily expansive, such as the elimination not only of threats but of potential threats; not only of enemies but also potential enemies; not only of our own adversaries but also the adversaries of others; we will stretch ourselves to the breaking point and beyond, and become more vulnerable, not less, to those truly wishing to do us harm.

Certainly, there are other terrorist organizations that we should continue to work with friends and allies to stop. But there is a difference between opposing those whose values we do not share and defeating those whose values we do not share who are also trying to kill us. That distinction should not be lost.

It is a symptom of how different the current confrontation is compared to others our nation has faced that there is not a government on earth that openly embraces al-Qaeda or its objectives. An obvious reason is bin Laden's desire to do away with the very institution of the state in the Muslim world and replace it with a revived and fundamentalist caliphate governing all Muslims. It is a rare government that supports its own dissolution.

This lack of explicit state support for al-Qaeda is welcome, but it also complicates our task and makes it harder to gauge the success of current strategies. As Secretary Rumsfeld wrote in a memo last October: "Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?"

Administration spokesmen have responded to this dilemma by citing the number of "known" al-Qaeda leaders who have been killed or captured. That is understandable but not necessarily helpful. It is hard to assess, for example, what effect even the capture or killing of bin Laden would have on the magnitude of the future threat. We need to remember that there is an ideological component to al-Qaeda's existence; this is not a criminal gang that can be rounded up and put behind bars; it is the lethal center of a spreading virus that has wholly perverted the minds of thousands, while distorting the thinking of millions more. It is a virus that will continue to spread until the right medicine is found.

I believe it begins with confidence. Bin Laden and his cohorts have absolutely nothing to offer their followers except destruction, death and the illusion of glory. Puncturing this illusion is the key to winning the battle of ideas that fuels the detonation of bombs. A part of that task is to expose the utter emptiness and sterility of al-Qaeda's political agenda. This group does not speak for the Palestinians, who have denounced them. It does not speak for the Iraqis, many of whom it has killed. It does not speak for the majority of Muslims the tenets of whose faith it has repeatedly violated. Nor does it speak for the majority of Arabs whose proud culture it has utterly betrayed.

The problem therefore is not combating al-Qaeda's inherent appeal, for it has none.

The problem is changing the fact that major components of America's foreign policy are either opposed or misunderstood by the vast majority of Arabs and Muslims, and by unprecedented numbers of Europeans, Asians, Latin Americans and Africans as well. According to Ambassador Edward Djerejian, chair of the State Department's Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world, "The bottom has indeed fallen out of support for the United States."

This unpopularity has handed bin Laden a gift that he has eagerly exploited. He sees himself, and is viewed by many, as a leader of all those who harbor anti-American sentiments whether for specific policy reasons or out of more general feelings of resentment. This has given him visibility and a following that is wholly undeserved. If we are to succeed, we must be sure that bin Laden goes down in history not as a defender of the faith or champion of the dispossessed, but rather as what he is-a murderer, a traitor to Islam, and a loser.

Long-term plan. The unraveling of America's global prestige over the past three years will require considerable time and effort to mend. It was disturbing, therefore, to see Defense Secretary Rumsfeld admit in that same October memo that "the US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan." That seems to me the wrong policy. I believe we need to put a lot of effort into a long-range plan to prevent the current generation of anti-American terrorists from being succeeded by a new, larger and even more deadly one. We need a strategy that uses the full range of national security tools, including military force, diplomacy, help from allies and international institutions, and foreign assistance.

We also need to think through the consequences of our policies. This statement is not the place to debate the wisdom of going to war in Iraq at the time we did with the support we had. It is worth noting, however, that before the war the president predicted that "the terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed." After the war, he admitted that "Iraq has become the central front in the war against terror." According to one terrorism specialist for the Congressional Research Service, "Iraq is a rallying cause for al-Qaeda - it's allowed them to attract new recruits. This was an organization that was under enormous pressure. Iraq has put new wind in its sails, definitely." A survey released by the Pew Global Attitudes Project on March 16 showed a large majority or plurality of people in each country surveyed believe the Iraq conflict hurt the war on terror while also raising doubts about U.S. motives and credibility. Roughly two-thirds of those surveyed from Jordan and Morocco believe suicide bombings against Americans and other westerners in Iraq are justifiable.

Adherence to democratic values. I have found widespread dismay in many corners of the world at the Bush Administration's decision to detain hundreds of people in Guantanamo for more than two years without trial, access to legal assistance or any specific charges being made against them. No other aspect of our policy has done as much to squander support for the United States and to create doubts about our commitment to our own ideals. It is possible and perhaps probable that anger over these detentions has helped bin Laden succeed in recruiting more new operatives than the number of suspects now being held. I recommend that we either charge the detainees or release them as soon as possible. In the words of the 2000 National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by L. Paul Bremer III, "Terrorist attacks against America threaten more than the tragic loss of individual lives. Some terrorists hope to provoke a response that undermines our Constitutional system of government. So U.S. leaders must find the appropriate balance by adopting counterterrorism policies which are effective but also respect the democratic traditions which are the bedrock of America's strength."

Terrorism, Democracy and the Middle East. President Bush has suggested that the best way to fight terrorism in the long term is to lay the groundwork for the democratic transformation of the Middle East. According to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, "The transformation of the Middle East is the only guarantee that it will no longer produce ideologies of hatred that lead men to fly airplanes into buildings in New York or Washington.

I certainly support the democratization of the Middle East. But in discussing it, we need to avoid two illusions. The first is that because transformation is billed as the solution to terrorism, supporting it makes other counter-terrorism efforts less necessary. That is certainly not the case. The second is that supporting democracy in the Middle East is a substitute for leadership in pursuing Israeli-Palestinian peace.

President Bush has argued that the way to make progress in the Middle East is to create a model democracy in Iraq. This, he says, will inspire the Palestinians to elect new leaders who will then crack down on violence and make peace on terms Israel can accept. I only wish it were that simple.

A stable and democratic Iraq would provide many benefits, but it will not by itself change Arab and Palestinian views about the rights and wrongs of history or what constitutes an acceptable outcome in the Middle East. And nothing would do more to doom a democracy initiative at birth than a perception that we are trying to change the subject from the Israeli-Palestinian crisis.

The good news is that many Arabs do want democracy. Recent surveys show that--despite widespread opposition to American policies--there is widespread enthusiasm among Arab populations for democratic values such as freedom of expression, multi-party systems and equal treatment under the law. The same surveys show solid majorities in places such as Jordan, Morocco and Kuwait believing that the principles of western-style democracy would work well in their countries.

The first element in any strategy for encouraging democracy in the Middle East must be to emphasize its reliance on local input and ideas.

Second, it must be multilateral. The label "Made in America" is not a selling point.

Third, the initiative must recognize the differences within the Arab world and between Arab and other Muslim-majority states. A cookie cutter approach that treats each of these societies the same would be simplistic and sure to fail.

Fourth, the strategy should be aimed at building democratic institutions gradually and from the ground up.

This means that it must include 1) education reform so students are taught how to succeed in the modern world, rather than try to destroy it; 2) economic reform and improved governance so outside investment is encouraged, small businesses can prosper and more young people can find good jobs; 3) training in the basics of political organization and campaigning so a true and peaceful competition of ideas is nurtured; 4) measures to discredit, expose and curtail corruption so the rule of law is enhanced; 5) scholarly discussions about how to find the right fit between the demands of democracy and the requirements of Islam; 6) a process for ensuring that women's voices are heard so the talents of all are enlisted in creating and sustaining democracy; and 7) opportunities for Arab-Americans to play a key role by sharing their own democratic experiences and knowledge.

No Middle East democracy initiative will succeed if it is viewed within the region as patronizing or imperial or as a way of avoiding hard questions about the Palestinians and Israel. However, there is a corollary to this. The world should not allow Arab leaders to use the Israeli-Palestinian dispute as a way to avoid hard questions about the nature of their own policies and governments.

To paraphrase something Yitzhak Rabin once said about terrorism and the pursuit of peace: We should seek peace regardless of how well democratization is proceeding; and we should seek democracy regardless of whether peace negotiations are going well.

Information. During the cold war, our government developed an elaborate apparatus for gathering information and then keeping it secret except from those with a very specific need to know. As a result, much more data flowed up the chain of command than spread across it, while very little trickled down. The dissemination of information was controlled by the originating agency. And clear separations were maintained between public and private, domestic and international, law enforcement and intelligence. Agencies such as the CIA and FBI developed their own sets of priorities, procedures and cultures-and did not learn how to cooperate or share information very well.

The old system was appropriate for the times, but the times have obviously changed. Al-Qaeda does not pose the same kind of threat as the Soviet Union. It is far less powerful, but it is also harder to see, harder to predict and harder to deter. Its goal is to kill people. Preventing that requires a military, intelligence and law enforcement response system that is fast, flexible and fullycoordinated.

As a former secretary of state, I am especially mindful of visa officers who must handle huge caseloads and are required to make judgments rapidly and without much information about the intentions of those applying for admission to the United States. These officers are highly dependent on the watchlists compiled by our intelligence, law enforcement and border protection agencies. For those watchlists to fulfill their protective purpose, the information on them must be 1) derived from both international and domestic sources, 2) carefullyvetted to meet agreed upon standards of relevance and accuracy and 3) shared with those whose eyes, ears and wits we rely upon to shield the public.

Those responsible for defending us must be able to "connect the dots" of relevant data that are available, but the dots will not all be available unless they are shared. It is vital, therefore, that we improve our watchlisting systems to ensure that all relevant agencies have access to a common data base that is comprehensive, up-to-date, cross referenced, and readily accessible to those who are on the front lines including visa and customs officers, border guards and law enforcement personnel at all levels.

Just as we need to share information between the federal and the state and local governments, so we need to share information more freely with other nations. Certainly, there are risks involved in doing this. And certainly we must exercise a high degree of prudence and care. Some governments merit our trust; others do not. But if we want to create a truly extensive and effective web of intelligence and law enforcement within which to ensnare our enemies, we will need to share our information about terrorist organizations with others to roughly the extent we demand that others share their information with us.

Mr. Chairman and members of the commission, let me close by saying that I sympathize greatly with President Bush, Secretary Powell and others in positions of responsibility at this time. Each day brings with it the possibility of a new terrorist strike. The March 11 train bombings in Madrid remind us that, despite all that has been done and is being done to protect our territory and citizens, we have to live with the fact that the enemy-if in a position to attack- will have a broad range of targets. We should all expect-and prepare ourselves psychologically-for the likelihood that further strikes will take place on our own soil.

We must be united in our determination that if and when that happens, it will do absolutely nothing to advance the terrorists' goals. It will not cause divisions within and among the American people. On the contrary, it must bring us closer together. It will not cause America to retreat from its global responsibilities. On the contrary, it must make us even more determined to fulfill them.

For more than two centuries, our countrymen have fought and died so that liberty might live. Since September 11, we have been summoned, each in our own way, to join in a new chapter of that struggle. We cannot under-estimate the risks or anticipate that final victories will come easily or soon. But we can draw strength from the knowledge of what terror can and cannot do. Terror can turn life to death, laughter to tears, and shared hopes to sorrowful memories. It can crash a plane and bring down towers that scraped the sky. But it cannot alter the essential goodness of the American people; or diminish our loyalty to one another; or cause our nation to turn its back on the world.

Obviously, it is beyond our power to turn the calendar back to before the eleventh of September, 2001. But we do have the power live in hope, not fear; to acknowledge the presence of evil in this world, but never lose sight of the good; to endure terrible blows, but never give in to those who would have us betray our principles or surrender our faith. By so doing, we can ensure that our adversaries will fail in their purpose; and that our nation, with others, will continue toward its purpose of creating a freer, more just and peaceful future for us and for all people.

Thank you very much and once again let me express my desire to be as helpful to you as possible.

Opening Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, March 23, 2004
Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a great pleasure to be before the Commission today, and I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you regarding the events leading up to and following the murderous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

It is my hope, as I know it is yours, that through the hard work of this Commission, our country can improve the way we wage the war on terror and, in particular, better protect our homeland and the American people.

I am pleased to have, of course, with me today Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage. Rich Armitage -- Secretary Armitage was sworn in on March 26 of 2001, two months into the administration and he has been intimately involved in the interagency deliberations on our counterterrorism policies. And, of course, he also participated in what are known as "principals [meetings]," as well as National Security Council meetings whenever I was on travel or otherwise unavailable.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, I leave Washington this evening to represent President Bush and the American people at the memorial service in Madrid, Spain, honoring the over-200 victims of the terrorists attacks of 3/11, March 11th, 2004. With deep sympathy and solidarity, our heart goes out to their loved ones and to the people of Spain.

And just last Thursday, in the garden of our embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, I presided at a memorial service in honor of two State Department family members, Barbara Green and her daughter Kristen Wormsley, who were killed two years ago by terrorists while they worshipped in church on a bright, beautiful spring morning.

I know that the families and friends of the victims of 9/11, some of whom are listening and watching today, grieve just as the Spanish are grieving and just as we at the Department of State did and still do for Barbara and Kristen.

Mr. Chairman, I am no newcomer to the horrors of terrorism. In 1983, Secretary Armitage and I were working for Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger, as was Secretary Lehman, at that time, when 243 wonderful, brave Marines and Navy Corpsmen were killed in Beirut, Lebanon.

I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1993 when the first bombing of the World Trade Center took place.

In 1996, I may have been out of government, though I followed closely the events surrounding the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Khobar and all the other terrorist attacks over the years were very much part of my consciousness as I prepared to assume the office of Secretary of State under President George Bush.

I was well aware of the fact that I was going to be sworn in to office just three months after the USS COLE was struck in the harbor at Aden, Yemen, taking the lives of 17 sailors and wounding 30 others.

I was well aware -- very well aware -- that our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had been blown up in 1998, injuring some 4,000 people and killing 220, 12 of them Americans -- the highest number of casualties in a single incident in the State Department's history.

As the new Chief Executive Officer of the Department of State, I was acutely aware that I would be responsible to President Bush. He made this clear that this was my responsibility, for the safety of the men and women serving at our posts overseas, as well as for the safety and welfare of private American citizens traveling and living abroad.

The 1999 Crowe Commission Report on embassy security became our blueprint for upgrading the security of all of our facilities. Admiral Crowe had done an extensive review and made some scathing criticisms on how lax our country was in protecting our personnel who were serving abroad from terrorist attacks. And one of my first actions was to ask retired Major General Chuck Williams of the Army Corps of Engineers to come into the Department and head our building operation. We wanted him to move aggressively to implement the Crowe recommendations and to protect our people and our installations, and he has done a tremendous job of that.

At the beginning of this administration, we were building one new, secure embassy a year. Today we are building 10 new secure embassies every single year.

As the president's principal foreign policy advisor, I was well aware, as was the president and all the members of the new national security team, that Communism and Fascism, our old foes of the past century, had been replaced by a new kind of enemy -- terrorism. We were all well aware that no nation is immune to terrorism. We were well aware that this adversary is not necessarily a state and that often has no clear "return address." We knew that this monster is hydra-headed, and many-tentacled. We knew that its evil leaders and followers espouse many false causes, but have one common purpose -- to murder innocent people.

Mr. Chairman, President Bush and all of us on his team knew that terrorism would be a major concern for us, as it has been for the past several administrations. During the transition from the Clinton to the Bush administration, we were pleased to receive the briefings and information that Secretary Albright and her staff provided us on President Clinton's counterterrorism policies and what they had done for the previous eight years before we came into office.

Indeed, on December 20th, four days -- four days after President Bush announced that I would be the next secretary of state, I asked for and got a briefing on our worldwide terrorism actions and policies from President Clinton's Counterterrorism Security Group, headed by Mr. Dick Clarke. In addition to Mr. Clarke, at this briefing, my very first briefing during the transition, also present were the CIA's [Central Intelligence Agency's] Counterterrorism Director Mr. Cofer Black, from the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], Dale Watson. Also present were representatives from the Department of Defense [DOD], the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], and from within the State Department, representatives of our own Bureau of Intelligence and Research [INR] as well as our acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

A major component of this briefing was al-Qaida's growing threat to the United States, our interests around the world, and Afghanistan's role as a safe haven for al-Qaida. As a matter of fact, that part of the briefing got my attention, so much so that later I asked Mr. Armitage, when he got sworn in, to get directly involved in all these issues, and he did.

In addition, in my transition book that was provided to me by Secretary Albright, there was a paper from Mike Sheehan, Secretary Albright's counterterrorism coordinator, and I read it very carefully. That transition paper, under the rubric, "Ongoing Threat Environment," stated that, "In close coordination with the intelligence community, we must ensure that all precautions are taken to strengthen our security posture, warn U.S. citizens abroad, and maintain a high level of readiness to respond to additional incidents" that might come along.

That paper informed me that: "The joint U.S.-Yemeni investigation of the USS Cole bombing continues to develop new information and leads," but that "It is still too early to definitely link, definitively link, the attack to a sponsor, i.e. Usama bin Laden." And under "Taliban," the paper records that "We must continue to rally international support for a new round of U.N. sanctions, including an arms embargo against the Taliban." The paper further stated: "We should maintain the momentum of getting others, such as the G-8, Russia, India, the Caucasus states, Central Asia, to isolate and pressure the Taliban...." It continued: "If the Cole investigation leads back to Afghanistan, we should use it to mobilize the international support needed for further pressures on the Taliban."

Let me emphasize that the paper covered a range of terrorism-related concerns, and not just al-Qaida and the Taliban.

So the outgoing administration provided me and others in the incoming administration with transition papers as well as briefings, based on their eight years of experience, that reinforced our awareness of the worldwide threat from terrorism.

All of us on the Bush national security team, beginning with President Bush, knew we needed continuity in counterterrorism policy. We did not want terrorists to see the early months of a new administration as a time of opportunity. And for continuity, President Bush retained Director Tenet at the CIA. Director Tenet's Counterterrorism Center remained under the leadership of Cofer Black. He was kept on there until he joined the State Department last year to become my assistant secretary for counterterrorism. Dick Clarke was retained at the National Security Council. I retained Ambassador Edmund Hull as acting coordinator for counterterrorism until I was able to bring a new team in a little bit later in the year, under the leadership of former Brigadier General Frank Taylor of the United States Air Force's Office of Special Investigations. He was Cofer Black's immediate predecessor. I also retained David Carpenter as assistant secretary for diplomatic security and kept Tom Fingar on as acting assistant secretary for intelligence and research. Christopher Kojm, now a staff member of your Commission, was a political appointee from the prior administration, and we kept him on as well in order to show continuity during this period. And of course, FBI Director Louis Freeh provided continuity on the domestic side.

Early on, we made clear to the Congress and to the American people that we understood the scope and compelling nature of the threat from terrorism. For example, on February 7, 2001, just a few weeks into the administration, my acting assistant secretary for intelligence, Tom Fingar, who had served in the same capacity in the previous administration, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding "Threats to the United States." In the first part of his testimony, he highlighted the threat from unconventional forces, saying: "The magnitude of each individual threat is small, but, in aggregate, unconventional threats probably pose a more immediate danger to Americans than do foreign armies, nuclear weapons, long-range missiles or the proliferation, even, of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and delivery systems."

Fingar then went on -- Mr. Fingar then went on to single out Usama bin Laden, saying that: "Plausible, if not always credible, threats linked to his organizations target Americans and America's friends or interests on almost every continent." Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, the Department of State was well aware of the terrorist threat.

The new Bush administration, as had the Clinton administration, created counterterrorism and regional interagency committees to study the counterterrorism issue in a comprehensive way. The committees, in turn, reported to a Deputies Committee, chaired by Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, on which Mr. Armitage was my representative. The Deputies, in turn, reported to cabinet-level Principals Committees, which answered to the National Security Council, chaired by the president. These committees, however, were not by any means the sum and substance of our interagency discussions on counterterrorism, nor did they represent all that was happening within the administration on a day-to-day basis.

In order to keep in constant touch on counterterrorism issues, as well as all of the other items on our agenda, Secretary Rumsfeld, Dr. Rice and I held a daily coordination phone call meeting on every morning that we were in town at 7:15. In addition to our regular and frequent meetings, at the State Department every morning at 8:30 I met with my staff and immediately had available at 8:30, information from my INR section, my intelligence people, as well as my counterterrorism coordinator, as well as the assistant secretary in charge of diplomatic security. We formalized regular luncheons with Dr. Rice, myself, the vice president and Secretary Rumsfeld, in order to make sure that we stayed in closest touch with each other, not only on terrorism, but on all issues.

Above all, from the start, the president, by word and deed, made clear his interest and his intense desire to protect the nation from terrorism. He frequently asked and prodded us to do more. He decided early on that we needed to be more aggressive in going after terrorists and especially al-Qaida. As he said in early spring, as we were developing our new comprehensive strategy, "I'm tired of swatting flies." He wanted a thorough, comprehensive, diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement and financial strategy to go after al-Qaida.

It was a demanding order, but it was a necessary one. There were many other compelling issues that were on our agenda that a new administration has to take into account: A Middle East policy that had just collapsed; the sanctions on Iraq had been unraveling steadily since 1998; [and] relations with Russia and China were complicated by the need to expel Russian spies in February, and the plane collision with a Chinese fighter in April. There were many foreign leaders who were coming to the United States, or wanted us to visit them to get engaged with the new administration.

Yes, we had to deal with all of these pressing matters and more. But we also were confident that we had an experienced counterterrorism team in place. President Bush and his entire national security team understood that terrorism had to be among our highest priorities. And it was.

Our counterterrorism planning developed very rapidly, considering the challenges of transition and of a new administration.

We were not given a counterterrorism action plan by the previous administration. As I mentioned, we were given good briefings on what they had been doing with respect to al-Qaida and with respect to the Taliban. The briefers, as well as the principals, conveyed to us the gravity of the threat posed by al-Qaida. But we noted early on that the actions that the previous administration had taken had not succeeded in eliminating the threat.

As a result, Dr. Rice directed a thorough policy review aimed at developing a comprehensive strategy to eliminate the al-Qaida threat. This was in her first week in her new position as national security advisor. This decision did not await any Deputies or Principals Committee review. She knew what we had to do and she put us to the task of doing it.

We wanted the new policy to go well beyond tit-for-tat retaliation. We felt that lethal strikes that largely miss the terrorists, if you don't have adequate targeting information, such as the cruise missile strikes in 1998, might lead al-Qaida to believe that we lacked resolve. These strikes had obviously not deterred al-Qaida from subsequently attacking the USS Cole.

We wanted to move beyond the roll-back policy of containment, criminal prosecution, and limited retaliation for specific terrorist attacks. We wanted to destroy al-Qaida.

We understood that Pakistan was critical to the success of our long-term strategy. To get at al-Qaida, we had to end Pakistan's support for the Taliban. So we had to recast our relations with that country. But nuclear sanctions, caused by Pakistan's nuclear weapons tests and the nature of the new regime -- the way President Musharraf took office -- made it difficult for us to work with Pakistan. We knew, however, that achieving sustainable new relations with Pakistan meant moving more aggressively to strengthen and shape our relations with India as well. So we began this rather more complex diplomatic approach very quickly upon assuming office, even as we were putting the strategy on paper and deciding its other, more complicated, elements.

For example, in February of 2001, Presidents Bush and Musharraf exchanged letters. Let me quote a few lines from President Bush's February 16th letter to President Musharraf of Pakistan. This was just a few weeks after coming into office. The president said to President Musharraf:

"Pakistan is an important member of the community of nations and one with which I hope to build better relations, particularly as you move ahead to return to civilian, constitutional government. We have concerns of which you are aware, but I am hopeful we can work together on our differences in the years ahead...."

"We should work together," the president continued, "to address Afghanistan's many problems. The most pressing of these is terrorism, and it inhibits progress on all other issues. The continued presence of Usama bin Laden and his al-Qaida organization is a direct threat to the United States and its interests that must be addressed. I believe al-Qaida also threatens Pakistan's long-term interests. We joined the United Nations in passing additional sanctions against the Taliban to bring bin Laden to justice and to close the network of terrorist camps in their territory." The president concluded, "I urge you to use your influence with the Taliban to bring this about...."

President Bush was very concerned about al-Qaida and about the safe haven given them by the Taliban. But he knew that implementing the diplomatic roadmap we envisioned would be difficult.

The Deputies went to work reviewing all of these complex regional issues. Early on we realized that a serious effort to remove al-Qaida's safe haven in Afghanistan might well require introducing military forces, especially ground forces. This, without the cooperation of Pakistan, would be out of the question. Pakistan had vital interests in Afghanistan, and was deeply suspicious of India's intentions. Pakistan's and India's mutual fears and suspicions threatened to boil over into nuclear conflict as the administration got into the early months of its existence. To put it mildly, the situation was delicate and dangerous. Any effort to effect change had to be calibrated very carefully, to avoid misperception and miscalculation.

Under the leadership of Steve Hadley, deputy national security advisor, the Deputies met a number of times during the spring and summer to craft this strategy for eliminating the al-Qaida threat and dealing with the complex implications for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

So we began to develop this more aggressive and more comprehensive strategy. And while we did so, we continued activities that had been going on in the previous administration aimed at al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, including intelligence activities. For example, during the summer of 2001, the CIA succeeded in a number of disruption activities against terrorist groups. These are activities where our agents create turmoil among those groups they know to be associated with terrorists so that the terrorists cannot assemble, cannot communicate, can't effectively plan, receive any support or money, and are generally unable to act in a coordinated fashion. You will hear more about these activities from Director Tenet tomorrow, but I want to emphasize that, notwithstanding all these intelligence activities that were underway, at no time during the early months of our administration were we presented with a vetted, viable operational proposal, which would have led to an opportunity to kill, capture or otherwise neutralize Usama bin Laden -- [we] never received any targetable information.

Let me return now to our diplomatic efforts. From early 2001 onward, we pressed the Taliban directly and sought the assistance of the government of Pakistan and other neighboring states to put additional pressure on the Taliban to expel bin Laden from Afghanistan and to shut down al-Qaida.

On February 8, 2001, less than three weeks into the administration, we closed the Taliban office in New York, implementing the U.N. resolutions passed the previous month, I must say, with the strong support and the dedicated efforts of Secretary Albright and Under Secretary Pickering.

In March, we repeated the warning to the Taliban that they would be held responsible for any al-Qaida attack against our interests.

In April 2001, senior Departmental officials traveled to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan to lay out our key concerns, including about terrorism and Afghanistan. We asked these Central Asian nations to coordinate their efforts with the various Afghan players who were opposed to the Taliban. We also used what we call the "Bonn Group" of concerned countries to bring together Germany, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and the United States to build a common approach to Afghanistan. At the same time, we encouraged and supported the "Rome Group" of expatriate Afghans to explore alternatives to the Taliban.

In May, Deputy Secretary Armitage met with First Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov of the Russian Federation to renew the work of the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghanistan. These discussions had previously been conducted at a lower level. We focused specifically on what we could do together about Afghanistan and about the Taliban. This, incidentally, laid the groundwork for obtaining Russian cooperation on liberating Afghanistan immediately after 9/11.

SECRETARY POWELL: I just wanted to make the point that in June and July and August, we took every effort that was available to us to put pressure on Pakistan to cut its losses with the Taliban and to take every effort possible to make sure that Pakistan understood the need to bring Afghanistan around to eliminating the threat provided by al-Qaida and its presence in Afghanistan.

We also put into play a number of other options that were available to us. As we know, during this period, we looked at some of the ideas that Mr. Clarke's team had presented that had not been tried in the previous administration. These activities fit the long-term time frame of our new strategy and were presented to us that way by Mr. Clarke. In other words, these were long-term actions that he had in mind and not immediate actions that would produce immediate results. If these ideas made sense, we explored them. If they looked workable, we adopted them.

For example, we provided new counterterrorism aid to Uzbekistan because we knew al-Qaida was sponsoring a terrorist effort in that country led by the Islamic Movement. We looked at the Predator [unmanned aerial vehicle -- UAV]. The Predator, at that time, in early 2001, was not an armed weapon that we used to go after anyone. And Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Tenet will talk more about this. But by the end of that summer period, and as we entered September and October, it was a weapon that was usable, and it was used extensively and effectively after 9/11 when it was ready.

Other ideas, such as arming the Northern Alliance with significant weaponry or giving them an added capability did not seem to be a practical thing to do at that time, for the same sorts of reasons that Secretary Albright discussed earlier.

The basic elements of our new strategy, which came together during these early months of the administration, first and foremost, [to] eliminate al-Qaida. It was no longer to roll it back or reduce its effectiveness; our goal was to destroy it. The strategy would call for ending all sanctuaries given to al-Qaida. We would try to do this first through diplomacy, but if diplomacy failed and there was a call for additional measures, including military operations, we would be prepared to do it, and military action would be more than just launching cruise missiles at already-warned targets. In fact, the strategy called for attacking al-Qaida and the Taliban's leadership, their command and control, their ground forces, and other targets.

The strategy would recognize the need for significant aid, not only to the Northern Alliance, but to other tribal groups that might help us with this. It would also include greatly expanding intelligence authorities, capabilities and funding. While all this was taking place, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, we did everything we could to protect the lives of American citizens around the world.

As you know, the threat information that we were receiving from the CIA and other sources suggested that we were increasingly at risk and the risk was -- looked to be mostly overseas. And while that is my responsibility, others in our administration were looking at the threat within the United States. But in response to these overseas threats, we issued threat warnings constantly. Every time the threat level went up, we would respond with appropriate threat warnings to our embassies, to our citizens around the world who were traveling or living in foreign countries, warning them of the nature of the threat and encouraging them to take the necessary cautions.

So it is not as if we weren't responding to the threat. We were responding to the threat in the way that we could respond to the threat: with warnings, with emergency action committee meetings in our embassies to make sure that we were "buttoning down" and "buttoning up."

Mr. Chairman, this all continued throughout the summer. It reached a conclusion in early September, when all the pieces of our strategy came together -- the intelligence part, the diplomatic part, the military components of it, law enforcement, the nature of the challenge we had before us, which was to eliminate al-Qaida -- it all came together on the 4th of September at a Principals meeting where we concluded our work on the National Security Directive that would be telling everybody in the administration what we were going to do as we move forward.

It took us roughly eight months to get to that point, but it was a solid eight months of dedicated work to bring us to that point. And then, as we all know, 9/11 hit and we had to accelerate all of our efforts and go onto a different kind of footing altogether.

I just might point out that with respect to Pakistan, consistent with the decisions that we had made in early September, after 9/11, within two days, Mr. Armitage had contacted the Pakistani intelligence chiefs who were -- happened to be in the United States, and laid out what we now needed from Pakistan. The time for diplomacy and discussions were over; we needed immediate action. And Mr. Armitage laid out seven specific steps for Pakistan to take to join us in this effort. We gave them 24-to-48 hours to consider it, and then I called President Musharraf and said, "We need your answer now. We need you as part of this campaign, this crusade." And President Musharraf made a historic and strategic decision that evening when I spoke to him, changed his policy and became a partner in this effort as opposed to a hindrance to the effort.

Mr. Chairman, I have to also say that we were successful during this period in rounding up international support. The OAS [Organization of American States], Organization of the Islamic Conference, the United Nations, NATO, the entire international community rallied to our effort.

To summarize all of this, Mr. Chairman, I might say that this administration came in fully recognizing the threat presented to the United States and its interests and allies around the world by terrorism. We went to work on it immediately. The president made it clear it was a high priority. The interagency group is working. We had continuity in our counterterrorism institutions and organizations. We kept dÃ©marching as was done in the previous administration, but while we were dÃ©marching, and while we were doing intelligence activities to disrupt, we were putting in place a comprehensive strategy that pulled all of these things together in a more aggressive way and in a way that would go after this threat in order to destroy it and not just keep dÃ©marching it.

We had eight or so months to do that, and in early September, that strategy came together. And when 9/11 hit us, and brought us to that terrible day that none of us will ever forget, that strategy was ready, and it was the basis upon which we went forward and we could accelerate all of our efforts. While I was warning embassies -- and taking cover in our embassies -- in response to the threats, Secretary Rumsfeld was doing the same thing with military forces. Director Tenet was doing the same thing with his assets around the world. And our domestic agencies, the FBI, the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], were also looking at what they needed to protect the nation.

Most of us still thought that the principal threat was outside the country. We didn't know, while we were going through this procedure and through these policies, and putting together this comprehensive strategy, that those who were going to perpetrate 9/11 were already in the country, had been in the country for some time and were hard at work. Anything we might have done against al-Qaida during this period or against Usama bin Laden may or may not have any influence on these people who were already in the country, already had their instructions, already burrowed in, and were getting ready to commit the crimes that we saw on 9/11. Nevertheless, we knew that al-Qaida was ultimately the source of this kind of terror and were determined to go after it.

As Secretary Albright said earlier, we have many other things we have to do in the months and years ahead. We have to get our message out. We have to do more with public diplomacy. We have to do more with our allies and with our partners around the world. We are working on all these issues. But al-Qaida no longer has a safe haven in Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan are on their way to democracy. I was there last week. There are going to be no more weapons of mass destruction or safe havens in Iraq. The people of Iraq have been liberated, and they're on their way to a democracy. And so I think we're trying to create conditions where we will bring the whole civilized world together against the threat of terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, I will end at this point, and my entire statement is available for your record.

Statement of William S. Cohen to The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States March 23, 2004

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Commission to discuss counterterrorism efforts of the Defense Department and the Interagency during my tenure as Secretary of Defense.

You have posed several questions, which I will address to the best of my ability, although I should note that in preparing this statement I have not had access to any non-public records with regard to events that took place during this period three to eight years ago and not all public records are easily accessible despite the internet. I have also organized your questions and my responses in a manner that seems to be most responsive to your objective and that reduces redundancies. You asked that my written testimony be "comprehensive." A truly comprehensive account would be book length, at least, and require access to materials that are not available to me. This written testimony is already longer than I anticipated, and while a few matters are discussed in detail, in most instances, I find it possible only to summarize matters addressed by your questions.

Your first question asked about the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy and the role of the Defense Department in that strategy during the second Clinton Administration.

While the second Clinton Administration's approach built on the first Administration's efforts, just as my approach derived from my work on the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services committees, I would point to President Clinton's December 5, 1996, announcement of the formation of his national security team for his second term. During that Oval Office event, President Clinton listed the challenges on which we were to focus. The very first item on the President's list was terrorism, followed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

A week into the new Administration, President Clinton came to the Pentagon to meet with me, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the ten unified combatant commands, our top military commanders. Terrorism and the Quadrennial Defense Review of the defense strategy and program were the top two topics on the agenda, which I highlighted at our subsequent press conference by announcing that "We should plan on terrorism being not the wave of the future, but the wave of the present."

In May 1997, I released the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD's first effort to define a long-term (15-year) strategy and accompanying defense program to meet post-Cold War challenges and opportunities. In the QDR, I stated:

The QDR formed the basis for all DOD strategy, programs and operations, including the Defense Strategy that I submitted to the President and Congress in my first annual report in January 1998, which identified four trends threatening US security. One of these four trends was the increased threat from violent, religiously-motivated terrorist groups:

Two of the other four trends also bear on terrorism, "failed states" and the "flow of potentially dangerous technologies," about which the Defense Strategy stated:

The new Defense Strategy led to significant efforts across DOD and its component Military Departments and Defense Agencies, and between DOD and other agencies, to address what we believed to be a growing terrorist threat against U.S. personnel and interests abroad and U.S. citizens at home.

This increased focus within DOD was part of a broader effort in the interagency. Building on Presidential Decision Directive 39 of 1995, the President announced major new counter-terrorism initiatives and signed Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 in May 1998, which addressed combating terrorism and critical infrastructure protection. These presidential decisions create new structures within the government; generated a very significant interagency effort, much expanded in scope and participation beyond prior interagency efforts; and provided significant increases in funding for these efforts, many of which had already had their funding substantially increased. Other Presidential actions included a series of memoranda of notification (MONs) specifically authorizing the killing or capturing an ever widening circle of al Qaeda leadership and overt, covert and clandestine programs to keep nuclear and other dangerous materials and weapons out of the hands of terrorists and to address the large numbers of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles circulating in the world, including the many Stinger missiles the Reagan Administration provided to Islamic fighters in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

We were especially concerned with terrorists gaining access to and using weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weapons, possibly combined with attacks on information networks that could disrupt our ability to prevent or respond to an attack, as well as attacks against aircraft and vehicle bombs. While, historically, the vast majority of deaths caused by terrorists resulted from car/truck bombs, intelligence indicated that various terrorist elements were seeking WMD to be able to inflict even larger casualties. We needed to protect against both "traditional" terrorist methods and what the intelligence indicated could be their new methods. Aum Shinrikyo had demonstrated that a small but committed group could make chemical weapons and use them against a civilian population (more Japanese died in Aum's two chemical attacks than did Americans in the two East Africa embassy bombings), and Aum had also made significant efforts to acquire biological and nuclear capability. But other groups, particularly those motivated by an anti-American Islamic extremism, also were reported by the intelligence community to be seeking such capabilities and were of particular concern.

Beyond making counter-terrorism a top priority for the U.S., we actively worked to make it a priority for other governments. Beginning with my first meetings with foreign officials, I emphasized the need for cooperation in addressing terrorist threats and new forms of terrorism. Given the global nature of the threat, this effort to gain international cooperation was done not just with senior officials from the Middle East and Europe, but with most foreign officials, including those from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Canada, throughout my tenure.

A counter-terrorism strategy had to deal with the threat comprehensively, including:

The Clinton Administration undertook substantial effort on all of these fronts, sometimes with congressional support and sometimes over congressional resistance. DOD was an active participant in these efforts, in some cases taking the lead role and in other cases providing support to other elements of the government when they were the Lead Federal Agency.

There are many complex issues involved in enabling DOD effectively and legally to participate in prevention of, preparation for, and response to terrorist acts in the U.S. These issues range from doctrinal, organizational, training, equipping, personnel and other technical issues to sensitive legal, policy, and public communications issues, since DOD is not the Lead Federal Agency for these matters within the U.S. and Congress has long imposed legal limitations on what the Defense Department and the military can do within the U.S.

While there are legal limitations on what the Department of Defense and the military can do within U.S. borders to address the threat of terrorism against Americans at home, there are measures that DOD can and did undertake. These include:

A limited list of examples of such efforts undertaken by DOD from 1997 to 2000 to enhance protection of Americans at home terrorist attacks include:

In March 1997, I announced that the National Guard, with its unique federal and State dual function, would be given new responsibilities and capabilities for assisting State and local authorities in preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks in the U.S. This was implemented through a series of actions from 1997 through 2000.

You asked about the role of force protection in DOD's counter-terrorism efforts. Force protection clearly was an imperative as we addressed the threat posed by terrorists. DOD has an obligation to protect our men and women in uniform to the extent possible. Our military personnel expect to go into harm's way, and we send them into harm's way on a regular basis. But to the extent that threats can be anticipated and countered, DOD is obligated to do so. I reject any viewpoint that force protection is a diversion from genuine counter-terrorism efforts.

As you know, in 1995 and 1996, attacks had been conducted against a Saudi National Guard facility where U.S. military personnel were located and against U.S. Air Force barracks at Khobar Towers. In addition to our obligation to protect our people, U.S. national interests required us to deny these terrorists their objective of driving the U.S. out of Arabia, which they believed was possible based on the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing that killed 241 Marines and led President Reagan to abandon the Lebanon mission and withdraw U.S. forces.

The Iraq war has allowed a reconfiguration of U.S. forces in Southwest and Central Asia, including relocation of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia, but U.S. forces remain at risk. This is partly due to the symbolic significance of attacks on U.S. forces, and partly due to the belief of terrorists that such attacks can cause the U.S. to alter its policy and abandon its interests.

Following Khobar, numerous measures to enhance force protection were undertaken. A few examples include:

With regard to offensive efforts, you asked a series of overlapping questions regarding military options, plans and operations to target Bin Laden and al Qaeda; factors affecting decisions on using force against Bin Laden and al Qaeda; planning for the use of special operations forces; and military actions considered or taken following the East Africa and USS Cole attacks and the Millennium plots.

Afghanistan as a focal point for both policy and military thinking had become a back burner matter beginning in the 1980s. I cannot address what occurred before my arrival at DOD, but early in 1998 DOD did undertake military planning activities related to Afghanistan and to al Qaeda-related targets outside of Afghanistan. Over the course of the next three years, this planning continued, developing more refined plans against a better defined target set. These plans were developed against the task given us that related to countering al Qaeda and capturing or killing Bin Laden and his senior leadership.

Following the August 1998 East Africa bombings, the ongoing flurry of non-specific threat warnings was supplemented by more specific information, partly due to unilateral U.S. collection of an increased level of communications among al Qaeda-affiliated elements and partly due to increased cooperation from foreign intelligence services.

During this time, U.S. intelligence community obtained actionable intelligence on a leadership conference that al Qaeda and other terrorist groups planned to hold on a specific date at a specific location near Khost, Afghanistan. We believed one purpose of the conference was to advance plans to conduct additional attacks against U.S. interests. While we did not have a roster of who would attend this conference, the intelligence reports indicated it would include senior leaders, quite possibly including Bin Laden.

Concurrently, the U.S. intelligence community obtained physical evidence from outside the al-Shifa facility in Sudan that supported long-standing concerns regarding its potential role in Sudanese chemical weapon efforts that could be exploited by al Qaeda. The al-Shifa facility had been under surveillance for some time because of a variety of intelligence reports, including HUMINT reports identifying it as a WMD-related facility, indirect links between the facility and Bin Laden and the Iraqi chemical weapons program, and extraordinary security - including surface-to-air missiles - used to protect it during its construction. The direct physical evidence from the scene obtained at that time convinced the U.S. intelligence community that their suspicions were correct about the facility's chemical weapons role and that there was a risk of chemical agents getting into the hands of al Qaeda, whose interest in obtaining such weapons was clear.

With actionable intelligence in hand, President Clinton made the decision to attack the al Qaeda leadership conference with the intent to kill as many participants as possible. Simultaneously with the attack on the al Qaeda leadership conference, we would attack and destroy the al-Shifa facility. Because of the need for tactical surprise and because of the geographical realities of Afghanistan and Sudan being remote from U.S. operating bases, professional military advice was to use sea-launched cruise missiles to attack the al Qaeda leadership conference and the al-Shifa facility in Operation Infinite Reach.

The attacks killed dozens of terrorists at the destroyed training facilities, destroyed the al- Shifa facility, and demonstrated that the terrorists were not immune to surprise attack regardless of their location. Intelligence and public reports following Operation Infinite Reach showed considerable confusion among the terrorists as to how they had been struck and from what direction. Some, for example, were convinced that we had launched B-1 bombers out of Central Asia. While Western media reports did develop a generally accurate picture of the operation (although I have never seen a fully accurate report in the media), we never publicly released operational details of the attack, preferring to leave the terrorists to their confusion and the need to look over both shoulders at all times.

The intelligence community reported afterward that Bin Laden had been at the conference, but departed several hours before our weapons struck their target. This did not come as a complete surprise given Bin Laden's strict operational security practices, including by some accounts, that he remained in any given location only for a few hours at a time. The fact that he slipped away before the missiles arrived did not diminish my belief that the mission was well worth having undertaken.

From that point onward, the U.S. actively sought to capture or kill Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders. The President signed a series of six memoranda of notification (MONs), which are the legally required authorizations for covert actions. This series of MONs steadily expanded the circle of al Qaeda leaders authorized to be killed or captured, starting initially with Bin Laden and his inner circle and growing to include many others as we increased our understanding of al Qaeda's organization and hierarchy.

For its part al Qaeda and affiliated groups were actively working to attack Americans and American interests. In the weeks after the East Africa bombings, Egyptian Islamic Jihad - Ayman al-Zawahiri's group that cooperated with al Qaeda in the late 1990s and, according to the State Department, merged with al Qaeda in June 2001 - conducted an operation to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Tirana, but was thwarted by U.S. at the embassy gate.

Other planned attacks were very likely stymied as operatives were rolled up and other actions by U.S. and foreign authorities disrupted terrorist plans. In the autumn of 1999, the intelligence community reported that anywhere from five to fifteen attacks against U.S. interests were planned to occur during the Millennium celebrations, leading to the most extensive U.S. counter-terrorism initiative ever conducted prior to September 11 to disrupt these planned terrorist attacks.

We know that major attacks in both the U.S. and the Middle East were prevented. This includes capturing terrorists in December 1999 who planned to attack the Los Angeles International Airport and planned to destroy the Raddison Hotel in Amman, Jordan, largely occupied by American and Israeli tourists for the Millennium, using a bomb nearly seven times larger than the one that destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. In addition, the terrorists captured in Jordan confessed to a plan to use chemical weapons in a crowded movie theater.

And in October 2000, the USS Cole was attacked while it was being serviced in port at Aden, Yemen, by explosives loaded onto a service boat.

The U.S. was already pursuing Bin Laden and al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and around the world. The President had authorized lethal force to be used if we ever had the opportunity to get Bin Laden or other al Qaeda leaders. This was equally before and after the Millennium, before and after the USS Cole. We already had far more than sufficient justification to eliminate Bin Laden and his leadership structure. We did not need the Millennium plots or the attack on the USS Cole to undertake military action - we needed actionable intelligence that would give us a reasonable chance of getting al Qaeda leaders. The President and the Principals determined that attacking al Qaeda's primitive facilities rather than attacking al Qaeda leaders would have little value in setting back al Qaeda and would be counter-productive, both by enhancing Bin Laden's position among anti-American Islamic elements and by undermining foreign intelligence and other international support for our counter-terrorism effort - all of which had proved to be so crucial in averting hundreds of American and other deaths from the Millennium and other terrorist plots.

It is my understanding that General Hugh Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already discussed with the Commission the existence of more than a dozen military plans that were prepared for putting U.S. troops on the ground to go after Bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda conspirators.

All military options for putting troops into Afghanistan had to address the serious challenges posed by what military planners often refer to as the tyranny of distance. Having to operate from staging facilities nearly a thousand miles away from their targets posed serious operational and logistical challenges, requiring a larger footprint of forces to execute any ground mission in Afghanistan. More support assets would be required, as would aerial refueling. Even if actionable intelligence ever became available, the quality and reliability of the intelligence would affect the size of the force required, because less reliable information, as had been characteristic of reporting out of Afghanistan, would dictate a larger force to help ensure mission success. There would also be a significant probability of detection when conducting such an operation, further complicating planning and execution. DOD was fully prepared to conduct a ground operation in Afghanistan if actionable intelligence ever became available, and we had assets forward deployed that could support such a mission. But the operation had to be planned so that it had a realistic chance of successfully accomplishing the mission, not merely to "do something."

Some have suggested that with actionable intelligence, a small special forces unit could have been dropped into Afghanistan and have successfully carried out their mission with only a small military footprint. Merely "dropping" them into Afghanistan would require substantial assets, as would getting them out - especially if they were detected before reaching the target or encountered trouble while engaging the target.

Others have suggested that a small special forces unit could have been inserted without actionable intelligence into Taliban-controlled Afghanstan in order to search for, find and capture or kill Bin Laden. The futility of this proposal has been amply demonstrated by the fact that for well over two years the U.S. has had many thousands of troops (13,500 at present) backed by significant intelligence assets in Afghanistan (where hostile forces are marginalized, not in control of the country) and yet we have been unable to locate much less capture Bin Laden.

We also had real experience with such matters. To a far greater extent than has ever been discussed publicly, from 1997 to 2000, we had special forces operating in the Serb section of Bosnia, Serbia proper and elsewhere actively hunting for war criminals. We had some successes. But a number of high profile PIFWCs (persons indicted for war crimes) eluded us. The simple fact is that someone who exercises good tradecraft is very difficult to locate and capture in enemy territory. And this is particularly true when, as in Afghanistan, U.S. forces would be required to operate from nearly a thousand miles away rather than, as in the Balkans, they operated mere tens of miles away and had the support of an enormous intelligence apparatus in country. Bin Laden exercised very good operational security on par with or better than senior Serb war criminals.

General Hugh Shelton, the senior military adviser to the President, me and other Principals, was serving as Commander in Chief of the US Special Operations Command when I recommended that the President name him Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had enormous experience in planning and carrying out special operations missions during a special forces career that started in Vietnam. During the efforts to seize war criminals in the Balkans, on many occasions I witnessed him quickly analyze the strengths and weaknesses of "snatch" plans presented to him by the relevant commander, who was not a special operations officer, and give guidance for fixing weaknesses, developing alternative approaches or simply dropping ill-conceived plans destined to fail. I found General Shelton's military advice to be focused on military success, not risk aversion.

Let me also note for the record that few public officials have been more supportive of special forces than have I. I wrote and pushed through to enactment the legislation creating the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and giving it extraordinary authority, including special budget and procurement authority possessed by no other military command and that in many respects made it a fifth service beside the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force. Rep. Dan Daniels and Senator Sam Nunn participated in that effort, along with later efforts to increase resources devoted to USSOCOM. My legislation also created the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) and his organization to ensure that USSOCOM had an advocate in the Pentagon. All of this was done in 1986 over the strenuous objections of the civilian and military DOD leadership of the day. When the DOD leadership of the day balked at filling the ASD SOLIC position, not unlike 2001- 2003, I and some colleagues stopped confirmation of other Pentagon positions until a nominee was named. When it became clear that the Secretary of Defense's first candidate to be ASD SOLIC viewed his mandate from his superiors to be to strangle rather than support the new organizations, I and others blocked his confirmation. DOD's response was to leave the position vacant, again not unlike 2001-2003, and so we passed legislation mandating that the Secretary of the Army, John Marsh, who supported my efforts, would also serve as Acting ASD SOLIC until the position was filled. After becoming Secretary of Defense, I selected the Commander of the USSOCOM to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the principal military adviser to the President and to me, ensuring that a deep knowledge and appreciation of special forces, their capabilities and how best to use them were in place at the very top of the Defense Department and informing all decisions on military planning and operations.

At the other end of the spectrum, it has also been suggested that we should have waged war in Afghanistan and militarily toppled the Taliban. Prior to September 11, it is my judgment that no President could have won U.S. public or congressional support for invading Afghanistan, much less support from Afghanistan's neighbors whose active cooperation would have been required for us to conduct such a war. After September 11, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and other neighboring countries allowed us to stage large military forces on their soil and provided other support that enabled us to wage war on Afghanistan and drive the Taliban from power. But before September 11, they clearly were not willing to provide such support, as evidenced by the refusal of some of them to cooperate against al Qaeda despite repeated and presidential-level pressure, or in other cases with their insistence that such cooperation remain covert.

Congressional action made securing Pakistan's cooperation even more difficult when sanctions were imposed, following its nuclear test and military coup. These sanctions served to restrain the Administration's hands and reduce our leverage with Pakistani authorities. Similarly, our military cooperative efforts with Uzbekistan and other countries were congressionally constrained.

As I have mentioned, President Clinton and his entire national security team devoted an extraordinary amount of time and effort to coping with the threat. We were able to achieve significant, albeit unheralded, successes in preventing the loss of lives here and abroad. In addition, I would note that the Hart-Rudman Commission, on which Congressman Hamilton served, issued a clarion call to action. Congress also created a number of subcommittees with jurisdiction to focus upon the threat of domestic and international terrorism. Yet, it is my judgment that at no time was there any realistic prospect that Congress or the American people would have supported a decision to invade Afghanistan or that our allies or countries in the region would have supported such a decision.

The lack of actionable intelligence was the missing element in our comprehensive effort to capture or kill Bin Laden and al Qaeda leadership.

The war against Iraq has highlighted the challenge of obtaining reliable intelligence against a so-called "hard target." While some charge that the Bush Administration exaggerated or manipulated the available intelligence, the fact is that all responsible officials from the Clinton and Bush administrations and, I believe, most Members of Congress genuinely believed that Saddam Hussein had active WMD programs. While it is too early to declare that belief to be entirely wrong, I think we all have been surprised by the inability to find meaningful evidence of such active WMD programs.

As difficult an intelligence target as Saddam's Iraq was, Islamic terrorist groups present a much harder target. No U.N. inspectors were walking into terrorist offices, interrogating terrorist officials or collecting hundreds of thousands of pages of terrorist documents, as they did with in Iraq. In ways that we cannot discuss here, the fact that Iraq was far less isolated internationally than the Taliban allowed us to exploit opportunities in Iraq that did not exist in Afghanistan to collect information.

To give you a sense of the difficulty of developing intelligence against terrorist targets, consider the al-Shifa facility in Sudan that we destroyed in 1998 because of the intelligence community's assessment that it was associated with terrorist efforts to obtain chemical weapons. At the time, the intelligence community at the highest level repeatedly assured us that "it never gets better than this" in terms of confidence in an intelligence conclusion regarding a hard target. There was a good reason for this confidence, including multiple, reinforcing elements of information ranging from links that the organization that built the facility had both with Bin Laden and with the leadership of the Iraqi chemical weapons program; extraordinary security when the facility was constructed; physical evidence from the site; and other information from HUMINT and technical sources. Given what we knew regarding terrorists' interest in acquiring and using chemical weapons against Americans, and given the intelligence assessment provided us regarding the al-Shifa facility, I continue to believe that destroying it was the right decision. But perfection is not to be attained in this world, and nowhere is this more true than in the field of intelligence collection and analysis.

Now consider that information about the whereabouts of Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders never came close to the reliability and confidence of the information we had on al-Shifa. The information on Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders was often from sources of questionable credibility, frequently fragmentary and packaged in inference, and ultimately of dubious reliability. It is unlikely that anyone who questioned the decision to destroy the al-Shifa facility would ever have supported military action based on the intelligence that was available regarding Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders.

In assessing intelligence on Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, Principals also had to factor in their experience with the quality of intelligence on similar matters. To cite just one example, in April 1999, the intelligence community reported that Imad Mugniyah (wanted for numerous terrorist attacks dating back to the Beirut bombings, killing more Americans than any other terrorist prior to September 11) would transit through a certain foreign airport on a specific flight. When the individual de-planed, however, U.S. personnel on the scene determined that he was not Mugniyah nor any other person of interest. This is one of several instances in which action, sometimes lethal action with significant collateral damage, was considered based on dubious intelligence regarding the identity of the targeted individuals. The military gun was cocked for an extended period, but only once was the intelligence adequate to pull the trigger and launch strikes in an attempt to kill Bin Laden or any other al Qaeda leader.

In the summer of 2000, field activities brought forward a demonstration project for landbased wide-area surveillance in Afghanistan and a concept for combining this with UAV surveillance. These offered the possibility of obtaining actionable intelligence, which continued to be the missing element in efforts to capture or kill Bin Laden and other al Qaeda leadership. DOD and interagency addressed and resolved technical and other issues for the UAV program, and the program moved forward with trial operations over Afghanistan conducted over several weeks in the fall of 2000 to determine if the modified Predator UAV could be successfully flown from an austere operating base over mountains into hostile Afghan airspace while it was remotely controlled via satellite by operators thousands of miles away on another continent and provide useful information. Some of these test flights produced unexpectedly good results before seasonal weather forced suspension of flights. This success led in late 2000 to plans to begin operational deployments in spring 2001 when weather permitted and to use the intervening months to integrate lethal missile capability onto the UAV. Despite the technical and other challenges involved, Hellfire-C missiles were integrated onto the Predator UAV and a successful series of in-flight missile firings from the Predator against a static target were conducted near Nellis Air Force Base on February 16 and 21, 2001, a few weeks after the change in Administration. It was my expectation that the reconnaissance UAV would be airborne again over Afghanistan as soon as weather conditions permitted in the spring of 2001, followed by the armed UAV as soon as it was mission ready. This turned out not to be the case, reportedly for a combination of operational and policy reasons, but I am not in a position to address the reasons for this.

Some seek to portray counter-terrorism as a choice between law enforcement and the exercise of military power. Likewise, some argue that a preference to capture terrorists alive reflects a law enforcement preference rather than a military approach to counterterrorism. Both of these views are fallacious.

Effective counter-terrorism requires effective use of all national capabilities - law enforcement, diplomatic, intelligence, militaryand other capabilities - which are not alternatives, one to be chosen to the exclusion of the others. This was the basis for President Clinton's counter-terrorism campaign in both the first and second administrations. It is the basis of President Bush's counter-terrorism campaign, as he articulated it on September 11. No counter-terrorism effort will be 100% effective, but an effort premised on a false dichotomy of law enforcement versus war will be far less effective than an integrated effort. Yet for reasons that are inexplicable, this false choice continues to be expressed by certain critics on both left and right.

Fundamental to all aspects of counter-terrorism is acquiring adequate and timely intelligence; therefore, it is generally more advantageous to capture than kill. Intelligence, sometimes critically important intelligence, can be obtained from a living detainee while, as the saying goes, dead men tell no tales. There is a reason we have over 600 detainees at Guantanamo and elsewhere.

According to the Bush Administration, intelligence is a substantial part of the mission at Guantanmo, and important information is being obtained from detainees that gives us a better understanding of the al Qaeda network and helps us to counter them. According to a New York Times article this past weekend interviewing the chief U.S. interrogator, information acquired from detainees has resulted in terrorist cells being broken, a better understanding of al Qaeda's efforts to obtain chemical and biological weapons, and al Qaeda fundraising and recruitment methods. Surely, no one would advocate that Khalid Sheik Mohammed and others should have been killed rather than captured, given the information that has been obtained from them. The reason reports last week about the possible impending capture of Aymad al-Zawahiri generated excitement was not only because he would be removed from involvement in any further terrorist actions but equally, if not more importantly, because of the information he might yield if captured.

Why would terrorists provide us with intelligence about their operations? Experience demonstrates that such individuals often do so unintentionally, whether through bravado, threats, or simple ignorance of what information might be important to us. Repeatedly, detained terrorists have given us critical information that has enabled us to disrupt terrorist plans, capture other terrorists, and better combat terrorist networks.

Accordingly, when there is a choice between capturing and interrogating or killing and interring, the former is clearly more advantageous to us. But if circumstances arise where we are able to kill known terrorists but are unable to capture them, then we should not hesitate to use lethal force out of self defense. President Clinton's series of MONs to kill al Qaeda and other terrorist leaders made this clear. It was clear in our military strikes to kill as many as possible at what the intelligence community reported was a conference of senior leaders of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups occurring at a specific place and time in August 1998. And it was precisely what we were prepared to do on the few other occasions when the intelligence community had preliminary indications that it might be able to provide actionable intelligence to support a military strike. US military forces were "spun up" to be ready to strike, but in each of those instances, the intelligence community concluded that it lacked actionable intelligence, much to the disappointment of Administration leaders and to our forces in the field, who often did not know what information had caused them to be "spun up" nor that the information proved to be inadequate on those occasions.

The decision to use force against a site at which Bin Laden might be located required weighing the probability of successfully getting Bin Laden because he was at the site against the probability that we would undermine our Bin Laden effort because he was not at the site.

Had we destroyed a compound and its inhabitants based on flawed or inadequate intelligence, international cooperation in tracking and seizing al Qaeda operatives would have very likely diminished significantly. Such cooperation proved essential in rolling up al Qaeda cells and preventing planned terrorist attacks following the August 1998 East Africa bombings. Such cooperation also provided the potential for acquiring information that would facilitate the capturing or killing of Bin Laden and al Qaeda leadership.

You asked about the priority of counter-terrorism efforts against Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda in Defense Department military planning, relative to other threats confronting the U.S.

DOD is responsible for military preparations and operations to address the full range of threats to and pursuit of American national interests. By law, Congress has added other responsibilities to these, such as drug interdiction.

During my tenure at DOD, no matter had a higher priority than countering the threat posed to America, our people and our interests by international terrorists. No issue consumed more personal attention by me, many other senior colleagues in DOD, and I believe other Principals. I personally made sure that it also was front and center for defence ministers, foreign ministers, prime ministers and presidents of the nearly 100 countries with which I dealt and whose cooperation could help in countering this threat.

As your question implies, it is important to understand that the U.S. faced then and faces today numerous threats to our national interests and to our national territory that DOD and other agencies must also address. Some of these other threats put at risk the lives of thousands to millions of Americans and millions of persons in allied countries. It would not have been responsible to have given less attention than we did to these other critical security issues. Likewise, DOD must ensure the capabilities and readiness of our Armed Forces are effective to meet both current and future threats. During my time in office, DOD:

In January 1997, U.S. and allied forces had just entered their second year in Bosnia in an environment that remained extremely challenging and dangerous, both to U.S. political objectives and to our troops. The Bosnian Serb regime headquartered in Pale, closely aligned with the Serb authorities in Belgrade and Serb paramilitary groups, aggressively committed and incited violence against Bosniak Muslims, Croats and NATO forces; displaced Bosniak Muslims; and pursued a strategic plan to undermine the Dayton Accords and effectively to gain control of Bosnia.

A number of factors led Belgrade and Pale Serbs to conclude that they had a realistic chance to succeed in their objectives based on: the geography of the situation, in which Bosnia Serb territory wrapped itself around much of Bosniak Muslim territory; the close links between the Pale Serbs and organized crime, which provided both economic and violent influence; and the lethargy of European-led civil reconstruction efforts, which some Europeans seemed to view as lifetime appointments rather than urgent requirements. During the course of the succeeding few years, through considerable effort and attention, an alternative Bosnian Serb regime, independent of Belgrade, was established in Banja Luka and largely displaced the influence of the Pale Serbs. This enabled political progress under the Dayton Accords, which - notwithstanding the sclerotic reconstruction efforts, the leadership deficiencies of the Bosniak Muslims, the continued tensions between the three Bosnian parties, and other issues - enabled Bosnia to become a muddling but stable success. Because U.S. forces and policy were in the line of fire when the second Administration started, Bosnia did command the attention of Principals and Deputies, as well as interagency groups specifically focused on the Balkans.

As Bosnia attained stability, Belgrade turned its attention to Kosovo, unleashing Serb paramilitaries and Serb forces on an ethnic cleansing campaign that displaced a million Albanian Kosovars and created refugee crisis for neighboring countries. One of Milosevic's objectives was to destabilize the fragile government in multi-ethnic Macedonia and possibly cause Greece to enter the fray, which in turn would have created pressure on Turkey and Bulgaria to do the same. It was for these reasons that President George H.W. Bush first warned Milosevic that a military move against Kosovo would result in war with the U.S. At the same time, violent Islamic terrorists sought to use the chaotic situation to establish a foothold in the region and, having been thwarted in Bosnia, found opportunity with the collapse of order in Albania. Egyptian Islamic Jihad and possibly others operated in Albania, and the U.S. successfully thwarted an attempted truck bombing of our embassy in Tirana.

Adhering to an allied approach to the war against Serbia did compel Principals to devote significant attention maintaining alliance cohesion, but it was necessary for two practical reasons. First, allied territory was needed to fight the largest air campaign since World War II. And secondly, looking to the long term, full allied support was necessary if we were to adhere to our plan of the U.S. carrying the vast majority of the war effort (over 80% by most measures) and the allies carrying the vast majority of the post-war effort.

During the war, we determined that the U.S. would contribute no more than 15% of the post-war stabilization force, while coalition partners would be required to contribute at least 85%; the U.S. would exercise strategic and ultimate control over the occupation, but coalition partners would bear the burden at subordinate levels for most of Kosovo; and coalition partners would bear the bulk of reconstruction costs. After the war, we successfully adhered to this plan, but only because we had maintained allied cohesion during the war. The wisdom of this is apparent in hindsight, looking both at the recent flare-up in violence in Kosovo and at the events in Iraq. But during the war it did require focused attention from Principals who continually worked foreign counterparts , although the Deputies and interagency Balkan specialists carried most of the weight for post-war occupation issues once the Helsinki negotiations with Russia were completed.

Following the war against Serbia over Kosovo, Milosevic prepared for a possible blitzgrieg military action against Montenegro, which while federated with Serbia in a rump Yugoslavia was exercising increasing independence from Belgrade. The US European Command developed plans to defeat a Serb military move against Montenegro, which Milosevic would have used to reignite conflict in Bosnia. Concurrent with this, Milosevic sought to stage manage an election process to bolster his political position after his failure in Kosovo. But the process became a real contest, and effective support to the democratic opposition led to Milosevic's ouster and then to his imprisonment in The Hague. This action prevented the fifth Balkan war of the decade, bringing to an end a series of wars that had killed hundreds of thousands, flooded Europe with millions of refugees, and threatened European stability and security at the very time that the collapse of the Soviet Union had created the opportunity to build (to quote President Bush Sr.) "a Europe whole and free" - an opportunity that we seized by supporting the enlargement of NATO and the European Union. Principals and Deputies actively guided this closing phase of the Balkan wars.

At the same time as the war against Serbia was being conducted, skirmishes broke out at sea between North Korea and South Korea, with dozens killed and ships destroyed. Tensions and the risk of war that could produce millions of Korean and tens of thousands of American casualties spiked above their normal hair-trigger levels.

I would note that there were very few instances in which I met with NATO counterparts, including during the many meetings held during the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, that I did not focus their attention on the threat posed by terrorists and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Likewise with Russia. While I was in Moscow, an apartment block was bombed reportedly by terrorists. I directed that a bilateral military intelligence dialogue be initiated, with a primary focus on extremist Islamic terrorists who posed a threat to both countries. Our policy dialogue with Russia sought to turn their attention from their false security concern of NATO enlargement to the real security concern of how best to address the terrorist threat, as well as the long-term threat they were creating for themselves and for us by allowing nuclear and missile technology to go to Iran and others.

The U.S. war in Afghanistan could not have been fought as it has been without the cooperation of formerly Soviet Central Asian states, which was based partly on U.S. military engagement, training and support conducted during the late 1990s, despite congressional limitations. Moreover, Central Asian support for the war in Afghanistan was dependent on Russian acquiescence, which also was based in part on the close cooperation with the Russian military during the 1990s, including American and Russian troops and commanders working side by side in military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The U.S. also conducted ongoing military operations in Iraq throughout my tenure. Iraq was effectively contained during this period through the combination of:

The effort to enhance U.S. military capabilities in the Gulf region and to develop and maintain support within GCC countries for ongoing U.S. operations against Iraq and for capabilities enhancement did require my regular personal attention. Other Principals, too, devoted considerable attention to Iraq-related issues to ensure that Iraq remained contained and to manage issues related to our military operations against Iraq.

Several other dangerous situations arose during these years that also warranted Principals' attention. Among others, these included the Kargil crisis that threatened to escalate into a general war between Pakistan and India, with the very real possibility of a nuclear war that could kill hundreds of thousands or more; the escalation of cross-Straits tensions that also threatened to erupt into warfare between China and Taiwan; hostilities between North and South Korea that had the potential to escalate, as discussed below; and North Korea development and testing of long-range missiles, capable of delivering nuclear weapons not only to allied territory but also to U.S. territory. All of these put at risk vital U.S. security interests and most of them directly threatened U.S. lives, necessitating attention by the President and the Principals.

Numerous other non-operational matters, but having operational consequences, also merited my and other Principals' attention during this period, among them:

Numerous deliberative war plans were also written or re-written. This included major plans regarding the nuclear SIOP and associated plans, China, Iraq, Iran, and Korea and other plans regarding such matters as Cuba. Some of these plans were revised multiple times. In addition, significant planning was done for withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Balkans and their dispatch to other theaters should that ever be required.

Also, presidential decision directives and presidentially approved contingency planning guidance were written requiring non-DOD agencies develop capabilities and deliberative plans for their roles in post-conflict situations, such as we see in Iraq, although my understanding is that these directives did not survive the Clinton Administration.

To discuss one in more detail, we re-wrote the war plan for the Korean Peninsula and instituted many changes to be able to execute it, as well as developed additional military plans for contingencies such as the collapse of the North Korean government. Previous operational plans had failed to properly address the likelihood of North Korean use of chemical weapons and possibly other WMD. Properly addressing this aspect of the threat required intensive and wide-ranging efforts by DOD. The operational plan revision also needed to take advantage of the transformation of U.S. military capabilities during the 1990s, as well as the need to ensure decisive action at the opening of a conflict and conflict termination on decisive terms rather than restoration of the status quo ante.

This effort was made more urgent by Kim Jong Il's reconfiguration of the North Korean military, moving forces forward to the area adjacent the DMZ, from which North Korean artillery could rain up to 500,000 shells per hour on half of South Korea's population and economy, including Seoul, and on tens of thousands of US forces and dependents; deploying hundreds of missiles capable of delivery conventional, chemical or other weapons to southernmost South Korea or to Japan; exercising more coordinated air and ground operations; and enhancing North Korea's large special operations forces for insertion in rear areas in South Korea and Japan.

North Korea's military realignment appeared designed to support a strategy for launching war with little to no warning; rapidly seize northern areas of South Korea; disrupt the US ability to fight from rear areas and to flow forces into the peninsula; and, when its advance on the peninsula slowed, to sue for peace under the threat of nuclear attack on South Korea or Japan.

In 1999-2000, North Korean training exercises were at record high levels and, learning from U.S. combat operations in the Balkans and Iraq, North Korean military modified facilities, dispersed forces and expanded camouflage, concealment and deception efforts. In June 1999, following several known North Korean submarine raids into South Korean waters, the first hostilities since the Korean War broke out, with North Korean and South Korean naval vessels firing on each other, resulting in two North Korean vessels destroyed and several dozen North Korean forces killed.

In short, the threat of war in Northeast Asia was very real during this period and remains so today. Such a war would put at risk vital American interests, tens of thousands of American lives, and millions of Korean lives, among others, assuming North Korea did not use nuclear weapons; the death toll would be much higher if it did. This risk of war justifiably warranted significant attention of myself and other Principals, just as it does Secretary Rumsfeld and his colleagues.

I have attempted to set forth some of the major initiatives under taken by the Department of Defense to counter the threat of terrorism during the time I was privileged to serve at the Pentagon.

As I noted, many of those initiatives proved successful in saving the lives of many of our citizens both here and abroad.

On many occasions the Administration was able to secure the cooperation of Congress and others in the pursuit of its goals. In a number of cases, it did not.

For example, some in Congress, the media and "policy community" accused those of us focused on the terrorist threat of being alarmist and of exaggerating the threat in order to boost our budgets. Countering the threat of terrorism was "the latest gravy train," according to one expert quoted by US News & World Report. The belief that we were indulging in cynical hyperbole resulted in several legislative actions.

In an effort to help remove doubt and complacency about the growing threat, working with congressional leadership, I appointed a panel in 1998 led by former Senators Rudman and Hart and including Vice Chairman Hamilton, former Speaker Gingrich, retired senior military commanders and others. The Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, on its own and without direction from the Administration, validated the reality of the threat to the American homeland from terrorism, including terrorists armed with WMD. In releasing the Commission's first report, long before September 11, Vice Chairman Hamilton stated well the fundamental issue:

Vice Chairman Hamilton's remarks resonated with me because I recalled that at my very first press conference as Secretary of Defense, I was asked "what is your greatest concern as you look toward to the future?" and my response was essentially the same as Lee Hamilton's:

I believe that we have been complacent as a society. We have failed to fully comprehend the gathering storm. Even now after September 11, it is far from clear that our society truly appreciates the gravity of the threat we face or is yet willing to do what is necessary to counter it. Even after September 11, and after anthrax and ricin attacks in the U.S., I remain concerned that the controversy over not finding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction will lead to the erroneous assumption that all the talk about the dangers of WMD is just another exercise in the cynical exploitation of fear. After all, it is commonly noted, there have been no attacks since 9/11. This is a dangerous delusion. The enemy is not only coming, he has been here. He is already amongst us. He will continue to try to examine our weaknesses, exploit the crevices in our security, and destroy our way of living as well as our lives.

As you can deduce from my statement, I believe that the Clinton Administration far more than any Administration prior to September 11 understood the threat that terrorists pose to our country and took far greater and more comprehensive action to counter it than any previous administration. But notwithstanding all this, the U.S. was hit in a devastating way. Clearly neither the first Bush Administration, nor the two Clinton Administrations, nor the current Bush Administration did all that we and they needed to do to prevent the rise and spread of violent Islamic extremists and to prevent them from reaching our shores with instruments of mass death.

Nor do I believe that even today, with a global war on terrorism being waged, are we doing all we need to do to prevent the further spread of violent Islamic extremists and to prevent them from reaching our shores with mass death.

I don't pretend to hold the keys to the kingdom of wisdom on what needs to be done in the future. All of us who have held high office must remain accountable for our actions while holding the public trust. It is my hope that the Commission through its work will focus as well on the fault lines that run through our democratic system as we struggle to cope with a challenge of unprecedented proportions.

It's a time for sober reflection and the charting of a responsible course of action. There's very little time to lose.

TESTIMONY OF U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD H. RUMSFELD
PREPARED FOR DELIVERY TO
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 23, 2004

The Commission requested that we comment on preparations during the period from January 20th through September 11, 2001 , the events of September 11 th , steps taken since September 11th, and any recommendations for the future.

I request that the text of my testimony be made a part of the record, along with several attachments.

Let me first express my condolences to the people of Spain . The bombings in Madrid have been called Europe 's 9/11. For the Spanish people, March 11, 2004 will leave their nation changed. I have no doubt that, like September 11th, the fruits of those attacks will not, over the long run, be hatred, fear or self-doubt, as the terrorists intended.

I am persuaded the attacks there will backfire on the terrorists as they have elsewhere -- for example, as the Istanbul bombings united Turks instead of dividing them; and as terrorist bombings in Riyadh spurred the Saudis to crack down on terrorist networks in their country.

Families that lost loved ones on 9/11 - some of whom I am sure are listening today - must feel a special bond with families in other countries who lost fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters to terrorism. They understand the pain, and the heartbreak.

Nothing can shorten the suffering of the bereaved families whose loved ones perished, or fill the empty space in their hearts.

The attacks by terrorists around the world are deadly reminders that our nation - and, indeed, the world's free nations - are at war. It is a war in which we face dangerous enemies, that kill innocent men, women and children - enemies who are working to acquire weapons that would one day allow them to kill not hundreds, as on March 11 th in Spain , but tens of thousands.

So this Commission has an important opportunity. Those in government are, of necessity, focused on dozens of issues. Commissions, however, can step back and focus on one thing, get it right, and provide insights that can be of great value.

ou have been asked to connect the dots - after the fact -- to examine events leading up to September 11 th , and consider whether events of that day might have been prevented - and, what lessons, if any, might be taken from that experience to prevent future dangers. It isn't easy, even after the fact. And that's with the benefit of hindsight. You have the opportunity to hold hearings, conduct interviews, to pore over tens of thousands of pages of documents, to focus exclusively on that one topic.

• Had up to 150 DoD personnel work on the collection, review, and processing of information requested by the Commission;

• Made available approximately 4,000 documents, totaling more than 136,000 pages;

Going through those documents and briefings, and conducting all those interviews and hearings, and trying to piece it all together and connect the dots, is difficult. Yet the challenge facing our country before September 11 th and still today is vastly more difficult: our task was then and is today to connect the dots -- not after the fact, but before the fact - to try to stop an attack before it happens. And that task must be done without the benefit of hindsight, hearings, briefings, interviews, or testimony.

Another attack against our people will be attempted. We do not know where, or when, or by what technique. It could be in weeks, months, or years - but it will happen.

That reality drives those of us in positions of responsibility in government to ask the tough question: when that attack is attempted, what will we wish we had done -- today and everyday - before an attack -- to prepare for, to mitigate, or if humanly possible, to prevent it?

The Commission might ask a similar question: when that next attack is attempted, what will you wish you had advised? What will you wish you had recommended our nation do to prepare for, and, if possible, to prevent an attack?

What have you learned that can inform our efforts, and help us to better understand surprise, to anticipate threats, and get better arranged to deal with them?

The unfamiliar challenges of the global war on terror are particularly tough for several reasons:

• First, it is tough because Western armed forces have been organized, trained and equipped to fight competing armies, navies and air forces - not to conduct man-hunts for terrorists.

• It is tough because safeguarding the privacy of individuals makes it hard to satisfy the requirement to know who or what is coming across our borders or moving money through financial networks.

• It is tough because globalization has created easy access to dual-use technology, fiber optics, and the knowledge and materials to build increasingly lethal weapons.

Your Commission can help by offering your considered opinions on a number of critical questions:

• How to adjust thinking about dealing with terrorism as a problem of national security vs. law enforcement?

• How to address peacetime constraints in a way to reflect that we are a nation at war -- albeit a new and different war.

Not easy questions. But this much is certain: on September 11 th , our world changed - and while it may be tempting to think that once this crisis has passed and our nation has healed, things can go back to the way they were -- we cannot go back. The world of September 10 th is past. We have entered a new security environment, arguably the most dangerous the world has known. And if we are to continue to live as free people, we cannot go back to thinking as we did on September 10 th . For if we do -- if we look at the problems of the 21 st century through a 20 th century prism -- we will come to wrong conclusions and fail the American people.

You can help our country adjust. I used to think one of the most powerful individuals in America was the person who could select the annual high school debate topic. Think of the power -- to set the agenda, and determine what millions of high school students will study, read about, think about, talk about with friends, discuss with their teachers, and debate with their parents and siblings over dinner.

Your Commission has similar power. You have the opportunity to focus the attention of the nation on critical questions - the issues we need to think about, debate, and discuss. You have an opportunity to elevate the debate above partisan interests, to lift people's eyes up and out to the horizon, to help point a way ahead.

The September 11 th attacks cost the American people hundreds of billions of dollars in lost income, lost jobs, and lost GDP. But the most terrible cost of the attack was the price paid in human lives, and the suffering of the families and loved ones of the 3,000 people killed on that day - the horrible memories and the constant sense of loss that the wives and husbands and children and parents and friends of those who were murdered on September 11th live with everyday.

I saw with my eyes the destruction terrorists wreaked on September 11 th . At the impact site, moments after American Airlines Flight #77 hit the Pentagon, one could feel the heat of the flames, smell the burning jet fuel, and see the smoldering rubble, twisted steel, and the agony of the victims. Those images will forever be seared into our memories.

I spent time, once the crisis passed, asking the questions posed to this Commission: What, if anything, could have been done to prevent it? And, if something like this were to happen again, have we -- today -- done everything possible to prevent it?

First, I must say, I know of no intelligence during the roughly six plus months leading up to September 11 th that indicated terrorists intended to hijack commercial airliners and fly them into the Pentagon or the World Trade Towers. If we had had such information, we could have acted on it -- as we did during the spike in intelligence chatter during the summer of 2001, when we had information that led us to move ships out of harbors in the Gulf region. Further, I believe that the actions taken since September 11 th in the global war on terror, and the international coalition assembled to fight that war, would have been impossible to achieve before the September 11 th attacks.

Think about it: after September 11 th , the President made the decision not simply to launch cruise missile strikes as the U.S. had previously tried. Rather, he decided to deal decisively with the terrorist network responsible for the attack -- and to hold not only the perpetrators to account, but also the regime that had harbored, aided, and supported them as they trained, planned, and executed their attacks.

The President rallied the world, and formed what is today a 90-nation coalition to wage the global war on terrorist networks. He sent U.S. and Coalition forces - air, sea, and ground - to attack Afghanistan , overthrow the Taliban regime, and destroy that al-Qaeda stronghold.

• Within 26 days of the attack -- on October 7 th , the air campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan had been launched.

• Within 38 days -- on October 19th, the U.S. military had forces on the ground in Afghanistan .

• Within 59 days -- on November 9 th , Mazar-e-Sharif fell to a coordinated assault by Afghan and U.S. forces, aided by precision strikes from Coalition ships and aircraft.

• Within 63 days -- on November 13, 2001 , Kabul was taken - and Afghanistan was liberated.

• Today a transitional government is in power in Afghanistan , which is transforming the country from a safe haven for terrorists to a coalition ally in the war against terrorism.

• And a clear message was sent: henceforth there will be a price to pay for harboring terrorists.

These were bold steps - and today, in light of September 11 th , no one questions those actions. T oday, I suspect most would support a pre-emptive action to deal with such a threat, if it had been possible to see it coming. Today, our remarkable military success in Afghanistan is largely taken for granted, as is the achievement in bringing together countries like Pakistan , India , Uzbekistan , and Oman into a 90-nation coalition.

But imagine for a moment that we were back before September 11, 2001 . Imagine that a U.S. President had looked at the information then available, and gone before the Congress and the world, and said: "We need to invade Afghanistan, overthrow the Taliban, and destroy the al-Qaeda terrorist network," based on what little was known before September 11th.

We likely would have heard objections to "pre-emption" similar to those voiced before the Coalition launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. We would have been asked:

• Aren't North Korea , Iran , Iraq , or Libya more immediate threats than Afghanistan ?

• If we go to war in Afghanistan , does it mean the U.S. will now go to war with every state that harbors terrorists before they have threatened us?

• Should we go to war when there is no international consensus behind ousting the Taliban regime by force?

• Wouldn't U.S. intervention enrage the Muslim world and increase support for the terrorists?

• How can we go to war when not one country in the region publicly supports us, and many seem to be opposed?

• Wouldn't the U.S. get bogged down in an expensive, dangerous long-term military occupation?

• Wouldn't we open ourselves to the risk that other rogue regimes might take advantage of the fact that the U.S. is tied up in Afghanistan to invade neighbors or cause other mischief?

• Won't launching a pre-emptive strike simply provoke more terrorist attacks against the U.S. ?

• If the Taliban and al-Qaeda knew we intended to overthrow their regime and destroy their network, what would they have to lose by launching a catastrophic attack in the U.S. ?

Those are essentially objections that were raised against military action in Iraq . And they were voiced after September 11 th , in a nation that already had experienced the loss of 3,000 innocent men, women and children to a surprise attack.

Imagine the outcry any U.S. President would have faced had he proposed what would have been labeled a pre-emptive war in Afghanistan before the experience of September 11 th .

Unfortunately, history shows that it can take a tragedy like September 11 th to awaken the world to new threats - and to the need for action -- and even then there are different views.

A few weeks after September 11 th , I was in the Middle East , and I met in a tent in the desert with the Sultan of Oman. He expressed his sympathy for the loss of life in America . But he said that perhaps that tragedy will wake up the world, so that nations will come together to take the steps necessary to see that there is not a September 11 th that involves a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon. Perhaps, he said, the loss of those 3,000 precious lives, in the end, will help to save tens of thousands of lives.

We cannot go back in time to stop the September 11 th attack. But we owe it to the families and loved ones of those who died on September 11 th to ensure that their loss will, in fact, be the call that helps to ensure that tens of thousands of other families do not go through the pain and suffering they have endured.

It is my hope that this Commission's work will help our nation meet its obligations to those families - and to future generations, whose freedom and security are in our hands today.

President Bush came to office with instructions to his Administration to prepare for the new threats of the 21 st century.

The bombing of the U.S.S. Cole on October 12, 2000 was seen both as evidence of the al-Qaeda threat and the need to adjust U.S. policy. There had been no response to the Cole bombing.

I've have had an interest in terrorism since my experience in Lebanon in the 1980s, during my service as Middle East Envoy for President Reagan.

The more one studies terrorism, the more one becomes convinced that the approach to fighting it that had evolved over several decades wasn't working. That strategy was essentially to treat terrorism as a matter of domestic security; to combat it through national and international law enforcement techniques; and to try to take defensive measures against terrorist attacks. From the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut , to the first World Trade Center attack, to the Embassy bombings in East Africa , and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole -- that was the pattern. Reasonable people have to conclude that the value of that approach had diminished over the years.

It had become increasingly clear that we could no longer afford to treat terrorism as a manageable evil - that we needed an approach that treated terrorism more like fascism -- as an evil that needed to be not contained, but fought and eliminated.

When this Administration came into office, the President asked the NSC to begin preparing a new counter-terrorism strategy. His instructions were to develop a strategy not simply to contain terrorism, but to deal with it more aggressively - not to reduce the threat posed by al-Qaeda, but to eliminate the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

A more comprehensive approach required a review not only of U.S. counter-terrorism policy, but also U.S. policies with regard to other countries, some of which had not previously been at the center of U.S. policy. It was a big task. Dr. Rice has stated she asked the National Security Council staff in her first week in office for a new Presidential initiative on al-Qaeda. The staff conducted an overall review of al-Qaeda policy. In early March, the staff was directed to craft a more aggressive strategy aimed at eliminating the al-Qaeda threat. The first draft of that new strategy, in the form of a Presidential directive, was circulated by the NSC staff on June 7, 2001 and I am told some five more meetings were held that summer at the Deputy Secretary level to address the policy questions involved, such as relating an aggressive strategy against the Taliban to U.S.-Pakistan relations. By the first week of September, this process had arrived at a strategy that was presented to Principals and later became National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-9.

• To use all elements of national power to do so -- diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, information and law enforcement;

• To eliminate sanctuaries for al-Qaeda and related terrorist networks - and if diplomatic efforts to do so failed, to consider additional measures.

The essence of this strategy was contained in NSPD-9. It was the first major substantive national security decision directive issued by this Administration. It was presented for decision by principals on September 4, 2001 - 7 days before September 11 th . The directive was signed by the President, with minor changes, and a preamble to reflect the events of 9/11, on October 25, 2001 .

While this review of counter-terrorism policy was taking place, the Department of Defense was developing a review of U.S. defense strategy. When President Bush took office, he asked us to transform the Defense Department, and arrange the U.S. Armed Forces for the new threats of the 21 st century, which he knew would be notably different from 20 th century threats that were familiar, but unlikely.

On February 2, 2001 , less than two weeks after taking office, I traveled to Germany for the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy - my first overseas trip since returning to the Pentagon. Already, at that early date, we were focused on the problem of unconventional or "asymmetric" threats. On the flight, I was asked by reporters about the principles that would drive our defense review. I answered that the 1991 Persian Gulf War had taught the world that taking on Western armies, navies and air forces directly is not a good idea. It was expensive and attackers were almost certain to lose a conventional conflict. It was therefore likely that potential adversaries would:

"look for so-called asymmetrical responses … [everything] from terrorism through cyber attacks, to information warfare, to cruise missiles, to short-range ballistic missiles, to longer range ballistic missiles, and weapons of mass destruction." (See Attachment #1)

The problem we faced was that, for most of the 20 th century, the U.S. Armed Forces had been organized, trained and equipped to fight opposing armies, navies and air forces. While we need to maintain the capability to fight traditional wars, we also knew that the likely threats in the 21 st century would require us to conduct much different kinds of military operations.

Even traditional adversaries would be likely to threaten us in unconventional or asymmetric ways. Moreover, we knew we would increasingly face threats from non-traditional adversaries, such as terrorist networks, and that we needed to re-arrange ourselves to be able to deter and dissuade such attacks - and to defeat such adversaries if they did attack.

• First, that hostile states will develop these weapons, and a variety of ways to deliver them against our people, and our friends and coalition partners, and thus have the power to hold our populations hostage to blackmail; and

• Second, that they might share those capabilities with terrorist networks, that could use them to attack us without fingerprints.

At the same time, the challenges facing the intelligence community were growing more complex. During my confirmation hearings, I was asked what one thing would keep me awake at night? I answered, without hesitation: "intelligence." (See Attachment #2)

I understand CIA Director Tenet will testify tomorrow and he will provide a detailed description of the challenges facing the intelligence community. Let me simply say this: during the Cold War, we faced a principal adversary - the Soviet Union - an enemy we grew to know and understand reasonably well over many decades. Today, we face multiple potential adversaries - both state and non-state actors - operating around the globe. We are living in an age where the nature of the international economy, the volume and rate of global interactions and communication, and the spread of technologies, mean the volume of information that must be monitored and assessed has grown and is growing.

The ability of the intelligence community to monitor the rapidly growing volume of data, sort it, analyze it, and then alert policymakers to threats to the U.S. and its interests, is growing more difficult by the year.

Their challenge is compounded by the fact that the ability of the intelligence community to learn the secrets of those who wish us harm, and to convey those secrets to policy-makers in confidence, continues to be compromised by frequent leaks and unauthorized disclosures. Hardly a day goes by when the media doesn't carry a story that reveals classified information. This aids our enemies in significant ways.

The harm done to the U.S. by spies and traitors the likes of Ames , Hansen, and Pollard is substantial. The result has been that important features of our intelligence capabilities have been compromised.

As part of our complicated world, adversaries of the U.S. have chosen terrorism as the preferred instrument to force free nations to submit to their agendas by inflicting death on their innocent citizens.

We were also concerned about the risk of surprise, and the danger that new threats could emerge with little or no warning. In June 2001, I attended the first meeting of NATO defense ministers in the 21 st century, and my first NATO meeting since returning to government. I told my colleagues about Vice President Cheney's appearance before the Senate for his confirmation hearings as Secretary of Defense in March of 1989. During those hearings, a wide range of security issues were discussed - but not one person uttered the word " Iraq ." Yet within a year, Iraq had invaded Kuwait and that word was in every headline and on everyone's lips. I wondered what word might come to dominate my term in office that wasn't raised by members of the Senate Committee during my confirmation hearings.

At that June 2001 meeting, months before September 11 th -- I cautioned our NATO colleagues as follows:

"We know this much for certain: it is unlikely that any of us here knows what is likely…. None of us…has a crystal ball through which we can clearly see the future. [But] while it is difficult to know precisely who will threaten us or where or when in the coming decades, it is less difficult to anticipate how we will be threatened. We know, for example, that as an Alliance of democracies, our open borders and open societies make it easy and inviting for terrorists to strike at our people where they live [and] work…. Our dependence on computer-based information networks make those networks attractive targets for new forms of cyber-attack. The ease with which potential adversaries can acquire advanced conventional weapons… will present us with new challenges in conventional war and force projection. Our lack of defenses against ballistic missiles creates incentives for missile proliferation which, combined with the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, give future adversaries the ability to hold our populations hostage to terror and blackmail…. [T]he parallel revolutions of miniaturization, information, biotechnology, robotics, nanotechnology, and high-density energy sources are putting unprecedented power in the hands of small countries and even terrorist groups , foreshadowing changes beyond any ability to forecast." (See Attachment #3)

These are the kinds of threats that we at Defense were preparing to meet and deal with in the months before September 11 th . And during those early months, we made significant progress in the effort to transform for the era of surprise and unconventional threats. They included:

In it, we identified as our first priority , the defense of the territory and people of the United States against a broad range of asymmetric threats - homeland defense .

And we made the important decision to move the Department from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" approach to defense planning - an approach that focuses not simply on who might threaten us, or where, or when, but more on how we might be threatened, and what portfolio of capabilities we will need to deter and defend against those new threats.

We did all this, I would add, with a skeletal staff. It was not until nearly 6 weeks into the new Administration that Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, was confirmed. For many weeks thereafter, he and I were the only confirmed Presidential appointees in the Defense Department. For example:

For most of the period before 9/11 we were working in a building where many of the most senior officials selected by the President had not been confirmed and were not available to help. So we were without their help for many months. The current system from clearance to confirmation is better suited to the industrial age and needs to be modernized to fit the 21 st century.

Notwithstanding those challenges, the few new civilian and the military leaders of the Department did do a significant amount of work in the early months. I held more than 250 meetings during the period before September 11th, many on the subjects described.

Those investments in time and energy by senior leaders of the Department paid off. We made important decisions about the strategic direction for the Department and the Armed Forces - decisions that were to be later validated by the decisive campaign that was planned and executed after 9/11.

Indeed, because we were doing all these things -- here in the Department, as well as in the NSC policy review -- the Administration was better prepared to respond when the 9/11 attacks came. We were able to take plans which were limited in their objectives -- plans that had evolved from the late 1990s through the first months of the Administration -- and rapidly modify and enlarge them to meet our broader objectives for Afghanistan . The rapid success in Afghanistan was made possible in part because of work that had been done in previous years and in the preceding seven months - changes in thinking, culture, and strategy that fortunately were underway when new threats emerged -- and which allowed us to move with speed and precision to shatter al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroy the Taliban regime in short order.

On the morning of September 11, 2001 , I was hosting a meeting for some of Members of Congress. Ironically, in the course of the conversation, I stressed how important it was for our country to be adequately prepared for the unexpected.

Someone handed me a note that a plane had hit one of the World Trade Center Towers . Later, I was in my office with a CIA briefer when I was told a second plane had hit the other tower. Shortly thereafter, at 9:38 AM , the Pentagon shook with an explosion of a then unknown origin.

I went outside to determine what had happened. I was not there long, apparently, because I am told I was back in the Pentagon, with a crisis action team, by shortly before or after 10:00 AM .

Upon my return from the crash site and before going to the Executive Support Center (ESC), I had one or more calls in my office, one of which I believe was with the President.

I left the ESC and went to the National Military Command Center where General Dick Myers, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had just returned from Capitol Hill. We discussed and I recommended to the President raising the U.S. Defense Condition level from 5 to 3, and increasing the Force Protection level. We later requested that the Russians be notified of the change and suggested they stand down an exercise they were conducting, which they did.

A summary was provided of the forces available in the Persian Gulf/Arabian Gulf. They included: two aircraft carrier battle groups and more than 200 TLAM cruise missiles among other vessels in the area.

In the National Military Command Center (NMCC), I joined the air threat telephone conference call in progress. One of my first conversations during the conference call was with the Vice President. He informed me of the President's authorization to shoot down hostile aircraft coming toward Washington , D.C.

My thoughts went to the pilots of the U.S. military aircraft that could be called upon to execute that order. I recalled an experience in 1975, while I was serving as White House Chief of Staff, when the ship Mayaguez was seized by pirates. During that incident, communications had been beamed into a room where President Ford and the rest of us could hear U.S. pilots as they weighed intercepting a boat moving from an island to the mainland -- very likely with the crew of the Mayaguez as captives.

I remember hearing the uncertainty in a pilot's voice -- a young man charged with making a grave decision about firing at or attempting to disable that boat to keep it from reaching the mainland. I find it useful to try to put myself in the shoes of others - whether a pilot, or a combatant commander. And I tried to put myself into the shoes of the pilots we were asking to be prepared to intercept civilian airliners, over American soil, filled with our neighbors, friends, and relatives -- and possibly having to shoot down those planes -- with row after row of their fellow Americans.

It was clear they needed rules of engagement telling them what they should and should not do. They needed clarity. And there were no rules of engagement on the books for this first-time situation where civilian aircraft were seized and were being used as missiles. Indeed, it may well be the first time in history that U.S. armed forces in peacetime, have been ordered to fire on fellow Americans going about their lawful business.

General Myers and I went to work to fashion appropriate rules of engagement. Throughout the course of the day, we returned to further refine those rules.

I spent the remainder of the morning and into the afternoon in the NMCC and the ESC, participating in the Air Threat Conference, talking to the President or Vice President, or giving guidance and thinking about the way forward. During the course of the day, the President indicated he expected us to provide him with robust options for military responses.

In the first month of the Administration, I had prepared a list of guidelines to be weighed before committing U.S. forces to combat. I had shared them with the President so he would know that, if we were to consider engaging U.S. forces, those were the kinds of considerations I would be weighing and discussing with him.

• First, is the proposed action truly necessary? If lives are going to be put at risk, there must be a darn good reason.

• Next, is the task achievable and at an acceptable risk? It has to be something that the United States is truly capable of doing. We need to understand that we have limitations.

• All instruments of national power should be engaged before, during and after any possible use of force.

• Decisions ought not to be made by committees. If the U.S. needs or prefers a coalition, which in my view it almost always will, it's important to avoid trying so hard to persuade others to join that it could compromise the goals or jeopardize the command structure. The mission needs to determine the coalition.

• If an engagement is worth doing, then the U.S. and coalition partners need to be willing to put lives at risk -- and leaders have to be willing to invest the political capital necessary to marshal support necessary to sustain the effort for whatever period of time conceivably could be required.

• It's important not to dumb down what's needed by promising not to do things - by saying "we won't use ground forces," or "we won't risk lives," or "we won't permit collateral damage," or "we won't bomb below 15,000 feet," or "we'll set an arbitrary deadline that it will end as of this date." That simplifies the problem for the enemy and makes our task vastly more difficult -- and vastly more dangerous.

I prepared those and the other guidelines attached to my testimony (Attachment #4) long before September 11 th - not as rules or a formula to encourage or inhibit military action, but rather as a checklist of questions to consider, so that if we did have to engage our forces, we would do so with a full appreciation of our responsibilities, the risks, the opportunities - and that we would do so decisively.

A few days after 9/11, I wrote down some thoughts on terrorism, and the new kind of war that had been visited upon us. I noted:

• "It will take a sustained effort to root [the terrorists] out…. The world needs to have realistic expectations. This campaign is a marathon, not a sprint. No terrorist or terrorist network, such as al-Qaeda, is going to be conclusively dealt with by cruise missiles or bombers."

• "The coalitions that are being fashioned will not be fixed; rather, they will change and evolve…. [E]ach country has a somewhat different perspective and different relationships, views and concerns. It should not be surprising that some countries will be supportive of some activities in which the U.S. is engaged, while other countries will not."

• "Some will be reluctant to join an effort against terrorism or at least some aspects of our efforts. Terrorists terrorize people. We accept that fact."

• "This is not a war against the people of any country. The regimes that support terrorism terrorize their own people as well. We need to enlist all civilized people to oppose terrorism, and we need to [help] make it safe for them to do so."

• "This is not a war against Islam…. The al-Qaeda terrorists are extremists whose views are antithetical to those of most Muslims. Their actions… are aimed in part at preventing Muslim people from engaging the rest of the world. There are millions of Muslims around the world who we expect to become allies in this struggle."

In the following days, we prepared options for the President. The President issued an ultimatum to the Taliban. When they failed to comply, he initiated the Global War on Terror and directed the Department to carry out Operation Enduring Freedom against al-Qaeda, their affiliates, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that harbored and supported the terrorists.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Defense has pursued two tracks simultaneously:

• We have prosecuted the global war on terror in concert with other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and

• We have continued and, where possible, accelerated, the effort to transform the Department to be able to meet and defeat the threats of the 21 st century.

What the courageous men and women in uniform have accomplished since our country was attacked 30 months ago is impressive. In the 2½ years since 9/11, with our Coalition partners, they have:

• Hunted down thousands of terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq , Afghanistan and other countries;

• Captured or killed 46 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq -- including Saddam Hussein;

• Interdicted shipments of chemical and nuclear weapons components bound for terrorist states;

At the same time, we have continued the defense transformation effort that began before 9/11. Our efforts have been driven by the tough question: if another attack were to occur 6 months from today, what would we wish we had done from today and each of the coming days to deter, defeat, or to prepare for it? We have done a great deal.

We have revised the Unified Command Plan twice since 9/11 and are preparing a third revision. Among other things, we have established:

• The Northern Command -- an entirely new command dedicated to defending the homeland;

• A new Strategic Command responsible for early warning of and defense against missile attack and the conduct of long-range attacks; and

• We have changed the Special Operations Command in major ways, expanding its capabilities and its missions, so that it can both support missions directed by regional combatant commanders, but also plan and execute its own missions in the global war on terror, supported by other combatant commands;

• We have strengthened existing defense intelligence counter-terrorism capabilities by establishing the new Joint Integrated Task Force--Counter-Terrorism (JITF-CT) under the Defense Intelligence Agency -- an intelligence fusion center to support the global war on terror focused on providing strategic and tactical warning, exposing and exploiting terrorist vulnerabilities, and preventing terrorists and their sponsors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction;

• With our NATO Allies, we have created a new NATO Response Force to give the Alliance the kind of rapid reaction capability that, had it existed on September 11 th , could have enabled NATO to contribute to combat operations in Afghanistan in a timely manner;

• The demands presented by the global war on terror have led to our establishing new strategic relationships that would have been unimaginable just a decade ago - including the nations of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa, as well as South Asia; and

• We have undertaken a comprehensive review of our global force posture, with the goal of transforming U.S. global capabilities from an arrangement driven by where the wars of the 20 th century ended, to a posture that positions us to deal with the new threats of the 21 st century security environment.

In addition, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have sent a clear message to the world's terrorist states: harboring terrorists and the pursuit of weapons of mass murder carries with it unpleasant costs. By contrast, leaders who abandon the support of terrorism and the pursuit of those weapons can find an open path to better relations with the world's free nations.

In the period since the September 11 th attacks, the Administration, several Committees of Congress, and now this Commission, have taken on the task of examining what happened on that treacherous day. And a number of questions have been raised.

Some have asked: When the Administration came into office, was there consideration of how to deal with the attack on the U.S.S. Cole? Were there steps that might have been taken to send terrorists a message that the U.S. Government was serious about terrorism?

That is a fair question. I do not believe that launching another cruise missile strike 4 months after the fact would have sent a message of strength to terrorists. Indeed, it might have sent a signal of weakness. Instead, we went to work implementing the recommendations of the Cole Commission and developing a more comprehensive approach to deal with al-Qaeda -- resulting in NSPD-9.

Meanwhile, a system managed by the Counter-Terrorism Security group was in place to coordinate security alerts and increased security postures at home and abroad, including force protection measures at U.S. military bases overseas.

Some have asked: Why wasn't bin Laden taken out, and if he had been hit, would it have prevented September 11 th ?

First, I know of no actionable intelligence since January 20, 2001 that would have allowed the U.S. to attack and capture or kill Usama bin Laden. In the 2 ½ years since September 11 th , all the nations of the Coalition have focused a great deal of time, energy and resources on the task of finding him and capturing or killing him. Thus far none of us has succeeded. But we will. It took ten months to capture Saddam Hussein in Iraq - and Coalition forces had passed by the hole he was hiding in many times during those ten months. They were able to find him only after someone with specific knowledge told us where he was. What that suggests is that it is exceedingly difficult to find a single individual who is determined to not be found.

Second, even if bin Laden had been captured or killed in the weeks before 9/11, no one I know believes it would have prevented 9/11. Killing bin Laden would not have removed the al-Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan . Moreover, the sleeper cells that flew the aircraft into the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon were already in the U.S. some months before the attacks. Indeed, if the stars had aligned, actionable intelligence had appeared, which it did not, and if it had somehow been possible to successfully attack him, it would have been a good thing, to be sure, but, regrettably, 9/11 would likely still have happened. And, ironically, much of the world in all likelihood would have blamed September 11th on the U.S. as an al-Qaeda retaliation for the U.S. provocation of capturing or killing Usama bin Laden.

Some have asked whether there were there plans to go after al-Qaeda in Afghanistan before 9/11 and, if so, why weren't they implemented?

I have recently reviewed a briefing that I am told was presented to me in early February, 2001. The brief outlined some approaches for dealing with Usama bin Laden - which, as I have indicated, I believe would not have prevented 9/11. And, I would not describe the briefing I saw as a comprehensive plan to deal with al-Qaeda and its sanctuary in Afghanistan .

I am told that I asked the briefer many questions and that the team went back and worked on refining their proposed approaches. The work they did in the ensuing months helped prepare the Department for Operation Enduring Freedom and the successful invasion of Afghanistan so soon after 9/11.

One thing is clear -- as of February 2001, we had not yet developed the kind of clear new policy direction which must properly precede the development of war plans. The NSC was at work during the spring and summer of 2001 developing a new counter-terrorism policy needed to inform new war plans. And we were at the same time in the process of overhauling all U.S. contingency plans.

Some have asked if it would have been possible to arm the Northern Alliance before 9/11 and might that have tied up the Taliban and al-Qaeda in a civil war in Afghanistan and prevented 9/11?

The answer is that: while doing so might have attrited al-Qaeda somewhat, it is highly unlikely such a strategy could have prevented 9/11. What was needed at the time was a new U.S. policy for the region, including our relationship with Pakistan , India , and Uzbekistan , and a more comprehensive strategy to eliminate al-Qaeda - which is what the NSC was working on.

Others have asked: Was there a spike in intelligence and terrorist chatter in the June/July 2001 timeframe - and what did the U.S. government do about it?

The answer to the intelligence question is yes there was a spike, as has been indicated by the Director of Central Intelligence. I am reminded that most of that intelligence was focused on overseas threats and some of it focused on potential hijackings, and that steps were taken by the FAA to warn about potential hijackings. However, I don't recall receiving anything in the months prior to 9/11 that suggested terrorists might take commercial airliners and use them as missiles to fly into buildings like the World Trade Center Towers or the Pentagon.

Some have asked: Could the development of the armed Predator been accelerated?

First, let me say that any suggestion that the Predator was delayed would be inaccurate. The Air Force did a good job of bringing in the armed Predator in near record time. Indeed, I am told that when General John Jumper was presented with the development plans, he was originally told it would take several years. He said: do it in one year. In fact, it was done in less than a year. Not only did they rapidly bring that capability online, they overcame a number of technical challenges to do so - from reinforcing the UAV's wings to make sure the Hellfire missile didn't blow the wings off, to expanding the "frag pattern" of the warhead to make it somewhat more effective against intended targets. In short, the Armed Predator was deployed, and played a role in the success of Operation Enduring Freedom well before it had been officially certified as ready for deployment. The Air Force, the CIA and others involved can be properly proud.

The nature of the war we are fighting today, and the adversary we face, is unlike anything our nation has faced before. Terrorist threats have been around before, to be sure. But the threats have changed in recent years - growing in boldness and lethality.

According to the State Department, there were 230 terrorist incidents between January 1968 and September 11, 2001 in which a total of almost 1,000 Americans were killed. (See Attachment #6) There were three times that number of Americans killed in one day on September 11 th .

• Use the institutions of everyday life - planes, trains, cars and letters - as weapons to kill innocent civilians; and

• Can attack with just handfuls of people, at a cost of just hundreds or thousands of dollars - while it requires many tens of thousands of soldiers and billions of dollars to defend against such attacks.

Rooting out and dealing with such enemies is tough. It will require many years. And it will require that we think differently than we did in the 20 th century - and that we wrestle with difficult questions about how we go about fighting such an enemy.

How can we strengthen the Intelligence community and get it better arranged for 21 st century challenges ?

I have heard the argument that, in the wake of 9/11, we need to take all the various intelligence agencies, consolidate them, and put them under the leadership of a single "intelligence czar." While these recommendations are well intentioned, we would not be doing the country a favor by centralizing intelligence. There are certain areas in life, like intelligence and research and development, where it is a mistake to rely on a single source. Instead, fostering multiple centers of information has proven to be better at promoting creativity and challenging conventional thinking. This is true of intelligence. There may be ways we can strengthen intelligence - but centralization is not one.

One possibility might be to consider reducing stovepipes. There is a good reason for having intelligence compartmentalized. It is a fact that the more people who know something, the more likely that information will be compromised. So there is a risk in breaking down stovepipes and integrating intelligence centers horizontally so that analysts have access to all the information they need. In a time when threats can emerge rapidly, with little or no warning, we need to weigh that risk of expanding access and risking compromise against the risk of not breaking down compartments and denying access. We need to consider whether they are greater than the risk of keeping information so tightly compartmentalized that people who need to know it, use it, and integrate it with other intelligence are kept in the dark.

We need to ensure that the laws and regulations that govern the gathering of intelligence make sense in today's world, and we should re-evaluate those that may be based on outdated technologies and that did not contemplate today's information technology environment.

We need to ensure that laws and regulations do not unduly restrict the sharing of information between U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Whatever is recommended, it is critical that the organization and management of the nation's intelligence capabilities are done in a manner that preserves the unique relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. As each year goes by, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between information that contributes to national intelligence versus information that is necessary for military intelligence and focuses on the battlefield. And we must do all this while finding a way to ensure that foreign intelligence of interest to domestic security efforts is collected and made available.

If one believes it could be necessary to centralize all intelligence under a single intelligence czar to improve national intelligence, then one can argue it equally forcefully that it is necessary to centralize all intelligence under the Department of Defense to improve military intelligence. Either course would be a major mistake and could damage our country's intelligence capability severely.

How can we wage war not just on terrorist networks, but also on the ideology of hate they spread ?

The global war on terror will, in fact, be a long, hard slog. Victory will require a sustained effort, over many years, to root out terrorist networks, deny them sanctuary, disrupt their financing, and hold to account states that sponsor or provide sanctuary to terrorists. But I am convinced that victory in the global war against terrorism will require a positive effort as well.

We need to find creative ways to stop the next generation of terrorists from being recruited, trained, financed and deployed against free people. For every terrorist that coalition forces capture, kill, dissuade or deter, still others are being recruited and trained. To win the war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas -- the battle for the minds of those who are being recruited by terrorist networks across the globe.

That is a tough question that our society is working through. I don't pretend to know the answers. But I do know that if we analyze, discuss and decide this issue as a 20 th century problem, we will get it wrong. We need to recalibrate our thinking to fit the new century.

How can we transform the nomination and confirmation process so we don't have long gaps with key positions unfilled each time there is a new Administration?

As I have indicated, for most of the seven months leading up to 9/11, the Defense Department was working without most of the senior officials responsible for the critical issues we were tackling. We ought to consider whether, in the 21 st century, our nation can afford the luxury of taking so long to clear and put in place the senior officials responsible for the security of the American people? And if we do not have that luxury, as I believe we do not, what reforms to the clearance, nomination and confirmation process might be appropriate?

Could our nation benefit from a Goldwater-Nichols-like law for the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government?

The Goldwater-Nichols Act in the 1980s helped move DoD towards a more effective "joint" approach to warfighting - where instead of just de-conflicting, the individual services were pressed to work together in ways that created power beyond the sum of the Services' individual capabilities. To achieve that better joint war fighting capability, each of the services had to give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives.

Today, one could argue that the Executive Branch of Government is stove-piped much like the four services were nearly 20 years ago. So the question arises: could we usefully apply the concept and principles of DoD's Goldwater-Nichols to the U.S. Government as a whole? Should we ask whether it might be appropriate for the various departments and agencies to do what the services did two decades ago - give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort?

And how might we work with Congress to mirror any related changes or reforms in the Executive Branch?

Think about what has been done since the September 11 th attacks: two state sponsors of terrorism have been removed from power, a 90-nation coalition has been formed which is cooperating on a number of levels - through diplomacy, law enforcement, military action, financial and economic measures, information and intelligence. Some of these actions are public and seen - still others are unseen, with operations that must remain secret, even in success.

All of these actions are putting pressure on terrorist networks. Taken together, they represent a collective effort that is unprecedented -- which has undoubtedly saved lives, and made us safer than before September 11 th .

And yet, despite that pressure and that collective effort, terrorist attacks have continued: in Bali and Baghdad , Jakarta and Jerusalem , Casablanca and Riyadh , Mombasa and Istanbul , and most recently the bombings in Madrid . It is likely -- indeed almost certain -- that, in the period ahead, somewhere, somehow, more terrorist attacks will be attempted -- even here in the United States. Certainly intelligence powerfully points to terrorist efforts to do just that.

What can be done? We can remain vigilant. We can continue the efforts underway to transform the institutions of government - military, intelligence, law enforcement and homeland defense -- to better focus on the threats of the 21 st century. We can continue working with allies and partners around the world. And we can continue rooting out terrorist networks, dealing with the proliferation of dangerous weapons of mass murder, and denying terrorists sanctuary.

Not long ago, we marked the 20 th anniversary of another terrorist attack: the suicide bomb attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut -- a blast that killed more than 240 Americans. Soon after that attack, President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz asked me to serve as Presidential Envoy for the Middle East . That experience taught me lessons about the nature of terrorism that are relevant today as we prosecute the global war on terror.

After the attack, one seemingly logical response was to put cement barricades around buildings to prevent more truck bombings. But the terrorists quickly figured out how to get around those barricades: they began lobbing rocket-propelled grenades over the cement barriers. The reaction was to hunker down even more. We started seeing buildings along the Corniche, the boardwalk that runs along the sea in Beirut , Lebanon , draped with a metal mesh, so that when rocket-propelled grenades hit the mesh, they would bounce off, doing little damage. It worked, only briefly. And the terrorists again adapted. They watched the comings and goings of embassy personnel and began hitting soft targets - killing people on their way to and from work. So for every defense that was put up, first barricades, then wire mesh over buildings, the terrorists moved to another avenue of attack.

Not long after that experience - in 1984 - I spoke to the Association of the United States Army, the text of which I have submitted with my testimony today as Attachment #7. I noted that terrorists had learned important lessons. They had learned that terrorism:

"is a great equalizer, a force multiplier. It is cheap, deniable, yields substantial results, is low risk, and … [often] without penalty." They had learned that "[a] single attack … by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations…"

Moreover, I said, free people had learned lessons as well -- that terrorists have a sizable advantage:

"Terrorist attacks can take place at any time, [in] any place, using any technique," and "regrettably, it is not possible to defend every potential target, in every place, at all times, against every form of attack."

"Terrorism is a form of warfare, and must be treated as such. As with other forms of conflict, weakness invites aggression. Simply standing in a defensive position, absorbing blows, is not enough. Terrorism must be deterred."

When our nation was attacked on September 11 th , the President recognized that what had happened was an act of war and must be treated as such -- not as a law enforcement matter. He knew that weakness would only invite aggression; and that the only way to defeat the terrorists was to take the war to them - to go after them where they live and plan and hide, and to make clear to states that sponsor and harbor them that such actions will have consequences.

As the President has made clear this wasn't about law enforcement. He declared that henceforth:

"any person involved in committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people becomes an enemy of this country . . . . Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent and equally guilty of terrorist crimes. [And] any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks or possesses weapons of mass destruction is a grave danger to the civilized world -- and will be confronted."

In the ensuing two years, thousands of terrorists have been rounded up, and two terrorist regimes have learned the President meant what he said.

That is why our country and our coalition is at war today. That is why we have forces risking their lives, at this moment, fighting terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere across the world. That is why the President is marshalling all elements of national power -- military, financial, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence and public diplomacy. Because to live as free people in the 21st century, we cannot think we can hide behind concrete barriers and wire mesh. We cannot think that acquiescence or trying to make a separate peace with terrorists to leave us alone, but to go after our friends, will work. Free people cannot live in fear and remain free. The only course is to stop terrorists before they can terrorize.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dick Myers and I would be happy to respond to questions.

Disarmament Documentation

Statements of current and former Secretaries of State and Defense to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, March 23

Statement of Madeleine K. Albright National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States March 23, 2004

Opening Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, March 23, 2004 Washington, D.C.

Statement of William S. Cohen to The National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States March 23, 2004

TESTIMONY OF U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD H. RUMSFELD PREPARED FOR DELIVERY TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES MARCH 23, 2004

Opening Remarks by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, March 23, 2004
Washington, D.C.

TESTIMONY OF U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DONALD H. RUMSFELD
PREPARED FOR DELIVERY TO
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 23, 2004