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US introduces Draft Resolution on Non-Proliferation into the UN Security Council, March 24

Remarks by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on the Draft Resolution on Non-Proliferation, at the Security Council Stakeout, March 24, 2004

See also: Text of the Draft Resolution, March 24, below

Ambassador Negroponte: Hi. I'd like to make a few points about the resolution - the draft resolution that we introduced on non-proliferation into the Security Council today. This draft calls on member states to criminalize the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to non-state actors. We believe that we must act now to set a higher standard to prevent these weapons, key elements used to create them, and designs used to make them from falling into the hands of non-state actors, including terrorists, who seek to do us harm. There is explicit language in the draft making clear that this resolution is not meant to supercede, undercut or undermine existing disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The draft resolution calls on member states to refrain from providing support to non-state actors attempting to develop, acquire, possess or use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. It also calls on member states to adopt and enforce laws prohibiting non-state actors from pursuing these activities and to establish effective domestic controls over these weapons and key items used to create them. We've also stated that those nations needing assistance in strengthening their controls may ask it of those of us in a position to provide such assistance. The resolution - the draft resolution calls upon all of us to review our current procedures, to improve them, and to cooperate to prevent these very dangerous weapons from spreading beyond our control. It's an important draft resolution, and an important step we can take together to confront a serious problem we will be facing for some time to come. Any questions?

Reporter: Ambassador, why did the U.S. decide to take out of the resolution the call for interdiction of ships at sea?

Ambassador Negroponte: Well, let me say that, first of all, the fundamental purpose of this resolution is to deal with a very important gap that exists in international law today and that is the question of dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and materials that could be used to make them, falling into the hands of non-state actors. There's nothing in this resolution that precludes the continuation of the Proliferation Security Initiative, which is being conducted at the moment, and that's the kind of initiative - that's the kind of activity you're talking about in your question, which is being conducted under existing international law. The real aim of this resolution is to deal with the problem of non-state actors. There are lots of disarmament and non-proliferation agreements that bind states to certain standards of behavior. This is the issue of preventing these weapons and materials from getting into the hands of non-state actors, who of course are not parties to such treaties.

Reporter: In the original draft, the resolution used the word interdiction explicitly - it did call for that. Was there a decision made not to go that route?

Ambassador Negroponte: Well, again I come back to the fundamental purpose of this resolution - the question of denying these weapons and these materials to non-state actors. It's a very important problem, it's a serious gap in the international regime and it's one that needs to be dealt with on an urgent basis. It took the P-5 a certain amount of time to come up with this draft. We now expect to go into a period of consultation with the other members of the Council. There will be experts meetings to start off with. We hope to move this forward as expeditiously as possible. Yes...

Reporter: Ambassador, not to belabor this issue too much, the Chinese delegation said earlier this week that the provision on op 7 on interdiction was essentially kicked out of the resolution as part of the final agreement. Is that the case? Does it no longer, sort of, enable you to do interdiction at sea?

Ambassador Negroponte: Well, again, the interdiction under the Proliferation Security Initiative is taking place or takes place under existing international law and consistent with international legal practices. I come back to the key point, the real focus of the resolution is how to prevent WMD and the materials that can be used to make them from falling into the hands of non-state actors, and the most important obligation that it asks member states of the United Nations to undertake is to criminalize the provision of such items and such materials to non-state actors through their own domestic legislation. That's the key part of the resolution.

Reporter: Did the United States agree to take out the reference to interdiction in exchange for getting China's acceptance of the resolution?

Ambassador Negroponte: Well, look - any other questions?

...

Draft Resolution on Non-proliferation, March 24, 2004

The Security Council,

Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery*, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including that all disputes between States should be peacefully resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Charter,

Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit acquisition of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance for all states to adopt and fully implement them in order to promote international stability,

Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation,

Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as a cover for proliferation,

Gravely concerned by the threat of the nexus between international terrorism and efforts to acquire, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and by the involvement in such actions of non-state actors* such as those identified in the UN list established and maintained by the Committee established under Security Council Resolution 1267 and those to whom Resolution 1373 applies,

Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials*, which addes a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to international peace and security,

Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security,

Recognizing that most states have undertaken binding legal obligations aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery,

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Determined to facilitate an effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Calls upon all States to refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

2. Decides that all States shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prvent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

(a) develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items or in production, use, storage and transport;

(b) develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;

(c) develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;

(d) establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and transshipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, transshipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and transshipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations;

4. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity the development of such lists;

5. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above provisions;

6. Calls upon all States:

(a) to promote the universal adoption, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;

(b) to adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral non-proliferation treaties;

(c) to renew and fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation;

(d) to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the public regarding their obligations under such laws;

7. Calls upon all states to promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation so as to counter the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, their means of delivery;

8. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all states, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, for a period of no more than six months, a committee of the Security Council and calling on other expertise, as appropriate, to report on implementation of this resolution, and calls upon States to report to the commitee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution, on their implementation of this resolution;

10. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end;

11. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;

12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

* Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only:

Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use.

Non-state actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution.

Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, productation or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Source: US Mission to the United Nations, http://www.un.int/usa/, and Reaching Critical Will, http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

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